*    APR  9  1908  *] 


Division  DTI07 
Section  .  C88 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
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MODERN  EGYPT 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •  BOSTON  •  CHICAGO 
ATLANTA  -  SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •   BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 


THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


MODERN  EGYPT 


BY 


THE  EARL  OF  CROMER 


In  his  first  intervienu  ivitA  the  Go<vernor  of  St.  Helena, 
Napoleon  said  emphatically  .•  "  E^pt  is  the  most  important 
iountrv  in  the  ivorld." 

Rose,  Life  of  Napoleon,  vol.  i.  p.  356. 

Earum  proprie  rerum  sit  historia,  quibus  rebus  gerendis 
interfuerit  is  qui  narret. 

Gellius,  Noctes  Atticae,  v.  18. 

TO  5*  €/oya  tQiv  trpa^OkvTtjiv  ev  tuJ  TToAlyaoj  ovk  «k 
Tov  TrapaTv)(^6vT0^  Trvvdavofievos  I'l^iwcra  ypac^eiv,  ovS' 
(is  ifiot  (SoKet,  aAA'  ots  re  avrhs  traprjv,  koi  irapa  tmv 
aAA(i>v  OCTOV  SwaTOV  aKpifSei^  trepl  eKacrrov  eTre^eXOiov, 

Thucydides,  i.  22. 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.  II 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1908 

yill  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1908, 
Bv  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  March,  i 


NorJjjoolj  5prf8S» 

J.  8.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 


PART  III  (Continued) 

THE  SOUDAN 

1882-1907 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

The  Fall  of  Khartoum 
October  6,  1884-Jani7aby  26,  1886 

PAOl 

Murder  of  Colonel  Stewart — Difficulties  of  the  Expedition — News 
from  General  Gordon — Occupation  of  Jakdul — The  battle  of 
Abu  Klea — Death  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart — The  column  reaches 
the  NUe — Two  steamers  leave  for  Khartoum — They  arrive  too 
late  —  Events  at  Khartoum  —  General  Gordon's  character  — 
Capitulation  of  Omdurman — General  Gordon's  death — Effect 
on  public  opinion  S 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

The  Evacuation  of  the  Soudan 
January  26,  1885-December  30,  1886 

Lord  Wolseley  urges  the  necessity  of  an  autumn  campaign — The 
Government  hesitate — And  then  agree — Sir  Redvers  BuUer 
retreats  to  Korti  —  Battle  of  Kirbekan  —  The  movement  on 
Berber  arrested — Operations  at  Suakin — Action  at  Hashin — 
And  at  Tofrik — Suspension  of  the  Suakin  operations — -The 
autumn  campaign  abandoned — Question  of  holding  Dongola — 
Change  of  Government  in  England — Evacuation  of  Dongola — 
Death  of  the  Mahdi — Battle  of  Ginniss  —  Review  of  British 
policy        ........  18 

V 


vi 


MODERN  EGYPT 


CHAPTER  XXX 

The  Debris  of  the  Soudan 

PACK 

The  outlying  provinces  : — ^1.  Darfour  -.  Surrender  of  the  province — 
The  Senoussieh  sect — The  revolt  of  Abu  Gemaizeh.  2.  Bahr-el- 
Qhazal :  Lupton  Bey  surrenders — His  death.  3.  Eqttatoria : 
Emin  Pasha  summoned  to  surrender— He  maintains  his  posi- 
tion— The  Stanley  expedition.  4.  Sennar :  The  garrison  sur- 
renders. 5.  ^a««oZa :  The  garrison  surrenders.  6.  The  Abyssinian 
Frontier  Garrisons  :  The  Hewett  treaty  —  The  garrisons  of 
Amadib,  Senhit,  Galabat,  Gera,  and  Gedaref.  7.  Berbera : 
Its  political  status — It  is  occupied  by  British  troops.  8.  Harrar  : 
Withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  garrison — Installation  of  the  Emir 
Abdullah — King  Menelek  occupies  the  province.  9.  Zeyla : 
It  is  occupied  by  British  troops.  10.  Tajourrah  :  The  French 
occupy  it.  11.  Massowah:  Its  political  status — Attitude  of  the 
British  Government — The  Italians  occupy  Massowah  .         .  35 

CHAPTER  XXXI 

The  Defence  of  Egypt 
1886-1892 

The  Egyptian  army — Negotiations  with  the  Dervishes — Fighting  on 
the  frontier — The  siege  of  Suakin — Defeat  of  Osman  Digna — 
Wad-el-Nejumi — Nejumi  advances — The  battles  of  Argin  and 
of  Toski — Death  of  Wad-el-Nejumi — Results  of  the  battle — 
Situation  at  Suakin — The  reoccupation  of  Tokar — Defeat  of 
Osman  Digna       .......  60 

CHAPTER  XXXn 

The  Reconquest  of  Khartoum 

October  1895-September  1898 

Necessity  of  reconquering  the  Soudan — Danger  of  premature  action 
• — The  Italian  defeat  at  Adua — It  is  decided  to  advance  on 
Dongola — Provision  of  funds — Sir  Herbert  Kitchener — Indian 
expedition  to  Suakin — Railway  construction — Battle  of  Firket 
— Capture  of  Dongola — The  Egj'ptian  Government  repay  the 
money  advanced  by  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt — The 
British  Government  advance  £800,000 — Question  of  a  further 
offensive  movement — Capture  of  Abu  Hamed  and  Berber — 
Reoccupation  of  Kassala — British  troops  sent  to  the  Soudan — 
The  battle  of  the  Atbara — The  battle  of  Omdurman — Cost  of 
the  campaign — The  War  Office — The  policy  of  reconquest       .  79 


CONTENTS 


vii 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

The  New  Soudan 

PAGE 

Question  of  the  future  political  status  of  the  Soudan — Anomalies 
of  the  British  position  —  Objections  to  annexation  —  And  to 
complete  incorporation  with  Egypt — Intricacy  of  the  problem 
— The  two  flags  —  Speech  at  Omdurman — The  right  of  con- 
quest—  The  Agreement  of  January  19,  1899  —  Its  unusual 
nature — Its  reception  by  Europe — Advantages  of  a  Free  Trade 
policy        .         .         .         .         .         .  .  .111 

PART  IV 

THE  EGYPTIAN  PUZZLE 

CHAPTER  XXXIV 

The  Dwellers  in  Egypt 

The  Englishman's  mission — Conditions  under  which  it  was  under- 
taken— Population  of  Egypt— Its  mixed  character — Hostility 
to  England  —  Main  tenets  of  Islam  —  Its  failure  as  a  social 
system — Degradation  of  women — Immutability  of  the  law — 
Slavery — Intolerance— Incidents  of  religious  belief  and  cere- 
monial— Mental  and  moral  attributes — Seclusion  of  women- 
Polygamy — Divorce — Coarseness  of  literature  and  conversation 
— Filial  piety — Government — Conservatism — Spirit  of  the  laws 
— Language — Art — Music — Customs — Obstacles  to  England's 
mission      ........  123 

CHAPTER  XXXV 
The  Moslems 

Classification  of  the  population  —  The  Turco  -  Egyptians  —  The 
Egyptians — The  hierarchy — The  Grand  Mufti — The  head  of 
the  El-Azhar  University  —  The  Grand  Kadi  — The  Sheikh 
el-Bekri — Mohammed  el-Saadat — Abdul-Khalik  el-Saadat  — 
Mohammed  Abdu — Mohammed  Beyram — The  Omdehs  and 
Sheikhs — Their  submissiveness  to  the  Pashas — Their  sympathy 
with  Arabi — Their  tyranny  over  the  fellaheen — Their  feelings 
towards  England— The  Fellaheen — The  Bedouins        .  .  168 

Appendix. — Translation  of  a  Letter  from  a  Sheikh  of  Keneh  to  a 

Sheikh  of  the  Mosque  of  Seyyidna-Hussein  at  Cairo    .  .  200 


viii 


MODERN  EGYPT 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 
The  Christians 

PAGE 

The  Copts — The  conservatisni  of  their  religion — Their  character — 
Their  attitude  towards  the  English — The  reform  movement — 
The  Syrians — -Their  position  —  Their  unpopularity  —  Their 
attitude  towards  the  English  —  The  AHME>nA>rs  —  Their  sub- 
serviency to  the  Turks — Xubar  Pasha — His  son  Boghos — 
Yacoub  Pasha  Artin — Tigrane  Pasha — The  Egyptians  should 
Dot  be  weighed  in  European  scales        ....  901 


CHAPTER  XXXVn 
The  Europeanised  Egyptians 

The  Europeanised  Egyptians  are  generaUy  Agnostics — Effects  of 
Europeanising  the  East — GaUicised  Egj'ptians — Attractions  of 
French  civilisation  —  Unsuitability  of  the  French  system  to 
form  the  Egyptian  character  —  The  official  classes  generally 
hostile  to  England .......  228 


CHAPTER  XXXVm 

The  Europeans 

Number  of  Europeans — The  Levantines — Their  characteristics — 
The  Greeks — Their  commercial  enterprise — The  EngUsh — The 
Army  of  Occupation  —  Anglo  -  Egj-ptian  officials  —  Feelings 
entertained  by  other  Europeans  towards  the  English — Summary 
of  the  classes  friendly  and  hostile  to  England    .         .         ,  246 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

The  Machinery  of  Government 

Nature  of  the  machinery — Parts  of  the  machine — 1.  Thie  SrxTAir 
—The  Firman  of  1892— The  Sinai  Peninsula— 2.  The  Khedive 
—Rescript  of  August  28,  1878— Constitutionalism  of  Tewfik 
Pasha — 3.  The  Miktsters — The  Departments — Position  of  an 
Egyptian  Minister — 4.  The  Organic  Law  of  May  1,  1883 — 
The  Provincial  Councils  —  The  Legislative  Council  —  The 
Legislative  Assembly      ......  260 


CONTENTS 


ix 


CHAPTER  XL 
The  British  Officials 

PAOB 

Qualifications  required  of  an  Anglo-Egyptian  oificial — Positions  of 
the  civil  and  military  officials  —  The  French  in  Tunis  —  The 
Financial  Adviser — Sir  Edgar  Vincent — The  Judicial  Adviser 

—  History  of  his  appointment — Sir  Raymond  West  —  Justice 
under  Egyptian  management — Sir  John  Scott — The  Public 
Works  Department— Sir  Cohn  Scott-MoncriefiF — Sir  William 
Garstin — The  Financial  Secretary — Blum  Pasha— Lord  Milner 

—  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  —  Sub -Departments   of   Finance  —  The 
Interior — PubUc  Instruction— European  and  Egyptian  officials  280 

CHAPTER  XLI 

The  International  Administrations 

Internationalism  —  1.  The  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt — 
Functions  of  the  Commission  —  The  Egyptian  Accounts  — 
The  Reserve  Fund — Uselessness  of  the  Commission — 2.  The 
Railway  Administratiok  —  3.  The  Daiha  Sanieh — 4.  The 
DoMAXNS  Admikistration  ....«•  SOI 

CHAPTER  XLII 
The  Judicial  System 

The  Mixed  Courts — Nubar  Pasha's  objects  in  creating  them— 
Attributes  and  composition  of  the  Mixed  Courts — Defects  in 
the  institution — The  Consular  Courts — The  Native  Tribunals 
and  the  Kadi's  Courts — Summary  of  jurisdictions  in  Egypt    .  316 

CHAPTER  XLHI 

The  Workers  of  the  Machine 

Importance  of  persons  rather  than  of  systems — The  British  Consul- 
General — Tewfik  Pasha — The  Prime  Ministers — Ch^rif  Pasha 
— Nubar  Pasha — Riaz  Pasha — Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi  ,  S21 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PART  V 

BRITISH  POLICY  IN  EGYPT 

CHAPTER  XLIV 

The  Struggle  for  a  Policy 
1882-1883 

PAOB 

Intentions  of  the  British  Government  —  Proposal  to  reduce  the 
garrison — Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — Difficulty  of  combining 
reform  and  evacuation — I  recommend  reduction  and  concentra- 
tion at  Alexandria — The  Government  approve  of  this  recom- 
mendation— The  reduction  is  countermanded    .  .  .  349 

Appendix. — Despatch  from  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  to  Earl  Granville, 

dated  October  9,  1883      .         .  .         .         .         .  362 

CHAPTER  XLV 

The  Northbrook  Mission 

SEPTEMBER-NoVEMBEal  1884 

It  is  decided  to  send  a  Special  Commissioner  to  Cairo — The  policy 
of  reporting — Lord  Northbrook  arrives  in  Egypt— His  financial 
proposals — His  General  Report — The  Government  reject  his 
proposals    ........  366 

CHAPTER  XLVI 

The  Wolff  Convention 

August  1885-Octobeb  1887 

Sir  Henry  WolflF  appointed  Special  Commissioner— Convention  of 
October  24,  1885— Moukhtar  Pasha— Convention  of  May  22, 
1887 — Comparison  of  the  two  Conventions — Frontier  affairs — 
The  army — Civil  reforms — Evacuation — France  and  Russia 
oppose  the  Convention — The  Sultan  refuses  to  ratify  it — 
Moukhtar  Pasha  permanently  located  in  Egypt — Results  of 
the  Wolff  mission  .......  372 

CHAPTER  XLVn 
The  Neutralisation  of  the  Suez  Canal 


Neutralisation  of  Egypt — Neutralisation  of  the  Canal — The  word 
neutrality — Circular  of  January  3,  1883 — The  Suez  Canal  Com- 


CONTENTS 


xi 


mission  of  1885 — The  Commission  dissolved — The  WolflF  Con- 
vention— Signature  of  the  Canal  Convention — Its  apphcatiou  .  382 

CHAPTER  XLVIII 

The  Anglo-French  Agreement  of  1904 

Apparent  insolubility  of  the  Egyptian  question— Gradual  change 
in  public  opinion — Statement  of  Lord  Ellenborough — The  busi- 
ness of  diplomacy — The  main  facts  of  the  problem — The  events 
of  1904 — Morocco — Signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement 
— Remarks  on  the  Agreement     .....  388 

PART  VI 
THE  REFORMS 

CHAPTER  XLIX 

The  Courbash 

Universal  use  of  the  courbash — Lord  DufFerin's  Circular — It  was 

partially  inoperative— Final  abohtion  of  the  courbash  .  .  397 

CHAPTER  L 

The  Corvee 

Connection  between  the  courbash  and  the  corvee  —  Merits  and 
demerits  of  the  corvee  system — The  corvee  law — Dredging  the 
canals — Proposed  reduction  of  the  land-tax — Proposal  to  abolish 
the  corvee  instead  of  reducing  the  land-tax — The  Powers  object 
— Action  of  the  British  Government — The  corvee  is  not  called 
out — A  Decree  is  issued  partially  abolishing  the  corvee — Final 
settlement  of  the  question  in  1892         ....  406 

CHAPTER  LI 
Corruption 

Universality  of  corruption — Steps  taken  to  arrest  it — Example  of 

British  officials — Diminution  of  corrupt  practices         .         .  420 


xii 


MODERN  EGYPT 


CHAPTER  LII 
European  Privilege 

FAOI 

Origin  of  the  Capitulations — Difference  between  Turkey  and  Egypt 
— Abuse  of  the  Capitulations — liaison  d'etre  of  European  privi- 
lege— Anomaly  of  the  British  position — Impossibility  of  arriving 
at  any  general!  solution — Minor  changes — The  right  to  enact  by- 
laws— The  House  Tax — The  Professional  Tax — Proposal  to 
create  a  local  legislature — Internationalism       .         .         .  4£6 


CHAPTER  Lin 
Finance 

The  first  bankruptcy  of  Egypt — Risk  of  a  second  bankruptcy — The 
Race  against  bankruptcy — The  era  of  reform — Fiscal  reUef 
— Reduction  of  taxation — Increase  of  revenue — Expenditure — 
Aggregate  surplus  since  1888— The  indebtedness  of  the  fella- 
heen— Distribution  of  land — Importance  of  the  financial  ques- 
tion ........  US 


CHAPTER  LIV 
Irrigation 

Nature's  bounty  to  Egypt — The  work  of  the  Pharaohs — Turkish 
neglect — Progress  under  British  guidance — Programme  of  the 
futiu-e — Causes  of  the  progress — Qualifications  of  the  officers 
selected  —  Absence  of  international  obstruction  —  Loan  of 
£1,800,000 — Support  of  the  pubHc — Importance  of  the  work  .  466 


CHAPTER  LV 

The  Army 

Disbandment  of  the  army  in  1882 — History  of  the  army — Mehemet 
Ali's  Syrian  campaigns — Ismail  Pasha — The  Abyssinian  cam- 
paign— Tel-el-Kebir — It  is  decided  to  form  a  fellaheen  army 
officered  by  Enghshmen — The  black  battalions — Will  the  army 
fight  ? — Reasons  why  the  reorganisation  has  been  successfully 
conducted  ........  4€6 


CONTENTS 


xiii 


CHAPTER  LVI 
The  Interior 

PAGE 

Uncertainty  of  British  policy — Difficulties  of  administrative  reform 
—  Lord  DufFerin's  Police  proposals  —  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  — 
Changes  made  in  the  Police  organisation  —  Nubar  Pasha's 
conflict  with  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd — The  latter  resigns — Friction  in 
the  Interior — Appointment  of  an  Adviser — And  of  Inspectors — 
Difficulties  of  the  present  moment         ....  478 


CHAPTER  LVII 

Sub-Departments  of  the  Interior 

1.  Prisons— State  of  the  prisons  in  1882 — Reform — 2.  Slavery — 
The  Slave  Trade  and  slavery — The  Convention  of  1877 — The 
Slave  Home— Change  of  opinion  in  Egypt — Success  of  the 
Convention — 3.  Medicai.  and  Sanitary  Ajjministration — 
Egyptian  superstitions — Clot  Bey — State  of  things  in  1883 — 
Improvements  effected  —  Sanitary  reform  —  Impediments  to 
progress — Treatment  of  epidemics         .         .         •         .  491 


CHAPTER  LVm 
Justice 

Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — The  Mixed  and  Consular  Courts — 
The  Kadis'  Courts  —  The  Native  Tribunals  —  Justice  prior  to 
1883  —  The  French  system  taken  as  a  model  —  The  judicial 
machinery  —  Reforms  instituted  by  Sir  John  Scott  and  Sir 
Malcolm  Mcllwraith  —  Opposition  to  these  reforms  —  The 
personnel  of  the  Courts — Result  of  the  reforms  .         .         .  514 


CHAPTER  LIX 
Education 

Educational  policy — Obstacles  to  progress — Want  of  money — The 
Pashas — Intellectual  awakening  of  Egypt— The  Mosque  schools 
— Primary  and  Secondary  education — Progress  made  in  forming 
the  characters  of  the  Egyptians — Female  education     .         .  524 


xiv 


MODERN  EGYPT 


CHAPTER  LX 
The  Soudan 

PAOB 

The  nature  of  the  Soudan  problem — Extent — Population— Results 
obtained  by  the  Convention  of  1899  —  Executive  agency  — 
Finance— Railways— Slavery       .....  ,543 

CHAPTER  LXI 
Conclusion 

Summary  of  this  work — Changes  since  the  time  of  Ismail — The 
British  reformers  —  Their  Egyptian  allies  —  Stability  of  the 
reforms      ........  US 

PART  VH 

THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT 

CHAPTER  LXH 

The  Future  of  Egypt 

Quo  Vadis  ?  —  The  question  of  the  occupation  —  Its  duration — 
Egyptian  autonomy — The  Capitulations — Desirability  of  train- 
ing the  Egyptians  —  Importance  of  finance — Display  of  sym- 
pathy— Conclusion  ......  563 

APPENDIX 

Khedives  of  Egypt — British  Secretaries  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
— British  Agents  and  Consuls-General  in  Egypt — Chronological 
Table  of  Events    .......  573 


INDEX  585 


PART  III  {Continued) 
THE  SOUDAN 

1882-1907 


VOL.  II 


1 


B 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

THE  FALL  OF  KHARTOUM 
October  5,  1884-January  26,  1885 

Murder  of  Colonel  Stewart — Difficulties  of  the  Expedition — News  from 
General  Gordon — Occupation  of  Jakdul — The  battle  of  Abu  Klea 
— Death  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart — The  column  reaches  the  Nile 
— Two  steamers  leave  for  Khartoum — They  arrive  too  lat& — 
Events  at  Khartoum — General  Gordon's  character — Capitulation 
of  Omdurman — General  Gordon's  death — Effect  on  public  opinion. 

It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  write  a 
detailed  history  of  the  military  operations  which 
took  place  in  the  Soudan.  Those  operations  have 
been  recorded  by  others  who  are  more  competent 
than  myself  to  deal  with  mihtary  matters.  I  pro- 
pose, therefore,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Egyptian 
campaign  of  1882,  merely  to  give  a  brief  sum- 
mary of  the  chief  events  connected  with  the  Nile 
Campaign  of  1884-85. 

Scarcely  had  the  campaign  commenced,  when 
news  arrived  that  Colonel  Stewart  had  been  killed. 
On  September  10,  he  left  Khartoum  in  a  steamer 
accompanied  by  Mr.  Power,  M.  Herbin,  the  French 
Consul,  and  about  forty  others.  Colonel  Stewart 
had  been  instructed  by  General  Gordon  to  inform 
the  various  authorities  concerned  of  the  true  nature 
of  the  situation  at  Khartoum.  Berber  and  Abu 
Hamed  were  passed  in  safety,  and  it  was  thought 
that  the  main  difficulties  of  the  voyage  had  been 
overcome,  when,  on  the  18th,  the  steamer  struck 

3 


4  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

on  a  rock  near  the  ^dllage  of  Hebbah,  some  sixty 
miles  below  Abu  Hamed.  The  boat  was  hopelessly 
disabled.  Colonel  Stewart  and  his  companions 
landed,  and  were  subsequently  induced  to  lay  aside 
their  arms  and  enter  a  house  in  the  village,  where 
they  were  treacherously  murdered  by  Suleiman 
Wad  Gamr,  the  Sheikh  of  the  ^Nlonasir  tribe.  It 
is  singular  that  Colonel  Stewart,  who  must  have 
known  the  treacherous  character  of  the  Bedouins, 
should  have  fallen  into  the  trap  which  was  laid 
for  him.  The  explanation  has  probably  been 
afforded  by  General  Gordon,  who  said  that  Colonel 
Stewart  "was  not  a  bit  suspicious."^ 

I  have  frequently  in  the  course  of  this  narra- 
tive alluded  to  Colonel  Stewart's  high  character, 
judgment,  and  abiUty.  I  can  only  repeat  that  by 
his  premature  death  the  Queen  and  the  British 
nation  lost  a  most  capable  public  servant.  A  more 
gallant  fellow  never  lived. 

The  Nile  expedition,  Colonel  Cohdlle  says,'' 
"was  a  campaign  less  against  man  than  against 
time.  Had  British  soldiers  and  Egj^tian  camels 
been  able  to  subsist  on  sand  and  occasional  water, 
or  had  the  desert  produced  beef  and  biscuit,  the 
army  might,  in  spite  of  its  late  start,  have  reached 
Khartoum  in  November."  The  difficulties  of 
supply  and  transport  were,  in  fact,  very  great. 

'  Journal,  p.  281.  The  whole  of  this  passage  is  worth  quoting,  as  it 
shows  what  a  singularly  accurate  forecast  General  Gordon  made  of  the 
manner  in  which  Colonel  Stewart  had  been  murdered,  before  he  had 
learnt  any  of  the  details.  "  I  feel  somehow,"  General  Gordon  wrote  on 
November  5,  "convinced  they  were  captured  by  treachery — the  Arabs 
pretending  to  be  friendly  —  and  surprising  them  at  night.  I  will 
own  that,  without  reason  (apparently,  for  the  chorus  was  that  the 
trip  was  safe),  I  have  never  been  comfortable  since  they  left.  Stewart 
was  a  man  who  did  not  chew  the  cud,  he  never  thought  of  danger  in 

ferspective  ;  he  was  not  a  bit  suspicious  (while  1  am  made  up  of  it), 
can  see  in  imagination  the  whole  scene,  the  Sheikh  inviting  them 
to  land,  saying,  '  Thank  God,  the  Mahdi  is  a  liar,' — bringing  in  wood 
— men  going  on  shore  and  dispersed.    The  Abbas  with  her  steam  down, 
then  a  rush  of  wild  Arabs,  and  all  is  over  ! " 
'  History  of  the  Soudan  Campaign,  p.  61. 


CH.  XXVIII    FALL  OF  KHARTOUM 


5 


But  British  energy  and  perseverance  overcame  them. 
By  the  end  of  December,  Lord  Wolseley  was  ready 
to  move  from  Korti  across  the  desert  to  Metemmeh. 
News  had  been  received  that  supplies  were  run- 
ning short  at  Khartoum,  and  it  was  clear  that,  if 
General  Gordon  was  to  be  saved,  not  a  day 
would  have  to  be  lost  in  estabhshing  communica- 
tions vidth  him.  It  was  resolved  to  divide  the  British 
force  into  two  portions.  One  division,  under  Sir 
Herbert  Stewart,  was  to  take  the  desert  route. 
The  other,  under  General  Earle,  was  to  follow  the 
course  of  the  NUe  with  a  view  ultimately  to  the 
capture  of  Berber,  which  General  Gordon  had 
warned  Lord  Wolseley  "  not  to  leave  in  his  rear." 

On  December  30,  the  day  on  which  Sir  Herbert 
Stewart  left  Korti,  a  messenger  arrived  with  a  piece 
of  paper  the  size  of  a  postage  stamp,  on  which  was 
written,  "Khartoum  all  right.  14.12.84.  C.  G. 
Gordon."  This  was  in  General  Gordon's  hand- 
writing, and  his  seal  was  affixed  to  the  back  of  the 
document.  The  letter  was,  however,  accompanied 
by  a  verbal  message  from  General  Gordon  which 
showed  the  straits  to  which  he  was  reduced. 
"  Our  troops,"  he  said,  "  at  Khartoum  are  suffering 
from  lack  of  provisions.  The  food  we  still  have 
is  little,  some  grain  and  biscuit.  We  want  you 
to  come  quickly.  ...  In  Khartoum  there  is  no 
butter,  no  dates,  Httle  meat.  All  food  is  very  dear." 

The  force  which  left  Korti  at  3  p.m.  on  December 
30,  under  the  command  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart, 
consisted  of  about  1100  British  officers  and  men, 
and  2200  camels.  It  reached  the  wells  of  Jakdul, 
ninety-eight  miles  distant,  early  on  the  morning  of 
January  2.  A  garrison  of  422  men  was  left  there 
with  instructions  to  rig  up  pumps  and  otherwise 
improve  the  water-supply.  On  the  evening  of  the 
2nd,  Sir  Herbert  Stewart  left  with  the  remainder 
of  the  force,  and  reached  Korti  at  noon  on  the  5th. 


6  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

On  the  8th,  he  agaui  started  from  Korti  with  the 
main  body  of  the  desert  column,  consisting  of 
about  1600  effective  British  troops,  some  300 
camp-followers,  and  about  2400  camels  and  horses. 
His  orders  were  to  advance  and  occupy  Metemmeh, 
to  leave  a  strong  detachment  there,  and  then  to 
return  to  Jakdul.  Sir  Charles  Wilson  accompanied 
the  column,  and,  after  the  occupation  of  Metemmeh, 
was  to  proceed  to  Khartoum  at  once  with  a  small 
detachment  of  infantry  on  board  the  steamers 
which,  it  was  known,  were  in  the  neighbourhood. 
The  column  reached  Jakdul  early  on  the  morning 
of  the  12th.  After  halting  for  a  day,  the  march 
was  resumed.  On  the  night  of  the  16th,  the  force 
bivouacked  about  three  and  a  half  miles  from  the 
wells  of  Abu  Klea,  which  were  occupied  in  con- 
siderable force  by  the  Der\'ishes. 

On  the  following  morning  (the  17th),  the  force 
advanced  in  square  to  attack  the  enemy.  A 
desperate  engagement  ensued.  The  Dervishes 
charged  the  square  with  the  utmost  gallantry,  and 
succeeded  in  penetrating  a  gap  wliich  had  been 
temporarily  caused  in  its  rear  face.  The  camels, 
Colonel  Colville  says,  "  which  up  to  this  time  had 
been  a  source  of  weakness  to  the  square,  now 
became  a  source  of  strength.  The  spearmen  by 
weight  of  numbers  forced  back  the  rear  face  of  the 
square  on  to  the  camels  ;  these  formed  a  Uvdng 
traverse  that  broke  the  rush,  and  gave  time  for  the 
right  face  and  front  face  to  take  advantage  of  find- 
ing themselves  on  higher  ground,  and  to  fire  over 
the  heads  of  those  engaged  in  a  hand-to-hand 
struggle  on  to  the  mass  of  the  enemy  behind. 
A  desperate  conflict  ensued  in  the  centre  of  the 
square,  but  the  slaughter  caused  by  the  musketry 
from  the  rising  ground  caused  the  rearvN'ard  Arabs 
to  waver  and  then  to  fall  back.  Witliin  the  square, 
the  din  of  battle  was  such  that  no  words  of 


cH.  XXVIII    FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  7 


command  could  be  heard,  and  each  man  was  obliged 
to  act  on  the  impulse  of  the  moment.  Officers  and 
men  alike  fought  well  in  this  short  hand-to-hand 
encounter,  and  many  acts  of  heroism  were  per- 
formed. .  .  .  Before  five  minutes  had  elapsed,  the 
little  band  of  less  than  1500  British  soldiers  had, 
by  sheer  pluck  and  muscle,  killed  the  last  of  the 
fanatics  who  had  penetrated  into  their  midst." 

The  victory  was  complete,  but  it  had  been 
dearly  bought.  Eighteen  officers  and  150  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men  were  kiUed  and 
wounded.  The  enemy's  loss  was  heavy;  1100 
bodies  were  counted  in  the  immediate  proximity  of 
the  square,  and  the  number  of  wounded  is  said  to 
have  been  very  great.  On  the  night  of  the  17th, 
the  troops  bivouacked  at  the  Abu  Klea  wells.  The 
baggage  animals  did  not  arrive  till  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th.  The  result  was  that  the 
troops  passed  the  night  without  food,  coats,  or 
blankets. 

Sir  Herbert  Stewart  then  determined  to  make  a 
night  march  to  Metemmeh,  about  twenty -three 
miles  distant.  At  4  p.m.  on  the  18th,  the  column 
left  Abu  Klea.  The  night  was  dark.  Many  of 
the  men  had  been  wdthout  sleep  for  two  nights. 
The  camels  were  exhausted.  The  route  lay  for  a 
considerable  distance  through  thick  bush.  Halts 
were  numerous.  At  last,  after  a  toilsome  march 
of  some  sixteen  hours,  the  Nile  appeared  in  sight. 
It  was,  however,  apparent  that  the  river  could  not 
be  reached  without  further  fighting.  WhUst  pre- 
parations were  being  made  for  an  advance,  the 
Dervishes  kept  up  a  hot  fire  from  the  long  grass  in 
which  they  were  concealed.  It  was  at  this  moment 
that  the  gallant  Stewart  received  his  death-wound. 
Colonel  Bumaby,  who  it  had  been  intended  by 
Lord  Wolseley  should  succeed  Sir  Herbert  Stewart 
in  the  event  of  the  latter's  death,  had  been  killed 


8 


MODERN  EGYPT 


at  Abu  Klea.  The  chief  command  devolved  on 
Sir  Charles  Wilson. 

At  3  P.M.  on  the  19th,  the  force  advanced  in 
square,  and  after  a  sharp  engagement,  in  which  an 
attack  of  the  Dervishes  was  successfully  repulsed, 
occupied  a  position  on  the  Nile  a  short  distance 
north  of  Metemmeh.  The  British  loss  on  this  day 
was  9  officers  and  102  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men  killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  following  morning  (the  20th),  the  force 
moved  to  Gubat.  At  10  a.m.  on  the  21st,  four 
steamers,  which  had  been  sent  by  General  Gordon, 
arrived  from  Khartoum.  They  brought  his  Journal 
and  several  letters,  in  one  of  which,  dated  December 
14,  he  said  that  he  expected  a  catastrophe  in  the 
town  after  ten  days'  time.  The  latest  news  was 
written  on  a  small  scrap  of  paper.  It  was  to  the 
following  effect :  "  Khartoum  is  all  right.  Could 
hold  out  for  years.  C.G.Gordon.  29.12.84."  It  was 
known  at  the  time  that  General  Gordon  ^vrote  this 
so  that,  in  the  event  of  his  letter  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  Dervishes,  they  would  be  deceived.  In 
reahty,  he  was  in  the  greatest  straits.  Ob\dously, 
the  next  thing  to  do  was  to  send  the  steamers  back 
to  Khartoum  with  some  soldiers  on  board  of  them. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  the  morning  of  the  24th 
that  two  steamers,  the  Bordein  and  the  Telaha- 
wiyeh,  left.  The  interval  between  the  21st  and 
the  24th  was  occupied  in  reconnaissances  both  up 
and  down  the  river,  and  in  making  arrangements 
for  the  proper  protection  of  the  force  at  Gubat.  ^ 

Both  the  steamers  carried  small  detachments 
of  British  soldiers,  as  well  as  larger  detachments  of 
Soudanese  troops.    Sir  Charles  Wilson  embarked 

^  The  delay  at  Gubat  has  formed  the  subject  of  much  discussion. 
The  conclusion  at  which  I  have  arrived^  after  a  careful  examination  of 
all  the  facts,  is  that  if  the  steamers  had  left  Gubat  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  21st,  they  would  probably  have  arrived  at  Khartoum  in  time  to  save 
the  town. 


CH.  XXVIII    FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  9 


on  board  the  Bordein.  All  went  well  until,  at 
6  P.M.  on  the  25th,  the  Bordein  struck  on  a  rock 
in  the  Sixth  Cataract,  the  navigation  of  which  is 
intricate.  Tliis  caused  a  delay  of  twenty-four  hours. 
On  the  night  of  the  26th,  the  steamers  were  only 
three  miles  nearer  Khartoum  than  they  had  been  on 
the  pre\dous  evening.  An  early  start  was  made 
on  the  27th.  The  dangerous  gorge  of  Shabluka 
was  passed  without  difficulty.  The  steamers 
continued  their  voyage  under  a  musketry  fire 
from  the  banks,  and  in  the  evening  stopped  near 
the  small  village  of  Tamaniat.  During  the  after- 
noon, a  man  on  the  bank  called  out  that  Khartoum 
had  fallen  and  that  General  Gordon  had  been  killed, 
but  he  was  not  beUeved  by  those  on  board.  The 
steamers  started  early  on  the  28th,  hoping  to  reach 
Khartoum  by  the  evening.  They  advanced  under  a 
heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery  until  they  came 
within  sight  of  the  Government  House  at  Khar- 
toum. An  eager  search  was  made  through  glasses 
to  see  whether  the  Egyptian  flag  was  still  flying. 
No  sign  of  it  could  be  discovered.  More  than 
this,  as  the  steamers  advanced  it  was  seen  that 
Government  House  and  the  buildings  near  it 
had  been  wrecked.  The  Khartoum  side  of  the 
White  Nile  was  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy. 
It  was  clear  that  the  indomitable  defender  of 
Khartoum  had  at  last  succumbed.  The  expedition 
had  arrived  too  late.  Sir  Charles  Wilson  ordered 
the  steamers  to  be  put  about  and  to  run  down 
stream.  On  the  return  journey,  both  the  steamers 
were  wrecked,  but  those  on  board  were  rescued 
from  the  perilous  position,  in  which  they  were  at 
one  time  placed,  by  a  party  sent  out  in  the  steamer 
Safieh  under  Lord  Charles  Beresford.  On  the 
afternoon  of  February  4,  Sir  Charles  Wilson  and 
his  companions  rejoined  the  main  body  of  the 
British  troops,  which  were  encamped  at  Gubat. 


10 


MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 


It  is  now  time  to  go  back  to  the  events  which 
were  passing  in  Khartoum. 

In  the  course  of  this  narrative,  I  have  alluded 
to  General  Gordon's  numerous  inconsistencies.  I 
have  pointed  out  errors  of  judgment  with  which  he 
may  justly  be  charged.  I  have  dwelt  on  defects 
of  character  which  unsuited  him  for  the  conduct 
of  poHtical  affairs.  But,  when  all  this  has  been 
said,  how  grandly  the  character  of  the  man  comes 
out  in  the  final  scene  of  the  Soudan  tragedy. 
History  has  recorded  few  incidents  more  calculated 
to  strike  the  imagination  than  that  presented  by 
this  brave  man,  who,  strong  in  the  faith  which 
sustained  him,  stood  undismayed  amidst  dangers 
which  might  well  have  appalled  the  stoutest  heart 
Hordes  of  savage  fanatics  surged  around  him. 
Shot  and  shell  poured  into  the  town  which  he 
was  defending  against  fearful  odds.  Starvation 
stared  him  in  the  face.  "The  soldiers  had  to 
eat  dogs,  donkeys,  skins  of  animals,  gum  and 
palm  fibre,  and  famine  prevailed.  The  soldiers 
stood  on  the  fortifications  Hke  pieces  of  wood. 
The  civilians  were  even  worse  off.  Many  died 
of  hunger,  and  corpses  filled  the  streets — no  one 
had  even  the  energy  to  bury  them."^  Treachery 
and  internal  dissension  threatened  him  from  within, 
whilst  a  waste  of  burning  African  desert  separated 
him  from  the  outward  help  which  his  countrjTiien, 
albeit  tardily,  were  straining  every  nerve  to  afford. 
"  AU  the  anxiety  he  had  undergone  had  gradually 
turned  his  hair  to  silvery  white. "Yet,"  said  an 
eye-witness,  "in  spite  of  all  this  danger  by  which 
he  was  surrounded,  Gordon  Pasha  had  no  fear." 
"Go,"  he  said,  "tell  all  the  people  in  Khartoum 
that  Gordon  fears  nothing,  for  God  has  created 
him  without  fear."^    Nor  was  this  an  idle  boast. 

*  Account  given  by  Bordeini  Beyj  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  166. 
'  Mahdiism,  eU.,  p.  169.  *  Ibid.  p.  164. 


CH.  XXVIII    FALL  OF  KHARTOUM 


11 


General  Gordon  did  not  know  what  the  word  fear 
meant.  Death  had  no  terrors  for  him.  "  I  would," 
he  wrote  to  his  sister,  "  that  all  could  look  on  death  as 
a  cheerful  friend,  who  takes  us  from  a  world  of  trial 
to  our  true  home."^  Many  a  man  before  General 
Gordon  has  laid  down  his  life  at  the  call  of  duty. 
Many  a  man  too  has  striven  to  regard  death  as  a 
glad  relief  from  pain,  sorrow,  and  suffering.  But 
no  soldier  about  to  lead  a  forlorn  hope,  no  Christian 
martyr  tied  to  the  stake  or  thrown  to  the  wild 
beasts  of  Ancient  Rome,  ever  faced  death  with 
more  unconcern  than  General  Gordon.  His  faith 
was  sublime.  Strong  in  that  faith,  he  could  meet 
the  savage  who  plunged  a  spear  into  his  breast 
with  a  "gesture  of  scorn, and  with  the  sure 
and  certain  hope  of  immortality  which  had  been 
promised  to  him  by  the  Master  in  whose  footsteps 
he  had  endeavoured  to  follow. 

From  a  military  point  of  view,  the  defence  of 
Khartoum  was  a  splendid  feat  of  arms.  When 
Ismail  Pasha  tried  to  use  General  Gordon  as  a 
pawn  on  his  financial  and  political  chessboard, 
kindly  laughter  was  provoked  from  all  who  knew 
the  facts  or  who  knew  the  man.  General  Gordon 
was  too  rash  and  impulsive  for  the  conduct  of 
pohtical  affairs  in  this  work-a-day  world.  But  as 
the  military  defender  of  a  beleaguered  city,  he  was 
in  his  element.  The  fighting  instinct,  which  was 
strong  within  him,  had  fuU  scope  for  action.  His 
example  and  precept,  his  bravery  and  resource, 
encouraged  the  faint-hearted  and  enabled  him, 
even  with  the  poor  material  of  which  he  disposed, 
to  keep  a  formidable  enemy  at  bay  for  ten  long 
months.  His  personal  influence  was  felt  by  all 
the  inhabitants  of  the  town,  who  regarded  him 
as  their  sole  refuge  in  distress,  their  only  bulwark 
against  disaster. 

*  Letters,  etc.,  p.  xii.  '  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  171. 


12 


MODERN  EGYPT 


To  return  to  the  narrative.  After  the  defeat 
of  El  Eilafun  on  September  1,  the  position  at 
Khartoum  became  well-nigh  desperate.  AH  the 
tribes  in  the  neighbourhood  submitted  to  the  Mahdi 
and  hurried  to  Khartoum  to  take  part  in  the  siege. 
"  They  fired  projectiles  from  the  guns,  rockets,  and 
firearms  of  all  descriptions,  which  fell  on  the  town 
from  all  sides.  From  time  to  time,  the  troops 
made  sorties  out  of  the  city  to  drive  them  off,  but 
almost  each  time  their  efforts  proved  fruitless,  and 
they  had  to  return  to  the  garrison,  for  the  pro- 
jectiles of  the  rebels  were  numerous."  On  January 
5,  1885,  Omdurman  capitulated.  "  Khartoum  then 
fell  into  a  dangerous  state.  The  rebels  surrounded 
it  from  all  sides,  and  cut  off  all  supplies.  .  .  .  The 
soldiers  suffered  terribly  from  want  of  food ;  some 
of  them  deserted  and  joined  the  rebels.  Gordon 
Pasha  used  to  say  every  day,  '  They  [the  English] 
must  come  to-morrow,'  but  they  never  came,  and 
we  began  to  think  that  they  must  have  been 
defeated  after  all.  .  .  .  We  all  became  heart- 
broken, and  concluded  that  no  army  was  coming 
to  reheve  Khartoum."  The  townspeople  began  to 
talk  of  capitulation.  General  Gordon  appealed  to 
them,  on  January  25,  to  make  a  determined  stand 
for  another  twenty-four  hours,  by  which  time  he 
thought  that  the  Enghsh  relief  would  arrive. 
"  What  more  can  I  say  ? "  were  his  words  to 
Bordeini  Bey.  "  The  people  will  no  longer  believe 
me.  I  have  told  them  over  and  over  again  that  help 
would  be  here,  but  it  has  never  come,  and  now  they 
must  see  I  tell  them  lies.  If  this,  my  last  promise, 
fails,  1  can  do  nothing  more.  Go  and  coUect  aU 
the  people  you  can  on  the  lines  and  make  a  good 
stand.    Now  leave  me  to  smoke  these  cigarettes." 

The  end  was  very  near.  Early  on  the  morning 
of  January  26,  by  which  time  Sir  Charles 
Wilson's  steamers  had  reached  the  foot  of  the 


CH.  XXVIII    FALL  OF  KHARTOUM 


13 


Sixth  Cataract,  the  Der\dshes  made  a  general  attack 
on  the  hnes  and  met  with  but  a  feeble  resistance 
from  the  half- starved  and  disheartened  soldiers. 
Farag  Pasha,  the  commandant,  who  was  suspected 
of  treachery,  escaped  to  the  Mahdist  camp,  and  met 
his  death  a  short  time  afterwards  at  the  hands  of 
an  Arab  with  whom  he  had  a  blood  feud.  The 
Palace  was  soon  reached.  General  Gordon  stood  in 
front  of  the  entrance  to  his  office.  He  had  on  a  white 
uniform.  His  sword  was  girt  around  him,  but  he 
did  not  draw  it.  He  carried  a  revolver  in  his  right 
hand,  but  he  disdained  to  use  it.  The  final  scene, 
in  which  the  civilised  Christian  faced  barbarous 
and  triumphant  fanaticism,  is  thus  described  by 
Bordeini  Bey,  and  it  would  be  difficult,  whether  in 
tales  of  fact  or  of  fiction,  to  find  a  more  pathetic, 
or,  it  may  be  added,  a  more  dramatic  passage : 
"  Taha  Shahin  was  the  first  to  encounter  Gordon 
beside  the  door  of  the  Divan,  apparently  waiting 
for  the  Arabs  and  standing  with  a  calm  and 
dignified  manner,  his  left  hand  resting  on  the 
hilt  of  his  sword.  Shahin,  dashing  forward  with 
the  curse,  '  Malaoun,  el-yom  yomak '  (O  cursed 
one,  your  time  is  come !),  plunged  his  spear  into 
his  body.^  Gordon,  it  is  said,  made  a  gesture  of 
scorn  with  his  right  hand  and  turned  his  back, 
when  he  received  another  spear -wound,  which 
caused  him  to  faU  forward,  and  was  most  likely 
his  mortal  wound.  The  other  three  men  closely 
following  Shahin  then  rushed  in,  and  cutting  at 
the  prostrate  body  with  their  swords,  must  have 
killed  him  in  a  few  seconds.  His  death  occurred 
just  before  sunrise.  He  made  no  resistance,  and 
did  not  fire  a  shot  from  his  revolver.  From  all 
I  know,  I  am  convinced  that  he  never  intended 

'  From  information  subsequently  obtained,  it  would  appear  that 
General  Gordon  received  his  death-blow,  not  from  Taha  Shahin,  as 
stated  above,  but  from  Sheikh  Mohammed  Nebawi,  who  waa  eventually 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Omdurman. 


14 


MODERN  EGYPT 


to  surrender.  I  should  say  that  he  must  have 
intended  to  use  his  revolver  only  if  he  saw  it 
was  the  intention  of  the  Arabs  to  take  him  prisoner 
ahve  ;  but  he  saw  such  crowds  rushing  on  him 
with  swords  and  spears,  and  there  being  no  im- 
portant Emirs  vdth  them,  he  must  have  known 
that  they  did  not  intend  to  spare  him,  and  that 
was  most  likely  what  he  wanted  ;  besides,  if  he  had 
fired,  it  could  only  have  delayed  his  death  a  few 
moments,  the  wild  fanatical  Arabs  would  never 
have  been  checked  by  a  few  shots  from  a  revolver. 
Gordon  Pasha's  head  was  immediately  cut  off  and 
sent  to  the  Mahdi  at  Omdurman,  whUe  his  body 
was  dragged  downstairs  and  left  exposed  for  a  time 
in  the  garden,  where  many  came  to  plunge  their 
spears  into  it."  ^ 

Foul  creatures  were  not  wanting  to  kick  the 
dead  lion.  Bordeini  Bey  goes  on  to  say  :  "  I  saw 
Gordon  Pasha's  head  exposed  in  Omdurman.  It 
was  fixed  between  the  branches  of  a  tree,  and  aU 
who  passed  by  threw  stones  at  it.  The  first  to 
throw  a  stone  was  Youssuf  Mansour,  late  Mamour 
of  PoHce  at  El  Obeid,  whom  Gordon  Pasha  had 
dismissed  for  misconduct,  and  who  afterwards  com- 
manded the  Mahdi's  artillery." 

Thus  General  Gordon  died.  WeU  do  I  remember 
the  blank  feeling  of  grief  and  disappointment  ^nth. 
which  I  received  the  news  of  his  death,  and  even 
now,  at  this  distance  of  time,  I  cannot  pen  the 
record  of  those  last  sad  days  at  Khartoum  without 
emotion.  If  any  consolation  can  be  offered  to 
those  who  strove,  but  strove  in  vain,  to  save  him, 
it  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  it  may  be  said 
of  General  Gordon,  perhaps  more  than  of  any  man, 
that  he  was  felix  opportunitate  mortis. 

*  The  best  evidence  obtainable  goes  to  prove  that  Bordeini  Bey's 
account  of  General  Gordon's  death  is  substantially  correct  It  differs, 
however,  in  many  important  particulars  from  the  account  given  by 
M.  Neufeld  in  chap.  xxv.  of  A  Prisoner  of  the  Khalifa. 


CH.  XXVIII    FALL  OF  KHARTOUM 


15 


Could  we  but  choose  our  time  and  choose  aright, 
'Tis  best  to  die,  our  honour  at  the  height, 
When  we  have  done  our  ancestors  no  shame. 
But  served  our  friends,  and  well  secured  our  fame. 
Then  should  we  wish  our  happy  life  to  close. 
And  leave  no  more  for  fortune  to  dispose  ; 
So  should  we  make  our  death  a  glad  rehef 
From  future  shame,  from  sickness,  and  from  grief. 

Dryden's  lines  may  well  serve  as  General  Gordon's 
epitaph.  He  died  in  the  plenitude  of  his  reputation, 
and  left  a  name  which  will  be  revered  so  long  as  the 
qualities  of  steadfast  faith  and  indomitable  courage 
have  any  hold  on  the  feelings  of  mankind. 

Rarely  has  public  opinion  in  England  been  so 
deeply  moved  as  when  the  news  arrived  of  the  fall 
of  Khartoum.  The  daily  movements  of  the  relief 
expedition  had  been  watched  by  anxious  multitudes 
of  General  Gordon's  countrymen,  yearning  for  news 
of  one  who  seemed  to  embody  in  his  own  person  the 
peculiar  form  of  heroism  which  is  perhaps  most  of  all 
calculated  to  move  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  When 
General  Gordon's  fate  was  known  a  wail  of  sorrow 
and  disappointment  was  heard  throughout  the 
land.  The  Queen's  feelings,  as  a  Sovereign  and  as 
a  woman  of  Uvely  sympathies,  were  touched  to  the 
quick.  Her  Majesty  wrote  a  sympathetic  letter 
to  Miss  Gordon,  deeply  lamenting  her  "  dear 
brother's  cruel,  though  heroic  fate."  On  this,  as 
on  other  occasions,  the  Queen's  language  truly 
represented  the  feelings  of  the  nation.^    Yet  the 

^  On  March  19,  1885,  Sir  Henry  Ponsonby,  the  Queen's  Private 
Secretary,  wrote  to  me  :  "  I  now  quite  admit  that  I  did  not  understand 
Gordon,  that  I  did  not  see  what  you  did,  the  force  and  reality  of  his 
position  and  requirements.  The  Government  were  to  blame  in  not 
understanding  this  also,  but  I  think  we  all  here — the  people,  high  and 
low — should  share  the  responsibility,  for  we  did  not  grasp  the  situation 
as  we  should  have  done.  The  Queen  was  in  a  terrible  state  about  the 
fall  of  Khartoum,  and  indeed  it  had  a  good  deal  to  do  with  making  her 
ill.    She  was  just  going  out  when  she  got  the  telegram,  and  sent  for 


16  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

British  nation  had  done  its  duty.  Parliament  voted 
supplies  in  no  grudging  spirit  to  enable  an  expedition 
to  be  sent  to  General  Gordon's  relief,  and  public 
opinion  ratified  the  vote.  The  British  army  also  sus- 
tained its  ancient  reputation.  Mistakes  may  have 
been,  and,  indeed,  were  made.  But  whatever  judg- 
ment may  be  pronounced  by  competent  critics  in 
connection  with  some  points  of  detail,  the  true 
reasons  for  the  failure  must  be  sought  elsewhere. 
They  are  thus  stated  by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate : 
"  To  innumerable  enemies,  flushed  with  \'ictory 
and  ardent  fanaticism,  Gordon  exposed  a  skill  and 
experience  in  savage  warfare  which  few  could  equal. 
Ill-provisioned  in  a  place  naturally  and  artificially 
weak,  Gordon  for  months  preserved  an  undaunted 
front.  Neither  treachery  in  the  besieged  nor  the 
stratagems  of  the  besiegers  caused  the  fall  of 
Khartoum.  The  to^vn  fell  through  starvation,  and 
despair  at  long  neglect.  There  were  no  elements 
of  chance  in  the  expedition  to  relieve  General 
Gordon.  It  was  sanctioned  too  late.  As  day  by 
day  no  EngUsh  came,  so  day  by  day  the  soldiers' 
hearts  sank  deeper  and  deeper  into  gloom.  As  day 
by  day  their  strength  wasted,  so  that  finally  gum, 
their  only  food,  was  rejected,  so  day  by  day  the 
Nile  ebbed  back  from  the  ditch  it  had  fiUed  with 
mud,  and  from  the  rampart  it  had  crumbled,  and 
left  a  broad  path  for  who  should  dare  to  enter."  ^ 

me.  She  then  went  out  to  my  cottage,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  off,  walked 
into  the  room,  pale  and  trembling,  and  said  to  my  wife,  who  was 
terrified  at  her  appearance — '  Too  late  ! '  " 

Throughout  the  whole  of  this  difiicult  period,  I  received  the  utmost 
support  from  the  Queen.  On  March  13,  1885,  the  following  note, 
written  by  Her  Majesty,  was  communicated  to  me  by  my  brother  (Mr. 
Edward  Baring,  subsequently  Lord  Revelstoke) :  "Tlie  concluding 
paragraph  of  Sir  E.  Baring's  telegram  "  (I  am  not  quite  sure  to  what 
particular  telegram  allusion  is  here  made)  "is  admirable.  Let  the 
Queen  have  a  copy.  She  wishes  Mary "  (Lady  Ponsonby,  who  was 
Lady  Revelstoke's  sister)  "  would  tell  Mr.  Edward  Baring  that  the 
Queen  has  endorsed  everything  his  brother  has  said." 

*  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  156. 


CH.  XXVIII    FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  17 


In  a  word,  the  Nile  expedition  was  sanctioned 
too  late,  and  the  reason  why  it  was  sanctioned  too 
late  was  that  Mr.  Gladstone  would  not  accept 
simple  evidence  of  a  plain  fact,  which  was  patent 
to  much  less  powerful  intellects  than  his  own. 
Posterity  has  yet  to  decide  on  the  services  which 
Mr.  Gladstone,  during  his  long  and  brilliant  career, 
rendered  in  other  directions  to  the  British  nation, 
but  it  is  improbable  that  the  verdict  of  his  con- 
temporaries in  respect  to  his  conduct  of  the  affairs 
of  the  Soudan  will  ever  be  reversed.  That  verdict 
has  been  distinctly  unfavourable.  "  Les  fautes  de 
I'homme  puissant,"  said  an  eminent  Frenchman,^ 
"sont  des  malheurs  publics."  Mr.  Gladstone's 
error  of  judgment  in  delaying  too  long  the  despatch 
of  the  Nile  expedition  left  a  stain  on  the  reputa- 
tion of  England  which  it  will  be  beyond  the  power 
of  either  the  impartial  historian  or  the  partial 
apologist  to  efface. 

'  Senancour. 


VOL.  II 


C 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


THE  EVACUATION  OF  THE  SOUDAN 
January  26,  1885-December  30,  1886 

Lord  Wolseley  urges  the  necessity  of  an  autumn  campaign — The 
Governmeut  hesitate  —  And  then  agree  —  Sir  Redvers  Buller 
retreats  to  Korti — Battle  of  Kirbekan — The  movement  on  Berber 
arrested — Operations  at  Suakin — Action  at  Hashin — And  atTofrik 
— Suspension  of  the  Suakin  operations — The  autumn  campaign 
abandoned — Question  of  holding  Dongola — Change  of  Government 
in  England — Evacuation  of  Dongola — Death  of  the  Mahdi — Battle 
of  Ginniss — Review  of  British  policy. 

When  Lord  Wolseley  heard  of  the  battle  of  Abu 
Klea  and  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart  ha^'ing  been 
wounded,  he  decided  to  send  Sir  Redvers  Buller  to 
take  command  of  the  desert  column,  and  to  rein- 
force it  by  two  battalions.  Shortly  afterwards,  news 
arrived  of  the  fall  of  Khartoum.  General  Earle  was 
ordered  to  arrest  the  forward  movement  of  the  river 
column  on  Abu  Hamed.  Pending  the  receipt  of 
instructions  from  London  as  to  the  poHcy  which 
was  now  to  be  pursued,  a  discretionary  power  was 
left  to  Sir  Redvers  Buller  to  act  according  to  local 
circumstances.  General  Earle  accordingly  halted  at 
Berti,  about  midway  between  Korti  and  Abu  Hamed. 
Sir  Redvers  BuUer  arrived  at  Gubat  on  Februars'^  11, 
He  found  that  there  were  only  about  twelve  days' 
supphes  at  Gubat,  and  another  twelve  days' 
supplies  at  Abu  Klea,  whilst  the  camels  were  in  a 
weak  and  emaciated  condition.    News  had  been 

18 


THE  EVACUATION  19 


received  that  a  Dervish  force  of  about  4000  men 
and  six  guns  was  on  its  way  from  Khartoum  to 
Gubat.  Sir  Redvers  BuUer,  therefore,  wisely 
decided  to  fall  back  on  Jakdul.  The  retreat  began 
on  February  14.    Jakdul  was  reached  on  the  26th. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  British  Government  were 
in  a  position  of  great  difficulty.  The  sole  object 
of  the  expedition  had  been  to  bring  General  Gordon 
and  Colonel  Stewart  away  from  Khartoum.  This 
object  had  not  been  attained.  Obviously,  unless  the 
policy  of  the  Government  was  to  undergo  a  com- 
plete change,  the  most  logical  course  to  have  pursued 
would  have  been  to  desist  from  any  further  inter- 
ference in  the  Soudan,  to  withdraw  the  British 
troops  to  some  good  strategical  position  in  the 
vaUey  of  the  Nile,  and  there  to  await  the  attack 
of  the  Mahdist  forces.  This  was  what  was 
eventually  done,  and,  judged  by  the  light  of  after 
events  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  it  would 
have  been  better  if  the  Government  had  at  once 
decided  to  take  up  a  defensive  attitude.  It  can, 
however,  be  no  matter  for  surprise  that,  in  the 
first  instance,  the  Government  decided  otherwise. 
British  public  opinion  was  greatly  excited.  Both 
the  nation  and  the  army  were  smarting  under  a  sense 
of  failure.  The  soldiers  were  burning  to  avenge 
their  comrades,  and  to  show  the  Dervishes  that 
they  were  no  match  for  British  troops.  It  was 
certain  that  the  fall  of  Khartoum  would  increase 
the  influence  and  prestige  of  the  Mahdi ;  neither 
was  it  easy  to  foresee  what  might  be  the  effect  of 
his  success  in  Egypt,  ^  and  amongst  Mohammedans 
in  other  parts  of  the  world. 

^  Directly  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Khartoum  reached  Cairo  on 
February  6,  I  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville  as  follows :  "  It  is  too 
early  to  express  any  opinion  worth  having  as  to  the  effect  which  the 
fall  of  KJiartoam  will  produce  in  Egypt  proper.  Moreover,  much  will 
no  doubt  depend  on  the  course  which  Her  Majesty's  Government  now 
decide  to  pursue  in  the  Soudan.    But  I  may  say  that,  so  far  as  I  can 


20 


MODERN  EGYPT 


General  Gordon's  fame  was  then  at  its  zenith. 
His  Journal,  which  had  been  received,  and  was 
immediately  published,  gave  a  clear  indication 
of  his  views.  He  strongly  advocated  a  pohcy 
of  "  smashing  up  "  the  Mahdi.  The  weight  of 
Lord  Wolseley's  authority  was  thrown  into  the 
same  scale.  He  deprecated  the  adoption  of  a 
defensive  policy.  "  It  must  never  be  forgotten," 
he  said,  "that  the  question  of  whether  this  war 
shall  or  shall  not  go  on  does  not  rest  with  us, 
unless  we  are  prepared  to  give  up  Egypt  to  the 
False  Prophet.  We  shall  not  bring  about  a  quiet 
state  of  affairs  by  adopting  a  defensive  poUcy. 
The  Mahdi  has  repeatedly  declared  it  to  be  his 
full  and  settled  intention  to  possess  himself  of 
Egypt,  and  his  followers  look  upon  themselves  as 
engaged  in  a  war  the  object  of  which  is  not  to  rest 
contented  with  the  capture  of  Berber,  but  to  drive 
the  infidels  into  the  sea."  Lord  Wolseley  thought 
that  the  final  struggle  with  Mahdiism  might  perhaps 
be  staved  off  for  a  few  years,  but  these  years,  he 
said,  "will  be  years  of  trouble  and  disturbance 
for  Egypt,  of  burdens  and  strains  to  our  military 
resources,  and  the  contest  that  wiU  come  in  the 
end  win  be  no  less  than  that  which  is  in  front  of 
us  now.  This  is  aU  we  shall  gain  by  a  defensive 
policy."  There  could,  he  thought,  be  Uttle  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  the  line  of  action  which  was 
"  most  befitting  our  national  dignity  and  honour." 
The  Mahdi  must  be  crushed.  That,  Lord  Wolseley 
thought,  was  the  only  pohcy,  "worthy  of  the 
English  nation." 

These  views  were  shared  by  others  on  the  spot. 
The  Government  had,  therefore,  to  face  a  strong 

at  present  jud^e,  I  do  not  anticipate  any  disturbance  so  far  as  the 
Egyptian  population  is  concerned.  The  eflFect  produced  upon  the 
Bedouins  on  the  frontier  is  more  difficult  to  forecast,  and  it  would  be 
as  well  to  be  prepared  to  send  at  short  notice  another  battalion  to 
Assouan^  as  proposed  some  little  while  ago  by  Lord  AVolseley." 


THE  EVACUATION 


21 


body  of  local  opinion  favourable  to  offensive  action. 
At  fii'st,  the  Ministers  hesitated,  and  they  might 
well  do  so,  for  they  were  asked  to  embark  on  a 
crusade  against  Mohammedan  fanaticism,  to  adopt 
an  adventurous  poHcy  of  which  no  one  could  foresee 
the  end,  and  to  wage  a  costly  war  in  a  remote 
country  under  conditions  of  exceptional  difficulty 
imposed  by  the  climate,  by  the  scantiness  of  local 
supplies,  and  by  the  absence  of  facilities  for  trans- 
port and  locomotion.  Lord  Wolseley  had  warned 
them  that  "the  strength  and  composition  of  his 
Httle  army  was  calculated  for  the  relief,  not  for  the 
siege  and  capture  of  Khartoum,  the  two  operations 
being  entirely  different  in  character  and  magnitude. 
.  .  .  Khartoum  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  could 
not  be  retaken  until  the  force  under  his  command 
had  been  largely  augmented  in  numbers  and  in 
artiller}^" 

Lord  Wolseley's  first  instructions,  which  were 
issued  on  February  6,  were  "to  check  the  advance 
of  the  Mahdi  in  districts  now  undisturbed." 
"Whether,"  it  was  added,  "it  will  be  ultimately 
necessary  to  advance  on  Khartoum  or  not,  cannot 
now  be  decided."  I  was  at  the  same  time  told  to 
give  the  Khedive  general  assurances  of  support, 
and  to  inform  Lord  Wolseley  that  it  was  the 
desire  of  the  Cabinet  "that  if  the  Mahdi  should 
make  any  proposals  he  should  transmit  them 
immediately  to  Her  Majesty's  Government  for 
their  consideration."  The  Mahdi  never  made  any 
proposals,  neither  was  there  at  this  or  any  other 
time  the  smallest  likeHhood  of  his  doing  so.  Lord 
Wolseley  rephed  that  Lord  Hartington's  telegram 
gave  him  "no  information  as  to  the  policy  with 
reference  to  the  Soudan  which  Her  Majesty's 
Government  meant  to  pursue."  Thus  pressed, 
the  Government  yielded.  On  February  9,  Lord 
Hartington  telegraphed  to  Lord  Wolseley  :  "  Your 


22 


MODERN  EGYPT 


military  policy  is  to  be  based  on  the  necessity, 
which  we  recognise  on  the  statement  of  facts  now 
before  us,  that  the  power  of  the  Mahdi  at  Khartoum 
must  be  overthrown." 

Unquestionably,  it  was  a  mistake  to  issue  these 
orders.  It  is  easy  to  see  now  that  both  General 
Gordon  and  Lord  Wolseley  credited  the  Mahdi  with 
an  amount  of  strength  for  offensive  purposes  which 
he  was  far  from  possessing.  But  this  was  not  so 
clear  then  as  it  became  later.  Lord  Wolseley, 
therefore,  thanked  Lord  Hartington  for  his  "  ex- 
plicit statement  of  policy,"  and  added :  "  I  am 
sure  it  is  the  correct  one,  as  the  Mahdi's  power 
is  incompatible  with  good  government  in  Egj-pt." 

The  military  arrangements  necessary  for  giving 
effect  to  the  policy  of  the  Government  had  then  to 
be  settled.  An  immediate  advance  on  Khartoum 
was  out  of  the  question.  Time  would  be  required 
for  the  necessary  reinforcements  to  come  from 
England.  Moreover,  the  hot  season  was  approach- 
ing. Lord  Wolseley,  therefore,  determined  to 
capture  Berber  and  Abu  Hamed  by  a  combined 
movement  of  the  forces  under  Sir  Redvers  Buller 
and  General  Earle,  and  to  hold  those  places  during 
the  summer,  preparatory  to  an  advance  on  Khartoum 
during  the  ensuing  cool  season.  At  the  same  time, 
a  force  was  to  co-operate  from  Suakin  with  a  view 
to  keeping  open  the  road  to  Berber.  "  The  sooner," 
Lord  Wolseley  telegraphed  to  Lord  Hartington, 
"you  can  now  deal  with  Osman  Digna  the  better." 

Sir  Redvers  Buller  was  ordered,  on  February  10, 
to  take  Metemmeh  "as  soon  as  he  felt  himself 
strong  enough  to  do  so,"  and  then  to  combine  with 
General  Earle  in  an  attack  on  Berber.  He  re- 
ceived these  instructions  late  on  the  night  of  the 
13th,  when  he  had  already  partly  evacuated  Gubat, 
and  had  made  all  the  arrangements  necessar}''  for 
leaving  it  entirely  at  dayUght  on  the  following 


THE  EVACUATION  23 


morning.  For  reasons  which  have  been  abeady 
given/  Sir  Redvers  Buller  decided  to  continue  the 
retrograde  movement  on  Abu  Klea.  The  course 
he  adopted  met  subsequently  with  the  approval  of 
Lord  Wolseley. 

Orders  were  issued  for  the  desert  column  to 
move  on  Merowi,  but  in  the  meanwhUe  it  had 
becorne  clear  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  under- 
take operations  such  as  those  contemplated  by 
Lord  Wolseley.  Sir  Redvers  Buller  wrote  several 
letters  to  Lord  Wolseley  from  Jakdul  in  which 
"  he  not  only  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
transport  of  the  desert  column  was  completely 
exhausted,  but  further  stated  that  the  boots  of  the 
men  were  thoroughly  worn  out,  and  that  many  of 
them  were  almost  shoeless."  Sir  Evelyn  Wood, 
who  was  also  at  Jakdul,  confirmed  the  views 
expressed  by  Sir  Redvers  Buller.  "I  do  not 
thmk,"  he  wrote  on  February  20,  "  that  the  debih- 
tated  state  of  our  transport  is  reahsed  at  Korti." 
Manifestly,  a  retreat  on  Korti  was  imposed  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  situation.  Lord  Wolseley 's 
original  plan,  under  which  a  combined  movement 
of  the  river  and  desert  columns  was  to  be  made  on 
Berber,  was  no  longer  feasible.  The  last  troops  of 
the  desert  column  arrived  at  Korti  on  March  16. 

I  now  turn  to  the  movements  of  the  river 
column.  Lord  Wolseley's  orders  to  halt  reached 
General  Earle  on  February  5.  On  the  8th,  General 
Earle  received  orders  to  push  on  to  Abu  Hamed. 
These  were  supplemented  later  on  the  same  day  by 
orders  to  advance  on  Berber,  and  to  co-operate  with 
Sir  Redvers  Buller  in.  the  capture  of  that  place. 
Shortly  after  leaving  Berti,  the  enemy  were  found  in 
force  occupying  a  ridge  called  Jebel  Kirbekan.  On 
the  10th,  they  were  attacked  and  driven  from  the 
position  with  heavy  loss.    The  British  loss  was 

*  Vide  ante,  p.  18. 


24 


MODERN  EGYPT 


7  officers  and  50  men  killed  and  wounded.  It  was 
in  this  action  that,  to  the  great  sorrow  of  all  who 
knew  him,  General  Earle  lost  his  life.  After  his 
death.  General  Brackenbury  assumed  the  command 
of  the  river  column. 

Subsequently  to  the  action  at  Ivirbekan,  the  for- 
ward movement  was  continued.  On  February  24, 
when  the  column  was  about  thirty  miles  from  Abu 
Hamed,  General  Brackenbury  received  a  message 
from  Lord  Wolseley  informing  liim  of  the  retreat 
of  the  desert  column.  "  1  have,"  Lord  Wolseley 
said,  "abandoned  aU  hope  of  going  to  Berber 
before  the  autumn  campaign  begins."  General 
Brackenbury  was,  therefore,  ordered  to  withdraw 
his  force  to  Merowi.    He  arrived  there  on  March  5. 

It  is  now  time  to  describe  the  operations  in 
the  vicinity  of  Suakin.  Sir  Gerald  Graham  was 
appointed  to  the  cliief  command.  His  instructions 
were  to  make  the  best  arrangements  he  could  for 
"  the  destruction  of  the  power  of  Osman  Digna." 
When  this  had  been  done,  he  was  to  "  arrange  for 
the  mihtary  occupation  of  the  Hadendowa  terri- 
tory, lying  near  the  Suakin -Berber  road."  He 
was  further  directed  to  do  aU  in  his  power  to 
facilitate  the  construction  of  the  Suakin -Berber 
railway.  A  force  of  13,000  men  was  placed  at  his 
disposal,  consisting  of  British  and  British -Indian 
troops,  and  also  of  a  battahon  of  infantry  and  a 
battery  of  artillery,  which  were  lent  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  New  South  Wales. 

By  the  middle  of  JNIarch,  the  force  was  ready  for 
action,  and  Sir  Gerald  Graham  proceeded  to  carry 
out  the  first  portion  of  his  instructions,  namely,  to 
crush  Osman  Digna.  It  was  reported  that  the 
main  body  of  the  Der\dshes,  in  number  about 
7000,  occupied  Tamai,  wliilst  smaller  bodies  held 
Hashin  and  Handoub,  aU  places  lying  witliin  a 
few  miles  of  Suakin.    It  was  decided,  in  the  first 


CH.XXIX        THE  EVACUATION 


25 


instance,  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Hashin.  This 
object  was  effected  on  INIarch  20  and  21,  with  the 
loss  of  1  officer  and  44  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men  killed  and  wounded.  The  force  then 
returned  to  Suakin. 

The  next  step  was  to  crush  the  main  Dervish 
force  at  Tamai.  On  March  22,  a  force  under  Sir 
John  McNeill  left  Suakin.  Sir  John  McNeill's 
orders  were  to  estabUsh  an  intermediate  post  be- 
tween Suakin  and  Tamai.  At  10.30  a.m.  the 
troops  halted  at  a  spot  named  Tofrik,  a  few  miles 
from  Suakin,  and  proceeded  to  entrench  themselves 
in  a  stockade.  Whilst  many  of  the  men  were 
scattered  in  the  act  of  cutting  brushwood,  a  sudden 
attack  was  made  by  a  body  of  about  5000  Dervishes. 
A  scene  of  great  confusion  ensued.  Many  of  the 
Dervishes  penetrated  into  the  half-formed  stockade. 
After  twenty  minutes  of  confused  fighting,  they  were 
driven  back  with  the  loss  of  1500  in  killed  besides 
many  wounded,  but  the  British  force  suffered 
severely.  Fifteen  officers  and  278  non-commissioned 
officers  and  men  were  killed,  wounded,  or  missing. 
The  camp-followers  suffered  severely.  Five  hun- 
dred camels  were  killed  or  missing.  Shortly  after 
this  engagement,  Osman  Digna  withdrew  his  forces 
from  Tamai,  which  was  occupied  by  Sir  Gerald 
Graham  on  April  3. 

According  to  the  terms  of  his  original  instruc- 
tions, Sir  Gerald  Graham  should  now  have  turned 
his  attention  to  opening  up  the  route  for  the  rail- 
way. On  April  15,  however,  orders  were  issued 
from  London  to  suspend  the  construction  of  the 
railway.  Suakin  was  "  to  be  held  for  the  present, 
as  also  any  position  in  the  neighbourhood  necessary 
for  protection  from  constant  attacks  as  last  year." 

Whilst  the  operations  described  above  were 
going  on,  the  policy  of  the  British  Government  had 
undergone  a  complete  change.    In  the  middle  of 


26 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  Ill 


February,  Lord  Wolseley  wished  to  issue  a  Procla- 
mation to  the  people  of  the  Soudan  to  the  effect 
that  his  mission  was  "  to  destroy  utterly  the  power 
of  the  Mahdi  at  Khartoum."  ^  The  Government 
agreed  to  the  issue  of  this  Proclamation  with  a 
characteristic  amendment,  wliich  was  made  at  the 
instigation  of  Mr.  Gladstone.  It  was  stipulated 
that  the  word  "  utterly "  should  be  omitted  from 
the  Proclamation.  Two  months  later,  the  Govern- 
ment had  decided  to  go  farther  than  the  omission 
of  the  word  "  utterlv  "  from  a  Proclamation.  The 
Mahdi  was  neither  to  be  utterlv  destroved  nor, 
indeed,  destroyed  at  all,  but  was  to  be  left  alone 
for  the  time  being  to  rule  undisturbed  over  the 
inhospitable  deserts  of  the  Soudan. 

Many  considerations  contributed  to  bring  about 
this  change  of  pohcy,  or  perhaps  it  should  rather 
be  said,  to  bring  about  a  return  to  the  original 
policy  of  the  Government,  which  in  a  moment  of 
excitement  had  been  too  hastily  abandoned. 
Public  opinion  in  England,  wliich  had  been 
\4olently  excited  when  the  news  of  the  fall  of 
Khartoum  arrived,  had  somewhat  calmed  do^^-n. 
It  had  found  its  natural  and  constitutional  safety- 
valve  in  the  shape  of  an  acrimonious  debate  in 
Parliament,  resulting  in  a  division  in  which  the 
Government  narrowly  escaped  defeat.  The  mihtary 
operations  subsequent  to  the  fall  of  Khartoum  had 
shown  that  any  forward  movement  in  the  autumn 
would  be  a  costly  and  difficult  undertaking.  The 

^  This  Proclamation,  as  it  was  originally  drafted,  consisted  of  short, 
crisp  sentences,  with  somewhat  of  a  Napoleonic  ring  about  them,  which,  it 
was  supposed,  would  create  a  deep  impression  on  the  people  of  the  Soudan. 
1  gave  it  to  a  talented  Egyptian  friend  of  mine,  after  it  had  been  trans- 
lated into  Arabic,  and  asked  him  to  give  me  his  opinion  upon  it.  He 
said  that  he  thoroughly  understood  what  was  meant,  but  that  to  the 
Soudanese  the  Proclamation  would  be  quite  incomprehensible.  At  my 
request,  he  prepared  a  counter  project  conveying  the  same  ideas  in 
different  language.  It  was  an  extremely  eloquent  document,  and 
reminded  me,  more  especially  in  its  vituperative  passages,  of  a  chapter 
in  Isaiah. 


THE  EVACUATION  27 


voices  of  politicians  and  diplomatists,  which  had  at 
first  been  hushed  by  the  clang  of  arms,  began  to 
be  heard.  The  disadvantages  of  an  offensive,  and 
the  advantages  of  a  defensive  pohcy  became  more 
and  more  clear  as  the  matter  was  calmly  considered. 
Further — and  this  exercised  a  very  material  in- 
fluence on  the  views  of  the  Government — affairs 
on  the  Indian  frontier  gave  cause  for  anxiety/  It 
was,  therefore,  undesirable  to  engage  in  a  campaign 
in  the  Soudan,  which  would  in  some  degree  cripple 
the  military  strength  of  the  nation  in  the  event  of 
the  services  of  the  army  being  required  elsewhere. 
The  sound  good  sense  of  the  British  nation,  which 
was  well  represented  in  the  Gladstone  Cabinet, 
reasserted  itself,  and  a  pohcy  based  upon  a  sober 
appreciation  of  national  interests  was  eventually 
adopted.^  On  April  21,  it  was  announced  in  both 
Houses  of  Parhament  that  it  was  not  intended  to 
advance  on  Khartoum  or  to  undertake  any  further 
offensive  operations  in  the  Soudan.  Lord  Wolseley 
was  instructed  accordingly. 

The  question  then  arose  whether  the  British 
and  Egyptian  troops  should  continue  to  hold 
Dongola,  or  whether  they  should  fall  back  to 
some  more  northerly  point  along  the  valley  of 
the  Nile. 

Lord  Wolseley's  opinions  were  expressed  im- 
mediately after  the  Government  had  decided  to 

*  The  news  that  General  Kornaroff  had  attacked  and  defeated  the 
Afghans  at  Penjdeh  reached  London  on  April  10. 

'  On  April  3,  I  wrote  a  private  letter  to  Lord  Granville  in  which, 
after  dwelling  on  the  ambiguity  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  statements  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  I  urged  the  necessity  of  facing  the  facts  and  of 
laying  down  some  definite  Soudan  policy  for  the  future.  I  concluded 
in  the  following  words  :  "The  main  question  which  1  have  propounded 
in  this  letter  is  as  follows : — Do  the  English  Government  intend  to 
establish  a  settled  form  of  government  at  Khartoum  or  not  ?  My  own 
opinion  is  that  this  question  should  be  answered  in  the  negative. 
Hence,  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  military  decision  to  advance  to 
Khartoum  should  be  reversed  and  that  no  such  advance  should  take 
place." 


28 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  Ill 


abandon  the  idea  of  an  autumn  campaign  against 
the  Mahdi.  "  If,"  he  telegraphed  to  Lord  Hart- 
ington  on  April  14,  "  our  position  is  to  be  ex- 
clusively one  of  defence,  I  would  hold  Wadi 
Haifa  and  Korosko  as  outposts,  with  a  strong 
brigade  at  Assouan."  The  next  day  he  added : 
"  Hold  on  to  Dongola  proidnce.  As  long  as 
you  do  tliis,  you  prevent  Mahdiism  spreadi^ig  in 
Egypt,  secure  allegiance  of  frontier  tribes,  and 
save  henceforth  trouble,  disturbances,  and  possibly 
local  risings,  which  a  pohcy  of  retreat  wtII  prob- 
ably entail,  and  which  will  necessitate  increased 
garrisons  in  Egypt  and  mihtary  occupation  of 
the  larger  towns." 

Sir  Redvers  Buller,  Sir  Charles  Wilson,  and 
Colonel  Kitchener  were  asked  their  opinions. 
They  all  deprecated  a  retreat  from  Dongola,  but 
it  was  clear  that  their  reason  for  doing  so  was 
that  they  wished  to  revert  to  the  pohcy  of 
advancing  on  Khartoum.  "  The  Soudan,"  Sir 
Redvers  Buller  said,  "will  never  be  quiet  till 
the  Mahdi  is  disposed  of."  "  I  still  beheve,"  Sir 
Charles  Wilson  said,  "  as  always,  that  the  control 
of  the  Soudan  is  necessary  to  Egypt."  "  The 
Mahdi  must  advance  or  disappear,"  Colonel 
Kitchener  said,  "  and  I  deprecate  leaving  him 
this  fresh  lease  of  life  and  power." 

I  did  not  agree  in  the  view  that  Dongola  should 
be  held  with  the  intention  of  advancing  on 
Khartoum.  At  the  same  time,  I  was  fearful  of 
the  political  effect  which  might  be  produced  in 
Egypt  if  an  immediate  retreat  were  carried  out. 
I  did  not  like  letting  the  Dervishes  come  so  far 
down  the  Nile  valley  as  Wadi  Haifa.  I  was 
incUned  to  adopt  a  proposal  put  forward  by  Sir 
Charles  Wilson,  to  the  effect  that  Dongola  should 
be  held  until  some  black  troops  could  be  organised, 
and  that  the  government  should  be  entrusted  to 


THE  EVACUATION 


29 


Abdul- Kader  Pasha.  "I  would  earnestly  im- 
press," I  said,  "upon  Her  Majesty's  Government 
that  it  would  be  neither  politically  wise  nor 
dignified  to  carry  out  at  once  the  poHcy  of  re- 
treat from  Dongola  and  the  immediate  neighbour- 
hood." The  Government,  however,  held  firmly 
to  their  original  opinions.  On  May  8,  Lord 
Hartington  telegraphed  to  Lord  Wolseley :  "  The 
Government,  after  considering  all  reports  received, 
adhere  to  the  decision  to  adopt  the  proposal  for 
the  defence  of  the  Egyptian  frontier  at  Wadi 
Haifa  and  Assouan  contained  in  your  telegram 
of  April  14." 

Whilst  measures  were  being  taken  to  carry  out 
these  instructions,  a  change  of  Government  took 
place  in  England.  On  June  24, 1885,  the  Ministry 
of  Lord  Sahsbury  succeeded  that  of  Mr.  Gladstone. 
Lord  Wolseley  urged  the  new  Government  to 
abandon  a  defensive  and  to  adopt  an  offensive 
pohcy.  "No  frontier  force,"  he  said,  "can  keep 
Mahdiism  out  of  Egypt,  and  the  Mahdi  sooner  or 
later  must  be  smashed,  or  he  will  smash  you.  .  .  . 
To  advance  on  Khartoum  and  discredit  the  Mahdi 
by  a  serious  defeat  on  his  own  ground  would 
certainly  finish  him."  After  a  short  interval.  Lord 
Wolseley  was  informed  that  the  new  Government 
adhered  to  the  decision  which  had  been  taken 
by  their  predecessors.  The  retreat  was  to  be 
continued. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  British 
Government  acted  wisely  in  deciding  to  retreat 
from  Dongola.  The  views  of  the  military 
authorities  were  based  on  the  presumed  political 
necessity  of  " smashing  the  Mahdi"  at  Khartoum. 
No  such  necessity  existed  in  reaUty.  It  is  possible 
that  the  policy,  which  I  recommended,  of  setting 
up  an  Egyptian  semi  -  independent  Governor  at 
Dongola  might  have  succeeded,  if  British  troops 


30 


MODERN  EGYPT 


had  been  allowed  to  remain  long  enough  to  enable 
a  black  force  to  be  organised,  but  I  am  glad  that 
the  experiment  was  not  tried.  Indeed,  had  I  at 
the  time  thoroughly  appreciated  the  physical 
features  of  the  country  between  Wadi  Haifa  and 
Dongola,  I  do  not  think  I  should  have  made  the 
proposal.  In  the  autumn  of  1889,  I  visited  Wadi 
Haifa  and  went  as  far  as  Sarras,  about  thirty  miles 
south  of  that  place.  I  saw  enough  to  convince 
myself  that,  as  an  advanced  position,  Wadi  Haifa 
is  far  stronger  than  Dongola. 

On  July  5,  the  British  troops  evacuated  Don- 
gola. In  view,  however,  of  the  threatening 
attitude  of  the  Dervishes,  the  movement  north- 
wards took  place  slowly.  The  jVIahdi  died 
suddenly  on  Jmie  20,  and  his  death  exercised 
a  dispiriting  effect  on  his  followers.  His  place 
was  taken  by  the  Khalifa  Abdullah  -  el  -  Taashi, 
who  proceeded  to  carry  out  his  predecessor's 
intention  of  invading  Egypt.  It  w^as  not,  how- 
ever, till  December  30,  1885,  that  a  mixed  British 
and  Egyptian  force,  under  the  command  of  Sir 
Frederick  Stephenson,  met  the  Der^dshes  at  Ginniss, 
about  midway  between  Wadi  Haifa  and  Dongola. 
The  Dervishes  w^ere  defeated  with  a  loss  of  about 
800  killed  and  wounded.  The  British  and  Egyptian 
loss  was  41  killed  and  wounded.  This  action  in- 
flicted a  severe  blow  on  the  Khalifa,  and  for  the  time 
being  allayed  all  fear  of  a  serious  invasion  of  Egj^t 
by  the  Dervishes.  By  April  13, 1886,  the  British  and 
Egyptian  troops  were  concentrated  at  Wadi  Haifa. 
Wadi  Haifa  was  then  left  to  the  care  of  the 
Egyptian  troops,  and  the  British  force  retired  to 
Assouan,  which  place  they  reached  on  May  7. 

With  the  action  at  Ginniss,  purely  British  inter- 
vention in  the  affkirs  of  the  Soudan  may  be  said 
practically  to  have  ceased  for  the  time  being.  The 
moment,  therefore,  is  opportune  for  reviewing  the 


THE  EVACUATION  31 


results  attained  by  British  policy  during  the  pre- 
vious two  years.  My  own  beUef  is  that  the 
fundamental  principles  of  that  poUcy  were  sound, 
if  once  the  fatal  mistake  of  non-interference  prior 
to  the  Hicks  defeat  be  condoned.  If  a  veto  had 
been  placed  on  the  Hicks  expedition,  the  prob- 
abihty  is  that  the  Egj-ptian  Government  would 
never  have  lost  possession  of  Khartoum. 

When  once  General  Hicks's  army  had  been 
destroyed,  the  pohcy  of  -wdthdrawal  was  enforced 
by  the  circumstances  of  the  situation.  The  British 
Ministers  wisely  set  their  faces  against  reconquest 
by  British  arms.  They  obliged  the  Eg}-ptian 
Government  to  look  the  facts  in  the  face,  and  in 
doing  so  they  rendered  a  great  ser\'ice  to  the 
Khedive  and  to  the  Egyptian  people. 

But  although  the  fundamental  principles  of 
British  poUcy  were,  with  the  reserve  stated  above, 
perfectly  sound,  the  execution  of  the  poUcy  was 
defective.  At  almost  every  point,  failure  was 
incurred. 

The  British  Government  endeavoured  to  assist 
the  Egyptian  Government  in  effecting  the  peace- 
able withdrawal  of  the  garrisons  and  Eg^-ptian  ci\*il 
population  from  the  Soudan.  The  withdrawal  was 
for  the  most  part  never  effected  at  all.  Sir  Reginald 
Wingate  estimated  ^  that  the  total  garrisons  in  the 
Soudan,  including  General  Hicks's  army  and  tlie 
force  sent  under  General  Baker  to  Suakiii, 
amounted  to  about  55,000  men.  Of  these,  about 
12,000  were  killed.  11,000  eventually  returned  to 
Egypt,  leaving  about  30,000  who  remained  in  the 
Soudan.  This  figure  is  exclusive  of  ci\alians, 
women,  and  children,  the  number  of  whom  Sir 
Reginald  Wingate  roughly  estimated  at  5000. 
These  figures  speak  for  themselves. 

Again,  the  Government  sent  two  high  officials 

>  Mahdii'Sm,  etc. 


32 


MODERN  EGYPT 


on  a  special  mission  to  the  Soudan.  They  failed 
to  accomphsh  the  objects  of  their  mission. 

A  military  force  was  then  sent  to  save  the  hves 
of  the  two  British  emissaries.  It  arrived  too  late. 
Both  General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  were 
killed. 

Lastly,  at  one  time  the  Government  intended  to 
deal  a  decisive  blow  to  the  power  of  the  Mahdi 
The  project  was  abandoned  and,  in  my  opinion, 
wisely  abandoned.  Nevertheless,  the  impression 
was  left  on  the  minds  of  the  Dervishes  that  a 
British  army  had  attempted  to  reconquer  the 
Soudan,  and  had  failed  to  do  so. 

Eventually,  the  Government  fell  back  on  its 
original  pohcy  of  withdrawal,  from  which  it  had 
temporarily  drifted. 

The  Gordon  mission  and  the  Nile  expedition 
were  thus  mere  episodes  in  Egyptian  and  Sou- 
danese history.  They  will  be  remembered  as 
mistakes  accompanied  by  suffering  and  sorrow  to 
individuals,  and  by  failure  in  an  undertaking  on 
which  the  British  nation  had  set  its  heart.  It  is 
melancholy  to  think  of  the  blood  and  treasure 
which  were  wasted.  Few  of  those  who  have  sacri- 
ficed their  lives  for  their  country  have  done  so  to 
so  Uttle  purpose  as  the  gallant  soldiers  who  fell  at 
Abu  Klea,  Kirbekan,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Suakin.  The  only  practical  result  of  the  Nile 
expedition  was  to  inspire  in  the  minds  of  the 
Dervishes  a  wholesome  dread  of  British  soldiers, 
and  to  break  the  force  of  the  Dervish  advance 
when  it  eventually  occurred.  It  would  be  an 
exaggeration  to  say  that  this  result  was  of  no 
utihty,  but  it  was  obtained  at  a  cost  altogether 
incommensurate  with  its  real  value.  The  same 
result  would  have  been  more  easily  and  perhaps 
more  thoroughly  obtained  by  the  adoption  of  a 
defensive  pohcy  from  the  first. 


THE  EVACUATION  33 


Looking  more  closely  to  the  details  in  the 
execution  of  the  British  pohcy,  the  following  are 
the  conclusions  at  which  I  arrive : — 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  a  mistake  to  send  any 
British  official  to  Khartoum.  The  task  he  had  to 
perform  was  well-nigh  impossible  of  execution,  and 
his  nomination  involved  the  assumption  of  respon- 
sibihties  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government, 
which  it  was  desirable  to  avoid. 

Secondly,  if  any  one  was  to  be  sent,  it  was  a 
mistake  to  choose  General  Gordon.  In  spite  of 
many  noble  traits  in  his  character,  he  was  wanting 
in  some  of  the  qualities  wliich  were  essential  to  the 
successful  accomphshment  of  his  mission. 

Thirdly,  when  once  General  Gordon  had  been 
sent,  he  should  have  been  left  a  free  hand  so  long 
as  he  kept  within  the  main  lines  of  the  policy 
which  he  was  authorised  to  execute.  It  is,  in  my 
opinion,  to  be  regretted  that  General  Gordon  was 
not  allowed  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha,  but  any 
view  held  as  to  the  probable  results  of  employing 
him  must  be  conjectural. 

Fourthly,  the  question  of  whether  an  expedition 
should  or  should  not  have  been  sent  from  Suakin 
to  Berber  in  the  spring  of  1884  depends  on  the 
military  practicability  of  the  undertaking,  a  point 
on  which  the  best  mihtary  authorities  differed  in 
opinion. 

Fifthly,  a  great  and  inexcusable  mistake  was 
made  in  delaying  for  so  long  the  despatch  of  the 
Gordon  relief  expedition. 

Sixthly,  the  Government  acted  wisely,  after  the 
faU  of  Khartoum,  in  eventually  adopting  a  defen- 
sive policy  and  in  ordering  a  retreat  to  Wadi 
Haifa, 

Lastly,  it  may  be  said  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment were  extraordinarily  unlucky.  Whatever 
amount  of  foresight  be  shown,  success  in  doubtful 

VOL.  II  D 


34 


MODERN  EGYPT 


and  difficult  enterprises,  such  as  the  Gordon  Mission 
and  the  Nile  Expedition,  must  always  depend 
a  good  deal  on  adventitious  circumstances,  which 
cannot  be  foreseen,  and  over  which  no  Govern- 
ment can  exercise  any  control  I  am  far  from 
saying  that  in  all  the  matters  which  are  dis- 
cussed in  these  pages,  the  British  Government 
exercised  a  proper  amount  of  foresight,  but  it  must 
be  admitted  that  whenever  the  goddess  Fortune 
could  play  them  a  trick,  she  appeared,  with  pro- 
verbial fickleness,  to  take  a  pleasure  in  doing  so. 
The  British  Government  made  at  the  time  a  great 
stir  in  the  world.  The  result  in  the  end  was  that 
no  object  of  any  importance  was  attained. 

Gratis  anhelans,  multa  agendo  nihil  agens. 

But  the  situation  was  one  of  inordinate  difficulty, 
and  those  who  have  had  most  experience  in  the 
conduct  of  political  affairs,  and  who  know  how 
difficult  it  is  to  be  right  and  how  easy  it  is  to  make 
mistakes,  will  be  least  of  all  inclined  to  criticise 
severely  the  principal  actors  on  the  scene. 


CHAPTER  XXX 


THE  d£bRIS  of  the  SOUDAN 

The  outlying  provinces  : — 1.  Barfour :  Surrender  of  the  province — The 
Senoussieh  sect — The  revolt  of  Abu  Gemaizeh.  2.  Bahr-el-Ghazal : 
Lupton  Bey  surrenders — His  death.  3.  Eqrmtoria  :  Emin  Pasha 
summoned  to  surrender — He  maintains  his  position — The  Stanley 
expedition.  4.  Sennar :  The  garrison  surrenders.  5.  Kassala  : 
The  garrison  surrenders.  6.  The  Abyssinian  Frontier  Garrisons : 
The  Hewett  treaty — The  garrisons  of  Amadib,  Senhit,  Galabat, 
Gera,  and  Gedaref.  7.  Berbera  :  Its  political  status — It  is  occupied 
by  British  troops.  8.  Harrar  :  Withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  garri- 
son— Installation  of  the  Emir  Abdullah — King  Menelek  occupies  the 
province.  9.  Zeyla  :  It  is  occupied  by  British  troops.  10.  Tajour- 
rah  :  The  French  occupy  it.  11.  Massowah  :  Its  political  status — 
Attitude  of  the  British  Government — The  Italians  occupy  Mas- 
sowah. 

When  the  collapse  of  Egyptian  authority  in  the 
Soudan  took  place,  the  disjecta  membra  of  Ismail 
Pasha's  huge  African  estate  fell  to  those  whose 
interest  it  was  to  pick  them  up,  and  who  had  the 
power  to  give  effect  to  their  wishes.  Those  por- 
tions which  were  remote  from  the  coast  relapsed 
into  barbarism.  Those  which  were  more  easy  of 
access  were  pounced  upon  by  various  European 
Powers,  who  about  this  time  began  what  was  aptly 
called  by  the  British  press  "the  scramble  for 
Africa."  In  the  present  chapter  the  main  facts  as 
regards  all  this  Egyptian  debris  will  be  briefly 
stated.^ 

^  In  the  preparation  of  this  chapter  I  have  received  great  assistance 
from  Sir  Reginald  Wingate's  work  Mahdiism  and  the  Egyptian  Soudan. 

36 


36  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 


1.  Darfour. 

When  the  Mahdist  rebellion  broke  out,  the 
Governor  of  this  province  was  Slatin  Bey,  an 
Austrian  officer  in  the  Egyptian  service.  His 
position  was  one  of  great  difficulty,  for  from  the 
first  his  own  officers  were  infected  with  the  spirit 
of  revolt.  After  the  destruction  of  General  Hicks's 
army,  the  position  in  Darfour  became  hopeless. 
Slatin  Bey  was  at  Dara,  the  capital  of  the  province, 
against  which  a  force  under  the  command  of  one 
of  the  Mahdi's  heutenants  advanced  towards  the 
end  of  1883.  The  town  at  once  surrendered. 
Slatia  Bey,  writing  to  General  Gordon,  described 
the  capitulation  in  the  following  terms  :  "After  the 
annihilation  of  Hicks's  army,  the  demoraUsed  troops 
refused  to  fight  any  longer.  .  .  .  Officers  and  men 
demanded  capitulation  and  I,  standing  there  alone 
and  a  European,  was  compelled  to  follow  the 
majority  and  compelled  to  capitulate.  Does  your 
Excellency  beheve  that  to  me,  as  an  Austrian 
officer,  the  surrender  was  easy  ?  It  was  one  of  the 
hardest  days  in  my  hfe."^ 

The  events  in  Darfour  during  the  next  few 
years  turned  in  some  degree  upon  the  influence 
exerted  over  that  remote  country  and  its  neighbour- 
hood by  the  celebrated  Sheikh  El  Senoussi.  I  take 
this  opportunity,  therefore,  to  describe  briefly  the 
rise  of  the  Senoussieh  sect. 

There  are  two  main  divisions  of  Moslems, 
namely,  the  Sunnites  and  the  Shiites.  Almost  all 
the  Mohammedan  inhabitants  of  the  Ottoman 

'  After  remaining  captive  at  Omdurmau  for  many  years,  Slatin  Pasha 
succeeded  in  making  his  escape  in  March  1895.  He  was  appointed 
Inspector-General  in  the  Soudan,  and  in  that  capacity  rendered  very 
valuable  services  to  the  Government.  He  is  a  gallant  and  very  capable 
officer.  Some  derogatory  remarks  made  about  him  by  General  Gordon 
in  his  Journal  are  wholly  undeserved. 


CH.  XXX   DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


37 


dominions  and  of  Africa  are  Sunnites.  They  are 
divided  into  four  Mezhebs,  or  principal  sects,  viz. 
the  Hanafi,  the  Shafai,  the  MaUki,  and  the  Han- 
bali.  These  sects  differ  on  points  of  ritual,  and  as 
regards  the  interpretation  of  certain  portions  of  the 
Mohammedan  law.  The  Turks  in  Egypt  belong  to 
the  Hanafite  sect.  Most  of  the  Egyptians  belong 
to  the  Shafai,  but  some  few  to  the  Mahki  sect. 
Beneath  these  four  main  divisions  are  a  number  of 
Tarikas,  or  minor  sects,^  which  were  called  into 
existence  at  a  later  period  of  Islamism  than  the 
Mezhebs.  They  have  generally  been  created,  and 
are  stiU  being  created,  by  persons  noted  for  their 
piety  and  asceticism,  who  have,  for  the  most  part, 
recommended  some  special  form  of  prayer  or  of 
ceremonial  as  being  particularly  efficacious.  Some 
of  the  Tarikas  have  risen  to  considerable  import- 
ance. Thus,  the  Wahabi  sect  caused  at  one  time 
great  poHtical  disturbance  by  reason  both  of  the 
number  and  of  the  aggressive  spirit  of  the  sectarians. 
The  Sheikh  El  Mirghani  also  founded  a  large 
Tarika  in  the  Eastern  Soudan.  The  Sheikh  El 
Senoussi  is  the  head  of  one  of  the  most  important 
Tarikas  which  now  exist.  It  has  been  estimated 
that  his  followers  number  no  fewer  than  3,000,000, 
who  are  scattered  widely  over  the  whole  of  Northern 
Africa.  They  are  especially  numerous  in  Wadai. 
In  Egypt,  the  followers  of  Senoussi  are  also  fairly 
numerous. 

Mohammed  Ben  Ali  El  Senoussi,  the  founder  of 
the  sect,  was  an  Algerian  by  birth,  and  though 
originally  a  Mahki,  did  not  altogether  agree  with 
the  recognised  leaders  of  that  sect.  In  one  respect 
his  teaching  resembled  that  of  Abdul  Wahab,  that 
is  to  say,  he  only  recognised  the  authority  of  the 
Koran  and  the  traditions  which  are  contemporaneous 
with  the  Koran,  rejecting  the  teaching  of  later 

*  The  literal  translation  of  the  word  "  Tarika  "  is  a  "  path." 


38 


MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 


commentators.^  In  1853,  he  established  himself  in 
an  oasis  of  the  Libyan  desert  named  Jerhboub,  near 
Siwa  (Jupiter  Ammon).  He  does  not  appear  at  any 
time  to  have  hazarded  a  definite  statement  that  his 
son  would  be  the  Mahdi,  but  he  gave  several  in- 
dications during  his  lifetime  that  such  a  contin- 
gency was  not  improbable.  For  instance,  on  one 
occasion  the  father  took  off  the  son's  sandals  and 
said  to  those  present :  "  Be  witness  that  I  have 
served  him."  It  is  inferred  that  he  would  not  have 
performed  this  act  of  servitude  if  he  had  not  wished 
it  to  be  believed  that  his  son's  religious  authority 
was  superior  to  his  own.  Further,  it  is  said  that  the 
principal  supporters  of  Mohammed  Ben  All's  son,* 
who  succeeded  to  the  headship  of  the  sect  on  his 
father's  death,  constantly  pointed  out  to  others 
that  their  leader  possessed  many  of  the  quahties 
essential  to  the  true  ]Mahdi.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  view  of  the  difficulty,  not  to  say  the  impossi- 
bility of  fulfilling  the  whole  of  those  conditions,  it 
may  be  confidently  predicted  that,  whenever  and 
wherever  a  Mahdi  is  proclaimed,  a  schism  ^^dll  at 
once  occur.  Senoussi  was,  \\'ithout  doubt,  well 
versed  in  Mohammedan  tradition,  and,  in  spite  of 
the  aspirations  of  a  few  of  liis  over -zealous  and 
ambitious  followers,  he  must  have  been  aware 
that  his  claims  to  be  considered  the  true  Mahdi 
would  not  meet  with  general  recognition  from  the 
Mohammedan  world.  He,  therefore,  msely  resisted 
the  temptation  to  proclaim  himself  as  the  Mahdi. 
It  was,  however,  natural  that  he  should  view  with 
disfavour  the  pretensions  of  any  rival.  Hence, 
from  the  outset,  Senoussi's  influence  was  exercised 
in  a  sense  antagonistic  to  the  movement  of  which 
Mohammed  Ahmed  was  the  leader.    His  views  on 

'  An  account  of  the  tenets  of  the  Senoussi  sect  is  given  in  eh.  xii. 
of  Mr.  Silva  ^\'hite's  book  From  Sfrhinx  to  Oracle.  Mr.  White  visited 
Siwa  iu  1890.    He  was  unable  to  go  to  Jerhboub. 

»  He  died  in  1902. 


CH.  XXX   DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  39 


this  subject  carried  all  the  more  weight  from  the 
fact  that  lus  reputation  for  piety  and  asceticism 
was  higher  than  that  of  Mohammed  Ahmed.  The 
latter  was  also  grasping  and  avaricious,  quahties 
which  compared  unfavourably  with  the  contempt 
for  worldly  riches  attributed  to  Senoussi.^ 

Several  years  of  internal  dissension  followed 
on  Slatin  Bey's  surrender.  As  the  cruelty  and 
rapacity  of  the  Dervish  rule  became  more  and  more 
evident,  the  rehgious  fervour,  which  had  been  at 
first  excited  by  Mohammed  Ahmed,  waned.  In 
1888,  a  certain  Abu  Gemaizeh  raised  the  standard 
of  revolt.  His  programme  was  "  to  overthrow  the 
Mahdi  imposture  and  to  re-estabHsh  the  true 
rehgion  of  the  Prophet."  Abu  Gemaizeh  was  not 
a  member  of  the  Senoussi  order,  but  he  attracted 
the  Senoussiyeh  to  liim  by  giving  out  that  his 
movement  was  favoured  by  the  Sheikh  of  Jerhboub. 
At  first,  he  gained  some  successes.  "  The  whole 
Soudan,"  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote,  "echoed 
with  the  wildest  reports ;  even  at  Cairo  it  was 
beUeved  that  the  end  of  Mahdiism  was  near,  and 
that  a  new  Ruler  had  arisen,  who  would  at  least 
open  the  roads  to  Mecca  and  would  no  longer  be 
at  war  with  all  the  world.  Relief  seemed  near. 
Every  arrival  from  the  Soudan  reported  the  grow- 
ing success  of  the  anti-Mahdist  revolt."  One  of  the 
weak  points  in  the  JVIahdist  rehgious  programme, 

*  There  is,  however,  a  practical  as  well  as  a  religious  side  to  the 
Senoussi  movement.  Mr.  Weld  Blundell,  who  visited  Siwa  in  1894, 
writes  :  "  From  the  practical  side,  the  whole  movement  may  he  described 
as  a  very  large,  well-organised,  slave-owning  and  slave-dealing  cor- 
poration, managed  by  the  heads  of  the  Brotherhood,  with  local  branches 
and  establishments  grouped  round  the  various  Zawyas  or  convents 
of  the  order  in  all  parts  of  North  Africa.  Without  presuming  to 
apportion  the  real  religious  sincerity  and  the  purely  material  element 
in  the  movement,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that,  as  in  similar 
religious  organisations  nearer  home,  religion  and  business  are  happily 
combined  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  entire  satisfaction  to  the  leaders 
who  get  the  principal  benefit  of  it  at  present,  and  to  foster  vague  hopes 
among  the  humbler  adherents  of  some  great  triumph  iu  the  future." 


40 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  m 


on  which  Abu  Gemaizeh  seized,  was  that  the 
Khalifa  had  placed  obstacles  in  the  way  of  Moham- 
medans performing  the  ordinary  Haj,  and  had 
proclaimed  that  a  visit  to  the  shrine  of  Mohammed 
Ahmed  at  Omdurman  might  be  substituted  for 
the  time-honoured  pUgrimage  to  Mecca.  When 
Senoussi's  views  were  eventually  made  known,  it 
was  discovered  that  he  gave  full  moral  support  to 
Abu  Gemaizeh,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  opposed  the 
heterodox  views  put  forward  by  the  Khalifa  on  the 
subject  of  the  pilgrimage.  But  beyond  this  he  did 
not  go.  He  was,  he  said,  "the  peaceful  pioneer 
of  a  rehgious  revival,  which  revolted  against  the 
bloodshed  and  rapine  of  the  false  Mahdi  of  the 
Soudan.  He  had  no  intention  or  desire  to  inter- 
fere. Mohammed  Ahmed  and  his  successor  must 
work  their  own  salvation  or  destruction ;  he  was  in 
no  way  responsible." 

Thus  the  great  Sheikh  of  Jerhboub  enunciated 
a  policy  of  non-intervention  in  terms  which  might 
have  done  credit  to  Lord  Granville.  The  result 
of  the  attitude  taken  up  by  Senoussi  was  that  the 
influence  of  Abu  Gemaizeh  speedUy  waned.  On 
February  22,  1889,  he  was  attacked  by  Osman 
Adam,  one  of  the  Khalifa's  Heutenants :  the 
Dervishes  gained  a  complete  victory.  Osman 
Adam's  report  of  this  action,  which  was  unearthed 
by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate,  may  be  quoted  as  a 
characteristic  specimen  of  Mahdist  official  litera- 
ture. "  The  Ansar,"  ^  he  TVTote,  "  not  satisfied  ^ith 
their  victory,  pursued  the  retreating  enemy  tiQ 
sunset,  and  after  that  the  cavalry  still  continued 
pursuing  till  almost  aU  were  kiUed.  They  followed 
them  even  as  far  as  the  caves  and  forests,  where 
they  tried  to  conceal  themselves,  but  they  were 

*  The  "Ansar"  (literally  "Helpers")  was  the  name  given  to  the 
first  converts  to  Islam  made  at  Medina  after  the  Hegira.  The  applica- 
tion by  the  Mahdi  of  this  name  to  his  followers  was  calculated  to  excite 
the  resentment  of  orthodox  Mohammedans. 


CH.  XXX  DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


41 


all  killed ;  even  those  who  transformed  themselves 
into  apes,  wolves,  dogs,  and  rabbits  (for  the  natives 
of  the  western  countries  can  be  so  transformed) 
were  also  killed  even  to  the  very  last.  .  .  .  Allah 
was  with  us,  and  we  saw  several  miracles  during 
the  battle.  Allah  sent  down  fire,  which  burnt 
up  the  dead  bodies  of  the  enemy  and  also  their 
wounded,  showing  how  violent  was  His  wrath 
upon  them.  The  brethren  also  saw  some  sixteen 
white  flags  with  green  borders  waving  in  the  air. 
They  also  heard  the  sound  of  drums  beating  in  the 
air,  and  saw  objects  like  mountains  falling  upon 
the  enemy.  The  Prophet  also  revealed  himself  to 
many  of  the  followers  previous  to  the  battle.  .  .  . 
It  had  been  my  intention  to  send  the  heads  of  all 
the  chiefs  to  you,  but  as  they  have  by  this  time 
decayed,  and  would  be  heavy  for  messengers,  I 
must  be  satisfied  with  sending  you  only  two  heads, 
viz.  the  head  of  the  devil's  agent,  and  the  head  of 
the  son  of  Sultan  Salih.  .  .  .  The  enemy's  devil, 
Abu  Gemaizeh,  died  from  small-pox  in  his  house 
some  days  ago,  and  thus  Darfour  is  left  without 
a  head."  Father  Ohrwalder,  who  escaped  from 
Omdurman  in  1891,  reported  that  "the  Abu 
Gemaizeh  revolt  depopulated  almost  the  entire 
district.  There  were  but  few  men  to  cultivate, 
and  the  country  became  infested  by  quantities  of 
elephants,  lions,  and  other  wild  animals." 

Further  internal  dissensions  ensued,  with  the 
result  that  the  KhaUfa  eventually  withdrew  his 
forces  from  Darfour. 

2.  Bahr-el-Ghazal. 

"  The  province  of  Bahr-el-Ghazal,"  Sir  Reginald 
Wingate  wrote,  "may  be  described  as  about  five 
times  as  big  as  England.  It  is  a  district  covered 
with  forests   and  mountains,  and  seamed  with 


42 


MODERN  EGYPT 


low  valleys  subject  to  inundation.  .  .  .  The  soil  is 
exceptionally  fertile  and  there  are  cattle  in  abun- 
dance, while  the  population  is  estimated  at  between 
three  and  four  millions."  ^  Gessi  Pasha,  General 
Gordon's  lieutenant,  was  the  first  European 
Governor  of  the  province.  In  1881,  he  was 
succeeded  by  Mr.  Frank  Lupton,  who  had  served 
in  the  British  mercantile  marine,  and  who  subse- 
quently joined  General  Gordon  in  the  Soudan. 

When,  in  1882,  the  news  of  the  Kordofan  re- 
beUion  reached  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  province,  many 
of  the  most  important  Sheikhs  sent  in  their  allegi- 
ance to  the  Mahdi.  Lupton,  however,  amidst 
many  vicissitudes,  held  his  own.  Towards  the  close 
of  1883,  news  arrived  of  the  annihilation  of  General 
Hicks's  army.  This  disaster  was  as  decisive  of  the 
fate  of  Bahr-el-Ghazal  as  it  had  been  of  that  of 
Darfour.  On  April  28,  1884,  Lupton  wrote  to 
Emin  Pasha :  "  It  is  aU  up  with  me  here.  Every 
one  has  joined  the  Mahdi,  and  his  army  takes 
charge  of  the  Mudirieh  the  day  after  to-morrow. 
What  I  have  passed  through  these  last  few  days  no 
one  knows.  I  am  perfectly  alone."  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  Lupton  surrendered  to  Karam- Allah,  the 
commander  of  the  DerWsh  force.  He  was  invited 
to  embrace  the  faith  of  Islam,  and  to  assume 
the  name  of  AbduUah.  Lupton,  an  eye-witness 
subsequently  reported,  "replied  to  Karam -AUah 
that  he  had  already  adopted  the  Mohammedan 
religion,  but  Karam -Allah  was  not  satisfied  and 
insisted  that  he  should  openly  adopt  the  creed, 
and  bade  Lupton  repeat  after  him :  '  There  is 
no  God  but  God,  and  Mohammed  is  the  Prophet 
of  God,'  and  while  Lupton  was  repeating  this,  the 
Emirs  drew  their  swords,  and  when  he  had  finished, 

^  This  was  probably  an  overestimate.  The  population  of  the  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  province,  prior  to  the  Dervish  rule,  was  subsequently  estimated 
at  1,500,000.— See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1904,  p.  79. 


CH.XXX  DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


43 


shouted  in  one  voice  :  '  Hold  to  your  faith,  you  are 
now  one  of  us  (Ansar)  as  we  are  of  you,  we  are 
brothers  in  the  faith.'  "  Lupton  was  shortly  after- 
wards confined  as  a  prisoner  at  Omdurman,  where 
he  subsequently  died. 

Thus  it  was  that,  in  Sir  Reginald  Wingate's 
words,  "in  this  vast  province,  not  a  shred  of 
Egyptian  authority  remained ;  all  had  been  sub- 
merged under  the  waves  of  Mahdiism,  which  now 
rolled  placidly  over  its  broad  plains,  bearing  on 
their  way  vast  bands  of  slaves  for  the  greatly 
enlarged  households  of  Mohammed  Ahmed,  his 
Khalifas,  and  his  Emirs." 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal 
province  resembles  that  of  Darfour.  Mahdist 
misrule  brought  in  its  train  its  natural  accom- 
paniment of  discontent  and  internal  dissensions. 
Eventually,  the  Dervishes  withdrew.  Few,  in  1885, 
would  have  predicted  that  thirteen  years  later  the 
ultimate  fate  of  this  remote  district  would  bring 
the  two  great  Western  Powers  of  Europe  to  the 
verge  of  war.^    Such,  however,  was  to  be  the  case. 

8.  Equatoria. 

To  the  south  and  south-east  of  the  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  province  hes  that  of  Equatoria,  the  creation 
of  Sir  Samuel  Baker,  whose  work  was  subsequently 
carried  on  by  General  Gordon.  In  1879,  General 
Gordon  named  Edward  Schnitzler,  a  native  of 
Prussian  Silesia,  better  known  as  Emin  Pasha,  to  be 
Governor  of  the  province.  The  latter,  on  assuming 
office,  gave  the  usual  account  of  Egyptian  misrule. 

*  I  have  purposely  omitted  any  account  of  what  is  known  as  the 
"  Fashoda  incident"  from  this  work.  1  sliould  be  most  unwilling- to 
do  anything  which  might  contribute  to  revive  public  interest  in  an 
affair  which  is  now,  happily  for  all  concerned,  well-nigh  forgotten. 

The  word  "  Fashoda "  has  been  erased  from  the  map.  The  place 
is  now  called  by  its  Shillouk  name  of  Kodok. 


44 


MODERN  EGYPT 


"  Since  1877,"  he  wrote,  "  no  accounts  have  been 
sent  in  from  or  kept  by  this  administration.  Though 
the  Governors  receive  monies  for  the  payment  of 
wages,  no  one  has  been  paid  a  piastre  for  years  ; 
probably,  however,  the  Governors  have  bought 
goods  with  the  funds  belonging  to  the  Government 
and  sold  them  at  three  times  the  amount.  Slaves 
figure  in  these  accounts  as  oxen,  asses,  etc.  The 
making  of  false  seals  and  fabricating  receipts  by 
their  use  complete  the  picture  of  what  has  been 
going  on  here,  and  with  it  all  the  place  is  full  of 
prayer-places  and  Fikis."^ 

By  the  end  of  1882,  the  whole  country  to  the 
south  of  Khartoum,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Equatorial  province,  was  in  open  revolt  against 
Egyptian  authority.  Towards  the  end  of  March 
1884,  the  news  of  the  annihilation  of  General  Hicks 's 
army  reached  Emin  Pasha.  Shortly  afterwards,  he 
was  summoned  by  Karam- Allah  to  surrender  his 
province.  "Now  just  think  of  my  position,"  he 
wrote  somewhat  later.  "  For  fourteen  months  I 
had  had  no  communication  with  Khartoum,  or 
news  from  there.  The  magazines  were  quite 
empty  of  clothes,  soap,  coffee,  etc.  ...  In  Lado, 
there  was  a  rabble  of  drunkards  and  gamblers, 
most  of  them  fellow-countrymen  of  the  rebels,  the 
clerks  of  my  divan.  The  prospect  was  not  brilhant. 
.  .  .  Accordingly,  I  asked  my  officers  here  in  open 
council  whether  they  considered  it  more  desirable  to 
submit  or  to  prepare  to  fight.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  what  the  answer  would  be ;  the  purport  of 
it  was  submission." 

Emin  Pasha  did  not,  however,  submit.  Karam- 
Allah's  advance  was  stayed  owing  to  disturbances 
in  his  rear.  Nevertheless,  in  the  anarchy  which 
prevailed,  no  effective  control  could  be  exercised 
over  the  outlying  portions  of  the  province.    "  At 

*  A  "  Fiki "  is  a  man  who  expounds  the  law  of  Islam. 


CH.XXX   DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


45 


the  end  of  1885,"  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote, 
"the  extent  of  Emin's  province  was  about  180 
mUes,  a  narrow  strip  from  the  lake  to  Lado,  and 
an  area  of  about  one-seventh  of  the  original  extent 
of  the  province  previous  to  the  revolt." 

In  February  1886,  Emin  Pasha  received  a  letter 
from  Nubar  Pasha  in  which  he  was  informed  that  the 
Egyptian  Government  had  decided  to  abandon  the 
Soudan,  that  they  were  imable  to  afford  him  any 
assistance,  and  that  he  was  authorised  to  take  any 
steps  he  might  consider  advisable  to  leave  the 
country.  At  the  same  time,  Emin  Pasha  heard  of 
the  fall  of  Khartoum  and  of  the  death  of  General 
Gordon.  The  difficulties  of  his  position  were  thus 
increased.  He  decided,  however,  to  remain  where 
he  was.  "  The  greater  part  of  my  men,"  he  wrote, 
"especially  my  officers,  have  no  desire  to  leave 
this  country.  ...  I  shall  remain  here  and  hold 
together,  as  long  as  possible,  the  renmant  of  the 
last  ten  years." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  the  detailed  history  of 
all  that  followed.  How,  by  reason  of  rebeUion  and 
mutiny,  Emin  Pasha's  position  became  daily  more 
difficult ;  how  his  situation  attracted  the  attention 
and  sympathy  of  the  civihsed  world  ;  how  an  expe- 
dition was  eventually  organised  to  reheve  him ; 
how  Stanley  and  his  adventurous  companions  cut 
their  way  through  the  dense  untrodden  forests  of 
Central  Africa ;  how,  when  they  at  last  reached 
Emin,  the  latter  was  unwiUing  to  leave ;  how  his 
hesitation  was  eventually  overcome ;  and  how  he 
and  his  companions  were  with  infinite  trouble  at 
last  brought  down  to  the  coast, — these  are  matters 
of  history,  which  have  been  described  by  others 
who  are  better  informed  than  myself  on  the  subject.^ 

The  Lado  Enclave,  as  it  is  now  termed,  was 
leased  to  King  Leopold  II.,  as  Sovereign  of  the 

*  Vide  Stanley's  In  Darkest  Africa,  1890. 


46 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  m 


Independent  State  of  the  Congo,  by  an  Agreement 
signed  at  Brussels  on  May  12,  1894.  The  Congo- 
lese occupation  caused  at  one  time  a  good  deal  of 
friction  between  the  British  Government  and  King 
Leopold/  Eventually,  a  further  Agreement  was 
signed  in  London  on  May  9,  1906.  Under  this 
Agreement,  the  Lado  Enclave  has  to  be  handed 
over  to  the  Soudanese  Government  within  six 
months  after  the  demise  of  King  Leopold. 

4.  Scnnar, 

Of  the  fate  of  the  province  of  Sennar  and  of  its 
once  celebrated  capital,  Uttle  need  be  said.  In  the 
spring  of  1885,  the  town  was  besieged  by  the 
Mahdists.  The  Egyptian  commander,  Hassan 
Sadik,  made  a  gallant  defence.  On  his  death, 
which  occurred  during  a  sortie,  he  was  succeeded 
by  Nur  Bey,  who  on  several  occasions  repulsed  the 
attacks  of  the  Dervishes  and  inflicted  great  loss  on 
them.  Eventually,  Abdul  -  Kerim,  the  Mahdist 
commander,  "  having  gathered  all  the  neighbour- 
ing tribes,  completely  cut  off  communication,  and 
soon  the  garrison,  weakened  by  continuous  fight- 
ing, was  at  the  last  stage  of  famine.  As  a  final 
effort,  Nur  Bey,  on  August  18,  ordered  a  sortie  to 
be  made  by  Hassan  Bey  Osman  with  1500  of  the 
troops,  but  the  rebels  falling  on  them  at  Kassab 
utterly  defeated  them,  and  the  remnant,  with  their 
leader  killed,  made  their  way  back  to  the  town. 
On  the  following  day,  Nur  Bey,  having  exhausted 
all  the  food  in  the  town,  was  obliged  to  capitulate. 
Of  the  original  garrison  of  3000  men,  700  only 
remained, — strong  evidence  indeed  of  the  severity 
of  the  fighting  and  of  the  siege."    The  province  of 

1  The  facts  are  briefly  stated  in  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906j  pp.  121-123, 
•Dd  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  p.  119. 


CH.XXX   DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


47 


Sennar  remained  under  Dervish  rule  till  the  downfall 
of  the  Khalifa's  power  in  1898. 

5.  Kassala. 

Kassala  is  the  most  important  inland  town  in 
the  Eastern  Soudan.  Its  population  numbers  about 
13,000.  In  November  1883,  it  was  besieged  by 
one  of  Osman  Digna's  Ueutenants.  The  siege 
continued  with  varying  fortunes  until  July  1885. 
Hopes  were  from  time  to  time  entertained  that 
reUef  would  come  from  Abyssinia.  The  garrison 
was  also  encouraged  to  hold  out  by  the  presence  of 
British  troops  at  Suakin.  But  no  rehef  came.  By 
April  13,  1885,  aU  the  donkeys  in  the  town  had 
been  eaten.  A  successful  sally,  made  on  June  15, 
in  which  1000  oxen  and  1000  sheep  were  captured, 
enabled  the  defence  to  be  prolonged.  But  the 
rehef  was  only  temporary.  By  July  30,  every 
kind  of  food,  including  gum  and  hides,  had  been 
exhausted.  The  garrison  capitulated.  They  re- 
ceived a  promise  that  their  hves  would  be  spared, 
but  the  promise  was  broken.  "  It  was  beheved," 
Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote,  "  that  the  inhabitants 
had  secreted  treasure,  and  this  was  made  the  plea  for 
every  description  of  torture,  cruelty,  and  robbery." 
In  1894,  Kassala  was  occupied  by  the  Itahans,  but 
three  years  later  (December  1897)  was  evacuated. 
It  now  forms  part  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Soudan. 

6.  The  Abyssinian  Frontier  Garrisons. 

When,  in  the  winter  of  1883,  the  policy  of  with- 
drawal from  the  Soudan  was  adopted,  the  British 
Government  decided  to  send  a  mission  to  King 
John  of  Abyssinia,  with  whom  they  were  on 
friendly  terms,  in  the  hope  that  his  aid  might  be 
enlisted  in  facihtating  the  retreat  of  the  garrisons 


48 


MODERN  EGYPT 


from  the  Egyptian  posts  adjoining  the  frontier  of 
Abyssinia.  Sir  William  Hewett  was  accordingly 
sent  to  Abyssinia  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  British 
Government.  He  was  accompanied  by  Mason 
Bey,  an  American  officer  in  the  Egyptian  service, 
who  was  well  acquainted  with  the  affairs  of  the 
Soudan,  and  who  acted  on  behalf  of  the  Egyptian 
Government. 

The  result  of  this  mission  was  that  a  Treaty 
was  signed  at  Adowa  on  June  3,  1884.  The  main 
provisions  of  tliis  Treaty  were  that  the  province  of 
Bogos,  which  the  King  had  for  long  coveted,  was 
to  be  ceded  to  him,  and  that  in  return  he  was  to 
facilitate  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  frontier 
garrisons,  and  to  permit  their  retreat  through 
Abyssinian  territory. 

Pubhc  attention  at  this  time  was  so  exclusively 
directed  to  the  events  which  were  passing  at 
Khartoum,  that  the  British  Government  never  got 
due  credit  for  the  successful  effi^rts  which  were  made 
to  save  the  Egyptian  garrisons  on  the  Abyssinian 
frontier. 

On  September  12,  1884,  the  province  of  Bogos 
was,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty, 
handed  over  to  Abyssinia. 

During  the  spring  of  1885,  the  Egyptian 
garrisons  of  Amadib  and  Senhit  were  brought 
safely  down  to  Massowah. 

One  of  the  most  important  garrisons  was  that  of 
Galabat.  In  August  1884,  Colonel  Chermside, 
who  was  at  that  time  Governor-General  of  the  Red 
Sea  Littoral,  despatched  Major  Saad  Rifaat  to 
Abyssinia  to  assist  in  the  preparations  which  were 
being  made  for  the  reUef  of  Galabat,  which  was 
then  besieged  by  the  Dervishes.  Leaving  Adowa 
with  a  considerable  force  of  Abyssinians  on 
January  27,  1885,  Major  Rifaat  shortly  afterwards 
attacked  and  defeated  the  enemy,  and  succeeded  in 


CH.  XXX  DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  49 


bringing  the  garrison  and  population,  numbering 
about  3000  men,  women,  and  children,  in  safety  to 
Massowah,  whence  those  who  wished  to  return 
were  sent  back  to  Egypt. 

The  garrison  of  Gera,  which  had  likewise  been 
besieged  for  some  months,  was  also  extricated  by 
the  Abyssinians,  the  Egyptian  soldiers  being,  more- 
over, subsequently  clothed  and  fed  by  Bang  John. 
About  5000  men,  women,  and  children  were  brought 
down  to  Massowah  and  despatched  to  Cairo. 

In  fact,  of  the  posts  on  the  Abyssinian  frontier, 
the  only  one  of  which  the  garrison  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Dervishes '  was  Gedaref,  called  also 
Suk  Abu  Sin.  The  commandant  of  this  post, 
which  was  garrisoned  by  about  200  men,  capitu- 
lated in  April  1884,  that  is  to  say  two  months 
before  the  Hewett  Treaty  had  been  concluded. 
On  the  whole,  therefore,  the  results  of  the  Treaty 
were  satisfactory. 

7.  Berbera. 

Ismail  Pasha  was  not  content  with  extending 
Egyptian  authority  to  the  sources  of  the  Nile. 
Pashadom,  with  its  baneful  accompaniments  of 
misrule  and  oppression,  stretched  its  tentacles  to 
the  Somah  coast  and  inland  to  the  fertile  province 
of  Harrar.  When  the  parent  trunk  rotted,  the 
first  of  the  branches  to  fall  off  was  Berbera.  It 
fell  at  the  feet  of  the  Queen  of  England. 

The  Egyptian  Governor  of  Berbera  was  of  the 
ordinary  type.  Mr.  F.  L.  James,  who  had  travelled 
much  in  the  Soudan  and  in  SomalUand,  wrote  to 
me  on  April  21,  1884  :  "  On  all  hands  we  heard 
nothing  but  the  most  bitter  complaints  as  to  the 
ill-treatment  the  natives  (Somalis)  met  with  at  the 
hands  of  the  Egyptian  Governor  of  Berbera,  Abdul 
Rahman  Bey.  .  .  .  That  he  is  detested  by  the 
people  and  a  very  bad  Governor  is  not  open  to 

VOL.  11  E 


50 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  Ill 


doubt ;  and  after  what  happened  two  years  ago 
to  myself  and  party,  while  travelling  in  the  Soudan, 
I  am  surprised  at  no  enormity  on  the  part  of  an 
Egyptian  Governor." 

Sir  Richard  Burton  wrote  in  1856:  "The 
occupation  of  the  port  of  Berbera  has  been  advised 
for  many  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  Berbera  is  the 
true  key  to  the  Red  Sea,  the  centre  of  East  African 
traffic,  and  the  only  place  for  shipping  upon  the 
western  Erythraean  shore  from  Suez  to  Guardafui. 
Backed  by  lands  capable  of  cultivation,  and  by  hiUs 
covered  with  pine  and  other  valuable  trees,  enjoying 
a  comparatively  temperate  climate,  with  a  regular, 
although  thin  monsoon,  this  harbour  has  been 
coveted  by  many  a  foreign  conqueror.  Circum- 
stances have  thrown  it,  as  it  were,  into  our  arms, 
and,  if  we  refuse  the  chance,  another  and  a  rival 
nation  will  not  be  so  blind."  ^  The  Indian  authori- 
ties had  always  been  alive  to  the  desirability  of 
preventing  Berbera  from  falling  into  the  hands  of 
any  European  Power. 

The  poUtical  status  of  the  coast  eastward  of 
Zeyla  was  on  a  diffisrent  footing  from  that  portion 
of  the  coast  which  extends  from  Zeyla  to  the 
straits  of  Bab-el-Mandeb.  The  Sultan  exercised 
rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  territory  between 
Bab-el-Mandeb  and  Zeyla,  which  rights,  although 
never  formally  recognised  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment, had  not  been  disputed.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Sultan  over  the  Somali 
tribes  lying  between  Zeyla  and  Ras  Hafoun  had 
been  repeatedly  denied  by  the  British  Government. 
In  1877,  a  Convention  was  negotiated  between 
Ismail  Pasha  and  the  British  Government,  the 
main  object  of  which  was  to  recognise  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Khedive,  under  the  suzerainty  of 
the  Sultan,  as  far  eastward  as  Ras  Hafoun.  The 

Burton,  First  Footsteps  in  East  Africa,  p.  xxxiv. 


CH.  XXX  DfiBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  51 


fifth  article  of  this  Convention  stipulated  that  it 
was  not  to  come  into  operation  until  the  Sultan 
gave  a  formal  assurance  to  the  British  Government 
that  no  portion  of  the  territory  on  the  Somah  coast 
should  be  ceded  to  any  foreign  Power.  In  spite  of 
repeated  invitations,  the  Sultan  had  never  given 
this  assurance.  The  Convention  was,  therefore, 
invahd,  and  the  hands  of  the  British  Government 
were  free.  Lord  GranviUe,  accordingly,  on  being 
pressed  by  the  India  Office  to  move  in  the  matter, 
instructed  Lord  Dufferin  on  May  29,  1884,  to 
denounce  the  Convention  and  to  inform  the  Porte 
that  "  with  regard  to  the  coast  eastward  of  Zeyla, 
it  was  the  intention  of  Her  Majesty's  Government, 
on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptians,  to  make  such 
arrangements  as  they  might  think  desirable  for  the 
preservation  of  order  and  the  security  of  British 
interests,  especially  at  Berbera,  from  which  Aden 
drew  its  chief  supplies."  This  communication  drew 
forth  some  remonstrances  from  Constantinople ; 
they  were  set  aside.  In  October  1884,  a  British 
official  was  charged  with  the  administration  of 
Berbera ;  a  small  force  of  police  and  sepoys  was 
placed  at  his  disposal.  A  notification  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  British  Protectorate  over  this  part  of 
the  coast  was  conveyed  to  the  French  Government 
by  Lord  Lyons  on  April  23,  1885,  Thus  Berbera, 
with  the  neighbouring  port  of  Bulbar,  were  peace- 
ably absorbed  into  the  British  dominions. 


8.  Harrar. 

The  fertile  province  of  Harrar  lies  about  200 
miles  south-west  of  Zeyla.  Sir  Richard  Burton 
visited  it  in  1856.  In  his  time,  the  province  was 
governed  in  a  barbarous  fashion  by  Emir  Ahmed, 
one  of  a  family  which  had  for  long  held  dominion 
over  the  country.    The  fertility  of  Harrar  excited 


52 


MODERN  EGYPT 


the  ambition  of  Ismail  Pasha.  It  was  amiexed, 
and  in  1874  the  reigning  Emir  was  put  to  death  by 
Raouf  Pasha,  himself  a  bad  specimen  of  a  bad  class. 
The  usual  results  followed.  Major  Hunter,  who 
visited  Harrar  early  in  1884,  reported :  "  The 
Khedive's  rule  is  extremely  unpopular,  and  justly 
so,  for  the  admitted  object  of  the  Governors  is  to 
tax  the  inhabitants  to  the  utmost.  No  justice  is 
obtainable,  peculation  is  rife,  trade  is  stifled,  the 
soldiery  pillage  the  villages,  and  the  troops  are 
discontented  owing  to  deferred  payment  and  pro- 
longed expatriation.  .  .  .  The  Governor,  Ah  Pasha, 
is  a  shaky,  garrulous  old  man  of  Turkish  extraction, 
who  has  no  idea  beyond  filling  the  Treasury, 
presumably  for  the  benefit  of  the  Egyptian 
Government." 

Manifestly,  the  only  wise  course  to  pursue,  both 
in  the  interests  of  Harrar  and  of  Egypt,  was  that 
the  Egyptian  Government  should  abandon  a  trust 
which  had  been  so  grossly  abused.  The  evacuation 
of  the  province  was  pressed  upon  the  Egyptian 
Ministers,  who,  albeit  reluctantly,  accepted  the 
inevitable  logic  of  facts. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  garrison,  and  of  others 
who  wished  to  leave,  across  200  miles  of  country, 
inhabited  by  tribes  who  were  far  from  friendly 
to  the  Egyptians,  was  no  easy  matter.  The  duty 
of  executing  this  task  was  entrusted  to  Major 
Hunter,  who  was  assisted  by  two  other  British 
officers.  Radwan  Pasha  was  sent  from  Cairo  to 
act  as  Egyptian  Commissioner ;  he  co-operated 
loyally  with  Major  Hunter.  The  retreat  was 
skilfully  conducted.  The  garrison  and  followers, 
to  the  number  of  8359  persons,  were  marched 
down  to  the  coast  in  detachments  during  the  early 
months  of  1885,  and  embarked  for  EgA'pt. 

The  government  of  the  pro\ince  was  then 
handed  over  to  AbduUah,  a  son  of  the  last  reigning 


CH.  XXX   DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


53 


Emir.  The  new  Emir  did  not  maintain  his  posi- 
tion for  long.  In  January  1887,  King  Menelek  of 
Shoa  attacked  and  took  possession  of  Harrar. 

9.  Zeyla. 

It  has  been  abeady  mentioned  that  the  political 
status  of  Zeyla  was  different  from  that  of  Berbera. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  Sultan  could  not  put  forward 
any  vahd  claim  to  suzerainty.  Zeyla,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  formed  part  of  the  Ottoman  dominions 
before  it  came  under  Egyptian  jurisdiction.  In 
1875,  it  was  farmed  by  the  Sultan  to  Ismail  Pasha, 
on  payment  of  a  tribute  of  £13,500  a  year. 

The  British  Government,  through  their  Ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople,  invited  the  Porte  on  May 
14,  1884,  "to  resume  direct  jurisdiction  over  the 
ports  on  the  Egyptian  coast  of  the  Red  Sea  and 
to  occupy  them  with  Turkish  troops."  On  July  17, 
the  Porte  was  again  invited  to  take  "  the  necessary 
steps,  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  troops, 
to  maintain  its  authority  over  Tajourrah  and 
Zeyla."  It  was,  at  the  same  time,  stated  that  the 
British  Government  were  "  anxious  to  receive  the 
reply  of  the  Porte  with  as  little  delay  as  possible." 
The  Porte  treated  the  matter  in  its  usual  dilatory 
fashion.  No  definite  answer  was  given.  In  the 
meanwhile,  there  was  an  imminent  risk  of  dis- 
turbances in  the  neighbourhood  of  Zeyla.  On 
August  1,  1884,  therefore.  Lord  DufFerin  was 
instructed  to  "inform  the  Porte  that  unless  the 
Turkish  Government  were  prepared  to  take  imme- 
diate steps  for  the  occupation  of  Zeyla,  it  would 
be  necessary  for  Her  5lajesty's  Government  to 
send  a  force  there  to  preserve  order."  Still  the 
Sultan  did  not  move.  Action  became  necessary 
on  the  part  of  the  British  Government.  On 
August  24,  1884,  Major  Hunter  telegraphed  to 


54  MODERN  EGYPT 


rae  :  "  Force  landed  at  Zeyla.  Somalis  impressed. 
Governor  obliging."  The  obliging  Governor  was 
kept  in  his  place  for  a  while,  because  some  dis- 
cussion ensued  as  to  the  future  of  Zeyla.  A 
difference  of  opinion  existed  among  the  British 
authorities  as  to  whether  it  was  worth  keeping  or 
not.    It  is  now  British  territory. 

The  Egyptian  tribute  was  paid  to  the  Porte  for 
some  while  after  the  British  occupation  of  Zeyla. 
Eventually,  in  connection  with  certain  Custom- 
house negotiations,  an  understanding  was  arrived 
at  between  Cairo  and  Constantinople  that  the 
payment  of  the  tribute  should  cease. 

10.  Tajourrah. 

It  was  not  to  be  supposed  that,  whilst  this 
scramble  for  Egyptian  territory  was  going  on, 
the  French  would  remain  idle.  In  1862,  they  had 
taken  possession  of  Obokh,  in  \drtue  of  a  Conven- 
tion made  with  some  local  Sheikhs.  The  French 
Government  now  decided  to  annex  the  neigh- 
bouring territory  of  Tajourrah.  Early  in  IVIay 
1884,  a  French  ship  arrived  at  Richal,  a  port  near 
Tajourrah ;  ten  sailors,  accompanied  by  the  Vizier 
of  Tajourrah,  landed,  told  the  local  Sheikhs  that 
the  place  belonged  to  them,  and  that  they  would 
return  to  take  possession  of  it.  IM.  Barrere,  the 
French  representative  at  Cairo,  "  knew  nothing  of 
the  matter;  he  knew  Tajourrah  was  Egyptian 
territory."  Mr.  Egerton  "  thought  it  possible  that 
there  might  be  some  misunderstanding."  There 
was,  however,  no  misunderstanding.  The  Porte 
uttered  some  feeble  protests,  and  tried  to  excite 
EngUsh  jealousy  of  French  extension.  The  British 
Government,  however,  wisely  remained  indifferent. 
Since  1884,  Tajourrah  has  been  a  French  possession. 


CH.XXX  DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


55 


11.  Massowah. 

Suakin  and  Massowah  were  placed  under 
Egj^tian  jurisdiction  by  an  Imperial  Firman 
issued  in  1865.  The  tribute  payable  by  Egypt 
to  the  Sultan  was,  at  the  same  time,  raised  by 
£37,500  a  year. 

The  same  disorder  reigned  at  Massowah  as 
elsewhere.  Colonel  Chermside  telegraphed  from 
Suakin  on  January  22,  1885  :  "  I  do  hope  you  will 
take  a  speedy  decision  as  to  the  Massowah  ques- 
tion, as,  without  wishing  to  reflect  on  the  long 
string  of  my  predecessors,  it  is  hard  to  carry  on  at 
all  in  the  chaos  everything  is  in,  police,  pensions, 
establishment  of  employes,  dues,  contracts,  water- 
supply,  pubhc  works,  mihtary  garrison,  every- 
thing is  in  indescribable  confusion,  costly  without 
efficiency."  The  Egyptian  Government  were  in- 
capable of  evolving  order  out  of  this  chaos.  The 
only  possible  course  was  to  let  Massowah  go  the 
way  of  the  other  lost  possessions  of  Egypt.  The 
question  then  arose  as  to  who  should  step  into 
possession  of  the  property,  which  was  about  to 
be  abandoned. 

"L'ltahe,"  a  French  diplomatist  said  at  the 
time  of  the  Berlin  Congress,  "r6de  autour  du 
monde  pour  trouver  un  endroit  quelconque  ou  elle 
pourra  placer  son  drapeau."  The  Italian  nation 
has,  in  fact,  ever  since  its  creation,  shown  a  good 
deal  of  the  restless  ambition  which  often  attaches 
itself  to  youth.  The  desire  manifested  of  late 
years  in  Italy  to  estabUsh  colonies  in  distant  lands 
appears  to  be  based  to  some  extent  on  the  plea 
that  other  great  Powers  have  founded  colonies, 
and  that,  therefore,  Italy  must  do  the  same.  The 
Italians,  in  all  the  exuberance  of  youthful  national 
life,  forgot,  in  1885,  that  the  monk's  cowl  does 
not  necessarily  make  the  monk,  and  rushed  into 


56 


MODERN  EGYPT 


African  colonisation  with  all  the  impetuosity  which 
characterises  Southern  nations. 

Some  years  previously,  the  Italians  had  estab- 
hshed  themselves  at  Assab  Bay,  a  proceeding  which 
was  viewed  with  a  good  deal  of  rather  unnecessary 
ill-humour  by  the  Indian  Government  of  the  day. 
When  it  became  apparent  that  the  neighbouring 
territory  of  JNIassowah  was  hkely  to  be  in  the 
political  market,  Italian  ambition  fired  up.  It 
was  thought  necessary  to  acquire  this  desirable 
possession  before  it  could  fall  into  the  hands  of 
any  rival  claimant.  The  first  thing  to  do  was  to 
secure  the  goodwill  of  England  ;  Lord  Gran\'ille  was 
sounded  on  the  subject.  On  December  22,  1884, 
he  wrote  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome  :  "  I 
have  informed  Count  Nigra  (the  Italian  Ambassador 
in  London)  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  were 
desirous  of  showing  their  friendly  feeling  towards 
Italy  in  all  ways.  The  Egj^ptian  Government 
were  imable,  I  said,  to  continue  their  hold  on  all 
the  African  Uttoral  of  the  Red  Sea.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  ports  naturally  reverted  to 
Turkey.  We  had  for  some  time  been  giving 
ad\dce  to  the  Porte  to  retake  possession  of  them. 
I  was  glad,  I  continued,  to  observe  that  M.  Mancini 
fully  recognised  that  we  had  no  right  and  made  no 
pretension  to  give  away  that  which  did  not  belong 
to  us.  If  the  ItaUan  Government  should  desire 
to  occupy  some  of  the  ports  in  question,  it 
was  a  matter  between  Italy  and  Turkey ;  but  I 
was  able  to  inform  him  that  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, for  their  part,  had  no  objection  to  raise 
against  the  Itahan  occupation  of  Zulla,  Beilul,  or 
Massowah." 

When,  at  a  subsequent  period,  many  sober- 
thinking  Italians  regretted  the  occupation  of 
Massowah,  it  was  occasionally  alleged  that  England 
had  instigated  the  occupation,  and  that  Italy  had, 


CH.  XXX  DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


57 


in  fact,  been  used  as  a  catspaw  in  order  to  get 
the  British  Government  out  of  a  difficulty.  These 
statements  are  devoid  of  foundation.  The  British 
Government  never  proposed  to  Italy  to  occupy 
Massowah.  All  they  did  was  to  adopt  a  friendly 
attitude  towards  Italy,  and  to  abstain  from  creating 
difficulties  which  might  have  proved  obstacles  to 
the  attamment  of  Itahan  aspirations.  The  British 
Government  did  nothing  to  thwart  the  Itahans  ; 
but  beyond  this  they  did  not  go.  Indeed,  I 
remember  teUing  M.  de  Martino,  the  Itahan 
Consul-General  at  Cairo,  that  my  personal  opinion 
was  that  the  Italians  were  making  a  mistake  in 
occupying  Massowah.  He  was  inchned  to  share 
my  views,  but  the  matter  was  not  one  for  him  to 
decide.  The  Itahan  Government  and  the  Itahan 
Parhament  were  naturally  presumed  to  be  the  best 
judges  of  Italian  interests.  M.  Mancini,  who  was 
then  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  warmly  espoused 
the  cause  of  occupation,  and  he  was  at  the  time 
supported  by  public  opinion  in  Italy.  Dissuasion 
or  opposition  on  the  part  of  England  would  have 
been  regarded  as  an  unfriendly  act  dictated  by  an 
imworthy  jealousy  of  Italian  extension. 

When  the  Itahan  Government  were  assured  of 
the  absence  of  objection  on  the  part  of  England, 
they  acted  with  promptitude.  Plausible  excuses 
for  action  were  not  wanting.  Some  Italian 
travellers  had  been  murdered  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Massowah,  and  the  Itahan  Government  had 
failed  to  obtain  adequate  satisfaction.  Early, 
therefore,  in  the  month  of  February  1885,  a 
formidable  squadron  appeared  at  Massowah  and 
took  possession  of  the  place.  The  Egyptian 
garrison  was  shortly  afterwards  withdrawn. 

The  Sultan  was  indignant.  For  a  time,  the 
Foreign  Offices  of  Europe  rang  with  angry  but 
ineffectual  protests  from  the  Porte.    The  Powers 


58 


MODERN  EGYPT 


who  had  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  were  implored  to  interfere.  But  no  one 
had  any  real  interest  in  the  matter.  The 
Cabinets  of  Europe  turned  their  heads  the  other 
way,  and  the  diplomatic  clamour  soon  died  out. 
From  that  time  forth,  Italy  has  been  in  possession 
of  Massowah.  Whether  it  is  worth  while  for  the 
Tuscan  and  NeapoUtan  peasant  to  continue  to  pay 
taxes  for  the  maintenance  of  Itahan  authority  over 
a  territory,  which  will  probably  never  be  of  any 
gi'eat  value  either  from  a  commercial  or  from  any 
other  point  of  view,  is  a  matter  for  the  ItaUan 
nation  to  decide.  Nations  are  not,  however, 
entirely  governed  by  considerations  of  material 
interests.  The  national  honour  and  dignity  are 
supposed  to  be  at  stake,  and  they  will,  without 
doubt,  so  far  carry  the  day  as  to  prevent  Italy 
from  abandoning  territory  v/hich  possibly  many 
Itahans  now  think  it  was  unvvdse  ever  to  have 
seized. 

Thus  it  was  that  the  huge  unwieldy  edifice, 
which  Ismail  Pasha  had  sought  to  erect,  fell  with  a 
crash  which  resounded  throughout  North-Eastem 
Africa.  The  Englishman,  the  ItaUan,  the  French- 
man, the  Abyssinian,  the  Der\ish,  and  the  slave- 
hunter  divided  the  spoils  between  them.  And  why 
did  the  edifice  fall  ?  The  destruction  of  General 
Hicks's  army  precipitated  the  catastrophe.  But 
the  real  reason  why  Ismail  Pasha's  empire  fell  was 
that  it  was  eventually  overtaken  by  the  fate 
inevitably  attending  all  poUtical  fabrics  which  are 
rotten  to  the  core.  It  fell  because  it  deserved  to 
fall.  It  may  be  that  the  hght  of  Western 
civihsation  will  some  day  be  shed  over  the  whole 
of  Africa,  but  if  this  consummation  is  ever  to  be 
attained,  it  must  be  through  other  agents  than 
the  slave-huntmg,  corrupt,  and  tyrannical  Pashas, 


OH.  XXX  DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN 


59 


who  were  employed  by  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment, and  who,  themselves  but  semi -civilised, 
introduced  none  of  the  blessings  but  some  of 
the  curses  of  civilisation  amongst  the  people 
who,  by  a  cruel  fate,  were  for  a  time  placed  under 
their  control. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 


THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT 
1886-1892 

The  Egyptian  army — Negotiations  with  the  Dervishes — Fighting  on 
the  frontier — The  siege  of  Suakin — Defeat  of  Osman  Digna — 
Wad-el-Nej umi — Nejumi  advances — The  battles  of  Argin  and  of 
Toski— Death  of  Wad-el-Nej  umi — Results  of  the  battle — Situation 
at  Suakin  —  The  reoccupation  of  Tokar — Defeat  of  Osman 
Digna. 

Although  British  military  aid  to  a  very  limited 
extent  was  subsequently  on  one  or  two  occasions 
afforded  to  the  Egyptian  Government,  it  may  be 
said  that  from  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Ginniss 
(December  30,  1885)  the  defence  of  Egypt  against 
the  Dervishes  practically  devolved  on  the  Egyptian 
army.  That  army  was  now  officered  by  a  well- 
selected  body  of  Englishmen.  Its  organisation  had 
been  greatly  improved.  The  men  were  gaining 
confidence  in  themselves.  A  small  Egj^tian  Camel 
Corps  had  fought  at  Kirbekan,  and  its  conduct  had 
obtained  General  Brackenbury's  commendations. 
A  more  considerable  Egyptian  force  had  taken  a 
creditable  part  in  the  battle  of  Ginniss.  Hopes, 
therefore,  began  to  be  entertained  that  for  the 
future  the  Egyptian  army  would  of  itself  suffice 
to  repel  any  attack  which  might  be  made  by  the 
Dervishes.  The  sequel  showed  that  these  hopes 
were  destined  to  be  reahsed. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  a  great  shrinkage 

60 


CH.XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  61 


of  Egyptian  territory  had  taken  place.  The  army 
was  no  longer  called  upon  to  defend  remote  regions 
in  the  centre  of  Africa.  Its  task  was  of  a  more 
modest  nature.  In  the  first  place,  it  had  to  prevent 
the  Dervishes  from  descending  the  valley  of  the 
Nile  farther  than  Wadi  Haifa  ;  in  the  second  place, 
it  had  to  maintain  whatever  was  left  of  Egyptian 
authority  in  the  Eastern  Soudan,  For  the  time 
being,  this  latter  task  was  confined  to  the  defence 
of  the  town  of  Suakin,  for  Egyptian  authority  did 
not  extend  beyond  its  walls.  For  obvious  reasons, 
based  on  the  difficulties  of  communication,  the 
operations  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile  and  at  Suakin 
were  to  a  great  extent  independent  of  each  other. 

Before  entering  upon  a  description  of  the 
mihtary  operations  which  were  about  to  take 
place,  it  will  be  as  well  to  allude  briefly  to  an 
attempt  which  was  made  to  negotiate  with  the 
Dervishes.  A  Convention  between  the  British 
Government  and  the  Porte  was  signed  at  Con- 
stantinople, on  October  24,  1885,  in  virtue  of 
which  two  Commissioners,  one  British  and  one 
Turkish,  were  despatched  to  Cairo.  ^  The  second 
article  of  the  Convention  provided  that  the  Ottoman 
Commissioner  was  to  consult  with  the  Khedive 
"  upon  the  best  means  of  tranquiUising  the  Soudan 
by  pacific  measures."  After  some  delay,  it  was 
arranged  that  Youssuf  Pasha  Shuhdi  should  be 
sent  to  Wadi  Haifa  in  order  to  try  his  hand  at 
negotiation  with  the  Dervishes.  He  left  Cairo  for 
the  frontier  in  May  1886. 

It  was  as  well  to  make  an  attempt  to  negotiate, 
if  only  to  show  to  those  who  beUeved  in  the 
possibility  of  successful  negotiations  that  it  was 
hopeless  to  attempt  to  come  to  any  arrangement 
with  the  Dervishes.  But  to  all  who  had  any 
appreciation  of  the  true  nature  of  the  Mahdist 

*  This  subject  is  more  fully  treated  in  Chapter  XLVI. 


62  MODERN  EGYPT 


movement,  it  was  obvious  that  Youssuf  Pasha 
Shuhdi's  mission  was  foredoomed  to  failure.  It 
proved,  in  fact,  to  be  wholly  unproductive  of  results. 
A  year  later,  the  Khalifa  addressed  letters  to  the 
Queen,  the  Sultan,  and  the  Khedive,  which 
breathed  the  true  spirit  of  Mahdiism.  The  letter 
to  the  Queen  terminated  in  the  following  eloquent, 
if  somewhat  bombastic  peroration :  "  And  thou, 
if  thou  wilt  not  yield  to  the  command  of  God,  and 
enter  among  the  people  of  Islam  and  the  followers 
of  the  Mahdi — grace  be  upon  him — come  thyself 
and  thy  armies  and  fight  with  the  host  of  God. 
And  if  thou  wilt  not  come,  then  be  ready  in  thy 
place,  for  at  His  pleasure  and  at  the  time  that 
He  shall  will  it,  the  hosts  of  God  wiU  raze  thy 
dwelling  and  let  thee  taste  of  sorrow,  because 
thou  hast  turned  away  from  the  path  of  the 
Lord,  for  therein  is  sufficiency,  and  salvation  is 
to  him  who  followeth  the  Mahdi." 

For  three  years  subsequent  to  the  battle  of 
Ginniss,  desultory  fighting  continued  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Suakm,  and  in  the  Nile  valley. 
Notably,  a  briUiant  skirmish  took  place  on  Apnl 
28,  1887,  at  Sarras,  which  resulted  in  the  defeat 
of  the  Dervishes  with  a  loss  of  about  200  men, 
the  Egyptian  loss  being  51  killed  and  wounded. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  December  1888  that 
any  serious  engagement  occurred.  By  that  time, 
the  indigenous  tribes  near  Suakin  had  learnt  to 
appreciate  the  true  character  of  Dervish  rule. 
They  were  either  openly  hostile  to  Osman  Digna, 
or  were  only  prevented  by  fear  from  throwing 
off  their  allegiance  to  the  Mahdi.  Osman  Digna, 
however,  still  terrorised  the  country  with  tribal 
levies  drawn  from  a  distance.  He  obtained  rein- 
forcements and  laid  siege  to  Suakin.  It  was 
eventually  decided  that  he  should  be  attacked, 
and  for  this  purpose  more  Egyptian  troops  were 


CH.  XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  63 


despatched  from  Cairo.  In  addition  to  these, 
owing  to  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
Government  in  Parhament,  a  small  British  force 
was  sent  from  Cairo  to  Suakin,  though  its  presence 
was  quite  unnecessary.  Sir  Francis  Grenfell, 
who  had  succeeded  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Egyptian  army,  conducted 
the  operations  in  person.  On  December  20,  1888, 
the  Dervishes  were  attacked  and  driven  from  their 
entrenchments  with  a  loss  of  500  men.  The  British 
and  Egyptian  loss  was  2  officers  and  50  men  killed 
and  wounded.  The  result  of  this  action  was  to 
reUeve  the  pressure  on  Suakin.  Osman  Digna, 
however,  stUl  maintained  his  hold  over  the  Eastern 
Soudan  generally.  A  further  result  of  no  sHght 
importance  was  that  the  Egyptian  troops  acquired 
confidence  in  themselves  and  inspired  confidence 
in  the  minds  of  the  pubhc.  Previous  to  this 
action,  few  believed  in  the  Egyptian  army. 
Subsequent  to  the  action,  the  voice  of  criticism 
was  to  a  certain  extent  silenced.  It  had  been 
proved  that  some  reliance  could  be  placed  on 
Egyptian  troops. 

After  this  engagement,  the  valley  of  the  Nile 
became  the  chief  centre  of  interest. 

A  period  of  political  hurricane,  whether  the 
scene  be  laid  in  savage  Africa  or  in  civihsed 
Europe,  generally  brings  to  the  front  some 
individual  who  appears  to  embody  in  his  own 
person  the  genius  of  the  principles  which  it  is 
sought  to  assert.  Arabi,  though  no  hero,  was  a 
fitting  representative  of  the  justifiable,  but  blind, 
sullen,  and  unintelligent  discontent  which  prevailed 
amongst  the  Egyptians  at  the  time  of  the  rebeUion 
of  which  he  was  the  leader.  The  Mahdist  Avatar 
was  of  a  different  type.  The  true  incarnation  of 
Mahdiism  was  not  to  be  found  in  Osman  Digna, 
nor  even  in  the  Mahdi  himself.    Both  of  these 


64 


MODERN  EGYPT 


men  were  in  some  degree  strutting  on  the  stage. 
It  may  well  be  doubted  whether  either  of  them 
believed  in  himself.  Enlightened  self-interest, 
more  especially  in  the  shape  of  the  acquisition 
of  wealth,  lurked  behind  the  grandiloquent  periods 
of  their  Proclamations,  and  may  be  traced  in  the 
stage  tricks  by  which  it  was  sought  to  strengthen 
the  faith  of  a  credulous  and  fanatical  population. 
When  a  prophet  puts  pepper  under  his  finger-nails 
in  order  to  exci'te  his  lachrymal  glands^  a  safe 
indication  is  given  that  he  has  descended  from  his 
prophetic  pedestal,  and  that,  by  his  own  confession, 
he  may  be  classed  amongst  Pythonesses,  the  mani- 
pulators of  Delphic  oracles  and  winking  virgins. 

It  was  reserved  for  Wad-el-Nejumi  to  embody 
in  his  own  person  the  true  principles  of  militant 
Mahdiism.  He  was  at  once  the  Peter  the  Hermit 
of  the  Mahdist  crusaders  and  the  Prince  Rupert 
of  Dervish  chivalry.  He  beheved  in  Mahdiism, 
and  he  believed  in  himself.  When  summoned  by 
Sir  Francis  Grenfell  to  surrender  previous  to  the 
battle  of  Toski,  he  repUed,  "  We  are  not  afraid  of 
any  one  ;  we  only  fear  God  ! "  and,  without  doubt, 
he  spoke  the  truth.  Brave,  resourceful,  and  per- 
tinacious, Nejumi  inspired  amongst  his  followers 
a  confidence  which  he  carried  to  his  grave,  and 
which  stood  the  test  of  mihtary  defeat  and  death. 
Few  pictures  are  more  touching  than  that  of  the 
host  of  %vild  Dervish  prisoners  mourning  with  heart- 
felt sorrow  in  the  palm-grove  of  Toski  over  the 
body  of  the  chieftain  who  had  led  them,  their 
companions,  their  wives  and  theu*  children,  through 
sufi'ering  and  privation,  to  the  destruction  of  their 
pohtical  hopes  and  to  death.    Sir  Reginald  Wingate 

^  "  The  Greek  who  came  in  told  the  Greek  Consul  that  the  Mahdi 
puts  pepper  under  his  finger-nails,  and  when  he  receives  visitors  then 
he  touches  his  eyes  and  weeps  copiously  ;  that  he  eats  a  few  grains  of 
dhoora  openly,  but  in  the  interior  of  the  house  he  has  fine  feeding  and 
drinks  alcoholic  drinks." — Gordon's  Journal,  vol.  i.  p.  32. 


CH.  XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  65 


thus  describes  the  character  of  this  picturesque 
savage :  "  Nejumi's  career  closed  only  at  Toski,  when 
his  dev^oted  bodyguard  sold  their  lives  dearly  in 
defence  of  his  revered  corpse.  He  was  a  Jaalin, 
but  one  in  whom  the  Baggara  recognised  warlike 
qualities  similar  to  their  own,  and  with  whom  it 
was  important  to  keep  on  good  terms.  In  early 
life  a  Fiki,  like  the  Mahdi,  and  his  devoted  friend, 
stern,  hard,  ascetic,  the  thin  dark  man  was  the 
incarnation  of  a  blind  sincerity  of  conviction.  He 
never  transgressed  the  self-appointed  strictness  with 
which  he  ruled  his  conduct.  Withal,  a  spice  of 
madness  entered  into  his  composition.  There  was 
no  man  but  trusted  his  word,  and  his  was  the 
distant  enterprise,  his  the  forefront  of  danger 
always.  Mahdiism  was  the  natural  outlet  for  his 
wild  temper.  He  was  the  Khalid  of  the  Prophet's 
wars.  He  it  was  who  prepared  the  stratagem 
which  annihilated  Hicks.  He  it  was  who  crept 
silently  round  through  the  shallow  mud  beyond 
the  crumbled  ramparts  of  Khartoum." 

The  defeat  at  Ginniss  checked  the  advance  of 
the  Dervishes,  but  their  leaders  were  not  dis- 
couraged. It  is  probable  that  the  Soudanese 
population  failed  to  realise  the  fact  that  any 
military  reverse  had  been  sustained.  The  Khalifa 
vied  with  Napoleon  in  the  mendacity  of  his 
bulletins.  Moreover,  the  main  facts,  as  they 
must  have  presented  themselves  to  the  minds  of 
his  followers,  were  that  a  British  force  had  invaded 
the  Soudan,  that  it  had  failed  to  accomplish  its 
object,  that  the  capital  of  the  Soudan  had  fallen 
in  spite  of  British  endeavours  to  save  it,  and  that 
the  British  army  had  then  retired  and  had  assumed 
a  defensive  attitude.  It  can,  therefore,  be  no 
matter  for  surprise  that  "  general  rejoicings  "  took 
place  at  Khartoum.  The  Dervishes,  confident  in 
the  sacred  nature  and  ultimate  success  of  their 

VOL.  II  F 


66 


MODERN  EGYPT 


cause,  were  stimulated  to  fresh  exertions.  As  Lord 
Wolseley,  General  Gordon,  and  others  had  pre- 
dicted, it  was  decided  to  invade  Egypt.  *'  Nejumi," 
Sir  Reginald  Wingate  says,  "burnt  his  house  at 
Omdurman,  and  vowed  that  he  would  not  return 
until  he  had  conquered  Egypt.  On  his  departure, 
the  Khalifa  Abdullah  assembled  the  four  Khalifas 
and  all  the  Emirs.  They  aU  stretched  out  their 
hands  in  the  direction  of  Cairo,  and  called  out 
'Allahu  Akbar,'  three  times.  Then  the  Khalifa 
Abdullah  called  out  in  a  loud  voice,  '  O  Ansar ! 
fear  not  for  the  fight  for  the  land  of  Egypt ;  you 
will  suffer  much  at  the  battle  of  Assouan,  after 
which  the  whole  of  Egypt  will  fall  into  your 
hands.  O  Ansar !  you  wiU  also  suffer  much  at 
the  battle  of  Mecca,  after  which  the  whole  country 
will  be  yours.' " 

Some  time,  however,  elapsed  before  any  for- 
ward movement  was  made.  A  revolt  against 
the  Khalifa's  authority  took  place  in  Kordofan ; 
troubles  occurred  in  Darfour,  and  considerable 
bodies  of  men  had  to  be  detached  for  service  on 
the  Abyssinian  frontier.  JSIoreover,  the  important 
tribe  of  Kababish  Arabs,  who  inhabit  the  territory 
west  of  Dongola,  assumed  an  attitude  of  hostihty 
to  Mahdiism,  nor  was  it  till  1887  that  they  were 
crushed  and  their  chief,  Saleh  Bey,  killed  in  a 
decisive  engagement.  The  Mahdist  leaders,  there- 
fore, had  their  hands  full  for  the  space  of  three 
years.  As  successive  seasons  passed  and  no  forw^ard 
movement  was  made,  it  began  to  be  thought  that 
Dervdsh  invasion  was  a  mere  bugbear. 

At  last,  however,  the  long-expected  invasion 
took  place.  In  the  summer  of  1889,  Kejumi 
advanced  up  the  valley  of  the  Nile  vnth.  a  motley 
force,  consisting  in  aU  of  over  11,000  souls.  He 
was  joined  at  Sarras  by  a  further  body  of  1200 
fighting  men,  of  whom  about  300  were  armed  with 


CH.XXXI   THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  67 


rifles,  and  some  1000  camp  -  followers.  A  short 
distance  south  of  Wadi  Haifa,  Nejumi  left  the 
river.  He  decided  to  turn  Wadi  Haifa,  to  move 
along  the  west  bank  parallel  to,  but  at  some  httle 
distance  from  the  Nile,  and  then  to  strike  the  river 
again  at  a  point  somewhere  between  Wadi  Haifa 
and  Korosko.  He  hoped  and  believed  that  he 
would  be  joined  by  the  Nubian  population. 

This  plan  was  faulty  in  its  conception.  It  was 
of  a  nature  to  facihtate  the  conduct  of  defensive 
operations.  It  involved  toilsome  marches  under 
a  burning  sun  over  a  trackless  desert  devoid  of 
water.  The  difficulty  of  obtaining  suppHes  was 
great.  Even  before  leaving  the  river,  many  of 
the  horses,  camels,  and  donkeys  had  been  kiUed 
and  eaten.  Constant  excursions  to  the  river  were 
necessary  in  order  to  obtain  water,  and  the  river 
was  occupied  by  Egyptian  troops,  who  could  be 
moved  from  point  to  point  with  comparative  ease 
by  utilising  the  steamers  and  barges  which  were 
at  the  disposal  of  Colonel  Wodehouse,  the  com- 
mandant of  the  frontier.  In  the  language  of 
strategists,  the  Egyptian  army  was  acting  on 
interior  Hnes.  By  July  2,  Nejumi's  force  occu- 
pied a  position  in  the  desert  a  short  distance  from 
Arguin,  a  village  on  the  river  about  3^  miles  north 
of  Wadi  Haifa.  His  movements  were  carefully 
watched  and  followed  by  Colonel  Wodehouse  with 
a  flying  column  of  about  2000  men.  The  Dervishes 
attacked  the  village  and,  after  a  sharp  engagement, 
were  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  about  900  men, 
amongst  whom  were  several  important  Emirs. 
The  Egyptian  loss  consisted  of  4  officers  and 
66  men  lolled  and  wounded.  This  spirited  action 
reflected  great  credit  on  Colonel  Wodehouse  and 
the  force  which  he  commanded.  It  discouraged 
the  Dervishes,  and  contributed  materially  to  the 
final  and  decisive  victory  at  Toski.     Many  of 


68 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Nejumi's  men  deserted.  Abdul  Halim,  his  prin- 
cipal lieutenant,  advised  a  retreat.  It  was  futile, 
he  thought,  "to  attempt  an  invasion  of  Egypt 
with  insufficient  men,  no  food,  and  enormous 
difficulties  in  obtaining  water."  Nejumi's  indomit- 
able spirit  was,  however,  not  to  be  broken.  He 
made  an  eloquent  appeal  to  the  rehgious  zeal  of 
his  followers,  who  resolved  to  go  on,  and  if  needs 
be  to  die  with  him.  Accordingly,  the  unwieldy 
column,  dogged  at  every  step  by  the  watchful  and 
pertinacious  Colonel  Wodehouse,  moved  slowly 
and  laboriously  northward.  The  Dervishes  suffered 
greatly.  "  Desultory  skirmishes,"  Sir  Reginald 
Wingate  wrote,  "took  place  daUy,  and  numbers 
of  camp  -  followers,  women  and  children,  were 
captured.  One  and  all  gave  pitiable  accounts  of 
the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Arab  camp.  The 
numbers  of  camels,  horses,  and  donkeys  were 
rapidly  diminishing,  as  they  constituted  almost 
the  sole  food.  Might  was  right ;  so  the  lion's 
share,  such  as  it  was,  fell  to  the  fighting  men, 
while  the  miserable  camp  -  followers  subsisted  on 
powdered  date-seeds  and  the  core  of  the  date-palm 
tree,  which,  when  ground,  is  said  to  have  certain 
nutritive  properties.  But  many  of  these  un- 
fortunate people  were  reduced  to  a  state  of  starva- 
tion and,  flocking  to  the  river-bank  in  numbers, 
were  received  by  patrolling  gun-boats,  and  brought 
to  the  Egyptian  camp,  where  they  were  fed  and 
cared  for,  and,  if  wounded,  admitted  to  hospital." 

In  the  meanwhile,  reinforcements,  both  British 
and  Egyptian,  were  hurrying  up  from  Cairo.  The 
Egyptians  were  the  first  to  arrive,  and  Sir  Francis 
Grenfell,  who  had  assumed  the  command,  seeing 
a  favourable  opportunity,  struck  the  decisive  blow 
before  the  main  body  of  British  troops  came  up.^ 

'  A  small  body  of  British  cavalry,  however,  took  part  in  the  battle 
of  Toski. 


CH.XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  69 


On  August  2,  the  Egyptian  force  occupied  Toski, 
a  village  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Nile,  about  mid- 
way between  Wadi  Haifa  and  Korosko.  Nejumi 
camped,  on  the  night  of  the  2nd,  in  the  desert 
about  five  miles  from  the  village.  Early  on  the 
morning  of  the  3rd,  Sir  Francis  GrenfeU  made  a 
reconnaissance  in  force,  and,  on  approaching  the 
Dervish  position,  at  once  recognised  that  the 
topographical  features  of  the  ground  were  very 
favourable  to  the  Egyptian  troops. 

I  visited  the  battlefield  of  Toski  a  few  months 
later.  Many  of  the  Dervish  dead  were  still  imburied. 
The  empty  cartridge  cases,  which  were  strewed 
about,  showed  clearly  the  positions  which  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Egyptian  troops.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  conceive  ground  better  calculated  to 
give  disciplined,  well-armed,  and  well -equipped 
troops  every  possible  advantage  over  hordes  of 
courageous  but  ill-disciplined  savages.  The  soil 
of  the  desert,  which  is  here  undulating,  is  composed 
of  hard  shingly  sand,  over  which  infantry,  cavalry, 
and  artillery  can  move  with  ease  and  rapidity. 
Here  and  there,  a  few  rocks  and  boulders,  behind 
which  shelter  can  be  obtained,  rise  up  from  the 
plain.  Save,  however,  in  these  locaKties,  the  ground 
is  completely  bare.  Once  driven  from  the  shelter  of 
the  rocks,  it  was  clear  that  the  arms  of  precision, 
with  which  the  Egyptian  soldiers  were  furnished, 
would  work  with  deadly  effect  on  the  Dervishes. 
Sir  Francis  Grenfell,  therefore,  with  the  eye  of  a 
true  tactician,  determined  to  bring  on  an  action 
at  once.  Orders  were  sent  to  Toski  for  the 
remainder  of  the  Egyptian  troops  to  come  out. 
In  the  meanwhile,  the  cavalry,  under  Colonel 
Batchener,  headed  Nejumi,  who  at  first  wished  to 
avoid  an  action,  and  was  endeavouring  to  shp  away 
to  the  north.  It  was  evident  to  Nejumi  that 
he  had  to  accept  Sir  Francis  GrenfeU's  challenge. 


70 


MODERN  EGYPT 


He  gave  his  followers  an  Arab  version  of  Nelson's 
order  at  Trafalgar.  "  We  must  all,"  he  said, 
"  stand  prepared  to  meet  our  Maker  to-day." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  a  detailed  account  of 
what  followed.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that 
Nejumi  s  force  was  routed ;  1200  of  his  followers 
were  killed,  and  the  greater  portion  of  the  remainder 
were  taken  prisoner,  either  immediately  or  during 
the  next  three  days.  Sir  Reginald  Wingate 
estimates  that  the  total  force  with  which  Nejumi 
crossed  the  frontier  on  July  1,  together  with  the 
reinforcements  he  subsequently  received,  amounted 
to  about  57 00  fighting  men  and  8000  camp-foUowers. 
Of  these,  about  1000  fighting  men  and  2000  camp- 
followers  returned  to  their  homes.  The  remainder 
were  either  killed,  died  of  disease  and  starvation,  or 
were  taken  prisoners.  The  Egyptian  loss  at  the 
battle  was  165  killed  and  wounded. 

What,  however,  became  of  him  who  is  the  one 
interesting  figure  in  Dervish  history  ?  What  became 
of  the  savage  chieftain  who  had  looked  down  on 
the  hnes  of  Wadi  Haifa  but  a  few  weeks  previously 
and  had  sworn,  in  words  that  bring  back  Border 
minstrelsy  to  the  mind  of  an  Enghshman,  that  he 
would  "  stable  his  steed  m  Wodehouse's  chamber  "  ? 
Nejumi  was  slightly  wounded  at  an  early  stage  of 
the  fight.  One  of  his  relations,  who  was  taken 
prisoner  at  Toski,  said  :  "  On  the  capture  of  the 
first  position,  one  of  the  Emirs  escaped  from  the 
onslaught  and  rushed  breathlessly  by,  cr}dng  to 
Nejumi  that  all  was  over  and  that  he  should  fly. 
Instead  of  hstening  to  this  advice,  Nejumi  mounted 
his  horse  and,  dashing  down  to  the  plain,  vainly 
endeavoured  to  rally  his  men."  He  was  again 
wounded,  this  time  severely,  and  his  horse  was 
shot  under  him,  but  he  reached  the  shelter  of  the 
hills.  He  appears  then  to  have  been  wounded  yet  a 
third  time.    "During  the  artillery  attack  on  the 


CH.  XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  71 


second  position,"  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  says,  "a 
well-directed  shell  brought  down  the  largest  banner, 
which  was  subsequently  discovered  to  be  Nejumi's, 
and  it  is  probable  that  the  shell  which  broke  his 
flag-pole  also  wounded  Nejumi  again."  He  was 
carefully  tended  by  his  faithftd  bodyguard,  who 
placed  him  on  a  rough  camel -htter,  and  en- 
deavoured to  carry  him  to  the  rear.  The  party, 
"on  being  observed,  was  fired  on  by  a  troop  of 
cavalry ;  the  camel  fell,  and  most  of  the  men 
appeared  to  have  been  killed ;  the  cavalry  then 
followed  up,  and  called  on  the  remainder  to 
surrender,  but  as  they  approached,  the  Arabs 
supposed  to  have  been  lolled,  suddenly  sprang 
up,  and  rushing  at  them,  a  hand-to-hand  encounter 
ensued ;  a  number  were  killed,  and  the  remainder 
returned  once  more  to  their  camel.  They  were 
again  called  upon  to  surrender,  but  their  only 
response  was  a  second  charge,  which  resulted  in 
all  being  killed  except  one,  who,  mounting  a 
passing  horse,  succeeded  in  escaping."  It  was 
then  found  that  the  camel  carried  the  dead  body 
of  Nejumi.  "  One  of  his  sons,  a  boy  of  five  years 
old,  was  found  dead  beside  the  camel,  while  another 
baby  boy  scarcely  a  year  old  was  brought  by  his 
nurse  into  the  camp  at  Toski  on  the  following 
day."^ 

There  is  a  rude  pathos  about  the  Hfe  and  death 
of  this  savage  warrior,  which  brings  to  the  mind 
an  avT)p  apt<7To<;  of  Homcric,  or  a  Beowulf  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  times. 

I  have  already  said  that  the  lives  lost  at  Abu 

'  Of  all  the  sons  of  earth,  few  have  had  their  destiny  more  completely 
changed  by  accident  than  this  child.  Instead  of  being  broutrht  up  to 
detest  Christians  amidst  savage  surroundings  in  the  Soudan,  he  was 
handed  over  to  the  tender  care  of  the  English  nursing  sisters  at  the 
principal  hospital  at  Cairo,  by  whom  he  was  a  good  deal  spoilt,  and 
who  were  more  devoted  and  certainly  more  willing  slaves  to  him  than 
any  of  those  whom  his  father  could  have  captured  in  the  centre  of 
Africa. 


72 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Klea,  Kirbekan,  and  other  previous  battles  in  the 
Soudan  were  wasted,  or  as  good  as  wasted.  The 
same  cannot  be  said  of  those  who  fell  at  Toski. 
In  this  case,  the  soldier  was  the  executive  arm  of  a 
wise  pohcy.  He  was  defending  the  ground  secured 
to  civilisation  from  the  attacks  of  barbarous  fanatics. 
He  fought  in  a  good  cause.  He  deserved  to 
triumph,  and  his  triumph  was  complete.  The 
victory  of  Toski  brought  important  poUtical  results 
in  its  train.  It  pricked  the  Mahdist  bubble.  It 
showed  that  the  Dervishes,  although  perhaps  still 
strong  for  purposes  of  defence  in  their  own  remote 
and  inhospitable  deserts,  were  no  longer  to  be 
feared  as  aggressors.  It  gave  confidence  to  the 
Egyptian  army,  to  the  Egyptian  people,  and  to 
Europe.  It  showed  that  those  who  had  dwelt 
on  the  necessity  of  "  smashing  up  the  INIahdi "  at 
Khartoum,  had  been  in  error ;  that,  although  right 
in  supposing  that  the  Dervishes  would  invade 
Egypt,  they  had  overrated  the  Dervish  power  of 
offence ;  that  the  Mahdist  movement  had  less 
cohesion  and  was  less  formidable  than  was 
originally  supposed  ;  and  that  a  small  Egj'ptian 
force  led  by  British  officers,  with  merely  the  moral 
support  to  be  derived  from  the  presence  of  a 
British  garrison  in  Egypt,  was  sufficient  to  guarantee 
the  integrity  of  the  Khedive's  dominions.  With  the 
defeat  at  Toski,  the  aggressive  power  of  Mahdiism 
collapsed.  Su'  Francis  GrenfeU,  and  those  who 
fought  under  him,  gave  tranquillity  to  the  valley 
of  the  Nile,  and  enabled  the  work  of  the  ci\ahan 
reformer  to  proceed  without  fear  of  external 
aggression.  These  were  great  acliievxments,  wliich 
deserve  the  acknowledgments  of  all  who  are 
interested  in  the  welfare  of  Eg^-pt. 

The  scene  must  now  be  shifted  back  again  to 
the  Eastern  Soudan.  For  more  than  two  years 
after  the  defeat  of  Osman  Digna  on  December  20, 


CH.  XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  73 


1888,  no  events  of  importance  took  place  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Suakin.  Egyptian  authority  was 
hmited  to  the  ground  enclosed  by  the  fortifications 
of  the  town.  Any  isolated  wood -cutter  or  culti- 
vator who  roamed  beyond  the  range  of  the  guns  was 
hable  to  be  killed  or  captured  by  the  stray  Dervishes 
who  infested  the  environs.  The  indigenous  tribes 
became  daUy  more  hostile  to  Osman  Digna,  but 
they  had  not  the  strength  nor  the  power  of  com- 
bination necessary  to  drive  him  out  of  the  country. 

In  the  meanwhile,  a  lengthened  controversy 
took  place  as  to  whether  it  was  desirable  to 
prohibit  or  to  permit  trade  with  the  interior. 
Considerable  difference  of  opinion  existed  amongst 
the  local  authorities  as  to  the  wisest  course  to  be 
pursued  under  the  circumstances.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  mihtary  authorities  urged  that  if  grain 
were  allowed  to  leave  the  coast,  it  could  not  be 
prevented  from  reaching  the  Dervishes,  and  further, 
that  under  the  cover  of  legitimate  trade,  they 
would  receive  munitions  of  war.  Thus,  attacks 
on  Egyptian  territory  would  be  facihtated.  A 
serious  attack  on  Suakin,  which  was  contemplated 
in  1890,  was,  in  fact,  only  prevented  by  the  with- 
drawal of  the  permission  to  trade,  which  had  been 
previously  accorded.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
urged  that  the  Dervishes  were  few  in  number,  that 
they  tyrannised  over  the  rest  of  the  population, 
and  that  it  was  unjust  and  impolitic  to  make  the 
mass  of  the  people  suffer  for  the  faults  of  a  few, 
who,  moreover,  did  not  form  part  of  the  indigenous 
tribes  of  the  Eastern  Soudan,  but  were  strangers 
coming  from  distant  parts,  whose  presence  was 
unwelcome  to  the  natives. 

A  pohcy,  which  was  almost  prohibitive  of  trade, 
as  also  one  which  placed  no  hindrance  on  trade, 
were,  therefore,  supported  with  an  equal  degree  of 
conviction  by  competent  authorities.    Under  these 


74 


MODERN  EGYPT 


circumstances,  the  course  of  action  dictated  from 
Cairo  was  necessarily  vacillating.  At  times,  trade 
was  allowed ;  at  other  times,  it  was  wholly  or  in 
part  prohibited.  Neither  could  this  be  any  matter 
for  surprise,  for  the  arguments  which  the  advocates 
of  both  policies  were  able  to  advance  were  valid, 
if  considered  exclusively  on  their  own  merits. 

Another  question,  which  grew  in  importance 
during  the  year  1890,  was  the  Slave  Trade,  to  which 
a  stimulus  was  given  by  the  presence  of  the 
Dervishes  on  the  coast.  The  British  cruisers  in  the 
Red  Sea  were  powerless  to  stop  the  traffic.  Arab 
dhows  would  lie  concealed  amongst  the  numerous 
creeks  along  the  coast,  which,  o\ving  to  the  coral 
reefs,  cannot  generally  be  approached  by  large 
ships.  The  slave  caravans  would  wait  a  short 
distance  inland.  A  favourable  opportunity  would 
be  awaited,  the  slaves  would  be  brought  down  to 
the  shore,  embarked  at  sunset,  and  by  the  following 
morning,  with  a  fair  wind,  the  dhow  would  have 
weU-nigh  reached  the  opposite  coast  of  Arabia. 

It  was  frequently  pressed  upon  me  during  the 
year  1889  that  the  only  remedy  for  this  state  of 
things  was  to  reoccupy  Tokar,  which  is  the  granary 
of  the  Eastern  Soudan.  It  was  pointed  out  that, 
if  Osman  Digna  were  once  driven  out  of  Tokar,  he 
would  be  no  longer  able  to  obtain  suppUes,  and 
would  perforce  be  obliged  to  evacuate  the  Eastern 
Soudan.  For  some  while,  I  hesitated  to  move.  I 
was  reluctant  to  undertake  offensive  operations  of 
any  kind  in  the  Soudan,  and,  moreover,  I  was  aware 
that  any  proposed  advance  would  be  viewed  with 
great  disHke  in  England.  At  last,  however,  I  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  reoccupation  of  Tokar 
was  desirable,  and  that  as  a  military  operation 
it  presented  no  great  difficulty.  In  the  spring 
of  1890,  I  submitted  these  views  to  the  British 
Government. 


OH.  XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  75 


Lord  Salisbury,  who  then  presided  at  the  Foreign 
Office,  was  not  on  principle  averse  to  the  employ- 
ment of  force,  but,  before  sanctioning  its  employ- 
ment, he  wished  to  be  convinced  that  the  adoption 
of  such  a  course  was  both  necessary  and  desirable. 
He  habitually  viewed  mihtary  arguments  with 
suspicion.  At  a  later  period,  when  there  was  a 
question  of  giving  up  to  Turkey  some  forts  garri- 
soned by  Egyptian  troops  on  the  coast  of  Midian, 
Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  me  privately :  "  I  would 
not  be  too  much  impressed  by  what  the  soldiers 
teU  you  about  the  strategic  importance  of  these 
places.  It  is  their  way.  If  they  were  allowed 
full  scope,  they  would  insist  on  the  importance  of 
garrisoning  the  moon  in  order  to  protect  us  from 
Mars." 

In  the  case  now  under  discussion.  Lord  Salisbury 
was  not  convinced  of  the  desirability  of  departing 
from  a  defensive  attitude.^  The  matter  was,  there- 
fore, allowed  to  drop  for  a  while. 

*  Lord  Salisbury's  objections  to  an  advance  on  Tokar  were  stated  to 
me  in  a  private  letter,  dated  March  28,  1890,  in  the  following  terms : 
"  The  arguments  against  taking  Tokar  appear  to  me  to  be  that  the 
operation  must  involve  some  money,  and  may  involve  very  much,  and 
that  the  finances  of  Egypt,  though  no  longer  in  an  embarrassed 
condition,  are  only  convalescent,  and  a  very  slight  imprudence  might 
throw  them  back  into  the  condition  from  which  they  have  been  so 
painfully  and  laboriously  drawn.  Again,  when  once  you  have  per- 
mitted a  military  advance,  the  extent  of  that  military  advance  scarcely 
remains  within  your  own  discretion.  It  is  always  open  to  the  military 
authorities  to  discover  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  area  to  which 
your  orders  confine  them,  some  danger  against  which  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  guard,  some  strategic  position  whose  invaluable  qualities 
will  repay  ten  times  any  risk  or  cost  that  its  occupation  may  involve. 
You  have  no  means  of  arguing  against  them.  They  are  upon  their 
own  territory,  and  can  set  down  your  opposition  to  civilian  ignorance  ; 
and  so,  step  by  step,  the  imperious  exactions  of  military  necessity  will 
lead  you  on  into  the  desert.  To  these  considerations  I  must  add  that 
they  will  appear  infinitely  magnified  to  the  terrified  minds  of  people 
here  at  home.  They  were  so  deeply  impressed  with  the  disasters  of 
six  years  ago,  and  the  apparently  inexorable  necessity  which  had  driven 
them  into  situations  where  those  disasters  were  inevitable,  that  they 
shrink  instinctively  from  any  proposal  to  advance  into  the  Egyptian 
desert.    I  do  not  say  that  this  is  a  sufficient  argument  to  prevent  such 


76 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  m 


In  the  autumn  of  1890,  the  subject  was  again 
brought  to  my  notice.  "  I  am  convinced,"  Sir 
Francis  Grenfell  wrote,  "that  the  time  has  come 
when,  without  any  strain  on  the  finances  of  the 
country,  and  without  any  assistance  from  EngHsh 
troops,  the  country  as  far  as  Tokar  could  be 
pacified."  I  reconsidered  the  question  care- 
fully. The  evils  resulting  from  the  presence 
of  the  Dervishes  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Suakin 
were  daily  becoming  more  apparent.  I  was  more 
than  ever  convinced  that,  as  a  mihtary  operation, 
the  reoccupation  of  Tokar  presented  no  great 
difficulties,  and  that  it  would  not  involve  any 
considerable  expenditure  of  money.  More  than 
this,  I  felt  certain  that  there  was  no  serious  risk  of 
being  dragged  into  offensive  operations  on  a  large 
scale  in  the  Soudan.  No  one  was  more  open  to 
conviction  than  Lord  Salisbury.  Kno^dng  this,  I 
pressed  him  to  reconsider  the  matter.  Eventually, 
on  February  7,  1891,  Lord  Sahsbury  telegraphed 
to  me  that  the  Government  sanctioned  the 
occupation  of  Tokar. 

Reinforcements  were  now  sent  to  Suakin.  On 
February  13,  Colonel  Holled  Smith,  with  a  force 
of  about  2000  men,  occupied  Trinkitat  without 
opposition.  On  the  16th,  he  advanced  in  the  direc- 
tion of  El  Teb.  On  the  19th,  he  came  in  contact 
with  the  enemy  at  a  short  distance  from  the  town 
of  Tokar.  A  sharp  engagement  ensued.  "  The 
Dervishes,"  Colonel  Holled  Smith  reported, "pushed 
home  their  attack  with  their  usual  intrepidity  and 
fearlessness.  The  troops,  however,  stood  their 
ground,  and  did  not  yield  one  inch  throughout  the 
fine."  Finally,  the  Dervishes  were  routed  with 
heavy  loss.     Osman  Digna  escaped,  but  most  of 

an  advance,  if  there  is  a  clear  balance  of  undoubted  advantage  in  its 
favour ;  but,  in  the  absence  of  any  such  evidence,  it  must  be  accepted 
as  a  strong  presumption." 


CH.XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT  77 


his  leading  Emirs  were  killed.  The  Egyptian  loss 
was  10  killed,  including  one  English  officer,  and 
48  wounded.  Whatever  remained  of  the  Dervish 
force  fled  in  confusion  towards  Kassala.  The 
defeat  of  the  Dervishes  was  hailed  with  genuine 
satisfaction  by  the  population.  The  number  of 
persons  found  at  Tokar  who  had  been  subjected  to 
mutilation  of  the  most  cruel  description,  bore  ample 
testimony  to  the  barbarity  of  Dervish  rule. 

The  Tokar  expedition  was,  therefore,  a  complete 
success.  It  accompUshed  for  the  Eastern  Soudan 
what  Toski  did  for  the  valley  of  the  Nile.  It 
cleared  the  country  of  Dervishes,  and  enabled  the 
work  of  the  civilian  reformer  to  commence.^ 

To  sum  up — the  three  important  military  events, 
which  took  place,  during  the  years  immediately 
following  the  evacuation  of  the  Soudan  in  1885, 
were,  first,  the  defeat  of  the  Dervishes  before  Suakin 
on  December  20,  1888  ;  this  relieved  the  pressure 
on  Suakin,  but  did  not  produce  any  further  result 
of  importance.  Secondly,  the  defeat  of  Nejumi's 
force  at  Toski  on  August  3,  1889 ;  this  broke  the 
aggressive  power  of  the  Dervishes  and  tranquillised 
the  NUe  valley.  Thirdly,  the  defeat  of  Osman 
Digna  near  Tokar  on  February  19,  1891  ;  this 
permitted  an  Egyptian  reoccupation  of  the  province 
of  Tokar,  and  tranquilhsed  the  greater  part  of  the 
Eastern  Soudan.  After  many  years  of  painful 
transition,  therefore,  Egypt,  reduced  to  manage- 
able dimensions,  at  last  acquired  a  settled  frontier, 
which  the  Egyptian  Government  were  able  to 
defend  with  the  military  and  financial  resources 
at  their  disposal. 

If  a  regenerated  Egypt  is  now  springing  up,  its 

*  On  February  13,  Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  me :  "  Up  to  the  time 
when  I  write  all  seems  to  have  gone  well  with  the  Tokar  expedition  ; 
very  little  notice  is  taken  of  it  here.  We  are  thinking  of  nothing 
except  strikes,  and  of  the  later  cantos  of  the  epic  of  Kitty  O'Shea.'" 


78 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT,  UI 


existence  is  in  a  great  measure  due  to  the  fact  that, 
through  good  and  evil  report,  the  policy  of  with- 
drawing from  the  Soudan  and  adhering  to  a  strictly 
defensive  attitude  on  the  Egyptian  frontier  was 
steadily  maintained  for  some  years. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 


THE  RECONQUEST  OF  KHARTOUM 
OcTOLER  1895-September  1898 

Necessity  of  reconquering  the  Soudan — Danger  of  premature  action — 
The  Italian  defeat  at  Adua — It  is  decided  to  advance  on  Uougola 
— Provision  of  funds — Sir  Herbert  Kitchener — Indian  expedition 
to  Suakin — Railway  construction — Battle  of  Firket — Capture  of 
Dongola — The  Egyptian  Government  repay  the  money  advanced 
by  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt — The  British  Government 
advance  £800,000 — Question  of  a  further  offensive  movement — • 
Capture  of  Abu  Hamed  and  Berber — Reoccupation  of  Kassala — 
British  troops  sent  to  the  Soudan — The  battle  of  the  Atbara — The 
battle  of  Omdurman — Cost  of  the  campaign — The  War  Office — The 
policy  of  reconquest. 

The  Soudan  had  been  left  derelict,  not  so  much 
because  the  cargo  was  valueless,  but  rather  because 
no  hands  were  available  to  effect  the  salvage.  It 
was,  however,  certain  from  the  first  that  the  recon- 
quest of  some,  at  all  events,  of  the  lost  provinces 
would,  sooner  or  later,  have  to  be  undertaken. 
To  those  who  were  well  acquainted  with  all 
the  circumstances,  it  might,  indeed,  be  clear  that 
England  was  not  responsible  for  the  loss  of  the 
Soudan,  but  the  broad  fact,  which  had  sunk  into 
the  minds  of  the  British  pubhc,  was  this — that  during 
a  period  when  British  influence  was  paramount  in 
Egypt,  certain  provinces,  which  had  before  been 
open  to  trade,  and  which  might  have  been  subjected 
to  the  influences  of  civiUsation,  had  been  allowed 
to  relapse  into  barbarism.  The  national  honour 
was  touched.    It  was  thought  that  the  British 

79 


80 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Government,  even  if  not  originally  responsible  for 
the  loss  of  the  provinces,  would  become  responsible 
if  no  endeavour  were  made  to  effect  their  recon- 
quest.  A  sense  of  shame  was  very  generally  felt 
that,  under  British  auspices,  Egj'ptian  territory 
should  have  undergone  such  severe  shrinkage. 
The  popular  sentiment  on  the  subject  found  ex- 
pression in  the  feehng  that  "  Gordon  should  be 
avenged." 

It  was  from  the  first  obvious  that  the  partial 
reconquest  of  the  Soudan  was  not  beyond  the 
mihtary  and  financial  resources  of  England,  but 
little  inclination  was  for  some  while  shown,  either 
by  successive  Governments  or  by  pubhc  opinion,  to 
employ  those  resources  in  order  to  attain  the  object 
in  view.  The  problem,  which  apparently  had  to  be 
faced,  was  how  the  Egyptian  Government,  with  but 
little  or  no  British  help,  could  reassert  their  authority 
in  the  Soudan.  It  was  a  necessary  condition  to 
the  solution  of  this  problem  that  it  should  not 
entail  any  increase  to  the  fiscal  burdens  of  the 
Egyptian  people,  and  that  it  should  not  involve 
any  serious  risk  that  the  affairs  of  Egypt  proper, 
which  were  begiiming  to  settle  down,  should  relapse 
into  disorder. 

During  the  years  which  immediately  followed 
the  retreat  of  the  troops  after  the  abortive  Gordon 
expedition,  the  main  danger,  against  which  it  was 
necessary  to  guard,  was  to  prevent  the  British  and 
Egyptian  Governments  from  being  driven  into 
premature  action  by  the  small  but  influential 
section  of  public  opinion  which  persistently  and 
strenuously  advocated  the  cause  of  immediate  re- 
conquest.  During  all  this  period,  therefore,  I  was 
careful  in  all  my  published  reports  to  lay  special 
stress  on  the  desirabihty  of  inaction.  Indeed,  my 
personal  opinion  was  that  the  period  of  enforced 
inaction  would  last  longer  than  was  actually  the 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  81 


case.  If,  about  the  year  1886,  I  had  been  asked 
how  long  a  time  would  probably  elapse  before  it 
would  be  possible  for  the  Egyptian  Government 
to  abandon  a  defensive  and  to  assume  an  offensive 
policy  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile,  I  should  have 
conjecturally  fixed  the  period  at  about  twenty-five 
years.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Egyptian  army 
reoccupied  Dongola  and  Berber  about  twelve 
years,  and  Khartoum  thirteen  years  after  their 
abandonment.  The  main  reason  why  my  forecast 
proved  erroneous  was  that  the  conditions  of  the 
problem  were  changed.  The  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment were  not  left  to  deal  single-handed  with  the 
military  and  financial  situation.  Valuable  assistance, 
both  in  men  and  money,  was  afforded  by  England. 

Before  any  thought  of  recon quest  could  be 
entertained,  two  conditions  had  to  be  fulfilled.  In 
the  first  place,  the  Egyptian  army  had  to  be 
rendered  efficient.  In  the  second  place,  not  only 
had  the  solvency  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury  to  be 
assured,  but  funds  had  to  be  provided  for  the 
extraordinary  expenditure  which  the  assumption  of 
an  offensive  policy  would  certainly  involve. 

The  engagements  which  took  place  in  1888-89 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Suakin  and  in  the  Nile 
valley,  showed  that  some  confidence  could  be  placed 
in  the  Egyptian  army. 

Financial  rehal  ilitation  and  material  progress  in 
every  direction  proceeded  at  a  far  more  rapid  pace 
than  had  been  anticipated.  By  1895,  the  recon- 
quest  of  the  Soudan  had  begun  to  be  generally 
discussed  as  an  undertaking,  which  would  probably 
be  capable  of  realisation  at  no  very  remote  period. 

In  October  1895,  the  question  was  raised  in  the 
following  form.  For  some  while  previous,  a 
scheme  for  holding  up  the  water  of  the  Nile  in 
a  large  reservoir  had  been  under  consideration. 
By  the  autumn  of  1895,  the  discussions  on  the 

VOL.  II  G 


82 


MODERN  EGYPT 


technical  aspects  of  the  proposal  were  so  far 
advanced  as  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  action 
might  before  long  be  taken.  It  was  at  the  time 
thought  that  the  Egyptian  Treasurj'^  could  not  deal 
simultaneously  with  both  the  reservoir  and  the 
Soudan.^  Unless  financial  help  were  to  be  afforded 
from  England,  the  wisest  plan  would  be  to  con- 
struct the  reservoir,  and  to  postpone  sine  die 
the  question  of  reoccupying  the  Soudan.  Subse- 
quently, the  increase  of  revenue  derived  from  the 
construction  of  the  reservoir  might,  it  was  thought, 
provide  funds  which  would  enable  the  Soudan  to 
be  reconquered.  I,  therefore,  asked  the  British 
Government  what  was  their  view  on  this  subject. 
I  was  told  in  reply  (November  15,  1895)  that  there 
was  not  any  present  prospect  of  the  Government 
consenting  to  the  despatch  of  a  miUtary  expedition 
into  the  Soudan,  and  that,  therefore,  the  financial 
arrangements  of  the  Egyptian  Government  could 
be  made  without  reference  to  the  cost  of  any  such 
expedition. 

When  I  received  this  communication,  I  thought 
that  the  question  of  reconquering  the  Soudan  had 
been  definitely  postponed  for  some  years  to  come. 
I  was  wrong.  I  was  about  to  receive  another 
object-lesson  on  the  danger  of  indulging  in  pohtical 
prophecy.  The  utterances  of  the  Oracle  of  Dodona 
depended  on  the  breeze  which  stirred  the  branches 
of  the  speaking  oaks  around  the  temple  of  Zeus. 
Those  of  the  London  oracle  are  scarcely  less 
uncertain.  They  depend  on  the  ephemeral  indica- 
tions of  the  pohtical  barometer.  When  I  pro- 
pounded the  question  of  whether  the  construction 
of  the  reservoir  was  to  be  preferred  to  Soudan 
recoiiquest,  a  steady  breeze  of  caution  was  blowing 

1  Eventually,  an  arrangement  was  made  under  which  the  Nile 
reservoir  at  Assouan  was  constructed  simultaneously  with  the  Soudan 
operations.  The  financial  difficulty  was  met  by  postponing  payment 
for  the  reservoir  until  it  was  completed. 


CH.XXXU    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  83 


amongst  the  political  oaks  of  London.  The  oracle 
pronounced,  in  no  uncertain  language,  in  favour  of 
the  reservoir.  But  a  sharp  squall  was  about  to 
come  up  from  an  opposite  direction,  with  the  result 
that  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  the  decision  was 
reversed,  and  the  oracle  pronounced  as  decisively 
in  favour  of  an  advance  into  the  Soudan  as  it  had 
previously,  under  different  barometrical  indications, 
rejected  any  such  idea. 

The  change  was  in  some  degree  the  outcome  of 
the  rapid  growth  of  the  Imperiahst  spirit,  which 
about  this  time  took  place  in  England,  but  the 
more  immediate  cause  was  the  turn  which  affairs 
took  at  Massowah.  The  Italians  were  being 
hard  pressed  by  the  Abyssinians.  Rumours  were 
afloat  that  the  latter  were  in  league  with  the 
Dervishes,  who  were  about  to  attack  Kassala. 
Early  in  January  1896,  some  discussion,  which 
was  not  productive  of  any  practical  result,  took 
place  as  to  whether  a  demonstration,  which  might 
possibly  reheve  the  pressure  on  the  Itahan  forces, 
could  not  advantageously  be  made  either  from 
Wadi  Haifa  or  Suakin.  Eventually,  on  March  1, 
the  Itahan  army  under  General  Baratieri  was 
totally  defeated  by  King  Menelek's  forces  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Adua. 

This  brought  matters  to  a  crisis.  The  Itahan 
Ambassador  in  London  urged  that  a  diversion 
should  be  made  in  Itahan  interests.  On  March 
12,  therefore,  it  was  suddenly  decided  to  reoccupy 
Dongola.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  decision 
was  taken  and  pubhcly  announced  with  some- 
what excessive  haste.  The  financial  and  imhtary 
difficulties,  which  would  have  to  be  encountered, 
were  inadequately  considered.  But  it  is  not  on 
that  account  to  be  inferred  that  the  decision  was 
unwise.  The  absence  of  consistency,  which  is  so 
frequently  noticeable  in  the  aims  of  British  policy, 


84 


MODERN  EGYPT 


is,  indeed,  a  never-ending  source  of  embarrassment 
to  those  on  whom  devolves  the  duty  of  carrying 
that  poHcy  into  execution.  A  British  Prime 
Minister  appears  to  be  in  the  position  of  the  steers- 
man of  a  surf-boat  lying  outside  the  mouth  of  an 
African  river.  He  has  to  wait  for  a  high  wave  to 
carry  him  over  the  bar.  In  the  particular  instance 
in  point,  it  appeared  at  the  time  that  it  would  on 
many  gi*ounds  have  been  wiser  to  have  delayed 
action.  The  arguments  based  on  the  desirability 
of  helping  the  Itahans,  and  of  checking  any  possible 
advance  on  the  part  of  the  Dervishes,  although  of 
some  weight,  were  not  conclusive.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  poUcy  of  eventual  reconquest  was  sound. 
It  is  not  always  possible  in  politics  to  choose 
beforehand  the  time  and  method  of  action.  The 
opportunity  must  be  seized  when  it  occurs. 
Whether  the  British  steersman  was  right  or  wrong 
in  selecting  the  Italian  wave  to  float  him  over 
the  Soudan  bar,  depended  in  a  great  measure  on 
whether  the  operation  was  or  was  not  successfully 
conducted.  At  the  time,  I  was  inchned  to  tliink 
the  action  premature,  but  there  could  be  no  doubt 
that,  when  once  it  had  been  decided  to  act,  no 
effort  should  be  spared  to  ensure  success.  It  was 
also  very  necessary  to  combat  the  idea,  which  at  first 
found  some  favour  in  London,  that  the  operations 
should  be  limited  to  a  mere  demonstration  so  far 
as  Akasha,  a  short  distance  south  of  Wadi  Haifa. 
It  was  manifest  that  the  advance  should  either  not 
be  undertaken  at  all,  or  else  that  it  should  be  made 
with  the  intention  of  permanently  occupying  the 
country  at  once  as  far  as  Dongola,  and  eventually 
at  least  as  far  as  Khartoum.  There  M  as  something 
to  be  said  in  favour  of  delay  before  embarking  on 
a  forward  poHcy.  There  was  nothing  whatever  to 
be  said  in  favour  of  trifhng  with  the  question.  It 
was  essential  to  discard  absolutely  the  vacillation 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  85 


of  the  past  in  dealing  with  Soudan  matters.  The 
idea  of  limiting  the  operations  to  a  demonstration 
was  speedily  abandoned. 

When  once  it  had  been  decided  to  advance,  one 
of  the  first  questions  which  naturally  arose  was 
how  funds  were  to  be  provided  for  the  expenses  of 
the  expedition. 

Egypt  has  throughout  the  occupation  benefited 
greatly  by  the  tendency  which  exists  in  England 
towards  administrative  decentrahsation.  No  serious 
attempt  has  ever  been  made  to  govern  Egypt  from 
London.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  system  is 
wise.  It  has  enabled  us  to  avoid  the  numberless 
errors  which  generally  result  fi-om  the  highly 
centraHsed  systems  generally  adopted  on  the  conti- 
nent of  Europe.  But  even  a  sound  system  may 
have  some  disadvantages,  although  of  a  nature  in 
no  serious  degree  to  outweigh  its  merits.  One 
disadvantage  of  the  British  system  is  that,  in- 
asmuch as  the  details  of  aU  Egyptian  affairs  are 
managed  in  Eg5;^t,  few,  if  any,  of  the  officials 
employed  in  the  London  public  offices  are  in- 
timately acquainted  with  all  the  intricate  wind- 
ings of  the  Egyptian  financial  and  administrative 
labyrinth.  This  ignorance,  although  ordinarily 
beneficent,  has  at  times  produced  some  strange 
and  even  embarrassing  results.  In  this  par- 
ticular instance,  the  authorities  sitting  in  London 
were  aware  that  Egyptian  finance  was  in  a  flourish- 
ing condition.  Moreover,  they  knew  that  large 
sums  of  money,  the  savings  of  past  years,  had 
accumulated  in  the  Treasury.  They  considered 
that  the  reconquest  of  Dongola  was  an  Egyptian 
interest,  and  that  the  Egyptian  Treasury  might 
justly  be  caUed  upon  to  bear  the  expenses.  The 
possibihty  of  any  charge  devolving  on  the  British 
Treasury  had  not,  in  the  first  instance  at  aU  events, 
been  adequately  considered.    It  was  held  not  only 


86 


MODERN  EGYPT 


that  the  Egyptian  Government  ought  to  pay,  but 
that  they  would  be  able  to  pay.  The  fact  that  the  key 
of  the  Egyptian  Treasure-house  was  in  international 
keeping  had  been  insufficiently  appreciated,  even 
if  it  had  not  been  altogether  forgotten.  It  was 
impossible  to  obtain  access  to  the  accumulations 
of  past  years  without  the  consent  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Debt. 

Application  was  accordingly  made  to  the  Com- 
missioners for  a  grant  of  £E.500,000  from  the 
General  Reserve  Fund,  in  order  to  cover  the  ex- 
penses of  the  Dongola  expedition.  By  a  majority 
of  four  to  two,  the  Commissioners  granted  the 
request.  The  money  was  paid  into  the  Egj'ptian 
Treasury.  The  French  and  Russian  Commis- 
sioners, who  constituted  the  dissentient  minority, 
instantly  commenced  an  action  against  the  Egyptian 
Government  in  the  Mixed  Tribimal  of  First  In- 
stance at  Cairo. 

The  judgment  of  the  Tribunal  was  dehvered  on 
June  8.  The  Egyptian  Government  were  directed 
to  repay  the  money  granted  by  the  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt.  An  appeal  was  at  once  made  to  the 
higher  Court  sitting  at  Alexandria,  with  results 
which  will  presently  be  described. 

Simultaneously  with  the  financial  question,  the 
composition  and  command  of  the  force  had  to  be 
considered. 

A  British  battalion  was  sent  from  Cairo  to 
Wadi  Haifa,  more  as  an  indication  that  in  case 
of  need  English  help  would  be  forthcoming  than 
for  any  other  reason.  Some  British  officers  were 
temporarily  lent  to  the  Egyptian  army,  but  beyond 
this  assistance,  it  was  decided  to  employ  only 
Egyptian  troops  in  the  Nile  valley. 

The  command  of  the  force  was  left  to  the  Sirdar 
of  the  Egyptian  army.  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener.  A 
better  choice  could  not  have  been  made.  Yomig, 


ca  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  87 


energetic,  ardently  and  exclusively  devoted  to  his 
profession,  and,  as  the  honourable  scars  on  his  face 
testified,  experienced  in  Soudanese  warfare,  Sir 
Herbert  Kitchener  possessed  all  the  qualities  neces- 
sary to  bring  the  campaign  to  a  successful  issue. 
Like  many  another  military  commander,  the  bonds 
wliich  united  him  and  his  subordinates  were  those 
of  stern  discipHne  on  the  one  side,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  respect  due  to  superior  talent  and  the 
confidence  felt  in  the  resourcefulness  of  a  strong 
and  masterful  spirit,  rather  than  the  affectionate 
obedience  yielded  to  the  behests  of  a  genial  chief. 
When  the  campaign  was  over,  there  were  not 
wanting  critics  who  whispered  that  Sir  Herbert 
Kitchener's  success  had  been  due  as  much  to  good 
luck  as  to  good  management.  If,  it  was  said,  a 
number  of  events  had  happened,  which,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  did  not  happen,  the  result  might  have  been 
different.  The  same  may  be  said  of  any  military 
commander  and  of  any  campaign.  Fortune  is 
proverbially  fickle  in  war.  The  greatest  captain  of 
ancient  times  spoke  of  "  Fortuna,  quae  plurimum 
potest  quum  in  reliquis  rebus  tum  praecipue  in 
bello."  ^  The  fact,  however,  is  that  Sir  Herbert 
Kitchener's  main  merit  was  that  he  left  as  Uttle  as 
possible  to  chance.  A  first-rate  military  adminis- 
trator, every  detail  of  the  machine,  with  which  he 
had  to  work,  received  adequate  attention.  Before 
any  decisive  movement  was  made,  each  portion  of 
the  machine  was  adapted,  so  far  as  human  foresight 
could  provide,  to  perform  its  allotted  task. 

Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  also  possessed  another 
quality  which  is  rare  among  soldiers,  and  which 
was  of  special  value  under  the  circumstances  then 
existing.  He  did  not  think  that  extravagance  was 
the  necessary  handmaid  of  efficiency.  On  the 
contrary,  he  was  a  rigid  economist,  and,  whilst 

^  Caesar,  De  Bello  Civili,  iii.  68. 


88 


MODERN  EGYPT 


making  adequate  provision  for  all  essential  and 
necessary  expenditure,  suppressed  with  a  firm  hand 
any  tendency  towards  waste  and  extravagance. 

Although  it  was  intended  that,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  one  British  battahon,  only  Egyptian  troops 
should  be  employed  in  the  advance  on  Dongola,  at 
the  same  time,  in  view  of  the  uncertainty  prevail- 
ing as  to  the  amount  of  resistance  Ukely  to  be 
encountered  from  the  Dervishes,  it  was  thought 
desirable  to  reheve  the  Egj^tian  army  temporarily 
of  the  duty  of  guarding  Suakin,  and  thus  enable 
the  Sirdar  to  concentrate  all  his  available  forces  in 
the  valley  of  the  Nile.  An  Indian  force  of  about 
2500  fighting  men  was,  therefore,  despatched  to 
Suakin.  It  arrived  early  in  June,  and  left  in  the 
following  December. 

Although  these  Indian  troops  merely  performed 
garrison  duties,  they  rendered  services  of  great 
value ;  their  presence  at  Suakin  relieved  both  the 
British  and  Egyptian  Governments  of  all  anxiety 
as  regarded  the  affairs  of  the  Eastern  Soudan. 

In  conformity  with  the  plan  adopted  throughout 
this  narrative,  no  attempt  \nt11  be  made  to  give 
a  detailed  account  of  the  campaign  of  1896.  A 
brief  statement  of  the  principal  incidents  will 
suflfice. 

From  the  first  it  was  manifest  that  one  of  the 
main  difficulties  was  how  to  transport  the  food 
and  stores  for  the  army  whilst  on  the  march  to 
Dongola.  Few  of  those  who  have  not  been 
directly  or  indirectly  concerned  wdth  the  opera- 
tions of  war,  fully  appreciate  the  fact  that  at  least 
three-fourths  of  the  time  of  a  military  commander 
on  active  service  are  taken  up  with  devising 
means  for  keeping  his  own  troops  ahve.  "  A 
starving  army,"  the  Duke  of  Wellington  wrote 
from  Portugal,  "is  actually  worse  than  none  at 
all."    When,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  march  of 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  89 


the  army  lies  through  a  barren  and  desolate 
country,  and  when,  in  the  absence  of  roads  and 
wheeled  transport,  every  pound  of  biscuit  and 
every  extra  round  of  ammunition  has  to  be  carried 
on  the  backs  of  camels,  whose  slow  uniform  pace 
no  eagerness  on  the  part  of  the  commander  of  the 
force  can  mend,  it  may  readily  be  conceived  that 
the  difficulties  of  supply  and  transport  are  greatly 
increased.  River  transport  could  only  be  used  in 
certain  localities,  that  is  to  say,  where  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Nile  was  unimpeded  by  rapids.  The 
obvious  solution  of  these  difficulties  was  to  con- 
tinue in  a  southerly  direction  the  railway,  which 
already  existed  between  Wadi  Haifa  and  Sarras, 
the  most  distant  outpost  held  by  the  Egyptian 
army.  Akasha,  some  fifty  miles  south  of  Sarras, 
was  accordingly  occupied  without  resistance  on 
March  20.  Work  on  the  railway,  which  was 
eventually  to  terminate  at  Kerma,  a  few  miles 
short  of  Dongola,  was  at  once  commenced.^ 

The  details  of  the  plan  of  campaign  were,  of 
course,  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  Sirdar. 
I  had,  however,  fully  discussed  the  general  scheme 
of  operations  with  him  before  he  left  Cairo.  The 
main  point  was  to  bring  on  an  action  at  an  early 
period  of  the  campaign.  Once  victorious,  even  on 
a  small  scale,  the  Egyptian  troops  would  acquire 
confidence  in  themselves,  and  the  enemy  would  be 
proportionately  discouraged.  It  was  desirable  not 
to  allow  the  Dervishes  to  retreat  without  fighting, 
and  thus  delay  any  action  till  Dongola  was  reached. 
The  smallest  check  had  above  all  things  to  be 
avoided.  It  would  be  magnified  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world,  and  although  perhaps  of  shght  intrinsic 

^  This  line,  which  was  very  roughly  constructed,  has  now  been 
abandoned.  The  produce  of  the  Dongola  Province  will,  in  future,  be 
conveyed  to  Port  Soudan  partly  by  water,  and  partly  by  a  railway 
which  extends  from  Abu  Hamed  westwards  along  the  right  bank  of 
the  Nile  as  far  as  Kereinia. 


90 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  in 


importance,  would  produce  a  bad  moral  effect.  In 
war,  the  moral  is  to  the  physical  as  three  to  one. 
Nowhere  has  the  truth  of  this  celebrated  Napoleonic 
maxim  been  more  fully  exemplified  than  in  the 
successive  petty  campaigns  which  have  been 
conducted  in  the  Soudan.  The  Sirdar's  general- 
ship had,  therefore,  to  be  showni  in  obUging  the 
Dervishes  to  fight  under  conditions  as  regards 
topography  and  relative  numbers,  which  would  be 
favourable  to  the  troops  under  his  command. 

The  general  plan  of  campaign  arranged  in  Cairo 
was  executed  to  the  letter.  By  the  beginning  of 
June,  the  railway  had  been  constructed  to  within 
a  few  miles  of  Akasha.  A  force  of  about  3500 
Dervishes  was  known  to  be  at  Firket,  some  sixteen 
miles  south  of  Akasha.  It  was  determined  to 
surprise  this  force.  The  utmost  secrecy  was  pre- 
served. On  the  night  of  June  6,  two  columns, 
numbering  in  all  about  10,000  men,  marched  by 
convergent  routes,  with  the  object  of  meeting  in 
the  early  morning,  and  surrounding  the  Dervish 
camp  before  a  retreat  could  be  made.  An  opera- 
tion, the  success  of  which  depends  on  the  opportune 
concentration  of  two  separate  columns  at  a  given 
time  and  place,  is  always  difficult  of  execution. 
The  difficulties  are  enhanced  when  the  march 
takes  place  at  night.  So  skilfully,  however,  were 
all  the  arrangements  planned  and  conducted,  that 
the  object  which  it  was  sought  to  attain  was  fully 
secured.  Early  on  the  morning  of  June  7,  the 
Dervishes,  completely  taken  by  surprise,  were 
attacked  and  routed  with  heavy  loss  both  in  killed 
and  prisoners.  The  Egyptian  loss  was  20  killed 
and  80  wounded.  The  cavalry  continued  the 
pursuit  for  some  miles  beyond  the  battlefield. 

Three  laborious  months  followed  the  battle  of 
Firket.  Cholera  broke  out  in  the  camp,  and,  in 
spite  of  the  energy  and  self-sacrifice  of  the  medical 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  91 


officers,  was  not  suppressed  before  many  valuable 
lives  had  been  lost.  Storms  of  unprecedented 
violence  occurred,  with  the  result  that  large 
stretches  of  the  railway  embankment  were  washed 
away  and  had  to  be  reconstructed.  But  these  and 
many  other  obstacles  were  eventually  overcome. 
The  dogged  perseverance  of  the  British  officers, 
and  the  willing  obedience  of  the  sturdy  black  and 
fellaheen  troops,  were  proof  against  excessive  heat, 
sandstorms,  and  other  incidents  which  had  to  be 
encountered  in  this  inhospitable  region. 

The  whole  force,  from  General  to  private, 
deserved  success,  and  they  succeeded.  After  a 
sharp  conflict  at  Hafir,  on  which  occasion  the  gun- 
boats, which  had  been  dragged  with  much  labour 
up  the  Cataracts,  did  excellent  service,  Dongola 
was  occupied  on  September  23.  The  campaign 
was  virtually  over.  At  a  cost  of  411  lives,  of  whom 
364  died  from  cholera  and  other  diseases,  and  of 
£E.715,000  in  money — a  figure  which  bore  testi- 
mony to  the  Sirdar's  economical  administration — 
the  province  of  Dongola  had  been  reclaimed 
from  barbarism.  On  September  26,  the  furthest 
Egyptian  outpost  was  fixed  at  Merowi,  the  ancient 
capital  of  the  Ethiopian  Queens  of  the  Candace 
dynasty,  situated  at  the  foot  of  the  Fourth  Cataract. 

The  financial  campaign  lasted  rather  longer  than 
the  mihtary.  It  was  not  altogether  inglorious. 
The  Judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeal — or  at  aU 
events  the  majority  of  them — could  not  altogether 
shake  themselves  free  from  the  poUtical  electricity 
with  which  the  atmosphere  of  Egypt  was  at  this 
time  so  heavily  charged.  On  December  6,  the 
Court  condemned  the  course  adopted  by  the 
majority  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt  as 
Ulegal,  and  ordered  the  Egyptian  Government  to 
refund  the  money. 

I  had  anticipated  the  judgment  of  the  Court, 


92 


MODERN  EGYPT 


and  was,  therefore,  prepared  to  act.  Immediately 
after  its  delivery,  I  was  authorised  to  promise 
the  Egyptian  Government  pecuniary  help  from 
England.  At  that  time,  the  Egyptian  Treasury 
happened  to  be  full.  It  was  desirable  to  act 
promptly  and  thus  bar  the  way  to  international 
complications.  On  December  6,  four  days  after 
the  delivery  of  the  judgment,  the  total  sum  due, 
amounting  to  £E. 515,000,  was — somewhat  to  the 
dismay  of  official  circles  in  London — paid  to  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Debt.  Subsequently,  with 
the  consent  of  ParHament,  the  British  Treasury 
advanced  a  sum  of  £800,000  to  the  Eg}^tian 
Government  at  2f  per  cent  interest. 

Such,  therefore,  are  the  main  pohtical,  mihtary, 
and  financial  facts  connected  with  the  reconquest 
of  Dongola.  The  episode  is  one  to  which  both 
Englishmen  and  Egyptians  may  look  back  with 
pride  and  satisfaction. 

I  conceive  that  in  aU  civilised  countries — and 
perhaps  notably  in  England — the  theory  of  govern- 
ment is  that  a  question  of  peace  or  war  is  one  to  be 
decided  by  poHticians.  The  functions  of  the  soldier 
are  supposed  to  be  confined,  in  the  first  place,  to 
advising  on  the  purely  military  aspects  of  the  issues 
involved  ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  to  giving  effect 
to  any  decisions  at  which  the  Government  may 
arrive.  It  has,  however,  often  been  said  that  the 
practice  in  this  matter  not  unfrequently  differs 
from  the  theory ;  that  the  soldier,  who  is  generally 
prone  to  advocate  vigorous  action,  is  inclined  to 
encroach  on  the  sphere  which  should  properly  be 
reserved  for  the  poUtician ;  that  the  former  is  often 
masterful  and  the  latter  weak,  too  easily  dazzled  by 
the  ghtter  of  arms,  or  too  readily  lured  onwards  by 
the  siren  voice  of  some  strategist  to  acquire  an 
almost  endless  set  of  what,  in  technical  language, 
are  called  "  keys  "  to  some  position ;  and  that  when 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  93 


this  happens,  the  soldier,  who  is  himself  uncon- 
sciously influenced  by  a  laudable  desire  to  obtain 
personal  distinction,  practically  dictates  the  pohcy 
of  the  nation  without  taking  a  sufficiently  compre- 
hensive view  of  national  interests.  Considerations 
of  this  nature  have  more  especially  been,  from  time 
to  time,  advanced  in  connection  with  the  numerous 
frontier  wars  which  have  occurred  in  India.  That 
they  contain  a  certain  element  of  truth  can  scarcely 
be  doubted.  My  own  experience  in  such  matters 
leads  me  to  the  conclusion  that  in  most  semi- 
mihtary,  semi-poHtical  affairs  there  is  generally  an 
early  stage  when  the  pohtician,  if  he  chooses  to  do 
so,  can  exercise  complete  and  effective  control  over 
the  action  of  the  soldier,  but  that  when  once  that 
control  has  been  even  shghtly  relaxed,  it  cannot  be 
regained  until,  by  the  course  of  subsequent  events, 
some  fresh  development  occurs  bringing  with  it  a 
favourable  opportunity  for  the  reassertion  of  civil 
and  pohtical  authority. 

Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  Soudan,  so  long  as  the 
frontier  remained  at  Wadi  Haifa,  the  poUcy  of  the 
British  and  Egyptian  Governments  was  well  under 
control.  It  was  possible  to  weigh  the  arguments 
for  and  against  an  advance,  and  to  dehberate  upon 
the  ultimate  consequences,  mUitary,  pohtical,  and 
financial,  if  an  advance  was  undertaken.  But 
when  once  the  first  onward  step  had  been  made, 
the  period  for  dehberation,  even  in  respect  to 
matters  which  were  not  perhaps  fully  within  the 
original  purview  of  the  two  Governments,  or  at 
all  events  of  the  British  Government,  was  at  an 
end.  No  one,  who  had  seriously  considered  the 
subject,  imagined  for  one  moment  that  any  sure 
halting-place  could  be  found  between  Wadi  Haifa 
and  Khartoum.  In  the  spring  of  1896,  it  was 
possible  to  adduce  reasons  of  some  weight  in  favour 
of  postponing  the  reconquest  of  the  Soudan.  In 


94 


MODERN  EGYPT 


the  autumn  of  the  same  year,  it  was  not  possible  to 
adduce  a  single  valid  argument  in  favour  of  remain- 
ing inactive  and  delaying  the  completion  of  the 
work,  which  had  been  akeady  begun.  A  certain 
amount  of  hesitation  was,  however,  in  the  first 
instance,  displayed  before  the  inevitable  conclusion 
was  accepted  that  the  British  Government  had 
committed  themselves  to  a  poHcy,  which  involved 
the  reconquest  of  the  whole  of  the  Soudan.  This 
hesitation  was  probably  due  more  to  financial 
timidity,  and  to  the  reluctance  always  felt  by 
British  Ministers  to  decide  on  anything  but  the 
issue  of  the  moment,  rather  than  to  any  failure  to 
reahse  the  true  facts  of  the  situation.  It  was  not 
till  February  5,  1897,  that  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  (Sir  Michael  Hicks  Beach),  speaking  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  publicly  recognised  that 
"Egypt  could  never  be  held  to  be  permanently 
secure  so  long  as  a  hostile  Power  was  in  occupation 
of  the  Nile  valley  up  to  Khartoum,"  and  that  the 
duty  of  giving  a  final  blow  to  the  "  baleful  power 
of  the  Khalifa  "  devolved  on  England. 

Some  months  before  this  declaration  was  made, 
the  British  Government  were,  however,  practically 
and  irrevocably  committed  to  an  offensive  poUcy. 
Shortly  after  the  capture  of  Dongola,  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway  to  connect  Wadi  Haifa  and  Abu 
Hamed  was  commenced. 

Thanks  to  the  energy  and  skill  of  the  young 
Engineer  officers  to  whom  this  important  work 
was  entrusted,  two-thirds  of  the  hne  were  com- 
pleted by  August  1897.  The  Sirdar  then  deter- 
mined to  occupy  Abu  Hamed.  A  column  under 
General  Hunter  moved  from  Merowi  up  the  river. 
Abu  Hamed  was  occupied,^  on  August  7,  after  a 

'  The  interval  which  elapsed  between  the  occupation  of  Abu  Hamed 
and  the  final  advance  on  Khartoum  was  a  period  of  much  anxiety.  Sir 
Herbert  Kitchener's  force  depended  entirely  on  the  desert  railway  for 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  95 


sharp  combat,  in  which  the  Egyptian  army  lost 
27  killed,  including  two  British  officers,  and  61 
wounded.  Almost  the  whole  of  the  Dervish  force 
was  either  killed  or  taken  prisoner.  Evidence  was 
steadily  accumulating  that  the  Egyptian  soldiers 
were  inspired  by  a  very  diffisrent  spirit  from  that 
which  prevailed  fifteen  years  previously,  when  the 
troops  of  Arabi  fled  ignominiously  almost  at  the 
first  cannon  shot. 

On  August  31,  Berber,  which  was  evacuated  by 
the  Dervishes,  was  occupied  by  the  Egyptian 
troops.  The  construction  of  the  railway  from  Abu 
Hamed  to  Berber  was  at  once  taken  in  hand. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  Italians,  who  but  a  short 
time  before  had  been  eager  to  occupy  the  Kassala 
district,  were  clamorous  to  abandon  a  possession, 
which  they  found  expensive  and  of  doubtful  utility. 
On  Christmas  Day  1897,  Kassala  was  occupied  by 
an  Egyptian  force  commanded  by  Colonel  Parsons. 

In  the  Nile  valley,  no  considerable  change  took 
place  in  the  situation  for  some  months  after  the 
occupation  of  Berber.  It  was  clear  that,  without 
the  aid  of  British  troops,  Khartoum  could  not  be 
retaken,  but  nothing  definite  had  as  yet  been 
decided  as  to  their  employment.  All  hesitation 
was  eventually  removed  by  the  force  of  circum- 
stances.    Towards  the  close  of  the  year  1897, 

its  supplies.  I  was  rather  haunted  with  the  idea  that  some  European 
adventurer,  of  the  type  familiar  in  India  a  century  and  more  ago, 
might  turn  up  at  Khartoum  and  advise  the  Dervishes  to  make  frequent 
raids  across  the  Nile  below  Abu  Hamed,  with  a  view  to  cutting  the 
communication  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  force  with  Wadi  Haifa.  This 
was  unquestionably  the  right  military  operation  to  have  undertaken  ; 
neither,  I  think,  would  it  have  l)een  very  difficult  of  accomplishment. 
Fortunately,  however,  the  Dervishes  were  themselves  devoid  of  all 
military  qualities,  with  the  exception  of  undaunted  courage,  and  did 
not  invite  any  European  assistance.  They,  therefore,  failed  to  take 
advantage  of  the  opportunity  presented  to  them.  To  myself,  it  was  a 
great  relief  when  the  period  of  suspense  was  over.  1  do  not  think 
that  the  somewhat  perilous  position  in  which  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener's 
army  was  unquestionably  placed  for  some  time  was  at  all  realised  by 
the  public  in  general. 


96 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  in 


reports  were  rife  of  an  intention  on  the  part  of 
the  Dervishes  to  take  the  offensive.  Whatever 
doubt  might  exist  as  to  the  time  when  a  further 
onward  movement  should  be  undertaken,  there 
could  be  but  one  opinion  as  to  the  necessity  of 
defending  the  territory  already  gained.  Retreat 
was  out  of  the  question.  The  Dervish  challenge 
had  to  be  accepted.  I  had  encouraged  the  Sirdar 
to  ask  for  British  troops  directly  he  thought  their 
presence  necessary.  On  the  first  day  of  the  year 
1898,  he  sent  me  an  historic  telegram,  which 
virtually  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Soudan.  "  General 
Hunter,"  he  said,  "reports  confirming  news  of 
a  Dervish  advance.  I  think  that  British  troops 
should  be  sent  to  Abu  Hamed,  and  that  reinforce- 
ments should  be  sent  to  Egypt  in  case  of  necessity. 
The  fight  for  the  Soudan  would  appear  to  be  hkely 
to  take  place  at  Berber."  Four  British  battahons 
were  at  once  sent  up  the  Nile.  The  Cairo  garrison 
was  increased.  Manifestly,  the  curtain  had  gone  up 
on  the  last  scene  in  the  drama,  which  commenced 
with  the  destruction  of  General  Hicks's  army  fifteen 
years  previously. 

A  few  days  after  the  first  demand  for  troops  had 
been  communicated  to  me,  the  Sirdar  telegraphed 
that,  when  the  final  advance  to  Khartoum  was 
made,  he  would  require,  in  addition  to  the  British 
troops  about  to  be  sent  to  the  Soudan,  another 
infantry  brigade  of  four  battahons,  a  regiment  of 
cavalry  and  a  battery  of  field  artillery.  His  fore- 
cast of  the  force  which  would  be  necessary  was 
wonderfully  accurate.  The  force  which  eventually 
advanced  on  Khartoum  some  six  months  later,  was 
precisely  identical  with  that  which  Sir  Herbert 
Kitchener  specified  early  in  January  1898.  To 
have  advanced  with  a  smaller  force  would  have 
been  dangerous.  A  larger  force  would  have  been 
rnwieldy,  and  its  employment  would  have  increased 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  97 


the  difficulties  of  transport  and  supply.  Amongst 
other  high  military  quahties,  the  Sirdar  possessed 
the  knowledge  of  how  to  adapt  his  means  to  his 
end. 

The  threatened  Dervish  advance  rendered  neces- 
sary the  despatch  of  British  troops  to  the  Soudan 
six  months  before  the  rise  of  the  Nile  allowed  of 
free  navigation.  Chmate,  it  was  thought  at  the 
time,  might  possibly  be  the  most  dangerous  enemy 
which  would  have  to  be  encountered.  Some  dis- 
cussion, therefore,  ensued  as  to  whether  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  send  up  two  British  brigades 
at  once,  and  advance  straightway  on  Khartoum. 
The  idea  was,  however,  speedily  abandoned.  The 
difficulties  of  transport  and  supply  would  have  been 
enormous.  At  least  7000  camels,  which  it  would 
have  been  well-nigh  impossible  to  have  obtained, 
would  have  been  required.  It  was,  therefore, 
decided  to  stand  on  the  defensive,  and  to  await 
the  favourable  season  before  striking  a  final  blow 
at  the  Dervish  stronghold  at  Omdurman. 

By  the  beginning  of  March,  a  force  consisting 
of  one  British  and  two  Egyptian  brigades,  together 
with  a  regiment  of  Egyptian  cavalry,  24  field  and 
horse  artillery  guns,  and  12  Maxims,  had  been 
concentrated  between  Berber  and  the  junction  of 
the  Atbara  and  the  Nile,  where  a  strong  entrenched 
camp  was  formed. 

About  the  middle  of  February,  a  Dervish  force 
of  about  12,000  men,  under  the  command  of  the 
Emir  Mahmoud,  which  had  been  stationed  at 
Metemmeh,  crossed  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river. 
Contradictory  reports  continued  to  be  received  as 
to  the  intentions  of  this  force.  It  was  known  that 
dissension  existed  amongst  the  Dervish  leaders. 
Eventually,  Mahmoud  abandoned  the  idea  of 
moving  up  the  right  bank  of  the  river.  He 
struck  across  the  desert,  and  estabUshed  himself 

VOL.  II  H 


98 


MODERN  EGYPT 


at  Nakheila  on  the  Atbara,  some  35  miles  from 
its  mouth.  On  March  20,  the  Sirdar  began  to 
move  slowly  up  the  Atbara  to  meet  him. 

A  pause  of  some  duration  then  ensued.  It  was 
hoped  that  Mahmoud  would  attack,  but  time  went 
on  and  he  showed  no  disposition  to  move. 

On  April  1,  the  Sirdar  telegraphed  to  me  as 
follows  : — 

"  I  am  rather  perplexed  by  the  situation  here. 
Mahmoud  remains  stationary  and  his  army  is  very 
badly  off  for  supplies,  and  deserters  keep  coming 
in  to  us,  though  not  in  such  large  numbers  as  I 
expected.  He  is  waiting  apparently  for  instructions 
from  the  Khalifa  before  advancing  or  retiring.  It 
seems  to  be  thought  by  the  deserters  that,  as  a 
retirement  would  be  an  acknowledgment  of  fear,  he 
will  eventually  advance.  Here  we  are  well  off  and 
healthy,  with  sufficient  transport,  fresh  bread  every 
second  day,  and  fresh  meat  every  day.  Yesterday, 
I  discussed  the  situation  with  Gatacre  and  Hunter  ; 
the  former  was  inclined  to  attack  Mahmoud's 
present  position,  the  latter  to  wait  here.  VYe 
should  have  great  advantage  of  ground  if  INlahmoud 
will  advance,  but  if  he  retires  mthout  our  attacking 
him,  the  opportunity  wiU  have  been  lost  of  dealing 
a  blow  by  which  future  resistance  in  the  Soudan 
would  probably  be  considerably  affected.  I  have 
little  doubt  of  the  success  of  our  attack  on  his 
present  entrenched  position,  though  it  would  prob- 
ably entail  considerable  loss.  I  have  decided  not 
to  change  present  policy  for  three  days,  before 
which  something  definite  will,  I  hope,  be  knoAvn.  I 
should  be  glad  to  learn  your  views  on  the  subject." 

The  point  which  struck  me  most  in  this  message 
was  that  General  Hunter  doubted  the  wisdom  of 
attacking.  I  knew  him  to  be  a  fighting  General. 
Moreover,  he  had  seen  Mahmoud's  position.  On 
the  previous  day  (March  31),  he  had  returned  from 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  99 


a  cavalry  reconnaissance,  as  to  the  results  of  which 
the  Sirdar  had  reported  to  me :  "  General  Hunter 
was  able  to  get  wdthin  300  yards  of  the  enemy's 
trenches.  Position  is  a  strong  one  with  Zariba 
(stockade)  and  in  heavy  bush ;  it  was  so  thick  that 
they  were  unable  to  get  more  than  a  partial  view 
of  the  encampment.  Enemy  was  lying  thick  in  the 
trenches,  which  were  in  some  places  in  three  rows, 
one  behind  the  other."  I  thought  it  not  improbable 
that  General  Hunter,  who  well  knew  the  strong 
and  weak  points  of  the  Egyptian  army,  hesitated 
to  attack  because  he  was  unwilling  to  risk  what 
might  possibly  be  a  hand-to-hand  encounter  between 
the  Egj^tian  soldiers  and  the  Dervishes  in  the 
"  heavy  bush  "  to  which  allusion  was  made  in  this 
telegram.  Past  experience  in  Soudanese  warfare 
enjoined  special  caution  in  respect  to  this  point. 

On  April  2,  therefore,  I  sent  the  Sirdar  the 
foUo\^dng  message,  which  represented  the  joint 
opinion  of  Sir  Francis  GrenfeU  and  myself : — 

"  The  following  observations  are  not  to  be 
regarded  as  instructions.  It  is  for  you  to  form  a  final 
opinion  on  their  value,  as  they  are  merely  remarks 
on  the  position  as  it  strikes  me  at  a  distance.  In 
case  you  should  think  it  desirable  to  act  contrary 
to  the  view  to  which  I  incUne,  1  have  no  desire 
to  cripple  your  full  hberty  of  action.  I  wish  to 
assure  you  that,  whatever  you  may  decide  to  do, 
you  will  receive  fuU  support  both  from  myself  and, 
I  am  sure  I  may  add,  from  the  authorities  at  home.^ 

"  You  have  the  following  arguments  against  an 
immediate  attack : — 

*  I  repeated  to  Loudon  the  Sirdar's  telegram  of  April  1,  and  at  once 
received  the  following  reply  from  Mr.  Arthur  Balfour,  who  was  iu 
charge  of  the  Foreign  Office  during  the  temporary  absence  of  Lord 
Salisbury  : — 

"  The  Sirdar  may  count  on  the  support  of  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment whichever  course  he  decides  on  adopting.  Unless  he  wishes  for 
a  military  opinion,  we  refrain  from  oflFering  any  remarks  which  would 
interfere  with  his  absolute  discretion." 


100 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  Ill 


"  (1)  The  extreme  importance  of  obviating,  so 
far  as  is  possible,  any  risk  of  reverse,  both  on  local 
and  general  grounds. 

"  (2)  That  it  is  rather  imprudent  to  try  your 
force  too  high  in  view  of  the  composition  of  a 
portion  of  it. 

"  (3)  The  great  importance,  as  has  been  shown 
by  all  former  experience  of  Soudanese  warfare,  of 
choosing  ground  for  an  engagement  which  will  be 
favourable  to  the  action  of  a  discipKned  and  weU- 
armed  force. 

"  (4)  The  weight  of  Hunter's  opinion.  Though 
I  have  the  greatest  confidence  in  Gatacre,  Hunter 
has  more  experience  in  Soudanese  warfare,  is  better 
acquainted  with  the  Eg}'ptian  army,  and  has, 
moreover,  seen  the  present  Dervish  position.  This 
latter  is  more  especially  a  consideration  of  the 
utmost  importance. 

"  (5)  The  fact  that  Mahmoud  probably  cannot 
stay  for  long  where  he  is,  and  that  he  will  be 
discredited  and  his  men  probably  discouraged  if 
he  retires  without  fighting. 

"You  have  on  the  other  side  the  argument 
that  Mahmoud's  force,  if  he  now  retires  without 
fighting,  will  go  to  strengthen  the  resistance  to 
be  ultimately  encountered. 

"  The  weight  of  this  argument,  though  un- 
doubted, does  not  appear  to  me  sufficient  to 
counterbalance  the  arguments  on  the  other  side, 
more  especially  if  it  be  remembered  that  your 
British  force  will  be  practically  doubled  in  the 
autumn,  if  the  decisive  moment  is  delayed  till 
then. 

"  Patience,  therefore,  is  what  I  am  inclined  to 
advise.  I  am  disposed  to  think  that  you  had 
better  not  attack  for  the  present,  but  wait  your 
opportunity  for  action  and  allow  events  to  develop. 
The  above  is  fuUy  agreed  in  by  General  Grenfell, 


caxxxn    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  101 


with  whom  I  have  discussed  the  whole  question 
thoroughly." 

Before  the  Sirdar  had  received  this  telegram,  he 
sent  me  (AprU  3)  the  following  further  message  : — 

"  The  same  story  of  privation  is  told  by  more 
deserters  who  are  coming  in.  There  is  an  increased 
desertion  of  blacks  resulting  from  the  capture  of 
the  women  at  Shendy,  which  is  now  known. 

"  Generals  Hunter  and  Gatacre  and  myself  now 
think  an  attack  upon  Mahmoud's  position  advisable. 
We  shall  probably  make  it  on  the  6th  April. 

"  I  will  postpone  the  forward  movement  if  your 
answer  to  my  last  telegram,  which  I  have  not  yet 
received,  should  be  against  this  course." 

This  was  followed  by  a  further  telegram  sent 
on  the  same  day  (April  3)  after  receipt  of  my 
reply  to  the  first  inquiry.  "I  will,"  the  Sirdar 
said,  "for  the  present  postpone  the  attack  on 
Mahmoud's  position,  in  view  of  your  opinion  as 
stated  in  your  telegram.  So  as  to  get  new  ground 
and  water,  we  shall  to-morrow  move  about  2^ 
miles  farther  on." 

When  I  knew  of  the  change  in  General 
Himter's  opinion,  my  own  hesitation  as  regards 
attacking  completely  disappeared.  I  was  unable  to 
consult  Sir  Francis  GrenifeU,  who  was  temporarily 
absent  from  Cairo,  but  I  at  once  telegraphed  to  the 
Sirdar : — 

"  With  reference  to  your  telegram  of  yesterday, 
our  telegrams  crossed.  Do  not  be  deterred  by 
my  first  telegram  from  attacking  if,  after  careful 
consideration,  you  think  it  advisable  to  do  so. 
It  is  very  difficult  to  give  any  valuable  opinion 
from  here.  In  your  first  telegram  the  point  which 
struck  me  most  was  that  Hunter,  who  has  seen  the 
Dervish  position,  was  adverse  to  an  advance.  He 
has  now,  I  understand,  come  round  to  the  other 
view.    The  case  is,  to  my  mind,  materially  altered 


102  MODERN  EGYPT 


by  this.  I  must  leave  the  decision  to  you,  only 
again  assuring  you  of  fiiU  support  whatever  you 
decide." 

The  next  day  (April  4)  I  received  the  following 
reply  :— 

"  The  confidence  which  yourself  and  the  Home 
authorities  repose  in  me  is  greatly  appreciated  by 
me.  I  propose  to  advance  more  slowly  and  with 
greater  deUberation  than  was  originally  my  inten- 
tion, and  to  make  as  sure  as  it  is  possible  to  do  by 
careful  reconnaissances  of  the  success  of  an  attack, 
I  shall  not  commit  myself  to  a  general  attack  until 
the  right  moment  has,  in  my  opinion,  arrived.  The 
difficulty  is  at  present  to  Imow  with  any  certainty 
how  long  the  Dervishes  can  hold  out  under  the 
privations  they  are  undergoing.  I  think  that 
by  getting  nearer  to  them  I  shall  have  a  better 
opportunity  of  satisfying  myself  on  this  point." 

It  was  clear  that  a  decisive  engagement  was 
imminent.    I  awaited  the  result  with  confidence. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  April  8  (Good  Friday), 
the  attack  was  deUvered.  After  forty  minutes' 
sharp  fighting,  Mahmoud  was  a  prisoner,  2000 
of  his  men  lay  dead  in  their  entrenchments,  others 
had  surrendered,  wliilst  a  large  number  of  those 
who  escaped  subsequently  died  of  wounds  or  thirst 
in  the  thick  bush  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river. 
The  victory  was  complete,  but  it  cost  many 
valuable  hves.  Of  the  British  brigade,  4  officers 
and  104  non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  and 
of  the  Egyptian  army,  5  British  and  16  Egj-ptian 
officers,  as  well  as  422  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men,  were  killed  and  wounded.  The  brunt 
of  the  Egyptian  fighting  feU  on  the  black  troops. 

Some  faint  hopes  were  at  one  time  entertained 
that  the  Dervishes  would  be  so  demoralised  by  the 
crusliing  defeat  they  had  experienced  on  the  Atbara, 
that  no  further  resistance  would  be  offered,  and 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  103 


that  the  capture  of  Khartoum  would  be  peacefully 
effected.  These  hopes  were  not  destined  to  be 
reaUsed.  Had  not  the  impostor  who  in  cruel  and 
depraved  state  reigned  supreme  at  Khartoum 
promised  his  credulous  followers,  whose  fate  was 
about  to  excite  ahke  pity  and  admiration,  that, 
although  the  infidels  would  be  allowed  to  advance 
to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  walls  of  Omdurman, 
their  skulls  in  countless  numbers  would  eventually 
whiten  the  Kereri  plain?  It  soon  became  clear 
that,  in  spite  of  the  recent  victory,  a  further 
apphcation  of  the  Bismarckian  blood -and -iron 
pohcy  would  alone  suffice  to  shake  the  heroic 
steadfastness  with  which  these  savage  Soudanese 
warriors  clung  to  an  execrable  cause. 

I  need  not  describe  in  detail  the  measures  which 
were  preUminary  to  the  final  effort.  It  will  be 
sufficient  for  me  to  say  that  the  first  British  brigade 
— possibly  encouraged  by  achieved  success,  and 
buoyed  up  by  the  hope  of  coming  excitement — 
bore  the  summer  heat  of  the  Soudan  well.  As 
had  been  pre-arranged,  a  second  brigade  was  sent 
up  the  Nile  in  the  course  of  the  month  of  July. 
By  the  end  of  August,  the  Sirdar  had  concentrated 
a  force  of  about  22,000  men  some  40  miles  south  of 
Khartoum. 

As  was  my  custom,  I  had  left  Egypt  in  the 
middle  of  July,  intending  to  return  before  the  final 
blow  was  struck.  On  all  grounds,  it  was  desirable 
to  expedite  matters,  but  the  military  movements 
depended  in  a  great  degree  on  the  rapidity  of  the 
rise  of  the  Nile,  a  point  in  respect  to  which  no  very 
early  forecast  was  possible.  Early  in  August, 
however,  the  Sirdar,  whose  calculations  of  time 
were  never  once  at  fault,  warned  me  that  I  ought 
to  be  back  in  Cairo  by  September  1.  I  had  made 
all  my  preparations  for  departure,  but  I  was  unable 
to  depart.    The  first  news  that  the  goal  which  for 


104 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  in 


so  many  years  I  had  striven  to  reach,  had  at  last 
been  attained,  was  conveyed  to  me  in  a  telegram 
which  the  Queen,  with  her  usual  thoughtfulness  for 
others,  sent  to  a  remote  shooting -lodge  in  the 
north  of  Scotland,  where  I  was  watching  the  last 
moments  of  her  who  inspired  me  to  write  this  book. 

The  long-expected  battle  took  place  under  the 
waUs  of  Omdurman  on  September  2.  The  Dervish 
leaders  showed  no  tactical  skill.  They  reUed  solely 
on  the  courage  and  devotion  of  their  followers  who, 
ignorant  of  the  fearful  powers  of  destruction  which 
science  has  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  European, 
dashed  recklessly  against  the  ranks  of  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  army,  and  were  swept  away  in  thousands 
by  the  deadly  fire  of  the  rifles  and  the  Maxims. 
"  The  honour  of  the  fight,"  said  a  competent  eye- 
witness,^ "must  still  go  with  the  men  who  died. 
Our  men  were  perfect,  but  the  Dervishes  were 
superb — beyond  perfection.  It  was  their  largest, 
best,  and  bravest  army  that  ever  fought  against  us 
for  Mahdiism,  and  it  died  worthily  of  the  huge 
empire  that  Mahdiism  won  and  kept  so  long. 
Their  riflemen,  mangled  by  every  kind  of  death 
and  torment  that  man  can  de\'ise,  clung  round  the 
black  flag  and  the  green,  emptying  their  poor 
rotten,  home-made  cartridges  dauntlessly.  Their 
spearmen  charged  death  at  every  minute  hope- 
lessly. ...  A  dusky  Une  got  up  and  stormed 
forward :  it  bent,  broke  up,  fell  apart,  and  dis- 
appeared. Before  the  smoke  had  cleared,  another 
line  was  bending  and  storming  forward  in  the  same 
track." 

The  Dervish  loss  was,  in  truth,  terrible.  Out  of 
an  army,  whose  strength  was  estimated  at  from 
40,000  to  50,000  men,  some  11,000  were  killed,  and 
about  16,000  wounded. 

*  Steevens,  With  Kitchener  to  Khartoum,  p.  282.  Mr.  Steevens  was 
the  correspondent  of  the  Daily  Mail. 


caxxxn    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  105 


On  the  British  side,  9  officers  and  122  men,  and 
on  the  Egyptian  side,  5  British  and  9  Egyptian 
officers  as  well  as  241  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men,  were  killed  and  wounded. 

These  brave  men  fell  in  a  good  cause.  It  wiU 
be  the  fault  of  their  countrjTnen,  in  obedience 
to  whose  orders — toZ?  KeLvaiv  pruiacn  ireidoiievoi — they 
lie  in  their  distant  graves,  if  their  blood  is  shed  in 
vain. 

On  the  afternoon  of  September  2,  the  victorious 
army  entered  the  filthy  stronghold  of  Mahdiism, 
where,  it  was  said,  "the  stench  was  unbearable." 
Two  days  later  (September  4),  the  British  and 
Egj^ptian  flags  were  hoisted  with  due  ceremony  on 
the  walls  of  the  ruined  Palace  of  Khartoum,  close 
to  the  spot  where  General  Gordon  feU.  The  sturdy 
and  reverent  Puritan  spirit,  which  still  animates 
Teutonic  Christianity  and  which  makes  the  soldier, 
at  the  moment  of  action,  look  to  the  guidance  and 
protection  of  a  Higher  Power,  found  expression  in 
a  religious  service  in  honour  of  the  Illustrious 
dead. 

The  Khalifa  escaped.  For  more  than  a  year,  he 
wandered  about  the  almost  inaccessible  wilds  of 
Kordofan  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  force.  At 
length,  he  approached  near  enough  to  the  river 
to  enable  a  decisive  blow  to  be  struck.  It  was 
reserved  for  Sir  Reginald  Wingate,  who  succeeded 
Lord  Kitchener  as  Sirdar  of  the  Egyptian  army 
towards  the  close  of  the  year  1899,  to  give  the 
final  coup  de  grace  to  Mahdiism.  By  a  series  of 
rapid  and  skilful  marches,  he  surprised  the  Dervish 
camp  on  November  24,  1899.  The  Khalifa  and  all 
his  principal  Emirs  were  kiUed.  His  whole  force 
surrendered. 

The  financial  success  was  no  less  remarkable 
than  the  military.  The  total  cost  of  the  campaigns 
of  1896-98  was  £E.2,354,000,  of  which  £E.1,200,000 


106  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

was  spent  on  railways  and  telegraphs,  and 
£E.  155,000  on  gunboats.  The  "  mihtary  ex- 
penditure," properly  so-called,  only  amounted  to 
£E.996,000. 

Of  the  total  sum  of  £E.2,354,000,  rather  less 
than  £E. 800,000  was  paid  by  the  British,  and  the 
balance  of  about  £E.  1,554,000  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury. 

In  writing  this  work,  I  have  throughout 
endeavoured  to  render  it  as  Uttle  autobiographical 
as  possible.  If  I  now  depart  in  some  degree  from 
this  principle,  my  reason  is  that  I  am  unable  to 
enforce  the  mihtary  lesson  which,  I  beUeve,  is  to 
be  derived  from  the  Khartoum  campaign  without 
toucliing  on  my  personal  position.  The  conditions 
under  which  the  campaign  was  conducted  were,  in 
fact,  very  peculiar.  In  official  circles  it  was  dubbed 
a  "  Foreign  Office  War."  For  a  variety  of  reasons, 
to  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  allude  in  detail,  the 
Sirdar  was,  from  the  commencement  of  the  opera- 
tions, placed  exclusively  under  my  orders  in  all 
matters.  The  War  Office  assumed  no  responsi- 
bihty,  and  issued  no  orders.  A  corresponding 
position  was  occupied  by  the  Head-Quarter  Staff 
of  the  Army  of  Occupation  in  Cairo.  Sir  Francis 
Grenfell  and  those  serving  under  him  rendered  the 
most  willing  assistance  whenever  it  was  required  of 
them,  but  beyond  that  point  their  functions  did 
not  extend.  The  result  was  that  I  found  myself 
in  the  somewhat  singular  position  of  a  civihan,  who 
had  had  some  Httle  mUitary  training  in  his  youth, 
but  who  had  had  no  experience  of  war,^  whose 
proper  functions  were  diplomacy  and  adminis- 
tration, but  who,  under  the  stress  of  circumstances 


*  I  was  present  for  a  few  weeks,  as  a  spectator,  with  Grant's  army 
at  the  siege  of  Petersburg  in  1864^  but  the  experience  was  too  short  to 
be  of  much  value. 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  107 


in  the  "Land  of  Paradox,"  had  to  be  ultimately 
responsible  for  the  maintenance,  and  even  to  some 
extent,  for  the  movements,  of  an  army  of  some 
25,000  men  in  the  field. 

That  good  results  were  obtained  under  this 
somewhat  anomalous  system  cannot  be  doubted. 
It  will  not,  therefore,  be  devoid  of  interest  to 
explain  how  the  system  worked  in  practice,  and 
Avhat  were  the  main  reasons  which  contributed 
towards  the  success. 

I  have  no  wish  to  disparage  the  strategical  and 
tactical  abihty  which  was  displayed  in  the  conduct 
of  the  campaign.  It  is,  however,  a  fact  that  no 
occasion  arose  for  the  display  of  any  great  sldll  in 
these  branches  of  mihtary  science.  When  once 
the  British  and  Egyptian  troops  were  brought  face 
to  face  with  the  enemy,  there  could — unless  the 
conditions  under  which  they  fought  were  altogether 
extraordinary — be  httle  doubt  of  the  result.  The 
speedy  and  successful  issue  of  the  campaign 
depended,  in  fact,  almost  entirely  upon  the  methods 
adopted  for  overcoming  the  very  exceptional  diffi- 
culties connected  with  the  supply  and  transport  of 
the  troops.  The  main  quaUty  required  to  meet 
these  difficulties  was  a  good  head  for  business. 
By  one  of  those  fortunate  accidents  which  have 
been  frequent  in  the  history  of  Anglo-Saxon  enter- 
prise, a  man  was  found  equal  to  the  occasion. 
Lord  Kitchener  of  Khartoum  won  his  well-deserved 
peerage  because  he  was  an  excellent  man  of 
business  ;  he  looked  carefully  after  every  important 
detail,  and  enforced  economy. 

My  own  merits,  such  as  they  were,  were  of  a 
purely  negative  character.  They  may  be  summed 
up  in  a  single  phrase.  I  abstained  from  a  mis- 
chievous activity,  and  I  acted  as  a  check  on  the 
interference  of  others.  I  had  full  confidence  in  the 
abihties  of  the  commander,  whom  I  had  practically 


108  MODERN  EGYPT 


myself  chosen,  and,  except  when  he  asked  for  my 
assistance,  I  left  him  entirely  alone.  I  encouraged 
him  to  pay  no  attention  to  those  vexatious  bureau- 
cratic formalities  with  which,  under  the  slang 
phrase  of  "  red  tape,"  our  military  system  is  some- 
what overburthened.  I  exercised  some  Uttle 
control  over  the  demands  for  stores  which  were 
sent  to  the  London  War  Office,  and  the  mere  fact 
that  those  demands  passed  through  my  hands,  and 
that  I  declined  to  forward  any  request  unless, 
besides  being  in  accordance  with  existing  regula- 
tions— a  point  to  which  I  attached  but  sHght 
importance — it  had  been  authorised  by  the  Sirdar, 
probably  tended  to  check  wastefulness  in  that 
quarter  where  it  was  most  to  be  feared.  Beyond 
this  I  did  nothing,  and  I  found — somewhat  to  my 
own  astonishment — that,  with  my  ordinary  very 
small  staff  of  diplomatic  secretaries,  the  general 
direction  of  a  war  of  no  inconsiderable  dimensions 
added  but  httle  to  my  ordinary  labours. 

I  do  not  say  that  this  system  would  always 
work  as  successfully  as  was  the  case  during  the 
Khartoum  campaign.  The  facts,  as  I  have  already 
said,  were  pecuhar.  The  commander,  on  whom 
everything  practically  depended,  was  a  man  of 
marked  mihtary  and  administrativ^e  abiUty.  Never- 
theless, I  venture  to  indulge  in  the  hope  that  some 
useful  lessons  for  the  future  may  be  derived  from 
the  Soudan  campaigns  of  1896  to  1898.  It  is  in 
no  spirit  of  conventional  eulogy  that  I  say  that 
the  British  army  consists  of  as  fme  material  as  any 
in  the  world.  Apart  from  any  question  of  national 
honour  and  interests,  it  positively  chills  my  heart 
to  think  that  the  Uves  of  the  gallant  young  men 
of  whom  that  army  is  mainly  composed,  may  be 
needlessly  sacrificed  by  defective  organisation  or 
guidance.  This  is  no  place  to  write  a  general 
essay  on  our  mihtary  administration,  but  I  cannot 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  109 


refrain  from  saying  that,  from  what  I  have  seen  of 
the  administration  of  the  British  War  Office,  it  stood 
at  one  time  in  great  need  of  improvement.  It  was 
costly.  It  was  hampered  by  tradition.  It  was,  to  use 
an  expressive  French  word,  terribly  "  paperassier  "  ; 
neither,  for  many  years,  was  sufficient  care  taken, 
in  every  branch  of  the  mihtary  service,  to  put  the 
right  man  in  the  right  place.  In  order  to  reform 
it,  men  rather  than  measures  were  required.  I 
should  add  that  there  is  reason  to  believe  that, 
since  the  South  African  War,  the  administration 
of  the  War  Office  has  been  greatly  improved.  It 
is,  however,  impossible  to  speak  positively  on  this 
point  until  its  ^ciency  has  undergone  the  crucial 
test  of  war. 

The  elation  with  which  the  news  of  the  capture 
of  Khartoum  was  received  in  England  was  in 
direct  proportion  to  the  despondency  which  chilled 
the  heart  of  the  British  nation  when,  thirteen 
years  previously,  it  was  known  that  Mahdiism  had 
triumphed  and  that  General  Gordon  had  been 
killed.  Lord  Kitchener,  on  his  return  to  London, 
was  received  with  an  enthusiastic  and  well-deserved 
ovation.  Indeed,  one  of  the  principal  arguments 
in  favour  of  recapturing  Khartoum  was  that  the 
British  pubhc  had  evidently  made  up  its  mind  that, 
sooner  or  later,  Khartoum  had  to  be  recaptured.  It 
might  have  been  possible  to  have  postponed  decisive 
action.  It  would  probably  have  been  impossible 
to  have  altogether  prevented  it.  The  national 
honour  was  not  to  be  indefinitely  baulked  of  the 
salve  for  which  it  yearned.  An  argument  of  this 
sort,  albeit  it  is  based  on  sentiment,  is  of  intrinsic 
importance.  In  the  execution  of  the  Imperialist 
policy,  to  which  England  is  pledged  almost  as  a 
necessity  of  her  existence,  it  is  not  at  all  desirable 
to  eliminate  entirely  those  considerations  which 


110 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  in 


appeal  to  the  imaginative,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
material  side  of  the  national  character.  Moreover, 
whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  undesLrabiUty  of 
admitting  any  emotional  lines  of  thought  as  guides 
to  practical  action  in  poUtics,  it  may  be  regarded  as 
certain  that  the  pohtician  who  endeavours  to  run 
absolutely  counter  to  the  impulse  of  the  national 
imagination,  instead  of  seeking  to  guide  it,  will  find 
that  he  is  attempting  an  impossible  task. 

The  policy  pursued  by  the  British  Government 
in  1896  is,  of  course,  capable  of  ample  justification 
on  other  and  less  sentimental  grounds  than  those 
to  which  allusion  is  made  above.  The  effective 
control  of  the  waters  of  the  Nile  from  the 
Equatorial  Lakes  to  the  sea  is  essential  to  the 
existence  of  Egypt. 

Whatever  opinion  may  be  entertained  of  the 
policy  itself,  or  of  whether  the  moment  chosen  for 
its  execution  was  opportune  or  the  reverse,  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that  the  capture  of  Khartoum 
did  more  than  appease  those  sentiments  of  national 
honour  which  had  been  stung  to  the  quick  by  the 
events  of  1885.  The  cannon  which  swept  away 
the  Dervish  hordes  at  Omdurman  proclaimed  to  the 
world  that  on  England — or,  to  be  more  strictly 
correct,  on  Eg5rpt  under  British  guidance  —  had 
devolved  the  solemn  and  responsible  duty  of  intro- 
ducing the  fight  of  Western  civifisation  amongst 
the  sorely  tried  people  of  the  Soudan. 

My  hope  and  behef  is  that  that  duty  will  be 
performed  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  best  traditions 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 


THE  NEW  SOUDAN 

Question  of  the  future  political  status  of  the  Soudan — Anomalies  of  the 
British  position — Objections  to  annexation — And  to  complete  in- 
corporation with  Egypt — Intricacy  of  the  problem — The  two  flags 
— Speech  at  Omdurman — The  right  of  conquest — The  Agreement 
of  January  19,  1899 — Its  unusual  nature — Its  reception  by  Europe 
— Advantages  of  a  Free  Trade  policy. 

The  Soudan  having  been  reconquered,  the  question 
of  the  future  poHtical  status  of  the  country  naturally 
presented  itself  for  solution. 

British  policy  in  Egypt  since  the  year  1882  may 
be  said  to  constitute  a  prolonged  and,  so  far,  only 
partially  successful  effort  to  escape  from  the  punish- 
ment due  to  original  sin.  The  ancient  adage  that 
truth  is  a  fellow-citizen  of  the  gods  ^  is  as  vaUd  in 
poUtics  as  in  morals.  British  statesmen  were  con- 
tinually harassed  by  a  Nemesis  in  the  shape  of  the 
magna  vis  veritatis,  which  was  for  ever  striving  to 
shatter  the  rickety  pohtical  edifice  constructed  at 
the  time  of  the  occupation  on  no  surer  foundations 
than  those  of  diplomatic  opportunism.  At  every 
turn  of  the  poHtical  wheel,  fact  clashed  with  theory. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  year  1898,  of  which  period  I 
am  now  writing,  Ottoman  supremacy  in  the 
Soudan,  whether  in  the  person  of  the  Sultan  or 
the  Khedive,  presented  a  sufficient  character  of 
sohdity  to  necessitate  its  recognition  as  a  practical 

*  'AXiJ^eta  BeCiv  bfibiroKis. 
Ill 


112 


MODERN  EGYPT 


fact.  It  could  not  be  treated  as  a  mere  diplo- 
matic wraith.  However  much  it  tended  at  times 
to  evaporate  into  a  phantom,  its  shape  was  still 
sufficiently  distinguishable  through  the  poUtical 
mist  to  enable  the  outline  of  a  kingly  crown  to  be 
clearly  traced.  Hence,  the  necessity  arose  of 
cloaking  the  reality  of  fact  with  some  more  or  less 
transparent  veil  of  theory. 

The  difference  between  the  real  and  the  supposi- 
titious was  brought  prominently  into  reUef  imme- 
diately after  the  fall  of  Khartoum.  On  no  occasion 
had  a  greater  amount  of  ingenuity  to  be  exercised 
in  effecting  an  apparent  reconcihation  between  the 
facts  as  they  existed  and  the  facts  as  they  were, 
by  a  pardonable  fiction,  supposed  to  exist.  The 
problem  in  this  instance  might  at  first  sight  appear 
to  have  been  almost  as  insoluble  as  that  of  squaring 
the  circle.  But,  as  Lord  SaHsbury  once  remarked 
to  me,  when  one  gets  to  the  foot  of  the  hills,  it  is 
generally  possible  to  find  some  pass  which  will  lead 
across  them.  I  have  now  to  describe  the  pass 
which,  with  some  difficulty,  was  eventually  found 
through  the  political  mountains  in  the  particular 
instance  under  discussion.  It  will  be  seen  that  an 
arrangement  was  made  which  elsewhere  might 
perhaps  have  been  considered  as  too  anomalous 
to  stand  the  wear  and  tear  of  daily  poUtical 
existence.  In  Egypt,  it  was  merely  thought  that 
one  more  paradox  had  been  added  to  the  goodly 
array  of  paradoxical  creations  with  which  the 
political  institutions  of  the  country  already  teemed. 

The  facts  were  plain  enough.  Fifteen  years 
previously,  Egyptian  misgovernment  had  led  to 
a  successful  rebeUion  in  the  Soudan.  British  rule 
had  developed  the  military  and  financial  resources 
of  Egypt  to  such  an  extent  as  to  justif)^  the 
adoption  of  a  pohcy  of  reconquest.  But  England, 
not  Egypt,  had  in  reaUty  reconquered  the  country. 


CH.  XXXIII      THE  NEW  SOUDAN  113 


It  is  true  that  the  Egyptian  Treasury  had  borne  the 
greater  portion  of  the  cost,  and  that  Egyptian  troops, 
officered,  however,  by  EngMshmen,  had  taken  a 
very  honourable  part  in  the  campaign.  But,  ahke 
during  the  period  of  the  preparation  and  of  the 
execution  of  the  policy,  the  guiding  hand  had  been 
that  of  England.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that 
without  British  assistance  in  the  form  of  men, 
money,  and  general  guidance,  the  Egyptian 
Government  could  have  reconquered  the  Soudan. 

From  this  point  of  view,  therefore,  the  annexation 
of  the  reconquered  territories  by  England  would 
have  been  partially  justifiable.  There  were,  how- 
ever, some  weighty  arguments  against  the  adoption 
of  this  course. 

In  the  first  place,  although  in  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  partnership  England  was  unquestionably 
the  senior  partner,  at  the  same  time,  Egypt  had 
played  a  very  useful  and  honourable,  albeit  auxiliary 
part  in  the  joint  undertaking.  It  would  have  been 
very  unjust  to  ignore  Egyptian  claims  in  deciding 
on  the  future  pohtical  status  of  the  Soudan. 

In  the  second  place,  the  campaign  had  through- 
out been  carried  on  in  the  name  of  the  Khedive. 
If,  immediately  on  its  conclusion,  decisive  action 
had  been  taken  in  the  name  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment acting  alone,  the  adoption  of  such  a  course 
would  have  involved  a  brusque  and  objectionable 
departure  from  the  policy  heretofore  pursued. 

In  the  third  place — and  this  consideration  would, 
by  itself,  have  been  conclusive — it  was  not  in  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain  to  add  to  its  responsi- 
bUities,  which  were  already  world-wide,  by  assuming 
the  direct  government  of  another  huge  African 
territory. 

These  and  other  considerations,  on  which  it  is 
unnecessary  to  dwell,  pointed  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  Soudan  should  be  regarded  as  Ottoman 

VOL.  II  I 


114  MODERN  EGYPT 


territory,  and  that,  therefore,  it  should  be  governed, 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Imperial 
Firmans,  by  the  Sultan's  feudatory,  the  Khedive. 

A  very  vahd  objection  existed,  however,  to  the 
adoption  of  this  course.  If  the  pohtical  status  of 
the  Soudan  were  to  be  assimilated  in  all  respects 
to  that  of  Egypt,  the  necessary  consequence  would 
be  that  the  administration  of  the  country  would  be 
burthened  by  the  introduction  of  the  Capitulations, 
and,  in  fact,  by  all  the  cumbersome  paraphernaha 
of  internationahsm,  which  had  done  so  much  to 
retard  Egyptian  progress.  It  was  manifestly  absurd 
that  British  Hves  should  be  sacrificed  and  British 
treasure  expended  merely  in  order  to  place  addi- 
tional arms  in  the  hands  of  Powers,  some  one  or 
other  of  whom  might  at  some  future  time  become 
the  enemy  of  England.  Moreover,  the  adoption 
of  this  course  would  have  been  highly  detrimental 
to  Egyptian  interests.  Egj^t,  more  than  England, 
had  suffered  from  the  international  incubus. 

Hence  there  arose  a  dilemma,  or,  if  it  is  permis- 
sible to  coin  so  unusual  an  expression,  a  trilemma  ; 
for  three  arguments,  which  were  in  some  degree 
mutually  destructive,  had  to  be  reconciled. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  essential  that  British 
influence  should  in  practice  be  paramount  in  the 
Soudan,  in  order  that  the  Egyptians  should  not 
have  conferred  on  them  a  "bastard  freedom"  to 
repeat  the  misgovernment  of  the  past. 

In  the  second  place,  British  influence  could  not 
be  exerted  under  the  same  ill-defined  and  anomalous 
conditions  as  those  which  prevailed  in  Egypt  with- 
out involving  the  mtroduction  of  the  baneftil  regime 
of  internationalism. 

In  the  third  place,  annexation  by  England, 
which  would  have  cut  the  international  knot,  was 
precluded  on  grounds  of  equity  and  poUcy. 

It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  invent  some 


I 

cH.  XXXIII      THE  NEW  SOUDAN 


115 


method  by  which  the  Soudan  should  be,  at  one 
and  the  same  time,  Egyptian  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  satisfy  equitable  and  poHtical  exigencies,  and 
yet  sufficiently  British  to  prevent  the  administra- 
tion of  the  country  from  being  hampered  by  the 
international  burr  which  necessarily  hung  on  to 
the  skirts  of  Egyptian  political  existence. 

It  was  manifest  that  these  conflicting  require- 
ments could  not  be  satisfied  without  the  creation 
of  some  hybrid  form  of  government,  hitherto 
unknown  to  international  jurisprudence. 

The  matter  was  discussed  when  I  was  in 
London  in  July  1898.  At  that  time,  although 
all  saw  clearly  enough  the  objects  to  be  attained, 
no  very  definite  method  for  attaining  them  was 
suggested.  In  order,  however,  to  give  an  outward 
and  visible  sign  that,  in  the  eyes  of  the  British 
Government,  the  pohtical  status  of  the  Soudan 
differed  from  that  of  Egypt,  Lord  Kitchener  was 
instructed,  on  the  capture  of  Khartoum,  to  hoist 
both  the  British  and  Egyptian  flags  side  by  side.^ 
These  orders  were  duly  executed.  Amidst  the 
clash  of  arms  and  the  jubilation  over  the  recent 
victory,  this  measure  attracted  but  little  attention. 
It  was  not  until  five  months  later,  that  its  im- 
portance was  generally  understood.  On  January 
4,  1899,  being  then  at  Omdurman,  I  made  a  speech 
to  the  assembled  Sheikhs.  As  I  intended  and 
anticipated,  it  attracted  much  attention.  It  was, 
indeed,  meant  for  the  pubUc  of  Egypt  and  Europe 
quite  as  much  as  for  the  audience  whom  I 
addressed.  In  the  course  of  this  speech  I  said : 
"  You  see  that  both  the  British  and  Egyptian 
flags  are  floating  over  this  house.^    That  is  an 

^  When  Lord  Kitchener  found  himself  face  to  face  with  Captain 
Marchand  at  Fashoda,  he  very  wisely  hoisted  the  Egyptian  flag  only. 

^  The  house,  in  the  courtyard  of  which  I  spoke,  had  but  a  short 
time  before  been  inhabited  by  one  of  the  Khalifa's  leading  Emirs.  At 
the  time  of  my  visit,  it  was  being  used  as  a  public  office. 


116  MODERN  EGYPT 


indication  that  for  the  future  you  will  be  governed 
by  the  Queen  of  England  and  by  the  Khedive  of 
Egypt."  There  could  be  no  mistaking  the  signifi- 
cance of  these  words,  and  there  was  no  desire  that 
they  should  be  mistaken.  They  meant  that  the 
Soudan  was  to  be  governed  by  a  partnership  of 
two,  of  which  England  was  the  predominant 
member. 

Before  making  this  speech,  I  had  submitted 
to  Lord  SaUsbury  the  project  of  an  Agreement 
between  the  British  and  Egyptian  Governments 
regulating  the  political  status  of  the  Soudan.  It 
had  been  prepared,  under  my  general  instructions, 
by  Sir  Malcolm  Mcllwraith,  the  Judicial  Adviser 
of  the  Egyptian  Government.  Shortly  after  my 
return  to  Cairo,  I  was  authorised  to  sign  it.  It 
was  accordingly  signed  by  the  Egj'ptian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  myself  on  January  19, 
1899.  I  proceed  to  give  a  brief  summary  of  the 
contents  of  this  document. 

The  first  and  most  important  point  was  to 
assert  a  vahd  title  to  the  exercise  of  sov^ereign 
rights  in  the  Soudan  by  the  Queen  of  England, 
in  conjunction  with  the  Khedive.  There  could 
be  only  one  sound  basis  on  which  that  title  could 
rest.  This  was  the  right  of  conquest.  A  title 
based  on  this  ground  had  the  merit  of  being  in 
accordance  with  the  indisputable  facts  of  the 
situation.  It  was  also  in  accordance,  if  not  with 
international  law — which  can  obviously  never  be 
codified  save  in  respect  to  certain  special  issues — at 
all  events,  with  international  practice,  as  set  forth 
by  competent  authorities.  It  was,  therefore,  laid 
down  in  the  preamble  of  the  Agreement  that  it 
was  desirable  "  to  give  effect  to  the  claims  which 
have  accrued  to  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, by  right  of  conquest,  to  share  in  the  present 
settlement  and  future  working  and  development " 


CH.  xxxm      THE  NEW  SOUDAN  117 


of  the  legislative  and  administrative  systems  of  the 
Soudan. 

This  principle  having  been  once  accepted,  the 
ground  was  cleared  for  further  action.  The 
sliadowy  claims  of  Turkish  suzerainty  were  practi- 
cally, though  not  nominally,  swept  away  by  a  stroke 
of  the  pen.  Their  disappearance  connoted  the 
abrogation  of  all  those  privileges  which,  in  other  parts 
of  the  Ottoman  dominions,  are  vested  in  European 
Powers  in  order  to  check  an  abusive  exercise  of 
the  Sultan's  sovereign  rights.  AU  that  then  re- 
mained was  to  settle  the  practical  points  at  issue 
in  the  manner  most  convenient  and  most  conducive 
to  the  interests  of  the  two  sole  contracting  parties, 
namely,  the  British  and  the  Egyptian  Governments. 

The  22nd  parallel  of  latitude  was  fixed  as  the 
northern  frontier  of  the  new  state ;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  southern  frontier  was  left  undefined.  It  was 
provided  that  both  the  British  and  Egyptian  flags 
should  be  used  throughout  the  Soudan ;  ^  that  the 
supreme  mihtary  and  civil  command  should  be 
vested  in  one  officer,  termed  "the  Governor- 
General  of  the  Soudan,"  who  was  to  be  appointed 
by  a  Khedivial  Decree  on  the  recommendation 
of  the  British  Government ;  that  Proclamations 
by  the  Governor-General  should  have  the  force 
of  law;  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Mixed  Tribunals 
shoidd  *'  not  extend  or  be  recognised  for  any  purpose 
whatsoever,  in  any  part  of  the  Soudan  " ;  and  that 
no  foreign  Consuls  should  be  allowed  to  reside  in 
the  country  without  the  previous  consent  of  the 
British  Government. 

When  this  Agreement  was  published,  it  naturally 
attracted  much  attention.    Diplomatists,  who  were 

^  In  the  first  instance,  the  town  of  Suakin  was  excepted  from  this 
and  from  some  other  portions  of  the  Agreement,  but  this  arrangement 
was  found  to  cause  a  good  deal  of  practical  inconvenience.  By  a 
subsequent  Agreement,  dated  July  10,  1899,  the  status  of  Suakin  was 
in  all  respects  assimilated  to  that  of  the  rest  of  the  Soudan. 


118  MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  in 


wedded  to  conventionalities,  were  puzzled,  and 
perhaps  slightly  shocked,  at  the  creation  of  a 
poHtical  status  hitherto  unknown  to  the  law  of 
Europe.  One  of  my  foreign  colleagues  pointed 
out  to  me  that  he  understood  what  British  territory 
meant,  as  also  what  Ottoman  territory  meant,  but 
that  he  could  not  understand  the  status  of  the 
Soudan,  which  was  neither  one  nor  the  other.  I 
rephed  that  the  pohtical  status  of  the  Soudan  was 
such  as  was  laid  down  in  the  Agreement  of 
January  19,  1899,  and  that  I  could  give  no  more 
precise  or  epigrammatic  definition.  Again,  I  was 
asked  what,  in  the  absence  of  any  Consuls,  was 
to  happen  to  Europeans  who  were  married  or 
buried  in  the  Soudan?  I  could  only  reply  that 
any  European  who  considered  it  essential  that  his 
marriage  or  burial  should  be  attested  by  a  Consular 
representative  of  his  country,  would  do  well  to 
remain  in  the  territory  lying  north  of  the  22nd 
parallel  of  latitude. 

But  the  splutter  of  amazement  caused  by  British 
want  of  pohtical  symmetry  soon  died  out.  It  is 
true  that  the  Sultan  murmured  some  few  words 
of  ineffectual  protest,  but  no  serious  opposition  was 
encountered  from  any  quarter. 

Why  was  this  ?    The  reasons  were  threefold. 

In  the  first  place,  whatever  fine-spun  arguments 
might  be  woven  from  the  loom  of  diplomatic 
technicaUty,  the  attitude  taken  up  by  the  British 
Government  was  in  substance  manifestly  both  just 
and  reasonable. 

In  the  second  place,  their  attitude  was  firm.  It 
was  clear  that  they  intended  to  carry  out  their 
programme.  The  inevitable  consequence  ensued. 
No  one  was  prepared  to  bell  the  cat,  even  if  he  felt 
any  disposition  to  do  so.  A  mere  platonic  protest 
would  have  caused  irritation,  and  would  have  been 
ineffectual.  • 


CH.  xxxin      THE  NEW  SOUDAN 


119 


In  the  third  place,  the  Powers  of  Europe, 
possibly  without  meaning  it,  paid  a  compliment 
to  British  rule.  However  much  the  Anglophobe 
press  on  the  Continent  might  at  times  rave,  it  was 
perfectly  well  known  that,  under  the  British  flag, 
Europeans — albeit  they  were  the  subjects  of  Powers, 
some  of  whom  were  animated  by  no  very  friendly 
spirit  towards  England  —  would  be  treated  with 
perfect  justice.  Notably,  Article  VI.  of  the  Agree- 
ment, to  which  at  the  time  I  attached  great 
importance,  tended  greatly  to  allay  any  spirit  of 
opposition  which  might  otherwise  have  been 
aroused.  It  laid  down  that,  in  all  matters  concern- 
ing trade  with,  and  residence  in  the  Soudan,  "no 
special  privileges  would  be  accorded  to  the  sub- 
jects of  any  one  or  more  Power  "  ;  in  other  words, 
the  German,  the  Frenchman,  the  Italian  and  others 
were  placed  on  a  precisely  similar  commercial  foot- 
ing to  that  enjoyed  by  a  subject  of  the  Queen 
of  England.  Even  the  most  militant  Anglophobe 
could  not  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  contrast  between 
this  liberal  attitude  and  the  exclusive  commercial 
policy  adopted  by  other  colonising  European 
Powers.  Thus,  in  laying  the  foundations  of  the 
new  Soudan,  a  Free  Trade  policy — which  I  trust 
will  never  be  dissociated  from  British  Imperialism 
— formed  one  of  the  corner-stones  of  the  poUtical 
edifice. 

After  this  fashion,  the  new  Soudan  was  bom. 
It  was  endowed  with  sufficient  strength  to  support 
existence.  Nevertheless,  it  was  of  necessity  to 
some  extent  the  child  of  opportunism.  Should 
it  eventually  die  and  make  place  for  some  more 
robust,  because  more  real  pohtical  creation,  its 
authors  need  not  bewail  its  fate.^ 

>  At  a  later  period  of  this  work  (vide  Chapter  LX.)  I  shall  give 
a  brief  account  of  the  results  which  have  so  far  been  obtained  under  the 
system  whose  main  features  are  described  in  this  chapter. 


PART  IV 


THE  EGYPTIAN  PUZZLE 


Quand  un  peuple  a  souffert  trop  longtemps,  c'est  tout  an 
plus  si,  dans  son  abaissement,  U  a  la  force  de  baiser  la  main 
qui  le  sauve. 

P.  J.  Stahl. 


This  country  is  a  palimpsest,  in  which  the  Bible  is  xvritten 
over  Herodotus,  and  the  Koran  over  that. 

Lady  Duff  Gordon"'s  Letters  from  Egypt. 


To  watch  the  immemorial  culture  of  the  East,  slow-moving 
with  the  weight  of  years,  dreamy  with  centuries  of  deep  medi- 
tation, accept  and  assimilate,  as  in  a  moment  of  time,  the 
science,  the  machinery,  the  restless  energy  and  practical  activity 
of  the  West  is  a  fascinating  employment. 

Kenneth  J.  Freeman,  Tlie  Schools  of  Hellas. 


121 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 


THE  DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT 

The  Englishman's  mission  —  Conditions  under  which  it  was  under- 
taken—  Population  of  Egypt — Its  mixed  character — Hostility  to 
England — Main  tenets  of  Islam — Its  failure  as  a  social  system — 
Degradation  of  women  —  Immutability  of  the  law  —  Slavery  — 
Intolerance — Incidents  of  religious  belief  and  ceremonial — Mental 
and  moral  attributes— Seclusion  of  women — Polygamy — Divorce — 
Coarseness  of  literature  and  conversation — Filial  piety — Govern- 
ment— Conservatism — Spirit  of  the  laws — Language — Art — Music 
— Customs — Obstacles  to  England's  mission. 

At  the  conclusion  of  Chapter  XVIII.  of  this  work, 
the  narrative  was  brought  down  to  the  time  when 
Kinglake's  Enghshman  had  planted  his  foot  on 
the  banks  of  the  Nile,  and  sat  in  the  seats  of  the 
faithful.  He  came  not  as  a  conqueror,  but  in  the 
familiar  garb  of  a  saviour  of  society.  The  mere 
assumption  of  this  part,  whether  by  a  nation  or  by 
an  individual,  is  calculated  to  arouse  some  degree  of 
suspicion.  The  world  is  apt  to  think  that  the  saviour 
is  not  improbably  looking  more  to  his  own  interests 
than  to  the  salvation  of  society,  and  experience  has 
proved  that  the  suspicion  is  not  unfrequently  well 
founded.  Yet  assuredly  the  Englishman  could  in 
this  case  produce  a  vaUd  title  to  justify  his  assump- 
tion of  the  part  which  had  been  thrust  upon  him. 
His  advent  was  hailed  with  dehght  by  the  lawful 
rulers  of  Egypt  and  by  the  mass  of  the  Egyptian 
people.  Tihe  greater  portion  of  Europe  also 
looked  upon  his  action  without  disfavour,  if  not 
with  positive  approval. 

123 


124 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


I  say  only  the  greater  portion  of  Europe,  for 
there  were  two  notable  exceptions.  In  the  East  of 
Europe,  the  Turk  chafed  under  the  reflection  that 
the  precious  jewel  of  political  opportunity  had  been 
offered  to  him,  and  that,  Uke  the  "  bird  in  the 
story  "  of  Moore's  song,  he  had  "  cast  the  fair  gem 
far  away."  In  the  West  of  Europe,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Frenchman  was  looking  on  askance  with 
a  gradually  awakening  sense  that  he  had  made  a 
mistake  in  allowing  the  Englishman  to  assume 
alone  the  part  of  the  Egyptian  saviour,  and,  when 
he  once  woke  up  to  a  sense  of  his  error,  he  mani- 
fested his  irritation  in  various  ways. 

With  these  two  exceptions,  which,  however,  for 
the  moment  hardly  caused  any  discordant  note  to 
be  sounded  amidst  the  universal  chorus  of  approba- 
tion, the  Enghshman  was  able  to  feel  that  none, 
whether  in  or  out  of  Egypt,  were  inclined  to  gain- 
say the  righteousness  of  his  cause.  More  than  this, 
one  of  the  first  qualifications  necessary  in  order  to 
play  the  part  of  a  saviour  of  society  is  that  the 
saviour  should  beUeve  in  himself  and  in  his  mission. 
This  the  Englishman  did.  He  was  convinced  that 
his  mission  was  to  save  Egyptian  society,  and, 
moreover,  that  he  was  able  to  save  it. 

How  was  he  to  accompHsh  his  mission  ?  Was 
he,  in  his  energetic,  brisk,  northern  fashion,  to  show 
the  Egyptians  what  they  had  to  do,  and  then  to 
leave  them  to  carry  on  the  work  by  themselves  ? 
This  is  what  he  thought  to  do,  but  alas  !  he  was  soon 
to  find  that  to  fulminate  against  abuses,  which  were 
the  growth  of  centuries,  was  like  firing  a  cannon- 
ball  into  a  mountain  of  mud.  By  the  adoption  of 
any  such  method,  he  could  only  produce  a  temporary 
ebullition.  If  he  were  to  do  any  good,  he  must 
not  only  show  what  was  to  be  done,  but  he  must 
stay  where  he  was  and  do  it  himself.  Or  was  he, 
as  some  fiery  spirits  advised,  to  go  to  the  other 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  125 


extreme?  Was  he  to  hoist  the  British  flag  over 
the  citadel  of  Cairo,  and  sweep  Pashadom,  Capi- 
tulations, Mixed  Tribunals,  and  all  the  hetero- 
geneous mass  of  international  cobwebs  to  be  found 
in  Egypt  into  the  poHtical  waste-paper  basket  ? 
Prudence,  which  bade  him  think  of  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  the  qualms  of  his  poHtical  conscience, 
which  obliged  him  to  be  mindful  of  his  plighted 
word,  albeit  it  had  perhaps  been  too  hghtly  pledged, 
stopped  the  way. 

Being  debarred  from  the  adoption  of  either 
extreme  course,  the  EngUshman  fell  back  on  the 
procedure,  which  is  endeared  to  him  by  habits  of 
thought  and  national  tradition.  He  adopted  a 
middle  course.  He  compromised.  Far  be  it  from 
his  Anglo-Saxon  mind  to  ask  for  that  "  situation 
nette  "  which  is  so  dear  to  the  logical  Frenchman. 
He  would  assert  his  native  genius  by  working  a 
system,  which,  according  to  every  canon  of  political 
thought,  was  unworkable.  He  would  not  annex 
Egypt,  but  he  would  do  as  much  good  to  the  country 
as  if  he  had  annexed  it.  He  would  not  interfere 
with  the  liberty  of  action  of  the  Khedivial  Govern- 
ment, but  in  practice  he  would  insist  on  the  Khedive 
and  the  Egyptian  Ministers  conforming  to  his 
views.  He  would  in  theory  be  one  of  many 
Powers  exercising  equal  rights,  but  in  practice  he 
would  wield  a  paramount  influence.  He  would 
occupy  a  portion  of  the  Ottoman  dominions  with 
British  troops,  and  at  the  same  time  he  would  do 
nothing  to  infringe  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Sultan.  He  would  not  break  his  promise  to  the 
Frenchman,  but  he  would  wrap  it  in  a  napkin  to 
be  produced  on  some  more  convenient  occasion. 
In  a  word,  he  would  act  with  aU  the  practical 
common  sense,  the  scorn  for  theory,  and  the  total 
absence  of  any  fixed  plan  based  on  logical  reasoning, 
which  are  the  distinguishing  features  of  his  race. 


126    '  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.iv 

I  propose  eventually  to  answer  the  question  of 
how  the  EngUshman  fulfilled  the  mission  which,  if 
it  was  not  conferred  on  him  by  Europe,  was  at  aU 
events  assumed  without  protest  from  Europe. 
Before,  however,  grappling  with  this  portion  of  my 
task,  it  wiU  be  as  well  to  say  something  of  the 
conditions  of  the  problem  which  had  to  be  solved. 
What  manner  of  men  were  these  Egyptians  over 
whom,  by  accident  rather  than  by  design,  the 
Englishman  was  caUed  upon  to  rule  without  having 
the  appearance  of  ruling  ?  To  what  influences  were 
they  subject  ?  What  were  their  national  char- 
acteristics ?  What  part  must  be  assigned  to  the 
foreign,  that  is  to  say,  the  European,  Asiatic,  and 
non- Egyptian  African  races  resident  in  Egypt? 
What  political  institutions  and  administrative 
systems  existed  when  the  EngUsh  stepped  upon 
the  Egyptian  scene  ?  In  a  word,  what  was  the 
chaotic  material  out  of  which  the  Enghshman  had 
to  evolve  something  Uke  order  ? 

These  are  important  questions.  It  is  essential 
that  they  should  be  answered  before  the  nature  of 
the  work  accomplished  by  England  in  Egypt  can 
be  understood. 

Modern  Egypt  measures  about  1000  miles  from 
Alexandria  to  Wadi  Haifa.  Its  breadth  from  Port 
Said  to  Alexandria  is  about  200  miles.  The  apex 
of  the  Nile  Delta  Hes  a  Httle  north  of  Cairo.  South- 
ward from  that  point,  the  habitable  country  narrows 
rapidly,  and  is  in  places  confined  to  a  few  yards  on 
either  bank  of  the  river.  This  habitable  area 
covers  an  extent  of  33,607  square  kilometres,  or 
about  8,000,000  acres. 

Who  are  the  inhabitants  of  these  eight  millions 
of  acres  ?  Of  what  was  the  raw  material  composed 
with  which  the  EngUshman  had  to  deal  ? 

It  might  naturally  be  supposed  that,  as  we  are 
dealing  with  the  country  called  Egypt,  the  inhabit- 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  127 


ants  of  whom  the  statesman  and  the  administrator 
would  have  almost  exclusively  to  take  account 
would  be  Egyptians.  Any  one  who  is  inclined  to 
rush  to  this  conclusion  should  remember  that 
Egypt,  as  Lord  MHner  has  stated  in  his  admirable 
work,  is  the  Land  of  Paradox.  If  any  one  walks 
down  one  of  the  principal  streets  of  London,  Paris, 
or  Berlin,  nine  out  of  ten  of  the  people  with  whom 
he  meets  bear  on  their  faces  evidence,  more  or  less 
palpable,  that  they  are  Englishmen,  Frenchmen, 
or  Germans.  But  let  any  one  who  has  a  general 
acquaintance  with  the  appearance  and  physiognomy 
of  the  principal  Eastern  races  try  if  he  can  give  a 
fair  ethnological  description  of  the  first  ten  people 
he  meets  in  one  of  the  streets  of  Cairo,  that  "  maze 
of  old  ruin  and  modern  caf^,  that  dying  Mecca  and 
stOl-bom  Rue  de  Rivoli,"  as  it  has  been  aptly 
•termed  by  Sir  Wilham  Butler.^  He  will  find  it 
no  easy  matter,  and  with  all  his  experience  he 
may  not  improbably  make  many  mistakes. 

The  first  passer-by  is  manifestly  an  Egyptian 
fellah  who  has  come  into  the  city  to  sell  his  garden 
produce.  The  headgear,  dress,  and  aquiline  nose 
of  the  second  render  it  easy  to  recognise  a  Bedouin 
who  is  perhaps  come  to  Cairo  to  buy  ammunition 
for  his  flint-lock  gun,  but  who  is  ill  at  ease  amidst 
urban  surroundings,  and  will  hasten  to  return  to 
the  more  congenial  air  of  the  desert.  The  small, 
thick-Upped  man  with  dreamy  eyes,  who  has  a  far- 
away look  of  one  of  the  bas-reliefs  on  an  ancient 
Egyptian  tomb,  but  who  ChampoUion  and  other 
savants  tell  us  is  not  the  lineal  descendant  of 
the  ancient  Egyptians,*  is  presumably  a  Coptic 

*  The  Campaign  of  the  Cataracts,  p.  95. 

*  Maspero,  Histoire  ancienne  des  peuples  de  TOrient,  p.  15.  Cham- 
polliou  le  Jeune's  opinion,  quoted  by  M.  Maspero,  is  as  follows  :  "  Les 
Coptes  sont  le  resultat  du  melange  confus  de  toutes  les  nations  qui  suc- 
cessivement  ont  domine  Tfigypt.  On  a  tort  de  vouloir  retrouver  chez 
eux  les  traits  de  la  vieille  race."    Mr.  S.  Lane  Poole,  however,  says 


128  MODERN  EGYPT 


clerk  in  some  Government  office.  The  face,  which 
peers  somewhat  loweringly  over  a  heavy  mous- 
tache from  the  window  of  a  passing  brougham,  is 
probably  that  of  some  Turco- Egyptian  Pasha, 
The  man  with  a  bold,  handsome,  cruel  face,  who 
swaggers  by  in  long  boots  and  baggy  trousers,  must 
surely  be  a  Circassian.  The  Syrian  money-lender, 
who  comes  next,  will  get  out  of  his  way,  albeit  he 
may  be  about  to  sell  up  the  Circassian's  property 
the  next  day  to  recover  a  loan  of  which  the  capital 
and  interest,  at  any  ordinary  rate,  have  been  already 
paid  twenty  times  over.  The  green  turban,  digni- 
fied mien,  and  slow  gait  of  the  seventh  passer- 
by denote  some  pious  Sheikh,  perhaps  on  his  way 
to  the  famous  University  of  El- Azhar.  The  eighth 
must  be  a  Jew,  who  has  just  returned  from  a  tour 
in  Asia  Minor  with  a  stock  of  embroideries,  which 
he  is  about  to  sell  to  the  winter  tourists.  The 
ninth  would  seem  to  be  some  Levantine  nonde- 
script, whose  ethnological  status  defies  diagnosis ; 
and  the  tenth,  though  not  easily  distinguishable 
from  the  latter  class,  is  in  reaUty  one  of  the  petty 
traders  of  whom  Greece  is  so  proUfic,  and  who  are 
to  be  found  dotted  all  over  the  Ottoman  dominions. 
Nor  is  the  Ust  yet  exhausted.  Armenians,  Tunisians, 
Algerians,  Soudanese,  Maltese,  half-breeds  of  every 
description,  and  pure-blooded  Europeans  pass  by  in 
procession,  and  aU  go  to  swell  the  mass,  if  not  of 
Egyptians,  at  all  events  of  dwellers  in  Egj'pt. 

The  compiler  of  the  census  of  1897  appears  to 
have  felt  a  difficulty  which  must  surely  have  weighed 
still  more  heavdly  on  those  amateur  poUticians  who, 
Hke  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt,  have  from  time  to  time 
advocated  a  poHcy  of  Egypt  for  the  true  Egyptians. 
Who,  in  fact,  is  a  true  Egyptian  ?    The  compiler 

{Cairo,  p.  206) :  "Copts,  Gypts,  Egyptians,  they  are,  indeed,  the  true 
survivors  of  the  people  whom  Pharaoh  ruled,  and  who  built  the  Pyramids 
of  Giza." 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  129 


of  the  census  very  wisely  did  not  attempt  to  define 
the  term ;  he  must  have  been  aware  that  precise 
definition  was  impossible.  At  the  same  time,  the 
instincts  of  his  craft  appear  to  have  rebelled  at  the 
idea  of  lumping  the  whole  population  of  Egypt, 
exclusive  of  Europeans,  into  one  seething  statis- 
tical mass  and  calling  them  Egyptians.  So  he 
divided  the  Egyptians  as  weU  as  he  could  into, 
first,  natives  ;  secondly,  persons  born  in  other  parts 
of  the  Ottoman  dominions,  who,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  are  for  the  most  part  Syrians  and  Armenians  ; 
thirdly,  semi -sedentary  Bedouins,  that  is  to  say, 
the  hybrid  between  the  fellah  and  the  Bedouin, 
who  has  one  foot  on  the  cultivated  land  of  the 
Nile  Valley,  and  the  other  on  the  desert ;  and, 
fourthly,  Nomad  Bedouins,  who  are  Bedouins  pure 
and  simple. 

The  census  of  1897  ^  informs  us,  therefore,  that 
at  that  time  there  were,  in  round  numbers, 
9,621,000  Ottoman  subjects  dwelling  in  Egypt, 
who  were  divided  into  the  following  categories : — 

Natives        ....  9,008,000 
Persons  born,  not  in  Egypt,  but  in 

other  parts  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  40,000 

Semi-sedentary  Bedouins      .           .  485,000 

Nomad  Bedouins      .          .          .  88,000 


Total       .       9,621,000  2 


These,  with  113,000  Europeans  and  protected 
subjects  of  European  Powers,  brought  the  dweUers 

'  I  am  obliged  to  use  the  1897  figures,  as  those  of  the  census  of  1907 
are  not  yet  available.  I  am,  however,  informed  that  the  provisional 
figures  work  out  to  a  total  of  about  11,206,000. 

^  According  to  the  census  of  1882,  the  population  was  6,814,000. 
There  was,  therefore,  including  Europeans,  an  increase  of  43  per  cent 
in  fifteen  years.  It  is,  however,  generally  supposed  that  the  census 
of  1882,  which  was  conducted  with  very  inadequate  machinery,  under- 
estimated the  population  at  the  time. 

VOL.  II  K 


130  MODERN  EGYPT 


in  Egypt,  male  and  female,  up  to  a  grand  total  of 
9,734,000. 

The  Englishman,  I  have  said,  came  to  Egypt 
with  the  fixed  idea  that  he  had  a  mission  to  perform, 
and,  with  his  views  about  individual  justice,  equal 
rights  before  the  law,  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number,  and  similar  notions,  he  will  not 
unnaturally  interpret  his  mission  in  this  sense,  that 
he  is  to  benefit  the  mass  of  the  population.  There 
lie  those  nine  or  ten  miUion  native  Egyptians  at 
the  bottom  of  the  social  ladder,  a  poor,  ignorant, 
credulous,  but  withal  not  unkindly  race,  being  such 
as  sixty  centuries  of  misgovernment  and  oppression 
by  various  rulers,  from  Pharaohs  to  Pashas,  have 
made  them.  It  is  for  the  civiUsed  Enghshman  to 
extend  to  them  the  hand  of  fellowship  and  encour- 
agement, and  to  raise  them,  morally  and  materially, 
from  the  abject  state  in  which  he  finds  them.  And 
the  Englishman  looks  towards  the  scene  of  other 
administrative  triumphs  of  world-wide  fame,  which 
his  progenitors  have  accomplished.  He  looks 
towards  India,  and  he  says  to  himself,  with  all 
the  confidence  of  an  imperial  race, — I  can  perform 
this  task ;  I  have  done  it  before  now  ;  I  have 
poured  numberless  blessings  on  the  heads  of  the 
ryots  of  Bengal  and  Madras,  who  are  own  cousins 
to  the  Egyptian  fellaheen ;  these  latter  also  shall 
have  water  for  their  fields,  justice  in  their  law- 
courts,  and  immunity  from  the  tyranny  under 
which  they  have  for  so  long  groaned  ;  the  reign  of 
Pashadom  shall  cease. 

But  the  Englishman  vnR  find,  when  he  once 
applies  himself  to  his  task,  that  there  is,  as  it  were, 
a  thick  mist  between  him  and  the  Eg}'ptian, 
composed  of  reHgious  prejudice,  antique  and  semi- 
barbarous  customs,  international  rivalry,  vested 
interests,  and  aspirations  of  one  sort  or  another, 
some  sordid,  others,  it  may  be,  not  ignoble  but 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  131 


incapable  of  realisation.  He  will  find,  in  the  first  f 
place,  that  those  113,000  Europeans,  although 
constituting  only  1*16  per  cent  of  the  total  popu- 
lation, represent  the  greater  part  of  the  wealth 
and  intelligence,  and  no  small  proportion  of  the 
rascahty  and  aggressive  egotism  of  the  country ; 
further,  that  whether  their  views  be  right  or  wrong, 
just  or  unjust,  these  113,000  elect  often  have  the 
power  to  enforce  their  behests,  for  are  they  not 
the  salt  of  the  Egyptian  earth,  the  Brahmins  of 
Egypt,  and  have  they  not  behind  them  the  diplo- 
matists, and  it  may  even  be,  the  soldiers  and  sailors 
of  every  State  of  Europe  ?  In  this  respect,  the 
EngHshman  will  find  that  he  has  to  deal  with  a 
problem  for  the  solution  of  which  his  Indian 
experience  vdll  avail  him  but  little.  In  the 
second  place,'  he  will  find  that  a  majority  of 
the  large  landowners  and  all  the  most  important 
officials  are  Turco- Egyptians  in  various  stages 
of  Egyptianisation,  who  enjoy  privileges  which 
are  wholly  inconsistent  with  Benthamite  principles, 
notably  the  privilege  of  oppressing  those  9,000,000 
Egyptians  whose  woes  wring  the  heart  of  their 
English  would-be  benefactor.  Obviously,  the 
EngHshman  is  not  Hkely  to  get  much  sympathy  or 
support  from  this  quarter.  In  the  third  place,  he  3 
will  find  a  host  of  minor  officials,  many  of  whom 
are  of  non- Egyptian  origin,  and  who,  for  various 
reasons,  are  indisposed  to  co-operate  loyally  in  the 
improvement  of  their  country  at  the  hand  of  the 
just,  well-intentioned,  but  somewhat  unsympathetic 
aUen.  In  fact,  the  Englishman  will  soon  find  that 
the  Egyptian,  whom  he  washes  to  mould  into  some- 
thing reaUy  useful  wdth  a  view  to  his  becoming 
eventually  autonomous,  is  merely  the  rawest  of  raw 
material,  and  that  the  principal  tools,  with  which 
he  will  have  to  work,  and  on  which  the  excellence 
of  the  finished  article  must  largely  depend,  may  be 


132  MODERN  EGYPT 


British,  French,  Turkish,  Syrian,  Armenian,  or  of 
half-a-dozen  other  nationahties,  but  they  will  rarely 
be  Egyptian.^ 

This,  therefore,  is  the  central  feature  of  the  local 
situation  which  the  Enghsh  found  in  existence  when 
they  took  in  hand  the  solution  of  the  Egyptian 
question.  The  Egyptians,  properly  so  called,  were 
numerous,  but  were,  from  the  pohtical  and  superior 
administrative  point  of  view,  httle  more  than  ciphers. 
The  main  difficulties  of  the  Enghsh  pohtician  and 
of  the  English  administrator  ^\all  arise  from  the 
fact  that  the  minority,  consisting  of  non-Egyptians 
or  of  what,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  may  in  some 
instances  be  called  semi-Egyptians,  were  relatively 
powerful,  and  not  imfrequently,  for  one  reason  or 
another,  hostile. 

I  have  said  that  rehgious  prejudice  constituted 
one  of  the  barriers  which  were  interposed  between 
the  Englishman  and  the  Egyptian  ;  for,  on  the  one 
hand,  besides  being  one  of  the  European  family  in 
respect  to  general  civihsation,  the  Enghshman, 
amidst  many  deviations  from  the  path,  will  strive, 
perhaps  to  a  greater  extent  than  any  other  member 
of  that  family,  to  attain  to  a  high  degree  of  eminently 
Christian  civilisation ;  that  is  to  say,  although  he 
will  in  his  official  capacity  discard  any  attempt 
to  proselytise,  he  will  endeavour  to  inculcate  a 
distinctly  Christian  code  of  moraUty  as  the  basis  for 
the  relations  between  man  and  man.  He  is,  indeed, 
guided  in  this  direction  by  the  hghts,  which  have 
been  handed  down  to  him  by  his  forefathers,  and  by 
the  Puritan  blood  which  still  circulates  in  his  veins. 

The  Egyptian,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  fast  to 
the  faith  of  Islam,  that  noble  monotheism,  behef  in 
which  takes  to  a  great  extent  the  place  of  patriotism 

1  I  am,  of  course,  speaking  here  of  the  state  of  things  which  existed 
in  1882.  Since  then,  the  proportion  of  Egyptian  employe's  in  the 
Government  service  has  very  largely  increased. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT 


133 


in  Eastern  countries,^  and  which  serves  as  a  common 
bond  of  union  to  all  JVIosIems  from  Delhi  to  Fez, 
from  Stamboul  to  Zanzibar,  as  they  turn  to  pray 
towards  the  cradle  of  their  creed.^ 

And  what  are  the  main  tenets  of  this  creed, 
which  has  exercised  so  mighty  an  influence  on  the 
destinies  of  mankind  ?  They  are  set  forth  in  the 
Sacred  Book  of  the  Moslems.  They  have  been 
explained  in  many  languages  by  learned  men  of 
many  nations.  But  their  original  grandeur  and 
simpHcity  have  never  been  more  eloquently  ex- 
pounded than  by  those  early  followers  of  the 
Prophet,  who  threw  themselves  at  the  feet  of  the 
Christian  King  of  Abyssinia  to  implore  his  protec- 
tion against  the  persecution  of  the  Koreish  Arabs. 
"  O  King,"  they  said,  "  we  Hved  in  ignorance, 
idolatry,  and  unchastity ;  the  strong  oppressed  the 
weak ;  we  spoke  untruth ;  we  violated  the  duties 
of  hospitahty.  Then  a  Prophet  arose,  one  whom 
we  knew  from  our  youth,  with  whose  descent  and 
conduct  and  good  faith  and  truth  we  are  all  well 
acquainted.  He  told  us  to  worship  one  God,  to 
speak  truth,  to  keep  good  faith,  to  assist  our 
relations,  to  fulfil  the  rights  of  hospitahty,  and  to 
abstain  from  all  things  impure,  ungodly,  unrighteous. 
And  he  ordered  us  to  say  prayers,  give  alms,  and  to 
fast.    We  believed  in  him  ;  we  followed  him." ' 

These  are  the  main  tenets  of  the  Moslem  faith.* 

^  Some  observers  think  that  association  with  Europe  has  to  some 
extent  resulted  in  substituting  the  bond  of  nationality  for  that  of 
reliifion  in  Moslem  countries.  Thus  M.  Le  Chatelier,  in  a  work 
published  in  1888,  and  entitled  Islam  au  XlXeme  Steele,  says  (p.  186)  : 
"  L'evolution  contemporaine  de  I'Europe  a  introduit  dans  celle  de 
rislam  un  facteur  commun,  le  developpement  de  I'espritde  nationalite, 
qu'elle  a  d'ailleurs  propage  dans  le  monde  entier."  Recent  events, 
not  only  in  Egypt  but  elsewhere,  tend  rather  to  confirm  M.  Le 
Chatelier's  view. 

2  See  Studies  in  a  Mosque,  p.  96. 

'  Ibid.  p.  48,  and  Muir's  Life  of  Mahomet,  p.  89. 

*  Mr.  Badger,  in  his  admirable  article  on  Mohammed  in  the  Dictionary 
of  Christian  Biography,  says:  "Surah  CXII.,  the  shortest  chapter  of 


134  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

To  the  many  hundreds  of  millions  who  have 
embraced  Islam,  and  more  especially  to  the  poor 
amongst  them,  the  adoption  of  these  tenets  has 
afforded  not  only  spiritual  consolation  but  material 
blessings  in  this  world,  as  well  as  the  hope  of 
immortality  in  the  world  to  come.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  a  primitive  society  benefits  greatly 
by  the  adoption  of  the  faith  of  Islam.^  Sir  John 
Seeley,  speaking  of  what  he  aptly  terms  "  the  state- 
building  power  of  rehgion,"  says  :  "  Wherever  a 
barbarous  tribe  has  raised  itself  at  all  above  the 
level  of  barbarism  and  taken  any  development,  it 
has  done  so  usually  through  conversion  to  Islam."* 

Unfortunately,  the  great  Arabian  reformer  of 
the  seventh  century  was  driven  by  the  necessities 
of  his  position  to  do  more  than  found  a  rehgion. 
He  endeavoured  to  found  a  social  system,  with 
results  which  are  thus  stated  by  a  close  observer  of 
the  strong  and  weak  parts  of  Islamism.  "As  a 
rehgion,"  Mr.  Stanley  Lane-Poole  says,  "  Islam  is 
great ;  it  has  taught  men  to  worship  one  God  with  a 
pure  worship  who  formerly  worshipped  many  gods  im- 
purely. As  a  social  system,  it  is  a  complete  failure."  * 

The  reasons  why  Islam  as  a  social  system  has 
been  a  complete  failure  are  manifold. 

First  and  foremost,  Islam  keeps  women  in  a 
position  of  marked  inferiority.*  In  the  second  place, 
Islam,  speaking  not  so  much  through  the  Koran  as 

the  Koran,  is  regarded  by  Moslems  as  containing  the  essence  of  the 
whole  book  :  '  Say,  God  is  one ;  God  the  eternal ;  He  begetteth  not, 
neither  is  He  begotten ;  neither  is  there  any  one  like  Him,' " 

^  "  L' Islam  est  uu  progres  pour  le  negre  qui  Tadopte. " — Renan, 
Eistoire  du  Peuple  d' Israel,  vol.  i.  p.  60. 

2  Introduction  to  Political  Science,  p.  63.  Miss  Kingsley  (West 
African  Studies,  ch.v.)  makes  some  very  apposite  remarks  on  the  adapt- 
ability of  Islamism  to  the  present  condition  of  African  society. 

^  Studies  in  a  Mosque,  p.  101. 

*  "  The  degradation  of  women  in  the  East  is  a  canker  that  begins  its 
destructive  work  early  in  childhood,  and  has  eaten  into  the  whole  system 
of  Islam." — Stanley  Lane-Poole,  Islam,  a  Prelection  delivered  l>efore  the 
University  of  Dublin. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  135 


through  the  traditions  which  cluster  round  the 
Koran,  crystallises  religion  and  law  into  one  in- 
separable and  immutable  whole,  with  the  result 
that  aU  elasticity  is  taken  away  from  the  social 
system.  If  to  this  day  an  Egyptian  goes  to  law 
over  a  question  of  testamentary  succession,  his  case 
is  decided  according  to  the  antique  principles  which 
were  laid  down  as  appUcable  to  the  primitive  society 
of  the  Arabian  Peninsula  in  the  seventh  century. 
Only  a  few  years  ago  (1890),  the  Grand  Mufti  of 
Cairo,  who  is  the  authoritative  expounder  of  the 
law  of  Islam,  explained  how  bands  of  robbers 
should  be  treated  who  were  found  guilty  of  making 
armed  attacks  on  a  village  by  night.  The  con- 
demned criminal  might  be  punished  in  six  different 
ways.  He  might  have  his  right  hand  and  left  foot 
cut  off  and  then  be  decapitated ;  or  he  might  be 
mutilated,  as  before,  and  then  crucified ;  or  he 
might  be  mutilated,  decapitated,  and  eventually 
crucified ;  or  he  might  be  simply  decapitated  or 
simply  crucified,  or  decapitated  first  and  crucified 
afterwards.  Full  details  were  given  in  the  Mufti's 
report  of  the  mode  of  crucifixion  which  was  to  be 
adopted.  The  condemned  person  was  to  be  attached 
to  a  cross  in  a  certain  manner,  after  which  "  il  sera 
perc^  a  la  mamelle  gauche  par  une  lance,  qui  devra 
etre  remu^e  dans  la  blessure  jusqu'a  ce  que  la  mort 
ait  Heu."  ^  These  terrible  penalties  could  not,  how- 
ever, for  some  reason,  which  at  first  sight  appears 
incomprehensible,^  be  incurred  if  a  dumb  man  were 
one  of  the  band  of  robbers.  In  this  latter  case  the 
lex  talionis  was  to  be  appHed.  The  next-of-kin  of 
any  one  who  might  have  been  murdered  could 
demand  a  Hfe  for  a  hfe,  or  could  claim  blood- 
money  in  Heu  of  expiation. 

*  The  original  was,  of  course,  in  Arabic,  but  the  French  translation, 
which  is  quoted  above,  was  published  in  the  OflBcial  Journal  of  the 
Egyptian  Government. 

^  See  p.  136,  note. 


136 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


The  rigidity  of  the  Sacred  Law  has  been  at 
times  sHghtly  tempered  by  well  -  meaning  and 
learned  Moslems  who  have  tortured  their  brains 
in  devising  sophisms  to  show  that  the  legal  prin- 
ciples and  social  system  of  the  seventh  century  can, 
by  some  strained  and  intricate  process  of  reasoning, 
be  consistently  and  logically  made  to  conform  with 
the  civilised  practices  of  the  twentieth  century.^ 
But,  as  a  rule,  custom  based  on  the  rehgious  law, 
coupled  with  exaggerated  reverence  for  the  original 
lawgiver,  holds  all  those  who  cling  to  the  faith  of 
Islam  with  a  grip  of  iron  from  which  there  is  no 
escape.  "  During  the  Middle  Ages,"  it  has  been 
truly  said,^  "man  lived  enveloped  in  a  cowl."  The 
true  Moslem  of  the  present  day  is  even  more  tightly 
enveloped  by  the  Sheriat. 

In  the  third  place,  Islam  does  not,  indeed, 
encourage,  but  it  tolerates  slavery.  "  Mohammed 
found  the  custom  existing  among  the  Pagan  Arabs  ; 
he  minimised  the  evil."^    But  he  was  powerless  to 

^  A  curious  instance  of  the  processes  of  reasoning  sometimes  adopted 
in  order  to  evade  the  rigidity  of  the  Sacred  Law  is  to  be  found  in  the 
provision,  to  which  allusion  is  made  above,  that  the  barbarous  punish- 
ments of  mutilation  and  crucifixion  cannot  be  inflicted  on  a  band  of 
brigands  if  a  dumb  man  forms  one  of  the  band.  The  reason  is  rather 
abstruse.  It  appears  that  certain  classes  of  offences,  such  as  robbery, 
adultery,  etc.,  are  specially  provided  for  by  the  Koran,  the  penalties 
being  generally  excessively  severe,  and,  as  no  mitigation  is  permissible, 
those  penalties  have  to  be  applied  in  their  entirety.  Thus,  for  brigand- 
age the  penalty  is  mutilation,  crucifixion,  etc.,  as  described  by  the 
Mufti.  But,  in  order,  in  some  degree,  to  leave  a  loophole  for  escape 
from  the  compulsory  infliction  of  these  punishments  in  all  cases,  the 
law  doctors  discovered  that  it  was  only  intended  that  they  should  be 
inflicted  when  all  the  parties  were  quite  sound  and  in  a  state  to  speak 
in  their  own  defence.  For  this  reason,  the  presence  of  a  child,  an 
idiot,  or  a  dumb  man  enables  the  Sacred  Law  to  be  put  aside  and  a 
milder  kind  of  punishment  inflicted  on  the  whole  party  under  the 
ordinary  law,  i.e.  the  will  of  the  Sovereign  or  of  his  delegate,  the  Kadi. 
If  I  understand  rightly,  the  Mufti  did  not  mean  that  the  dumb  man 
saved  all  his  associates  from  punishment,  but  only  that  they  were 
thereby  transferred  from  the  province  of  the  Divine  law  to  that  of  their 
human  authorities. 

*  Symonds,  Renaissance  in  Italy,  p.  14. 

•  Sj^ed  Ameer  Ali,  Personal  Law  of  the  Mohammedans,  p.  38, 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  137 


abolish  it  altogether.  His  followers  have  forgotten 
the  discouragement,  and  have  very  generally  made 
the  permission  to  possess  slaves  the  practical  guide 
for  their  conduct.  This  is  another  fatal  blot  in 
Islam. 

rjfiKTV  yap  t  dpeTr}<;  airoalvvraL  evpvoira  Zeu? 
avepo'i,  evT  av  fiiv  Kara  Bov\iov  rjixap  €\t](tiv. 

The  Christian,  to  his  shame  be  it  said,  has  before 
now  been  not  only  a  slave-owner,  but,  which  is 
much  worse,  a  slave-hunter.  The  Christian  reHgion 
has,  however,  never  sanctioned  slavery. 

Lastly,  Islam  has  the  reputation  of  being  an 
intolerant  reHgion,  and  the  reputation  is,  from 
some  points  of  view,  well  deserved,  though  the 
bald  and  sweeping  accusation  of  intolerance  requires 
qualification  and  explanation.  The  followers  of 
the  Prophet  have,  indeed,  waged  war  against  those 
whom  they  considered  infidels.  They  are  taught 
by  their  rehgious  code  that  any  unbehevers,  who 
may  be  made  prisoners  of  war,  may  rightly  be 
enslaved.^  Moreover,  sectarian  strife  has  not  been 
uncommon.  Sunni  has  fought  against  Shiah.  The 
orthodox  Moslem  has  mercilessly  repressed  the 
followers  of  Abdul  Wahab.  Further,  apostasy  from 
Islam  is  punishable  with  death,  and  it  is  not  many 
years  ago  that  the  sentence  used  to  be  carried  into 
effect.'^    On  the  other  hand,  the  annals  of  Islam  are 

^  The  Hidayah,  which  is  regarded  by  the  Sunnis  as  the  standard 
commentary  on  the  Sheriat,  or  religious  code,  says :  "  The  Imam, 
with  respect  to  captives,  has  it  in  his  choice  to  slay  them,  because  the 
Prophet  put  captives  to  death,  and  also  because  slaying  them  terminates 
wickedness  ;  or,  if  he  chooses,  he  may  make  them  slaves,  because  by 
enslaving  them  the  wickedness  of  them  is  remedied,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  Moslems  reap  an  advantage." 

^  Lane  saw  a  woman  stripped,  strangled,  and  thrown  into  the  Nile 
for  apostasy  (J/orfem  Egyptians,  vol.  i.  p.  136).  To  the  best  of  my 
belief,  the  last  person  executed  for  apostasy  in  virtue  of  a  decision  of  an 
Ottoman  law-court  was  an  Armenian,  who  in  1843  adopted  the  faith  of 
Islam,  subsequently  repented,  and  returned  to  the  Christian  Church. 
Lord  Stratford,  who  was  then  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  rose  in 


138  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

not  stained  by  the  history  of  an  Inquisition.^  More 
than  this,  when  he  is  not  moved  by  any  circum- 
stances specially  calculated  to  rouse  his  rehgious 
passions,  the  Moslem  readily  extends  a  half-con- 
temptuous tolerance  to  the  Jew  and  the  Christian.' 
In  the  villages  of  Upper  Egypt,  the  Crescent  and 
the  Cross,  the  Mosque  and  the  Monastery,  have 
stood  peacefully  side  by  side  for  many  a  long  year. 
Nevertheless,  the  general  tendency  of  Islam  is  to 
stimulate  intolerance  and  to  engender  hatred  and 
contempt  not  only  for  polytheists,  but  also,  although 
in  a  modified  form,  for  all  monotheists  who  will 
not  repeat  the  formula  which  acknowledges  that 

all  his  wrath,  and,  after  some  sharp  diplomatic  passages,  extracted  a 
declaration  from  the  Porte  that  for  the  future  no  apostate  should  be 
put  to  death.  The  incident  is  related  in  Chapter  XVIIl.  of  the  lAfe 
of  Stratford  Canning.  Religious  freedom  was  further  assured  by 
Articles  X.-XII.  of  the  Khatt-i-Humayoun  of  February  28,  1856,  which 
was  issued  after  the  Crimean  War. 

I  once  asked  a  high  Moslem  authority  in  Cairo  how  he  reconciled 
the  fact  that  an  apostate  could  now  no  longer  be  executed  with  the 
alleged  immutability  of  the  Sacred  Law.  The  casuistry  of  his  reply 
would  have  done  honour  to  a  Spanish  Inquisitor.  The  Kadi,  he  said, 
does  not  recognise  any  change  in  the  Law.  He  would,  in  the  case  of  an 
apostate,  pronounce  sentence  of  death  according  to  the  Law,  but  it  was 
for  the  secular  authorities  to  carry  out  the  sentence.  If  they  failed  in 
their  duty,  the  sin  of  disobeying  the  Law  would  lie  on  their  heads. 
Cases  of  apostasy  are  very  rare,  but  during  my  tenure  of  oflBce  in 
Esypt,  I  had  to  interfere  once  or  twice  to  protect  from  maltreatment 
Moslems  who  had  been  converted  to  Christianity  by  the  American 
missionaries. 

'  Mr.  Pickthall  {Folk-Lore  of  the  Holy  Land,  p.  xv),  speaking  of  the 
capture  of  Jerusalem  by  the  Khalif  Omar,  says :  "  Omar's  severity 
towards  the  Christians  was  so  much  below  their  anticipations  that  he 
figures  in  the  popular  memory  almost  as  a  benefactor  of  their  religion. 
They  were  deprived  of  their  church-bells,  but  kept  their  churches  ;  and 
if  large  numbers  of  them  embraced  El  Islam,  it  was  through  self-interest 
(or  conviction)  and  not  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  as  has  been  repre- 
sented. Indeed,  the  toleration  displayed  by  the  Moslems  towards  the 
vanquished,  though  less  than  we  should  practise  nowadays,  is  without 
a  parallel  in  Europe  till  many  centuries  later.  It  was  not  emulated  by 
the  Crusaders,  who,  rushing  to  wrest  the  Holy  Sepulchre  from  the 
clutch  of  the  '  foul  Paynim,'  were  astonished  to  find  it  in  the  hands 
of  Christians,  whom,  to  cloak  their  disconcertion,  they  denounced  as 
heretics." 

'  Upon  the  toleration  accorded  to  the  Jews  by  Moslems,  see  Milman's 
History  of  the  Jews,  bk.  xxiii. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  139 


Mohammed  was  indeed  the  Prophet  of  God.  Neither 
can  this  be  any  matter  for  surprise.  The  faith  of 
Islam  admits  of  no  compromise.  The  Moslem  is 
the  antithesis  of  the  pantheistic  Hindoo.  His  faith 
is  essentially  exclusive.  Its  founder  launched  fiery 
anathemas  against  all  who  would  not  accept  the 
divinity  of  his  inspiration,  and  his  words  fell  on 
fertile  ground,  for  a  large  number  of  those  who 
have  embraced  Islam  are  semi-savages,  and  often 
warlike  savages,  whose  minds  are  too  untrained  to 
receive  the  idea  that  an  honest  difference  of  opinion 
is  no  cause  for  bitter  hatred.  More  than  this,  the 
Moslem  has  for  centuries  past  been  taught  that 
the  barbarous  principles  of  the  lex  talionis  are 
sanctioned,  and  even  enjoined  by  his  religion.  He 
is  told  to  revenge  himself  on  his  enemies,  to  strike 
them  that  strike  him,  to  claim  an  eye  for  an  eye, 
and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth.  Islamism,  therefore,  unlike 
Christianity,  tends  to  engender  the  idea  that  revenge 
and  hatred,  rather  than  love  and  charity,^  should 
form  the  basis  of  the  relations  between  man  and 
man ;  and  it  inculcates  a  special  degree  of  hatred 
against  those  who  do  not  accept  the  Moslem  faith. 
"  When  ye  encoimter  the  unbelievers,"  says  the 
Koran,  "  strike  off  their  heads  until  ye  have  made 
a  great  slaughter  among  them,  and  bind  them  in 
bonds.  .  .  .  O  true  behevers,  if  ye  assist  God,  by 
fighting  for  his  religion,  he  will  assist  you  against 
your  enemies  ;  and  will  set  your  feet  fast ;  but  as 
for  the  infidels,  let  them  perish  ;  and  their  works 
God  shall  render  vain.  .  .  .  Verily,  God  will  intro- 
duce those  who  beheve  and  do  good  works  into 
gardens  beneath  which  rivers  flow,  but  the  un- 
believers indulge  themselves  in  pleasures,  and  eat 
as  beasts   eat ;  and  their  abode  shall   be  hell 

1  "Le  Christianismo  a  ete  intolerant,  mais  I'intolerance  n'est  pas 
un  fait  essentiellement  chretien.  C'est  un  fait  juif." — Renan,  Vie  de 
Jesus,  p.  425. 


140  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

fire."  ^  It  is  true  that  when  Mohammed  denounced 
unbehevers  he  was  alluding  more  especially  to  the 
pagans  who  during  his  lifetime  inhabited  the 
Arabian  Peninsula,  but  later  commentators  and 
interpreters  of  the  Koran  applied  his  denunciations 
to  Christians  and  Jews,  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that 
they  are  now  understood  by  a  large  number  of 
Mohammedans.  Does  not  the  word  "  Ghazi,"  which 
is  the  highest  title  attainable  by  an  officer  of  the 
Sultan's  army,  signify  "  one  who  fights  in  the  cause 
of  Islam ;  a  hero ;  a  warrior ;  one  who  slays  an 
infidel "  ?  Does  not  every  ]\Iollah,  when  he 
recites  the  Khutbeh  at  the  INIosque,  invoke  Divine 
wrath  on  the  heads  of  unbehevers  in  terms  which 
are  sufficiently  pronounced  at  all  times,  and  in 
which  the  diapason  of  invective  swells  still  more 
loudly  when  any  adventitious  circumstances  may 
have  tended  to  fan  the  flame  of  fanaticism  ?  Should 
not  every  non-Moslem  land  be  considered  in  strict 
parlance  a  Dar-el-Harb,  a  land  of  warfare  ?  ^  When 
principles  such  as  these  have  been  dinned  for 
centuries  past  into  the  ears  of  Moslems,  it  can 
be  no  matter  for  surprise  that  a  spirit  of  intolerance 
has  been  generated. 

The  Englishman  in  Egypt  will  find  that,  in  the 

*  On  the  other  hand,  Surah  ii.  267,  says:  "Let  there  be  no  com- 
pulsion in  religion."  The  numerous  contradictory  utterances  and 
inconsistencies  of  the  Koran  cannot  be  reconciled.  They  are  probably 
due  to  the  fact  that  Mohammed's  teaching  was  greatly  influenced  by  pass- 
ing events  as  well  as  by  the  personal  episodes  of  his  own  career. 

*  Hughes'  Dictionary  of  Mam,  p.  139. 

'  There  is,  however,  considerable  difference  of  opinion  amongst 
Moslem  authorities  as  to  the  precise  definition  of  a  Dar-el-Harb.  The 
question  is  one  of  considerable  importance  to  the  rulers  of  India.  It 
is  discussed  in  Sir  VV'illiam  Hunter's  work  entitled  Indian  Musulmans. 
The  highest  Moslem  authorities  have  expressed  opinions  that  India  is  a 
Dar-el-Islam,  and  not  a  Dar-el-Harb.  Hence,  it  is  not  incumbent  on 
the  Moslems  of  India  to  carry  on  a  Jihad  against  the  infidels.  The 
truth  is  that  when,  twelve  centuries  ago,  these  words  came  into  use,  it 
was  never  contemplated  that  sixty  millions  of  Moslems  would  be  living 
peacefully  under  the  rule  of  a  Christian  King  or  Queen.  Hence,  some 
modus  Vivendi  had  to  be  found,  which  would  bring  the  facts  of  the 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  141 


practical  everyday  work  of  administration,  this  in- 
tolerant spirit,  though  it  may  not  always  find  expres- 
sion in  word  or  deed,  is  an  obstacle  to  the  reformer 
of  which  it  is  difficult  to  overrate  the  importance. 
He  will  find  that  he  has  not,  as  in  India,  to  deal 
with  a  body  of  Moslems,  numerically  strong,  but 
whose  power  of  cohesion  is  enfeebled  from  their 
being  scattered  broadcast  amongst  a  population 
five  times  as  numerous  as  themselves,  who  hold  to 
another  and  more  tolerant  creed.  He  wiU  have  to 
deal  with  a  smaller  but  more  compact  body  of 
Moslems,  who  are  more  subject  to  the  influences 
of  their  spiritual  leaders  than  their  co-rehgionists 
in  India.  The  Enghshman  will  do  his  best  under 
these  circumstances.  He  will  scrupulously  abstain 
from  interference  in  rehgious  matters.  He  will 
be  eager  to  explain  that  proselytism  forms  no 
part  of  his  pohtical  programme.  He  will  look 
the  other  way  when  greedy  Sheikhs  swallow  up 
the  endowments  left  by  pious  Moslems  for  chari- 
table purposes.  His  Western  mind  may,  indeed, 
revolt  at  the  misappropriation  of  funds,  but  he 
would  rather  let  these  things  be  than  incur  the 
charge  of  tampering  with  any  quasi-rehgious  in- 
stitution. For  similar  reasons,  he  will  abstain 
from  laying  his  reforming  hand  on  the  iniquities 
of  the  Kadi's  courts.  The  hired  perjurer  will  be 
allowed  full  immunity  to  exercise  his  profession,^ 

firesent  day  into  apparent  conformity  with  the  doctrines  of  Islam.  The 
aw  doctors  of  Northern  India  wisely  laid  down  the  principle  that  no 
Jihad  was  justifiable  unless  it  was  likely  to  be  successful.  This  view 
was  conformable  to  the  worldly  interests  both  of  the  rulers  of  India 
and  of  their  Moslem  subjects,  but  there  is  a  somewhat  secular  ring 
about  an  utterance  of  this  sort.  It  commends  itself  to  the  politician 
rather  than  to  the  uncompromising  divine.  Even  the  exponents  of 
unbending  Islam  seem,  however,  prepared  at  times  to  admit  the 
principle  qu'il  y  a  des  accommodements  avec  le  del. 

*  A  number  of  false  witnesses  ply,  or,  at  all  events,  used  to  ply  for 
hire  about  the  precincts  of  the  Kadi's  court  at  Cairo.  They  are  pre- 
pared, on  payment,  to  swear  to  anything.  I  have  been  informed  that 
when  the  British  Government  took  over  the  administration  of  Cyprus 


142  MODERN  EGYPT 


for  the  Englishman  is  informed  that  the  criminal 
cannot  be  brought  to  justice  without  shaking  one 
of  the  props  which  hold  together  the  religious 
edifice  founded  twelve  centuries  ago  by  the  Prophet 
of  Arabia.  He  did  not  for  many  years  allow  a 
murderer,  whose  offence  was  clearly  proved,  to  be 
hanged  because  Islam  declared — or  was  supposed 
by  many  Ul-informed  Moslems  to  declare — that  such 
an  act  is  unlawful  unless  the  murderer  confesses 
his  crime,  or  unless  the  act  is  committed  in  the 
presence  of  two  witnesses ;  and  he  accepted  this 
principle  in  deference  to  Moslem  sentiment,  with 
the  full  knowledge  that,  in  accepting  it,  he  was 
giving  a  direct  encouragement  to  perjury  and  the 
use  of  torture  to  extract  evidence.^  In  the  work 
of  civil  juridical  reform,  he  will  bear  with  all  the 
antiquated  formaUties  of  the  Mehkemeh  Sheraieh. 
He  will  scrupulously  respect  all  Moslem  observ- 
ances. He  wUl  generally,  amidst  some  twinges 
of  his  Sabbatarian  coiiscience,  observe  Friday  as  a 
holiday,  and  perform  the  work  of  the  Eg}"ptian 
Government  on  Sunday.'^  He  will  put  on  slippers 
over  his  boots  when  he  enters  a  Mosque.  He  will 
pay  his  respects  to  Moslem  notabihties  during  the 
fast  of  Ramazan  and  the  feast  of  Bairam.  He 
will,  when  an  officer  of  the  army,  take  part  in 

it  was  found  that  the  profession  of  false  witness  had  been  officially 
recognised  by  the  Turkish  Government.  Perjurers  took  out  licenses 
for  the  exercise  of  their  profession.  A  good  account  of  the  proceed- 
ings of  these  professional  witnesses  is  given  in  Senior's  Journal  in 
Turkey  and  Greece,  p.  80. 

It  ought  in  fairness  to  be  added  that  hired  perjurers  existed  at  one 
time  in  England.  The  literature  of  the  Elizabethan  period  abounds 
with  allusions  to  "  Knights  of  the  Post,"  as  they  were  then  termed. 

^  The  law  on  this  subject  was  eventually  changed.  After  prolonged 
inquiry,  it  was  ascertained  beyond  doubt  that  the  view  commonly  held 
in  Egypt  was  not  in  conformity  with  Moslem  law  or  tradition.  In 
1897,  therefore,  a  law  was  passed  in  virtue  of  which  the  special  pro- 
vision as  regards  the  evidence  necessary  in  order  to  permit  of  a  capital 
punishment  being  inflicted  in  a  case  of  murder  was  abolished. 

*  Some  British  officials  have  declined  to  work  on  Sundays,  and  have 
made  up  the  hours  thus  lost  by  working  extra  hours  on  week-days. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  143 


Moslem  religious  ceremonies,  fire  salutes  at  religious 
festivals,  and  sometimes  expose  his  life  under  the 
burning  rays  of  an  Aifrican  sun  rather  than  substi- 
tute a  Christian  helmet  for  the  tarboush,  which  is 
the  distinctive  mark  of  the  INIoslem  soldier  in  the 
Ottoman  dominions.  And  when  he  has  done  all 
these  things  and  many  more  of  a  hke  nature,  they 
will  only  avail  him  so  far  that  they  may  perhaps 
tend  to  obviate  any  active  eruption  of  the  volcano 
of  intolerance.  They  will  acquire  for  him  a  grudg- 
ing acknowledgment  that  he  is  content  to  let  weU 
alone,  and  that  he  does  not  endeavour  to  evangeUse 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  He  will  not  be  able 
to  inspire  any  strong  feeling  of  gratitude  beyond 
this  hmit.  The  Enghsh  engineer  may  give  the 
Egyptian  fellah  water  for  his  fields,  and  roads 
and  railways  to  enable  him  to  bring  his  produce 
to  market ;  the  Enghsh  financier  may  afford 
him  fiscal  reUef  beyond  his  wildest  hopes ;  the 
Enghsh  jurist  may  prevent  his  being  sent  to 
death  or  exile  for  a  crime  of  which  he  is  innocent ; 
the  English  schoolmaster  may  open  to  him  the  door 
of  Western  knowledge  and  science ;  in  a  word,  his 
material  comfort  may  be  increased,  his  intellect 
may  be  developed,  and  his  moral  being  elevated 
imder  British  auspices,  but  the  Egyptian  Moslem, 
albeit  he  hates  and  fears  the  Turkish  Pasha, 
that  he  recognises  the  benefits  conferred  on 
him  by  the  Enghshman  and  acknowledges  his 
superior  ability,  can  never  forget  the  fact  that 
the  Enghshman  wears  a  hat  whilst  he,  him- 
self, wears  a  tarboush  or  a  turban.  Though  he 
accepts  the  benefits  willingly  enough,  he  is  always 
mindful  that  the  hand  which  bestows  them  is  not 
that  of  a  co-rehgionist,  and  it  is  this  which  affects 
him  far  more  than  the  thought  that  the  English- 
man is  not  his  compatriot.  Do  what  he  will, 
through  the  combined  channels  of  sympathy  and 


144  MODERN  EGYPT 


of  reason,  the  Englishman  will  never  be  able  to 
break  down  this  barrier,  that  whereas  both  he  and 
the  Egyptian  Moslems  are  prepared  to  aver  that 
there  is  no  God  but  God,  the  Egyptian  is,  and  the 
Englishman  is  not  prepared  to  subscribe  to  the 
latter  part  of  the  formula,  which  lays  do"wn  that 
JNIohammed  was  the  Prophet  of  God.  "  Islam  is  aU 
in  aU  to  the  fellah  ;  the  unbehevers  he  looks  on  as 
a  miserable  minority ;  and  it  is  only  the  unpleasant 
fact  that  they  cannot  be  crushed  at  present  that 
prevents  his  crushing  them,  and  asserting  the 
supremacy  of  Islam."  ^ 

Neither  is  this  the  sole  barrier  which  is  inter- 
posed between  the  two  races.  Look,  not  only  to 
the  leading  dogma,  but  to  the  incidents  of  Di^dne 
worship  associated  with  Islamism  as  opposed  to 
those  of  Christianity.  Examine  the  consequences 
which  the  degradation  of  women  brings  in  its  train. 
Consider  the  mental  and  moral  attributes,  the 
customs,  art,  architecture,^  language,  dress,  and 
tastes  of  the  dark-skinned  Eastern  as  compared 
with  the  fair-skinned  Western.  It  will  be  found 
that  on  every  point  they  are  the  poles  asunder.' 
It  would  seem,  indeed,  as  if  even  in  the  most 
trivial  acts  of  hfe  some  mifelt  impulse,  for  which 
no  special  reason  can  be  assigned,  drives  the 
Eastern  to  do  the  exact  opposite  to  that  which 
the  Western  would  do  under  similar  circumstances.* 

'  W.  Flinders  Petrie,  Ten  Years  Digging  in  Egypt,  p.  180. 

'  Dean  Milman  says:  "The  East,  having  once  wrought  out  its 
architectural  type  and  model,  settled  down  in  unprogressive,  un- 
creative  acquiescence,  and  went  on  copying  that  type  with  servile  and 
almost  undeviating  uniformity.  In  the  West,  within  certain  limits, 
with  certain  principles,  and  with  a  fixed  aim,  there  was  freedom,  pro- 
gression, invention." — History  of  Latin  Christianity,  vol.  ix.  270. 

'  Sir  George  Cornewall  Lewis  (On  the  Method  of  Observation  and 
Reasoning  in  Politics,  voL  ii.  oh.  xvi.)  has  some  interesting  remarks  on 
this  subject. 

*  An  Englishman,  who  was  a  keen  observer  of  Egyptian  manners  and 
customs,  told  me  that,  as  a  test  of  intelligence,  he  once  asked  a  fellah 
to  point  to  his  left  ear.    A  European  would  certainly  have  taken  hold 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  145 


It  will  be  interesting  to  dwell  on  this  point  at  some- 
what greater  length. 

Consider  first  differences,  some  of  great,  some 
of  trifling  importance,  which  hinge  on  religious 
belief  and  ceremonial. 

The  Christian  clings  to  the  hope  that,  in  the 
spiritual  heaven  to  which  he  looks  forward,  he  will 
meet  with  those  with  whom  he  has  been  associated 
in  this  world.  This  hope  is,  indeed,  one  of  the 
most  beautiful  and  consolatory  features  of  his 
faith.  The  Moslem's  beUef  in  immortality  is  dis- 
sociated from  any  ideas  of  this  nature.  The  Houris, 
who  people  the  Paradise  which  he  hopes  to  gain, 
were  never  inhabitants  of  this  world. 

The  Christian  prays  for  certain  qualities  to  be 
granted  to  him,  or  for  certain  specific  objects  to 
be  accomplished.  The  Moslem  generally  utters 
certain  set  formulas  of  adoration ;  he  rarely  prays 
for  specific  objects. 

The  Christian  will  say  his  daily  prayers  in 
private.  The  Moslem  will  say  them  in  public. 
He  has  no  false  shame  about  bearing  public  testi- 
mony to  the  fact  that,  in  every  act  he  performs, 
he  is  in  the  hands  of  God.  "  God,"  said  an  English 
divine  who  had  made  a  study  of  Eastern  religions, 
"  is  present  to  Mohammedans  in  a  sense  in  which 
He  is  rarely  present  to  us  amidst  the  hurry  and 
confusion  of  the  West."^ 

The  Christian,  when  he  fasts  at  all,  fasts 
moderately  by  day  and  sleeps  at  night.  The 
Moslem,  during  his  fast,  neither  eats,  nor  drinks, 
nor  smokes  by  day,  but  indulges  without  restraint 
at  night. 

The  Christian  religion  encourages  the  fine  arts, 

of  the  lobe  of  his  left  ear  with  his  left  hand.  The  Egyptian  passed  his 
right  hand  over  the  top  of  his  head  and  with  that  hand  grasped  the 
upper  part  of  his  left  ear. 

'  Dean  Stanley's  Lectures  on  the  Eastern  Church,  p.  334. 
VOI„  II  L 


146  MODERN  EGYPT 


and  draws  a  potent  influence  from  them.  The 
Mohammedan  rehgion  is  iconoclastic.  Painting  and 
sculpture,  when  they  represent  any  living  creature, 
are  condemned.    Music  is  never  heard  in  a  Mosque. 

The  Christian  will  sometimes  be  cleanly  because 
he  thinks  that  it  conduces  to  his  health  and  com- 
fort. He  puts  cleanliness  next  to  godliness,  but 
does  not  associate  the  two  ideas  together.  The 
Moslem  will  be  cleanly  after  a  fashion  because  his 
reUgion  enjoins  him  to  be  so. 

Turn  now  to  the  mental  and  moral  attributes 
of  the  two  races.  It  will  be  found  that  the  anti- 
theses are  striking. 

Sir  Alfred  Lyall  once  said  to  me :  "  Accuracy 
is  abhorrent  to  the  Oriental  mind.  Every  Anglo- 
Indian  official  should  always  remember  that 
maxim,"  Want  of  accuracy,  which  easily  degen- 
erates into  untruthfulness,^  is,  in  fact,  the  main 
characteristic  of  the  Oriental  mind. 

The  European  is  a  close  reasoner ;  his  state- 
ments of  fact  are  devoid  of  ambiguity ;  he  is  a 
natural  logician,  albeit  he  may  not  have  studied 
logic ;  he  loves  symmetry  in  all  things ;  he  is  by 
nature  sceptical  and  requires  proof  before  he  can 
accept  the  truth  of  any  proposition ;  his  trained 
intelligence  works  Uke  a  piece  of  mechanism.  The 
mind  of  the  Oriental,  on  the  other  hand,  Uke 
his  picturesque  streets,  is  eminently  wanting  in 
symmetry.  His  reasoning  is  of  the  most  slip- 
shod description.  Although  the  ancient  Arabs 
acquired  in  a  somewhat  high  degree  the  science  of 

*  "  Pour  nous,  races  profondement  se»ieuses,  la  conviction  sig'aifie 
la  sincerite  avec  soi-meme.  Mais  la  sincerite  avec  soi-meme  n'a  pas 
beaucoup  de  sens  chez  les  peuples  Orientaux,  peu  habitues  aux 
delicatesses  de  I'esprit  critique.  Bonne  foi  et  imposture  sout  des 
mots  qui,  dans  notre  conscience  rigide,  s'opposent  comme  deux  termes 
inconciliables.  En  Orient,  il  y  a  de  I'un  a  I'autre  mille  fuites  et  mille 
detours.  ...  La  ve'rite  materielle  a  tres  peu  de  prix  pour  I'Oriental ; 
il  voit  tout  a  travers  ses  prejuge's,  ses  inte'rets,  ses  passions." — Renan, 
Vie  de  Jesus,  p.  263. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  147 


dialectics/  their  descendants  are  singularly  deficient 
in  the  logical  faculty.  They  are  often  incapable 
of  drawing  the  most  ob\'ious  conclusions  from  any 
simple  premises  of  which  they  may  admit  the  truth. 
Endeavour  to  eUcit  a  plain  statement  of  facts 
from  an  ordinary  Egyptian.  His  explanation  vdll 
generally  be  lengthy,  and  wanting  in  lucidity.  He 
wdll  probably  contradict  himself  half-a-dozen  times 
before  he  has  finished  his  story.  He  wiU  often 
break  down  under  the  mildest  process  of  cross- 
examination.  The  Egyptian  is  also  eminently 
unsceptical.  He  readily  becomes  the  dupe  of 
the  magician  and  the  astrologer.  Even  highly 
educated  Egyptians  are  prone  to  refer  the  com- 
mon occurrences  of  hfe  to  the  intervention  of 
some  supernatural  agency.  In  pohtical  matters, 
as  well  as  in  the  affairs  of  everyday  life,  the 
Egyptian  will,  without  inquiry,  accept  as  true 

1  It  is  well  known  that  the  Arabs  of  the  eleventh  and  twelfth 
centuries  exercised  a  considerable  influence  on  European  thought  by 
their  teaching  of  the  Aristotelian  philosophy.  See,  inter  alia,  Milman's 
History  of  Latin  Christianity,  vol.  ix.  ciii.  Also  Symouds'  Renaissance 
in  Italy,  p.  68.  Dauta  {Inf.  c.  iv.  143)  speaks  of  Avicenna  and  of 
"  Awerroes,  che  '1  gran  commento  feo." 

Renan  (Averroes  et  I'Averroisme,  pp.  ii.  and  iii.)  makes  the  following 
remarks  : — "  Les  Arabes  ne  firent  qu'adopter  I'ensemble  de  I'encyclo- 
pedie  grecque  telle  que  le  monde  entier  I'avait  acceptee  vers  le  Vlleme 
et  le  VI  Heme  siecle.  ...  La  philosophic  Arabe  oft're  I'exemple  a  peu 
pres  unique  d'une  tres  haute  culture  supprimee  presque  instantanement 
sans  laisser  de  traces,  et  a  peu  pres  oubliee  du  peuple  qui  I'a  creee. 
L'Islamisme  devoila  en  cette  circonstance  ce  qu'il  y  a  d'irremediable- 
meut  etroit  dans  son  genie.  Le  Christianisme,  lui  aussi,  a  ete  peu 
favorable  au  de'veloppement  de  la  science  positive ;  il  a  reussi  a 
I'arreter  en  Espagne  et  a  I'entraver  beaucoup  en  Italic,  mais  il  ne  I'a 
pas  etouffee,  et  meme  les  branches  les  plus  elevees  de  la  famille 
chretienne  ont  fini  par  se  reconcilier  avec  elle.  Incapable  de  se 
transformer  et  d'admettre  aucun  ele'ment  de  vie  civile  et  profane, 
rislamisme  arracha  de  son  sein  tout  genre  de  culture  rationelle. 
Cette  tendance  fatale  fut  combattue  tandis  que  I'hegemonie  de 
rislamisme  resta  entre  les  mains  des  Arabes,  race  si   fine  et  si 

Sirituelle,  ou  des  Persans,  race  tres  portee  a  la  speculation  ;  mais 
le  regna  sans  contrepoids  depuis  que  des  barbares  (Turcs,  Berbers, 
etc.)  prirent  la  direction  de  I'lslam.    Le  monde  Musulman  entra  des 
lors  dans  cette  periode  d'ignorante  brutalite,  d'ou  il  n'est  sorti  que 
pour  tomber  dans  la  morne  agonie  ou  il  se  debat  sous  nos  yeux." 
Averroes  is,  of  course,  a  Spanish  corruption  of  Ibu-Rushd. 


148  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  rv 


the  most  absurd  rumours.^  He  will,  indeed,  do 
more  than  this.  He  will  often  accept  or  reject 
such  rumours  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  their  prob- 
abiUty,  for,  true  to  his  natural  inconsistency  and 
want  of  rational  discrimination,  he  will  occasionally 
develop  a  flash  of  hardy  scepticism  when  he  is 
asked  to  beUeve  the  truth. 

Contrast  again  the  talkative  European,  bursting 
with  superfluous  energy,  active  in  mind,  inquisitive 
about  everything  he  sees  and  hears,  chafing  under 
delay,  and  impatient  of  suffering,  with  the  grave 
and  silent  Eastern,  devoid  of  energy  and  initiative, 
stagnant  in  mind,  wanting  in  curiosity  about 
matters  which  are  new  to  him,  careless  of  waste 
of  time  and  patient  under  suffering. 

Or,  again,  look  at  the  fulsome  flattery,  which 
the  Oriental  wiU  offer  to  his  superior  and  expect 
to  receive  from  his  inferior,  and  compare  the 
general  approval  of  such  practices  with  the 
European  frame  of  mind,  which  spurns  both  the 
flatterer  and  the  person  who  invites  flattery.  This 
contemptible  flattery,  "the  nurse  of  crime,"  as  it 
was  called  by  the  poet  Gay,  is,  indeed,  a  thorn  in  the 
side  of  the  EngUshman  in  Egj^pt,  for  it  prevents 
Khedives  and  Pashas  from  hearing  the  truth  from 
their  own  countrymen.' 

1  "The  note  of  the  primitive  mind  is  amazing  inaccuracy,  coupled 
with  wonderful  receptivity." — Lyall,  Asiatic  Studies,  Second  Series, 
p.  1!)3. 

"  The  extent  to  which  servile  flattery  may  be  carried  at  an  Oriental 
court  is  well  illustrated  by  the  account  given  by  Creasy  {Ottoman  Turks, 
p.  261)  of  the  relations  between  Sultan  Ibrahim  (a.d.  1640-48)  and  his 
Grand  Viziers.  His  first  Vizier  was  Kara-Mustapha,  an  honest  and 
courageous  man,  who  dared  to  tell  the  truth  to  his  Sovereign.  After 
a  short  career,  he  was  dismissed  from  office  and  strangled.  His 
successor,  Sultanzade  Pasha,  determined  not  to  err  on  the  side  of 
frankness.  Even  Ibrahim,  who  was  one  of  the  worst  of  the  degenerate 
Sultans,  could  not  help  noticing  his  servility.  "  How  is  it,"  he  said, 
"  that  thou  art  able  always  to  approve  of  my  actions,  whether  good  or 
evil.''"  "My  Padishah!"  replied  the  Minister,  "thou  art  Khalif; 
thou  art  God's  shadow  upon  earth.  Every  idea  which  thy  spirit  enter- 
tains is  a  revelation  from  Heaven.    Thy  orders,  even  when  they  appear 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  149 


Perhaps  there  is  no  point  as  to  which  the  differ- 
ence between  Eastern  and  Western  habits  of 
thought  comes  out  into  stronger  reUef  than  in  the 
views  which  are  respectively  entertained  by  the 
Oriental  and  the  European  as  regards  provision 
for  the  future  in  this  world.  The  European, 
especially  if  he  be  a  Frenchman,  is  usually 
economical,  and  his  economy  will  not  unfrequently 
degenerate  into  meanness.  He  vdll  pause  before 
he  gives  pledges  which,  whilst  providing  for  his 
immediate  wants,  may  embarrass  him  or  even 
reduce  him  to  penury  at  no  distant  date.  He  will 
usually  make  provision  for  his  old  age,  for  the 
wife,  who  may,  and  for  the  children,  who  probably 
will  survive  him.  The  Egyptian  generally  cares 
for  none  of  these  things.  He  takes  httle  heed  for 
the  morrow  which  will  dawn  on  himself,  and  none 
for  the  days  which  are  in  store  for  those  whom 
he  ^vill  leave  behind  him.  He  is,  perhaps,  un- 
consciously influenced  by  the  frame  of  mind 
engendered  in  himself  and  his  progenitors  from 
having  lived  for  centuries  under  a  succession  of 
Governments,  which  afforded  no  security  to  the 
rights  of  property.^  Whether  he  occupies  the 
palace  or  the  mud  hut,  he  will  often  pledge  his 
future  with  scarcely  a  thought  of  how  his  pledges 
may  be  redeemed.  His  life  is  in  the  past  and 
in  the  present.  The  morrow  must  take  care  of 
the  things  of  itself. 

unreasonable,  have  an  innate  reasonablenesf?,  which  thy  slave  ever 
reveres,  thoug^h  he  may  not  always  understand." 

Ibrahim,  Creasy  adds,  "  accepted  these  assurances  of  infallibility  and 
impeccability  ;  and  thenceforth  spoke  of  himself  as  divinely  inspired, 
in  the  midst  of  the  most  disgraceful  scenes  of  folly,  vice,  and  crime." 
He  was  eventually  deposed  and  murdered. 

^  Indications  are  not  wanting  that,  under  the  influence  of  good 
government,  the  improvident  habits  of  the  Egyptian  population  are 
being  sensibly  modified.  I  have  alluded  to  this  subject  several  times 
in  successive  Annual  Reports  in  connection  with  the  scheme  which  has 
been  introduced  with  a  view  to  lending  small  sums  to  the  fellaheen, 
and  thus  liberating  them  from  the  grip  of  the  village  usurers. 


150  MODERN  EGYPT 


But  these  same  habits  of  improvidence  tend 
perhaps  to  develop  a  quaUty  which  is  worthy  of 
praise.  The  Oriental  may  often  be  blamed  for 
prodigality,  but  he  rarely  incurs  the  charge  of 
meanness.  He  is  charitable  to  his  neighbours,  and 
the  fact  may  be  recorded  to  his  advantage  without 
stopping  to  inquire  whether  his  charity  is  due  to 
kindliness  of  heart,  or  to  the  self-interest,  which 
impels  him,  at  the  dictates  of  his  religion,  to  lay 
up  riches  in  the  world  to  come.  ISIoreover,  the 
Oriental  is  proverbially  hospitable.  Indeed,  his 
hospitaUty  often  errs  on  the  side  of  being  too  la\-ish. 

It  may  be  added,  whilst  on  the  subject  of  kind- 
liness of  heart,  that  the  cruelty  to  animals,  which 
so  often  shocks  visitors  to  Egypt,  is  no  worse  than 
that  which  may  be  witnessed  amongst  Christian 
nations  in  the  south  of  Europe,  and  is  probably, 
as  Lane  observed  in  1835,  not  a  plant  of  indigenous 
growth,  but  is  rather  due  to  association  with  low- 
class  Europeans.  The  JNIoslem  religion  enjoins 
kindness  to  animals.  "  There  is  no  religion  which 
has  taken  a  higher  view  in  its  authoritative  docu- 
ments of  animal  life.  '  There  is  no  beast  on  earth,' 
says  the  Koran,  '  nor  bird  which  flieth  with  wings, 
but  the  same  is  a  people  like  unto  you, — unto  the 
Lord  shall  they  return.'  "  ^ 

Passing  on  to  the  consideration  of  another  differ- 
ence between  the  Oriental  and  the  European, 
which  will  prove  a  perpetual  stumbling-block  to 
the  Englishman  in  Egypt,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
the  ways  of  the  Oriental  are  tortuous  ;  his  love  of 
intrigue  is  inveterate  ;  centuries  of  despotic  govern- 
ment, during  which  his  race  has  been  exposed  to 
the  unbridled  violence  of  capricious  and  headstrong 
Governors,  have  led  him  to  fall  back  on  the  natural 
defence  of  the  weak  against  the  strong.  He 
reposes  unhmited  faith  in  his  own  cunning,  and 

'  Bosworth  Smithy  Mohammed  and  Mohammedanism,  p.  255. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT 


151 


to  some  extent  his  chosen  weapon  will  stand  him 
in  good  stead.  But  its  employment  will  widen  the 
breach  between  him  and  his  protectors,  for  fate 
has  willed  that  the  Egyptians  should  be  more 
especially  associated  with  those  members  of  the 
European  family  who,  perhaps  more  than  any 
others,  loathe  and  despise  intrigue  ;  who,  in  their 
dealings  with  their  fellow-men,  are  frank  and  blunt, 
even  at  times  to  brutahty ;  and  who,  though  not 
difficult  to  beguile,  are  apt  unexpectedly  to  turn 
round  and  smite  those  who  have  beguiled  them  so 
hardly  as  to  crush  them  to  the  dust.  From  this 
point  of  view,  one  of  the  more  subtle  Latin  races, 
had  it  occupied  the  predominant  position  held 
by  the  English  in  Egypt,  would  probably  have  had 
more  sympathy  with  the  weaknesses  of  Egyptian 
character  than  the  Anglo-Saxon. 

Look,  again,  to  the  high  powers  of  organisation 
displayed  by  the  European,  to  his  constant  endea- 
vours to  bend  circumstances  to  suit  his  wiR,  and 
to  his  tendency  to  question  the  acts  of  his  superiors 
unless  he  happens  to  agi'ee  with  them,  a  tendency 
which  is  especially  marked  in  Englishmen,  and 
which  is  only  kept  in  subjection  by  the  trained 
and  intelligent  discipline  resulting  from  education. 
Compare  these  attributes  with  the  feeble  organising 
powers  of  the  Oriental,  with  his  fatalism  which 
accepts  the  inevitable,  and  with  his  submissiveness 
to  all  constituted  authority. 

And  if  it  be  held  that  powers  of  organisation 
are  only  required  amongst  the  educated  classes, 
look  to  what,  for  want  of  a  more  appropriate  term 
to  express  the  idea,  may  be  called  the  general 
muddle -headedn  ess  of  the  ordinary  uneducated 
Eg^-ptian,  of  which  a  few  instances  may  be  given. 

On  more  than  one  occasion,  a  pointsman  in  the 
Egyptian  railway  serAdce  has  been  known  to  turn 
his  points  when  the  passing  train  had  been  half 


152 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


transferred  from  one  line  to  the  other,  with  the 
natural  result  that  the  train  was  upset.  An  Egyp- 
tian engine-driv^er  has  been  known  to  forget  which 
handle  to  turn  in  order  to  stop  his  locomotive. 
On  several  occasions,  railway  employes  have 
been  killed  owing  to  their  having  gone  to  sleep 
with  their  heads  on  the  rail,  that  special  position 
having  been  adopted  in  order  to  ensure  then* 
being  awakened  by  the  noise  of  an  approaching 
train.  A  European  would  think  that,  where  a 
road  and  a  paved  side-walk  existed,  it  requu'ed  no 
great  effort  of  the  reasoning  faculty  to  perceive 
that  human  beings  were  intended  to  pass  along  the 
side- walk,  and  animals  along  the  road.  The  point 
is  not  always  so  clear  to  the  Egyptian.  He  will 
not  unfrequently  walk  in  the  middle  of  the  road,  and 
wiU  send  his  donkey  along  the  side-path.  Instances 
of  this  sort  might  be  multipHed.  Compare  the 
habits  of  thought  which  can  lead  to  actions  of 
this  nature  with  the  promptitude  with  which  the 
European  seizes  on  an  idea  when  it  is  presented 
to  him,  and  acts  as  occasion  may  demand. 

Then,  again,  side  by  side  with  the  European's 
appreciation  of  arithmetic,  consider  that  in  all 
matters  connected  with  number  or  quantity,  the 
ordiaary  Egyptian  goes  hopelessly  astray.  Few 
uneducated  Egyptians  know  their  own  age.  The 
usual  reply  of  an  Egj^tian,  if  asked  the  age  of 
some  old  man,  is  that  he  is  a  hundred  years  old. 
What  importance,  he  thinks,  can  be  attached  to 
precision  about  a  matter  of  this  sort,  or,  indeed, 
to  any  scientific  or  quasi -scientific  subject  ?  I 
once  asked  a  former  head  of  the  El-Azhar  Uni- 
versity whether  his  professors  taught  that  the  sun 
went  round  the  earth  or  the  earth  round  the  sun. 
He  rephed  that  he  was  not  sure,  that  one  nation 
thought  one  way,  and  another  another  way, — 
his  natural  poUteness  possibly  forbidding  him  to 


CH.  xxxiv    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT 


153 


express  to  me  what  he  really  thought  of  the  infidels 
Kepler  and  Copernicus  and  their  doctrines, — that 
his  general  impression  was  that  the  sun  went  round 
the  earth,  but  that  he  had  never  paid  much  atten- 
tion to  the  matter,  and  that  the  subject  was  too 
unimportant  to  merit  serious  discussion.  Tell  an 
Egyptian  cook  that  he  puts  too  much  salt  into  the 
soup.  He  will  abstain  altogether  from  the  use  of 
salt.  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  tell  him  that  he  does 
not  use  salt  enough  ;  he  will  throw  in  a  bucketful. 
He  cannot  hit  the  happy  mean  ;  moderation  in  the 
use  of  salt,  or  in  anything  else,  is  foreign  to  his 
nature ;  he  cannot  grasp  the  idea  of  quantity. 
Again,  ask  an  Arab  from  the  Soudan  how  many 
men  were  killed  at  one  of  the  numerous  battles 
which  have  taken  place  in  that  country.  The  only 
thing  which  is  certain  is  that  he  will  not  state  the 
precise  truth,  or  anything  near  it,  except  by 
accident.  Neither  will  he  reply  that  he  cannot 
answer  the  question  addressed  to  him.  He  will, 
without  hesitation,  blurt  out  the  first  conjecture, 
wliich  flashes  across  his  brain,  as  a  fact  coming 
within  his  personal  knowledge.  He  may  say  100, 
or  he  may  say  2000.  He  has  a  very  faint  concep- 
tion of  what  either  figure  represents,  and  he  will 
be  prepared  to  bring  the  original  100  up  to  2000, 
or  the  original  2000  down  to  100,  according  to  the 
views  which,  by  the  light  of  subsequent  conversa- 
tion, would  appear  gratifying  to  his  interrogator. 

Again,  consider  the  manners  of  the  Oriental  as 
contrasted  with  those  of  the  European.  We  hear 
a  great  deal  in  praise  of  Oriental  courtesy,  and  the 
praise  is  in  some  respects  well  deserved.  A  high- 
class  European  will  be  charmed  with  the  manners 
of  a  high-class  Oriental,  albeit  he  is  aware  that  the 
exaggerated  compliments  common  in  the  East  are 
merely  figurative,  and  cannot  be  taken  to  represent 
the  real  sentiments  of  the  speaker.     But  look  a 


154 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


little  deeper  and  examine  the  ground  on  which 
these  outward  forms  of  courtesy  are  based.  The 
examination  will  bring  out  a  somewhat  unpleasant 
feature  of  the  Egyptian  character.  For  one  of  the 
main  reasons  why  an  Egj'ptian,  if  he  is  in  any 
position  of  authority,  is  courteous  is  that  he  thinks 
it  his  interest  to  be  so.  In  spite  of  this  outside 
courtesy  to  his  superiors,  he  wiU  not  unfrequently 
be  harsh  and  tyrannical  to  his  inferiors,  to  whose 
feelings  and  interests  he  is  often  indifferent.  There 
are,  however,  exceptions.  Slaves  are  more  often 
treated  with  kindness  than  severity,  although  in 
this  case  motives  of  self-interest  may  perhaps  be 
traced.  Amongst  the  middle  and  lower  classes 
of  Egyptians  a  spirit  of  real  courtesy,  not  based 
on  self-interest,  is  often  to  be  found  in  their 
hospitality  towards  strangers.  Moreover,  among 
equals  of  all  classes,  the  outward  forms  of  courtesy 
are  preserved. 

These  points  have  been  indicated  at  some 
length  because  the  differences  between  Eastern 
and  Western  habits  of  thought  constitute  a  barrier 
interposed  between  the  Egyptian  and  the  Eng- 
lishman almost  as  great  as  that  resulting  from 
differences  of  rehgion,  ideas  of  government,  and 
social  customs.  Indeed,  this  difference  of  mental 
attributes  constitutes  perhaps  the  greatest  of  all 
barriers.  It  prevents  the  Englishman  and  the 
Egyptian  from  understanding  each  other.  Never- 
theless, there  is  one  saving  clause,  which  serves  in 
some  respects  as  a  bond  of  union  between  the  two 
races.  Once  explain  to  an  Egyptian  what  he  is  to 
do,  and  he  will  assimilate  the  idea  rapidly.  He 
is  a  good  imitator,  and  will  make  a  faithful,  even 
sometimes  a  too  servile  copy  of  the  work  of  his 
European  teacher.  His  civilisation  may  be  a 
veneer,  yet  he  will  readily  adopt  the  letter,  the 
catchwords    and   jargon,   if  not    the  spirit  of 


CH.  xxxrv    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  155 


European  administrative  systems.  His  movements 
A\Till,  it  is  true,  be  not  unfrequently  those  of  an 
automaton,  but  a  skilfully  constructed  automaton 
may  do  a  great  deal  of  useful  work.  This  feature 
in  the  Egyptian  character  is  of  great  importance  in 
connection  with  the  administration  of  the  country. 
It  is  a  source  of  strength,  and  also  a  source  of 
weakness ;  for,  so  long  as  British  supervision  is 
maintained,  the  Egyptian  will  readily  copy  the  prac- 
tices and  procedures  of  his  English  teachers.  No 
necessity  will,  therefore,  arise  for  employing  any 
large  number  of  English  subordinates.  On  the 
other  hand,  inasmuch  as  the  Egyptian  has  but  Mttle 
power  of  initiation,  and  often  does  not  thoroughly 
grasp  the  reasons  why  his  teachers  have  impelled 
him  in  certain  directions,  a  relapse  will  ensue  if 
English  supervision  be  withdrawn. 

Look  now  to  the  consequences  which  result 
from  the  degradation  of  women  in  Mohammedan 
countries.  In  respect  to  two  points,  both  of  which 
are  of  vital  importance,  there  is  a  radical  difference 
between  the  position  of  Moslem  women  and  that 
of  their  European  sisters.  In  the  first  place,  the 
face  of  the  Moslem  woman  is  veiled  when  she 
appears  in  pubhc.  She  hves  a  life  of  seclusion. 
The  face  of  the  European  woman  is  exposed  to 
view  in  public.  The  only  restraints  placed  on  her 
movements  are  those  dictated  by  her  own  sense 
of  propriety.  In  the  second  place,  the  East  is 
polygamous,  the  West  is  monogamous. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  seclusion  of 
women  exercises  a  baneful  effect  on  Eastern 
society.  The  arguments  on  this  subject  are, 
indeed,  so  commonplace  that  it  is  unnecessary  to 
dweU  on  them.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that 
seclusion,  by  confining  the  sphere  of  woman's 
interest  to  a  very  Hmited  horizon,  cramps  the 
intellect  and  withers  the  mental  development  of 


156  MODERN  EGYPT 


one-half  of  the  population  in  Moslem  countries. 
"  An  Englishwoman  asked  an  Egj-ptian  lady  how 
she  passed  her  time.  '  I  sit  on  tliis  sofa,'  she 
answered,  '  and  when  I  am  tired,  I  cross  over  and 
sit  on  that.'"^  Moreover,  inasmuch  as  women, 
in  their  capacities  as  wives  and  mothers,  exer- 
cise a  great  influence  over  the  characters  of  their 
husbands  and  sons,  it  is  obvious  that  the  seclusion 
of  women  must  produce  a  deteriorating  effect  on 
the  male  population,  in  whose  presumed  interests 
the  custom  was  originally  estabhshed,  and  is  still 
maintained. 

When  an  Egyptian  woman  interferes  in  pohtics, 
her  interference  is  almost  always  mischievous. 
The  information  she  obtains  is  necessarily  com- 
municated to  her  through  a  variety  of  distorted 
media.  The  fact  of  her  seclusion  renders  it  well- 
nigh  impossible  for  her  to  hear  both  sides  of  a 
question.  The  most  trumpery  gossip  will  be 
sufficient  to  set  her  suspicions  ablaze,  and  to  con- 
vince her  that  some  danger,  which  is  often 
imaginary,  hangs  over  the  head  of  herself  or  her 
relatives.  Ignorance  of  any  world  beyond  that  of 
the  harem  renders  it  impossible  for  her  to  dis- 
criminate between  truth  and  falsehood,  between 
what  is  within  the  bounds  of  possibihty  and  what 
is  so  manifestly  absurd  as  to  be  impossible. 

I  need  not  dwell  on  the  causes  wliich,  in  Egypt, 
as  in  other  Oriental  countries,  have  led  to  the 
seclusion  of  women,  nor  on  the  extent  to  which 
this  practice  is  due  to  the  prevalence  of  the 
Mohammedan  rehgion.^  From  the  point  of  view  of 
the  poUtician  and  administrator,  the  consideration 
of  these  questions,  interesting  though  they  be,  is 

1  Cairo,  p.  140. 

^  "  The  system  of  the  harem  is,  in  its  origin,  not  Moslem,  but  simply 
Oriental.  The  only  reproach  that  can  be  made  against  the  Prophet  is 
that,  by  too  definite  legislation,  he  rendered  subsequent  development 
and  reform  impossible." — Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  190. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  157 


of  little  more  than  academic  interest.  I  am  not 
endeavouring  in  this  work  to  discuss  the  effects 
of  Islamism  upon  progress  and  civilisation  in 
general.  My  task  is  of  a  more  humble  nature. 
I  am  merely  attempting  to  describe  the  state  of 
things  which  the  English  found  in  existence  when 
they  took  in  hand  the  rehabilitation  of  Egypt. 
Amongst  other  social  difficulties  it  has,  therefore, 
to  be  noted  that  Moslem  women  in  Egypt  are 
secluded,  and  that  their  influence,  partly  by  reason 
of  their  seclusion,  is,  in  all  poHtical  and  adminis- 
trative matters,  generally  bad. 

The  effects  of  polygamy  are  more  baneful  and 
far-reaching  than  those  of  seclusion.  The  whole 
fabric  of  European  society  rests  upon  the  preserva- 
tion of  family  hfe.  Monogamy  fosters  family  life, 
polygamy  destroys  it.  The  monogamous  Christian 
respects  women ;  the  teaching  of  his  religion  and 
the  incidents  of  his  religious  worship  tend  to 
elevate  them.  He  sees  in  the  Virgin  Mary  an 
ideal  of  womanhood,  which  would  be  incompre- 
hensible in  a  Moslem  country.^  The  Moslem,  on 
the  other  hand,  despises  women ;  both  his  religion 
and  the  example  of  his  Prophet,  the  history  of 
whose  private  life  has  been  handed  down  to  him, 
tend  to  lower  them  in  his  eyes.  Save  in  excep- 
tional cases,  the  Christian  fulfils  the  vow  which 
he  has  made  at  the  altar  to  cleave  to  his  wedded 
wife  for  life.  The  Moslem,  when  his  passion  is 
sated,  can  if  he  Ukes  throw  off  his  wife  Hke 
an  old  glove.    According  to  the  Sunnis,  whose 

^  See  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  vol.  ii.  p.  367.  No 
Moslem  could  appreciate  the  beauty  of  Wordsworth's  sonnet  on  the 
Virgin : — 

Thy  image  falls  to  earth.    Yet  some,  I  ween. 
Not  unforgiven  the  suppliant  knee  might  bend 
As  to  a  visible  Power,  in  which  did  blend 
All  that  was  mixed  and  reconciled  in  thee. 
Of  Mother's  love  with  maiden  purity. 
Of  high  with  low,  celestial  with  terrene. 


158  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

doctrines  are  quoted  because  the  Egyptians  are 
Sunnis,  "  A  husband  may  divorce  his  wife  without 
any  misbehaviour  on  her  part,  or  without  assigning 
any  cause.  The  divorce  of  every  husband  is 
effective  if  he  be  of  sound  understanding  and  of 
mature  age."  ^  There  is,  however,  a  good  deal  of 
difference  of  opinion  amongst  legal  authorities 
as  to  the  law  of  divorce.'^  The  general  principle 
inculcated  by  Mohammed  on  this  subject  is  thus 
explained  in  the  Traditions :  "  The  thing  which 
is  lawful,  but  disUked  by  God,  is  divorce."'  The 
practice  of  monogamy  has  of  late  years  been 
gaining  ground  amongst  the  more  enUghtened 
Egyptians.  The  late  and  the  present  Khedive, 
the  late  Cherif  Pasha,  and  Riaz  Pasha  may  be 
cited  as  monogamous  notabihties.  The  movement 
in  this  direction  may  be  attributed  to  several  causes. 
In  the  first  place,  education  and  association  with 
Europeans  may  have  induced  the  conviction  that 
it  is  more  respectable,  and  generally  more  con- 
ducive to  domestic  happiness,  to  marry  one  wife 
rather  than  to  take  advantage  of  the  permission 
granted  by  Mohammed  to  "  marry  what  seems  good 
to  you  of  women,  by  twos,  or  threes,  or  fours,  or 
what  your  right  hand  possesses  "  {Surah,  iv.  3). 
In  the  second  place,  polygamy  is  expensive.  Lane 
said,  so  long  ago  as  1835,  "  I  beheve  that  not  more 
than  one  husband  among  twenty  has  two  wives,"  * 
and  since  Lane's  time,  the  practice  of  polygamy 
has  certainly  diminished.  Nevertheless,  the  move- 
ment in  favour  of  monogamy  carmot  be  as  yet 
called  general.  The  first  thing  an  Egyptian  of 
the  lower  classes  will  do  when  he  gets  a  Uttle 
money  is  to  marry  a  second  wife.    A  groom  in 

*  Dictionary  of  Islam,  p.  88. 

^  This  question  is  fully  discussed  by  Syed  Ameer  All  iu  his  Penonal 
Law  of  the  Mohammedans,  chapters  xi.-xiiL 
^  Dictionary  of  Islam,  p.  87. 

*  Modem  Egyptians,  vol.  i.  p.  231. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  159 


my  stables  was  divorced  and  re -married  eleven 
times  in  the  course  of  a  year  or  two.  I  remember 
hearing  of  an  old  Pasha  who  complained  peevishly 
that  he  had  to  go  to  the  funeral  of  his  first  wife,  to 
whom  he  had  been  married  forty  years  previously, 
and  whose  very  existence  he  had  forgotten.  The 
great  facility  given  to  divorce  necessarily  weakens 
the  strength  of  the  family  tie.  Further,  in  the 
West,  a  wife,  whose  personal  attractions  have  dis- 
appeared under  the  hand  of  time,  can  often,  in 
default  of  other  influences,  maintain  her  hold  over 
her  husband's  affections  through  the  children  which 
she  has  borne  to  him. 

Femina  quum  senuit,  retinet  connubia  partu, 
Uxorisque  decus  matris  reverentia  pensat. 

The  hold  which  the  discarded  or  neglected  Moslem 
wife  might  maintain  on  grounds  such  as  these  is 
weakened  by  the  presence  of  younger  and  more 
attractive  rivals,  who  have  perhaps  borne  other 
children  to  her  husband. 

Amongst  other  consequences  resulting  from 
polygamy  and  the  customs  which  cluster  round 
polygamy,  it  may  be  noted  that,  whereas  in  the 
West  the  elevation  of  women  has  tended  towards 
the  refinement  both  of  literature  and  of  con- 
versation, in  the  East  their  degradation  has 
encouraged  literary  and  conversational  coarseness. 
This  coarseness  has  attracted  the  attention  of 
all  who  have  written  on  Egyptian  manners  and 
customs.^  It  is  true  that  the  Moslem  may  fairly 
argue  that  he  started  600  years  later  than  the 
Christian  in  the  race  to  attain  civilisation,  and  that, 
apart  from  the  English  dramatists  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  the  writings  of  Boccaccio  and  of 
Rabelais  denote  a  state  of  society  no  more  refined 
than  that  which  at  present  exists  in  Egypt ;  and 

*  Laue's  Modem  Egyptians,  vol.  i.  pp.  260  and  273. 


160  MODERN  EGYPT 


he  may  use  this  argument  with  all  the  greater 
reason  inasmuch  as  the  class  of  humour  which 
finds  most  favour  in  Egyptian  society  is  very 
much  akin  to  that  which  we  may  now  read  in  the 
Decameron.  But,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  Decameron  is  a  model  of 
refinement  as  compared  with  many  works  in 
Arabic ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  it  may  be 
doubted  whether,  even  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the 
general  coarseness  of  European  society  was  ever 
on  a  par  with  that  of  the  modern  Egyptians. 

There  is,  however,  one  feature  in  connection  with 
family  life  in  the  East,  where  the  Oriental  contrasts 
very  favourably  with  the  European.  "  Paradise," 
the  Prophet  finely  said,  "Ues  under  the  feet  of 
mothers."  Greater  outward  respect  is,  in  fact, 
shown  to  parents,  and  to  old  age  in  general, 
by  Eastern  than  by  Western  races.  "  Thou 
shalt  rise  up  before  the  hoary  head  and  honour 
the  face  of  the  old  man  and  fear  thy  God." 
Egyptians  have  from  time  immemorial  acted  on 
this  Levitical  principle.  Herodotus  says  :  "  Their 
(the  Egyptian)  young  men  when  they  meet  their 
elders  in  the  streets,  give  way  to  them  and  step 
aside ;  and  if  an  elder  man  comes  in  where  young 
men  are  present,  these  latter  rise  from  their  seats. 
Yoimg  Egyptians  generally  respect  and  obey  their 
parents  and  are  well  treated  by  them,  unless, 
indeed,  both  parents  and  children  occupy  very 
high  positions,  in  which  case,  the  principle  laid 
down  by  the  Prophet  ISIicah  rather  than  that 
prescribed  by  Moses  forms  the  basis  of  the  family 
connection :  "  A  man's  enemies  are  the  men  of  his 
own  house." 

Consider  also  the  different  standpoints  from 
which  the  European  and  the  Oriental  approach 
the  subject  of  government. 

^  Book  u.  chapter  132, 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  161 


The  point  of  view  of  the  Eastern  is  wholly 
different  from  that  of  the  Western.  I  speak,  of 
course,  of  the  true  Eastern,  free  from  European 
alloy ;  for  when  once  the  Eastern,  and  notably  the 
E?xyptian,  has  been  semi  -  Europeanised,  he  will 
often  develop  with  amazing  rapidity  into  a  root- 
and  -  branch  reformer.  He  will  not  understand 
moderation  in  reform  any  more  than  the  Egyptian 
cook,  who  was  recently  mentioned,  will  under- 
stand moderation  in  the  use  of  salt.  The  true 
Eastern  is  a  staunch  conservative.  He  would 
probably  look  upon  an  Oriental  Lord  Eldon  as  a 
rash  innovator.  European  affairs  appear  to  him 
to  be  in  a  constant  state  of  flux  ;  his  frame  of 
mind  is  fitly  represented  by  Matthew  Arnold's 
fine  lines  : — 

The  East  bowed  low  before  the  blast 
In  patient  deep  disdain ; 
She  let  the  legions  thunder  past, 
And  plunged  in  thought  again. 

The  mind  of  the  true  Eastern  is  at  once  lethargic 
and  suspicious ;  he  does  not  want  to  be  reformed,  and 
he  is  convinced  that,  if  the  European  wishes  to  re- 
form him,  the  desire  springs  from  sentiments  which 
bode  him  no  good.  Moreover,  his  conservatism 
is  due  to  an  instinct  of  self-preservation,  and  to 
a  dim  perception  that,  if  he  allows  himself  to  be 
even  slightly  reformed,  all  the  things  to  which  he 
attaches  importance  will  be  not  merely  changed  in 
this  or  that  particular,  but  will  rather  be  swept  off 
the  face  of  the  earth.  Perhaps  he  is  not  far  wrong. 
Although  there  are  many  highly-educated  gentle- 
men who  profess  the  Moslem  religion,  it  has  yet 
to  be  proved  that  Islam  can  assimilate  civihsation 
without  succumbing  in  the  process.  It  is,  indeed, 
not  improbable  that,  in  its  passage  through  the 
Eliuropean  crucible,  many  of  the  distinctive  features 

VOL.  II  M 


162 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  IV 


of  Islam,  the  good  alike  with  the  bad,  will  be 
volatilised,  and  that  it  will  eventually  issue  forth 
in  a  form  scarcely  capable  of  recognition.  "  The 
Egyptians,"  Moses  said,  "whom  ye  have  seen  to-day, 
ye  shall  see  them  again  no  more  for  ever."  ^  The 
prophecy  may  be  approaching  fulfilment  in  a  sense 
different  to  that  in  which  it  was  addressed  to  the 
IsraeUtes. 

Look,  moreover,  not  only  to  the  spirit  of  the 
lawgivers,  but  to  the  general  principles  on  which 
the  laws  are  based.  The  tendency  in  all  civihsed 
European  States  is  to  separate  religious  from  civil 
laws.  In  Moslem  States,  on  the  other  hand, 
rehgious  and  civil  laws  are  inextricably  interwoven. 

In  the  West,  the  law  recognises  and  encourages 
the  use  of  credit,^  and  protects  the  creditor.  It 
may  be  remarked  incidentally  that,  in  respect  to 
this  point  perhaps  more  than  any  other,  the 
ignorant  and  improvident  Egj'ptian  suffered  when 
the  Code  Napoldon,  hke  a  Juggernaut's  car,  passed 
over  his  back.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Moslem 
law  condemns  usury,  and  thus  discourages  the 
outlay  of  capital.^  The  lax  Egyptian  Moslem  is 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  all  sorts  of  subter- 
fuges in  order  to  lend  money  without  violating 
the  letter  of  the  law.  The  presence  of  the  Cliris- 
tian  usurer,  with  whom  it  is  at  times  possible 
for  the  Moslem  to  form  an  umiatural  aUiance 
based  on  a  community  of  interest,  facihtates 
subterfuges  of  this  sort. 

Again,  in  the  East  the  theory  and  practice  that 
the  Government  is  the  sole  proprietor  of  the  soil 
survives  to  a  certain  extent.    In  the  West,  on 

1  Exodus  xiv.  13. 

2  It  should,  however,  he  remembered  that,  during  the  Middle  Ages, 
the  Christian  Church  exerted  its  influence  against  usury,  with  the 
result  that  the  money-lending  business  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Jews. 

^  The  Moslem  depositors  in  the  Government  Savings  Banks  often 
decline  to  accept  interest  on  their  deposits. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT 


163 


the  other  hand,  the  theory  has  been  well-nigh  for- 
gotten, and  the  practice  no  longer  survives.  Save 
in  the  least  civilised  portions  of  Europe,^  land  is 
held  to  be  the  private  property  of  individuals. 

So  also  as  regards  criminal  laws,  the  differences 
are  striking.  The  Moslem  code  is  based  upon  the 
principle,  long  since  abandoned  in  the  West,  that 
it  is  the  business  of  the  State  to  obhge  its  citizens 
to  be  religious  and  moral.  A  sentence  of  death 
for  blasphemy  could  not,  of  course,  at  present  be 
carried  out,  but  a  case  occurred  in  Egypt,  since 
the  British  occupation,  of  a  man  who  received 
eighty  blows  with  a  courbash,  under  sentence 
from  the  Kadi,  for  smoking  a  cigarette  in  the 
streets  during  the  Ramazan  fast.  In  general 
also.  Oriental  punishments  are  cruel,^  whilst  Euro- 
pean punishments  are  mild.  This  fact  tends 
towards  brutahsing  the  population  and  rendering 
them  cruel  to  each  other. 

Compare,  again,  the  languages,  art,  architecture, 
and  music  of  the  Oriental  with  those  of  the  Euro- 
pean. It  will  be  found  that  on  almost  every 
point  the  practices  and  the  tastes  of  the  one  are 
opposed  to  those  of  the  other. 

Oriental  alphabets  are  intricate.  The  Turk,  the 
Arab,  and  the  Persian  begin  to  write  on  the  right 
side  of  the  page ;  the  short  vowels  are  almost 
always  omitted.  European  alphabets,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  simple.  The  European  begins  to  write 
on  the  left-hand  side  of  the  page. 

Orientals  continue  to  copy  from  one  style  of  art. 
European  art  is  various  and  constantly  develops 
new  forms. 

Oriental  music,  which  is  much  the  same  in  all 
parts  of  the  East,  is  wanting  in  harmony  and 

1  See  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace's  Russia. 

2  Moltlte,  who  wrote  in  18.36,  says  {Briefe,  etc.,  in  der  Turkei,  p.  36) 
that  he  had  heen  a  personal  witness  of  the  barbarous  punishment 
inflicted  in  Turkey  on  unfaithful  wives. 


164  MODERN  EGYPT 


monotonous  to  the  ears  of  most  Europeans.^ 
European  music,  on  the  other  hand,  generally 
fails  to  please  Orientals. 

Turn,  again,  to  the  most  ordinary  customs  and 
expressions,  the  dress,  etc.,  of  the  Oriental  as  com- 
pared with  the  European.  It  will  be  found  that, 
even  in  the  most  trivial  matters,  the  Oriental  will 
generally  do  or  say  the  opposite  to  what  the 
European  would  do  or  say  under  similar  circum- 
stances. Numerous  instances  in  point  will  readily 
occur  to  any  one  who  has  even  a  sUght  acquaint- 
ance with  Eastern  social  hfe. 

The  ethnologist,  the  comparative  philologist, 
and  the  sociologist  would  possibly  be  able  to  give 
explanations  as  regards  many  of  the  differences 
which  exist  between  the  East  and  the  West.  As  I 
am  only  a  diplomatist  and  an  administrator,  whose 
proper  study  is  also  man,  but  from  the  point  of 
view  of  governing  him  rather  than  from  that  of 
scientific  research  into  how  he  comes  to  be  what  he 
is,  I  content  myself  with  noting  the  fact  that  some- 
how or  other  the  Oriental  generally  acts,  speaks, 
and  thinks  in  a  manner  exactly  opposite  to  the 
European.  "  Tout,  chez  ce  peuple,  porte  I'empreinte 
d'un  contraste  frappant  avec  les  habitudes  des 
nations  Europeennes.  Cette  difference  est  rou\Tage 
du  climat,  des  institutions  civiles  et  des  prejug^s 
religieux."  ^ 

Many  of  the  observations  contained  in  this 
chapter  may  be  considered  commonplace.  Nothing, 
indeed,  has  been  stated  which  will  be  new  to  those 
who  have  paid  attention  to  Eastern  affairs,  or  who 
are  in  any  degree  familiar  with  the  social  life  of  the 
East.  I  have,  however,  thought  it  desirable  to 
make  a  catalogue — and,  I  may  add,  a  very  incom- 


'  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  from  the  earliest  times  the  Arabs  have 
taken  extreme  delight  in  their  own  music.  See  Kremer's  Culturgeschichte 
dea  Orients,  vol.  i.  p.  149.  -  Description  de  t Egypte,  p.  83. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  165 


plete  catalogue — of  the  main  points  as  to  which 
Egyptian  and  European  habits  of  thought  and 
customs  diverge,  for,  although  each  detail  taken  by 
itself  may  be  well  known,  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  even  those  Englishmen  who  have  been 
actively  engaged  in  the  work  of  Egyptian  adminis- 
tration have  always  recognised  to  the  full  that,  in 
taking  in  hand  Egyptian  reform,  they  had  to  deal 
with  a  society  which  was  not  only  in  a  backward 
state  of  civilisation,  but  which  was  also,  from  their 
point  of  view,  well-nigh  incomprehensible.  They 
were  brought  face  to  face  with  a  population  which, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  European,  was,  morally  and 
pohtically  speaking,  walking  on  its  head.  Lord 
Dalling,  at  one  time  Ambassador  at  Constantinople, 
is  credited  vvdth  saying :  "  When  you  wish  to  know 
what  a  Turkish  official  is  likely  to  do,  first  consider 
what  it  would  be  his  interest  to  do  ;  next,  what  any 
other  man  would  do  in  similar  circumstances  ;  and 
thirdly,  what  every  one  expects  him  to  do.  When 
you  have  ascertained  these,  you  are  so  far  advanced 
on  your  road  that  you  may  be  perfectly  certain  he 
will  not  adopt  any  of  these  courses."  Often  have  I 
thought  that  an  Egyptian  would  take  a  certain 
view  of  a  question  based  on  my  idea  of  the  manner 
in  which  he  would  interpret  either  his  ovm  or 
Egyptian  interests.  And  often  have  I  found  that 
he  interpreted  those  interests  in  some  strange  and 
fanciful  manner,  which  would  never  have  entered 
into  the  head  of  any  European. 

AU  these  considerations,  however,  affected  the 
EngUshman  but  shghtly  when,  in  1882,  he  under- 
took the  regeneration  of  Egypt.  When  it  is 
remembered  that,  in  addition  to  the  difficulties 
arising  from  the  causes  to  which  allusion  is  made  in 
this  chapter,  the  country  had,  for  at  least  a  century 
previous  to  1882,  been  governed  under  a  system 
which  exhibited  the  extremes  of  savage  cruelty  and 


166  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

barbarity ;  ^  that  the  impulse  towards  civilisation 
first  imparted,  and  not  unintelligently  imparted  by 
the  rough  men  of  genius  who  founded  the  Khedivial 
dynasty,  was  continued  on  principles,  which  may 
almost  be  characterised  as  insane,  by  the  incapable 
Said,  and  the  spendthrift  Ismail ;  that  under  their 
auspices  all  that  was  least  creditable  to  European 
civilisation  was  attracted  to  Egypt,  on  whose  carcase 
swarms  of  needy  adventurers  preyed  at  will ;  that,  as 
a  consequence  of  these  proceedings,  the  very  name 
of  European  stank  in  the  nostrils  of  the  Egyptian 
population ;  that  whatever  European  ideas  had 
taken  root  in  the  country  had  been  imported  from 
France ;  that  the  French  Government  and  French 
public  opinion  were  at  the  outset  bitterly  opposed 
to  the  action  of  England  in  Egypt ;  that,  through 
the  medium  of  an  unscrupulous  press.  Englishmen 
were  vilified  and  their  actions  systematically  misre- 
presented ;  that,  under  the  pressure  of  Europe  and 
the  European  creditors  of  Egypt,  a  variety  of  com- 
pUcated  institutions  had  been  created  which  were 
in  advance  of  the  requirements  and  state  of  civilisa- 
tion of  the  country ;  that  the  Treasury  was  well- 
nigh  bankrupt ;  that  the  army  had  been  disbanded  ; 
that  no  law-courts  worthy  of  the  name  existed ; 

1  Bruce,  writing  of  his  visit  to  Cairo  in  1768,  says  :  "  The  Govern- 
ment of  Cairo  is  much  praised  by  some.  It  may  perhaps  have  merit 
when  explained,  but  I  never  could  understand  it,  and  therefore  cannot 
explain  it.  But  a  more  brutal,  unjust,  tyrannical,  oppressive,  avari- 
cious set  of  infernal  miscreants  there  is  not  on  earth  than  are  the 
members  of  the  Government  of  Cairo  "  {Travek  to  discover  the  Source  of 
the  Nile,  vol.  i.  p.  26).  Voluey,  who  visited  Eprypt  in  1783-5,  wrote : 
"Tout  ce  que  I'ou  voit,  ou  que  Ton  entend,  annonce  que  Ton  est  dans 
le  pays  de  I'esclavage  et  de  la  tyrannic.  On  ne  parle  que  de  troubles 
civils,  que  de  misere  publique,  que  d'extorsions  d'argent,  que  de 
bastonnades  et  de  meurtres.  NuUe  surete'  pour  la  vie  ou  la  propriete. 
On  verse  le  sang  d'un  homme  comme  celui  d'un  boeuf.  La  justice 
meme  le  verse  sans  formalite.  L'officier  de  nuit  dans  ses  rondes, 
I'officier  de  jour  dans  ses  tournees,  jugent,  condaniuent  et  font  executer 
en  un  clin  d'oeil  et  sans  appel.  Des  bourreaux  les  accompagnent,  et 
au  premier  ordre  la  tete  d'un  malheureux  tombe  dans  le  sac  de  cuir,  ou 
on  la  re^oit  de  peur  de  souiller  la  place." — Voyage  en  Syrie  et  en  £gypte, 
p.  162. 


CH.  XXXIV    DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  167 


that  the  Englishman's  own  countrymen,  who, 
according  to  their  custom,  judged  mainly  by 
results,  expected  that  at  the  touch  of  his  adminis- 
trative wand  all  abuses  would  forthwith  disappear  ; 
that  the  fellah  expected  immediate  relief  from 
taxation  and  oppression ;  that  the  Levantine  con- 
tractor expected  to  dip  his  itching  palm  into  the 
till  of  the  British  Treasury  ;  that  the  Englishman's 
position  was  undefined,  and  that  he  was  unable  to 
satisfy  all  these  expectations  at  once  ;  that,  having 
just  quelled  a  rebeUion  in  Egypt,  he  was  con- 
fronted with  a  still  more  formidable  rebellion  in 
the  Soudan ;  and,  lastly,  that  before  he  had 
seriously  begun  the  work  of  reform,  he  was  con- 
stantly pressed  by  Frenchmen,  and  by  some  of  his 
own  countrymen,  to  declare  his  conviction  that  the 
work  was  accomplished, — when  all  these  points  are 
remembered,  the  difficulty  of  the  task  which  Eng- 
land undertook  may  be  appreciated  in  its  true  light. 
But  the  task  was  ennobled  by  its  difficulty.  It  was 
one  worthy  of  the  past  history,  the  might,  the 
resources,  and  the  sterling  national  qualities  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race.  I  shall  presently  endeavour  to 
show  how  it  was  accomplished.  Before,  however, 
dealing  with  this  portion  of  my  task,  the  component 
parts  of  the  population  of  Egypt  require  some 
further  analysis. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 


THE  MOSLEMS 

Classification  of  the  population — The  Turco-Egyptians — The  Egyptians 
— The  hierarchy — The  Grand  Mufti — The  head  of  the  El-Aihar 
University — The  Grand  Kadi — The  Sheikh  el-Bekri — Mohammed 
el-Saadat — Ahdul  -  Khalik  el  -  Saadat  —  Mohammed  Abdu  — 
Mohammed  Beyram — The  Omdehs  and  Sheikhs  —  Their  sub- 
missiveness  to  the  Pashas — Their  sympathy  with  Arabi — Their 
tyranny  over  the  Fellaheen — Their  feelings  towards  England — 
The  Fellaheen — The  Bedouins. 

According  to  the  census  of  1897,  the  dwellers  in 
Egypt  were  at  that  time  9,734,000  in  number. 
These  9,734,000  souls  may  be  classified  in  various 
ways. 

In  the  first  place,  they  may  be  considered  as,  on 
the  one  side,  Ottoman  subjects,  a  category  which 
would  include  almost  every  species  of  semi-Egyptian 
hybrid,  and  on  the  other  side,  Europeans,  a  cate- 
gory which  would  include  every  nondescript  who 
could,  by  hook  or  by  crook,  get  his  name  registered 
at  some  European  Consulate.  Or,  they  may  be 
classified  as  officials  and  non-officials,  a  classification, 
the  discussion  of  which  would  bring  into  rehef  the 
fact  that,  when  the  British  occupation  commenced, 
it  had  not  yet  been  realised  by  the  native  officials 
of  Egypt  that  they  were  the  trustees  of  the 
non-official  classes  ;  rather  were  the  latter  considered 
to  be  the  legitimate  prey  of  the  former.  Or,  they 
may  be  classified  as  JVIoslems  and  Christians,  a 
distinction  wliich,  being  converted  from  terms  of 

168 


THE  MOSLEMS 


169 


reKgious  belief  into  those  of  political  and  social  life, 
would  differentiate  the  ignorant,  conservative  mass 
from  the  more  subtle,  more  superficially  intellectual, 
but,  if  the  true  Europeans  be  excluded,  by  no 
means  more  virile  minority.  In  the  following 
remarks,  the  last  of  these  three  classifications  will 
be  adopted. 

The  Moslems  consist,  first,  of  Turks  and  Turco- 
Egyptians  ;  secondly,  of  Egyptians  ;  and  thirdly,  of 
Bedouins.  A  few  Moslems  resident  in  Egypt  will 
thus  remain  imclassified ;  for  instance,  there  are  a 
few  Algerians  and  Tunisians,  who  are  French,  and 
a  few  natives  of  India,  who  are  British  subjects. 
There  are  also  a  considerable  number  of  Soudanese, 
an  element  which  was  found  of  importance  when 
the  reorganisation  of  the  Egyptian  army  was  taken 
in  hand.  But,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present 
argument,  it  will  suffice  to  deal  with  the  Moslems 
imder  the  three  main  heads  given  above. 

The  Turk  was  the  conqueror  of  Egypt,  and 
within  the  memory  of  persons  still  Uving  behaved 
as  such.  But  there  are  now  but  few  pure  Turks 
left.  In  the  absence  of  fresh  importations  from 
Turkey,  a  process  of  Egyptianisation  set  in. 
Absence  from  the  headquarters  of  Ottoman 
thought  and  action,  and  intermarriage  with  Egy|3- 
tians,  produced  their  natural  results.  It  is  thought 
that  no  such  thing  as  a  pure  Turk  of  the  third 
generation  is  to  be  found  within  the  length  and 
breadth  of  the  land.  It  is,  indeed,  a  misnomer  to 
speak  of  Turks  in  Egypt.  By  the  time  the  Enghsh 
occupied  the  country  in  1882,  aU  the  Turks  had 
blossomed  or,  as  some  would  say,  degenerated  into 
Turco  -  Egj'pticins.  This  is  a  point  which  the 
English  politician  had  to  bear  carefully  in  mind, 
for  as  each  year  of  the  British  occupation  passed 
by,  the  Turco  -  Egyptian  element  in  Egyptian 
society  became  more  Egyptian  and  less  Turkish 


170 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


in  character  and  habits  of  thought.  In  common 
with  other  Moslems,  the  Turco-Egyptians  looked 
to  the  Sultan  as  their  Pope.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  were  year  by  year  less  inclined  to 
regard  him  as  their  King.  When,  in  1892,  the 
British  Government  stepped  in  and  prevented  a 
Firman  of  the  Sultan  from  being  promulgated,  they 
rallied  in  a  half-hearted  and  platonic  manner  round 
the  Commander  of  the  Faithful.  They  winced  at 
the  spectacle  of  his  humihation  at  the  hands  of  a 
Christian  Power.  But,  even  then,  the  feelings  of 
indignation  excited  in  their  breasts  were  probably  no 
stronger  than  those  which  would  be  felt  by  an  Itahan 
patriot,  who  was  also  a  devout  CathoUc,  and  who 
saw  the  Vatican  obHged  to  yield  to  the  Quirinal. 

Again,  in  1906,  when  the  relations  between 
England  and  Turkey  were  strained  by  the  occur- 
rence of  what  is  known  as  the  "  Sinai  Peninsula  " 
incident,  a  strong  wave  of  pro-Turkish  feeling 
seemed  to  sweep  over  Egypt,  but  it  was  a  purely 
fictitious  movement,  manufactured  by  the  Anglo- 
phobe  press.    It  speedily  died  a  natural  death. 

In  truth,  religious  conviction,  backed  by  racial 
prejudices  and  by  the  sympathy  generally  entertained 
amongst  Orientals  for  a  theocratic  form  of  govern- 
ment, may  for  a  while  wrestle  with  personal  interest 
and  political  associations,  but  the  chances  are  that, 
if  the  struggle  is  continued,  religious  conviction  will 
get  a  fall.  Pro-Turkish  sentiment  will,  therefore, 
smoulder  and  occasionally  flicker  up  sufficiently  to 
show  some  feeble  Ught,  but  it  will  never  burst  into 
a  blaze.  For,  in  fact,  many  considerations  are 
constantly  dragging  the  Turco  -  Egyptian  in  a 
direction  away  from  Constantinople.  Although 
he  may  try  to  deceive  others,  he  cannot  deceive 
himself.  He  knows  well  enough  what  he  would 
do  if  he  got  the  upper  hand ;  he  would  plunder 
every  one  he  could  indiscriminately.     He  knows 


CH.  XXXV 


THE  MOSLEMS 


171 


that  his  own  brethren,  whom  his  ancestors  left 
behind  at  Constantinople,  are  prepared  to  act  on 
precisely  similar  principles,  and  he  feels  that  if 
they,  who  are  certainly  the  most  powerful  of  the 
sons  of  Islam,  were  once  to  step  on  the  scene,  his 
affinity  of  race  would  avail  him  Httle ;  he  would 
take  rank  with  the  plundered  rather  than  with  the 
plunderers  ;  or,  at  best,  he  would  have  to  stand  by 
and  see  the  Egyptians  robbed  without  obtaining 
any  adequate  share  of  the  plunder.  Rather  than 
submit  to  this  fate,  it  were  perhaps  better  to  take 
the  good  things  the  EngHshmen  offer  to  him  ;  it  is 
true  that  they  will  not  let  him  spoil  the  Egyptian, 
but  they  will  prevent  the  Constantinopolitan  Turk 
from  spoUing  him ;  they  give  him  wealth  and 
security  for  his  Ufe  and  property ;  perhaps  it  will 
be  as  well  to  pause  before  throwing  away  these 
benefits  in  order  to  obtain  the  doubtful  advantages 
of  being  governed  by  a  number  of  co-religionists, 
whose  community  of  rehgion  will  in  no  degree 
temper  their  rapacity.  Then,  again,  as  time 
went  on,  a  few  Turco- Egyptians  were  animated 
by  sentiments  which,  however  unpractical,  were 
by  no  means  ignoble.  They  became  identified 
with  Egyptian  aspirations,  and  wished  to  estabhsh 
a  government  free  from  the  interference  of  either 
Turk  or  European.  A  few  also  recognised  the 
benefits  conferred  on  the  country  by  the  British 
occupation,  and  loyally  co-operated  with  the 
British  officials  in  farthering  the  cause  of  reform. 

Thus,  in  1882,  the  Enghsh  found  a  body  of 
Turco-Egyptians  who  occupied  the  principal  places 
under  Government ;  who  were  the  chief  land- 
owners in  the  country ;  who  disHked  the  English, 
inasmuch  as  they  knew  by  intuition  that  their 
intervention  would  save  the  Egyptians  from  being 
plundered  ;  who  occasionally  cast  a  glance  towards 
Constantinople,  and  were  willing  enough  to  try  and 


172  MODERN  EGYPT 


scare  the  Englishman  with  the  bugbear  of  the  KhaUf  s 
spiritual  authority;  who  would  have  been  bitterly  dis- 
appointed if  their  poUtical  flirtations  with  the  Porte 
had  been  taken  seriously,  and  if  the  Mohammedan 
Pope,  doffing  his  mitre,  had  assumed  the  crown, 
handled  the  sword,  and  commenced  to  assert  his 
authority  in  temporal  affairs  ;  and  who,  lastly,  in 
the  presence  of  the  aUen  and  the  Christian,  showed 
a  tendency  to  amalgamate  with  the  other  dwellers 
on  Egyptian  soil  in  the  creation  of  a  sort  of 
spurious  patriotism.  I  say  spurious  patriotism, 
because  the  alliance  between  the  semi-Egyptianised 
Turk  and  the  pure  Egyptian  is  imnatural.  The 
people  of  Egypt  are  not  really  with  the  repre- 
sentative Turco-Egyptians.  The  pecuhar  character- 
istic of  the  typical  Turco-Egyptian  is  his  cathoHc 
capacity  for  impotent  hatred.  He  hates  the 
Englishman,  because  the  Englishman  curbs  him. 
He  hates  and  fears  the  pure  Turk,  because  the 
pure  Turk  is  difficult  to  curb.  He  despises  the 
Egyptian,  whom  he  regards  as  his  prey,  and  who, 
in  fact,  would  be  his  prey  were  it  not  for  the 
English  watchdog  who  keeps  him  off. 

Amongst  the  many  vague  ideals  incapable  of 
realisation  which  are  floating  about  in  the  Egyptian 
poHtical  atmosphere,  nothing  is  more  certain  than 
that  the  ideal  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  can  never 
be  realised.  He  can  never  be  restored  to  the 
position  of  trust,  which  he  formerly  occupied  and 
abused. 

But,  with  all  this,  the  Turco-Egyptian  has  some 
redeeming  quahties.  The  glamour  of  a  dominant 
race  stiU  hovers  as  an  aureole,  albeit  a  very  dimmed 
aureole,  round  his  head.  He  is  certainly  not  more 
corrupt  than  the  Egyptian ;  he  is  more  manly,  and 
the  greater  the  quantity  of  Tm-kish  blood  running 
in  his  veins,  the  more  will  his  manly  qualities 
appear.    He  is  sometimes  truthful  and  outspoken 


THE  MOSLEMS 


173 


after  his  own  fashion.  He  has  a  rude  standard  of 
honour.  Go  where  you  will  in  Egypt,  if  any  bit  of 
administrative  work  requiring  a  certain  amount  of 
energy  has  been  well  done  by  a  native  official,  it 
will  generally  be  found  that  the  official  in  question 
is  a  Circassian  or  a  Turco-Egyptian,  who  is  probably 
more  Turk  than  Egyptian.  The  Turco-Egyptian 
can,  in  fact,  still  to  a  certain  extent  command,  and 
that  is  why,  with  all  his  defects,  and  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  class  to  which  he  belongs  is  generally 
Anglophobe  —  although  there  are  some  notable 
exceptions, — it  will  often  be  found  that  the  in- 
dividual Enghshman  will  get  on  well  with  the 
individual  Turk,  and  better  with  the  Turco- 
Egyptian  than  with  the  pure  Egyptian,  the  Syrian 
or  the  Armenian.  The  northerner  and  the  Oriental 
meet  on  the  common  ground  that  the  Englishman 
is  masterful,  and  that  the  Turco-Egyptian,  though 
less  masterful  than  the  pure  Turk,  is  more  so  than 
the  pure  Egyptian.  The  Englishman  belongs  to 
an  imperial  race,  and  the  Turco-Egyptian  to  a 
race  which  but  yesterday  was  imperial.  The 
EngHsh,  Nubar  Pasha  once  said  to  me,  "  are  the  / 
Turks  of  the  West." 

The  second  category  of  Egyptian  Moslems  may 
be  divided  into  three  heads.  These  are — first,  the 
hierarchy  ;  second,  the  squirearchy ;  and  third,  the 
fellaheen. 

The  Ulema — the  learned  men^ — of  the  El- 
Azhar  Mosque  constitute  a  distinct  religious  cor- 
poration, which  is  divided  into  grades,  and  which 
is  officially  recognised  by  the  Government.  A 
University  is  attached  to  the  Mosque.  The 
number  of  Ulema  is  limited ;  in  order  to  qualify 
for  the  rank  of  "  Ahm,"  which  carries  with  it  the 
right  to  wear  a  pelisse  conferred  by  the  Khedive, 

^  "Ulema"  is  the  plural  of  the  Arabic  word  "  Alim,"  signifying 
learned,  a  doctor  of  laws. 


174 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


a  candidate  must  have  studied  at  the  University, 
and  have  passed  certain  examinations  to  test  his 
knowledge  of  the  Koran,  the  Traditions  (Hadith), 
and  the  Sacred  Law  of  Islam.  Many  a  Moslem 
may  be  learned  in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of  the 
term  ;  he  may,  for  instance  be  a  "  Hafiz,"  who  can 
repeat  the  whole  Koran  by  heart,  or,  at  all  events, 
is  supposed  to  be  able  to  do  so ;  but  unless  he 
has  undergone  the  necessary  examination  at  the 
El-Azhar  University,  he  is  not,  technically  speak- 
ing, considered  an  "Alim."  He  may  officiate  at 
religious  services,  but  he  will  not  have  acquired 
the  right  to  expound  either  the  tenets  of  Islam 
or  the  Sacred  Law  at  any  of  the  principal  JSIosques. 

The  three  chief  Ulema  are  the  Grand  ]Mufti, 
the  head  of  the  El-Azhar  University,  and  the 
Grand  Kadi.  The  last  named  takes  what  is  the 
equivalent  of  his  degree,  not  at  Cairo,  but  at 
Constantinople. 

The  Grand  Mufti  is  the  chief  law-doctor  of  the 
country.  It  is  liis  duty  to  pronounce  ex  cathedra 
opinions  (Fetwas)  upon  any  doubtful  points  of  the 
Sacred  Law,  which  may  be  submitted  to  him. 
He  is  a  magnate  of  whose  spiritual  authority  the 
temporal  rulers  of  the  country  must  take  accomit. 
Despotic  Khedives  and  even,  it  is  said,  Suleiman 
the  JNIagnificent,^  have  tried  to  force  the  hand  or 
override  the  decisions  of  the  Grand  Mufti,  and  like 
their  Christian  prototype  who  tried  to  throw  off 

^  It  is  related  that  Sultan  Suleiman  the  Magnificent  asked  Sheikh 
Abu  Saoud,  who  was  one  of  the  greatest  of  the  Ottoman  Muftis,  to  issue 
a  Fetwa  declaring  it  lawful  to  put  to  death  all  the  inhabitants  of  con- 
quered European  provinces  who  refused  to  embrace  the  faith  of  Islam. 
The  Grand  Mufti  would  not  comply  with  this  request. 

Abbas  I.  is  said  to  have  requested  the  Grand  Mufti  (Sheikh-el- 
Abbasi,  who  died  in  1893  at  the  age  of  ninety)  to  issue  a  Fetwa  stating 
that  the  power  of  ratifying  a  sentence  of  death  lay  not,  as  was  then  the 
practice,  with  the  Sultan,  but  with  the  \'iceroy.  The  Grand  Mufti 
refused.  He  was  exiled  to  the  Soudan,  but,  in  the  face  of  the  strong 
protests  made  by  many  of  the  leading  Mohammedans  of  Cairo,  eveu 
despotic  Abbas  was  obliged  to  yield.    The  Mufti  was  recalled. 


THE  MOSLEMS 


175 


the  spiritual  yoke,  they  have  generally  been 
obliged  to  go  to  Canossa.^  The  English  politician 
also  has  to  recognise  the  Mufti's  existence.  When, 
indeed,  the  venerable  old  man,  who  at  one  time 
occupied  the  post  of  Grand  Mufti,  advocated,  as 
the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world,  the  crucifixion 
of  criminals,^  it  was  scarcely  necessary  for  the 
Englishman  to  raise  his  httle  finger  in  order  to 
remind  the  Egyptian  world  that,  although  the 
onward  tramp  of  civihsation  might  be  heard  but 
faintly  within  the  sacred  precincts  of  the  Mosque, 
he  was  nevertheless  standing  outside  its  waUs  with 
his  treaties,  his  newspapers,  and  if  needs  be,  his 
soldiers,  to  assert  the  vahdity  of  anti-crucifixionist 
principles.  But,  though  in  an  extreme  case  such  as 
this  the  Englishman  could  impose  a  veto  on  some 
barbarous  act,  he  could  not  do  much  more.  He 
could  not  make  the  Egyptian  horse  drink  of  the 
waters  of  civilisation,  albeit  the  most  hmpid  streams 
of  social  and  juridical  reform  were  turned  into  the 
trough  before  him,  if  the  Mufti  condemned  the  act 
of  drinking  as  impious.  Popes  and  other  ecclesi- 
astical dignitaries  have  before  now  shown  that  they 
cannot  be  dragooned  into  submission.  Neither  do 
Muftis  fear  red-coated  soldiers.  Moreover,  they 
fear  the  wrath  of  the  European  press  even  less  than 
they  fear  redcoats. 

The  head  of  the  famous  El-Azhar  University 
exercises  a  certain  degree  of  control  in  temporal 
matters  over  those  of  the  Ulema  who  lecture  in  the 
mosques,  and  must  himself  be,  par  excellence,  an 
"  Alim."  The  incumbent  of  this  office  during  the 
first  few  years  of  my  residence  in  Egypt  was  a 
worthy  old  man,  with  whom  I  entertained  excellent 
personal  relations,  although,  as  has  been  already 

^  I  say  "  generally  "  because  there  have  been  exceptions  to  the  rule. 
Thus,  in  1637,  Amurath  IV.  put  the  Grand  Mufti  to  death. — Creasy, 
Ottoman  Turks,  p.  253.  2  yi^g  ^^^^^  p  J35 


176  MODERN  EGYPT 


mentioned/  our  views  as  to  the  movements  of  the 
planets  were  not  identical. 

Tiie  Grand  Kadi  is  perhaps  the  greatest  of  the 
Ulema.  Up  to  the  present  time,  he  has  always 
been  a  Turk  from  Constantinople.  He  pronounces 
final  judgment  on  all  subjects  which  come  within 
the  domain  of  personal  law,  having  been  bereft  of 
criminal  and  civil  jurisdiction  by  the  progress 
which  is  constantly  kibing  the  heel  of  his  decadent 
system.  I  well  remember  the  Grand  Kadi  who 
was  in  office  when  I  first  went  to  Cairo.  His 
venerable  face,  long  white  beard,  small  hands, 
dignified  mien,  and  graceful  robes  rendered  him 
a  striking  figure.  Such,  I  can  fancy,  were  the 
Pharisees  who  were  members  of  the  Je\\dsh  Sanhe- 
drim. His  manners  were  perfect,  perhaps  more  so 
than  his  judgments.  His  successor  was  a  younger 
man  with  a  fine  intelligent  face.  He  arrived  at 
Cairo  with  excellent  intentions ;  he  was  going  to 
purify  his  court  of  false  witnesses,  and  he  was 
dehghted  when  he  found  that  I  was  able  to  talk 
to  him  in  Turkish,  albeit  very  bad  Turkish,  on  the 
subject.  I  welcomed  an  ally,  and  awaited  the 
result  with  interest.  I  had  not  long  to  wait.  The 
Kadi  soon  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Egyptians 
I  were  an  uninteresting  race.  As  they  appeared  to 
Hke  the  corrupt  system  to  which  they  were  accus- 
tomed, why  should  he  kick  against  the  pricks  in 
trying  to  reform  it  ? 

These  three  are,  from  their  official  positions,  the 
most  important  of  the  class,  who,  by  reason  of  their 
acquaintance  with  theological  lore  and  ancient 
custom,  are  termed  "learned."  It  may,  however, 
be  interesting  to  sketch  a  few  other  types  of  their 
class. 

The  Sheikh  el-Bekri  is  an  "  Alim,"  and  a  notable 
one  of  his  class.    The  first  incumbent  of  the  office 

»  Vide  ante,  p.  163. 


THE  MOSLEMS 


177 


during  my  residence  in  Cairo  was  a  small  wizened 
man  with  a  pock-marked  countenance,  who,  when  I 
paid  liim  my  Ramazan  visit,  used  to  peer  at  me 
through  a  pair  of  cunning  little  eyes,  in  which  fear 
and  hatred  of  his  visitor  seemed  to  be  struggling 
for  predominance.  I  always  felt  that,  when  I  left 
his  house,  he  cursed  me,  my  race,  and  my  rehgion, 
and  I  never  entertained  the  least  ill-will  against  him 
for  doing  so.  When  he  died,  his  brother,  a  much 
younger  man,  succeeded  him.  It  soon  became 
apparent  that  a  new  Sheikh  el-Bekri  had  arisen. 
When  the  spiritual  head  of  a  variety  of  Moslem 
sects  boasted  of  his  acquaintance  with  Lord 
SaHsbury  and  Mr.  Gladstone ;  when  he  quoted 
Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  to  me  on  the  Rights  of  Man 
in  excellent  French ;  when  he  indulged  in  platitudes 
on  the  blessings  of  parhamentary  government ;  and 
when  he  asked  me  to  lend  him  a  few  books  which 
might  enable  him  to  understand  the  "philosophy 
of  the  French  Revolution," — then  I  asked  myself 
whether  I  was  in  a  dream.  Was  this  Jin  de  siecle 
Sheikh,  this  curious  compound  of  Mecca  and  the 
Paris  Boulevards,  the  latest  development  of 
Islamism  ?  I  should  add  that  the  combination 
produced  no  results  of  any  importance.  The  new 
Sheikh  soon  sank  into  poHtical  insignificance. 

I  can  best  describe  another  "  Alim  "  by  relating  an 
anecdote  about  him.  Sheikh  Mohammed  el-Saadat, 
as  his  name  signifies,  was  a  Seyyid,  a  descendant 
of  the  Prophet.^  He  was,  moreover,  w^ealthy  and 
influential.  I  happened  to  hear  at  one  time  that 
he  was  raving  against  the  EngUsh.  My  experience 
had  taught  me  that  poUtical  opinions  in  Egypt  are 
not  unfrequently  connected  with  some  personal 
grievance.  I  called  on  the  Sheikh,  and  asked 
him  how  he  thought  matters  were  going  on. 

*  "Saadat"  is  the  plural  form  of  the  Arabic  word  "Seyyid,"  which 
means  a  descendant  of  the  Prophet,  an  aristocrat,  lord,  master. 
VOI>.  II  N 


178  MODERN  EGYPT 


Everything,  he  said,  was  very  bad.  I  encouraged 
him  to  talk.  Then  he  burst  out  into  a  long  tirade 
about  the  desperate  state  of  the  country.  Could 
he,  I  asked,  point  out  any  particular  abuse,  for  it 
was  difficult  to  deal  with  generaUties  ?  Certainly 
he  could  do  so ;  he  had  no  water  for  a  portion  of 
his  property,  whereas  he  always  got  water  before 
the  English  came  into  the  country.  I  inquired 
into  the  matter.  As  I  had  expected,  I  found  that 
the  Sheikh's  statement  was  quite  correct.  He 
belonged  to  the  privileged  class.  Under  the  old 
regime,  he  always  got  water,  although  his  neighbours 
often  went  without  it.  Since  the  English  engineers 
had  taken  the  irrigation  of  the  country  in  hand, 
they  had  recognised  no  privileges.  All  were  treated 
alike.  The  Sheikh  had  to  await  his  turn.  Naturally 
enough,  he  did  not  Uke  this  levelling  process. 
Fortunately,  shortly  after  my  interview  with  him, 
the  Sheikh's  turn  came.  He,  of  course,  attributed 
this  to  the  exercise  of  my  influence  on  his  behalf. 
I  heard  afterwards  that  his  language  at  once 
changed.  He  spoke  in  terms  of  warm  commenda- 
tion of  the  British  administration. 

Sheikh  Abdul- Khalik  el-Saadat,  a  nephew  of 
the  last-named  Sheikh,  is  the  head  of  one  of  the 
oldest  purely  Egyptian  families  in  Egypt.  Napoleon 
made  great  efforts  to  ingratiate  himself  with  one  of 
this  Sheikh's  ancestors,  who  was  at  first  decorated 
with  the  Legion  of  Honour,  and  on  this  treatment 
proving  ineffectual  to  produce  the  required  results, 
was  bastinadoed.  The  present  Sheikh  is  a  member 
of  the  Legislative  Council.  He  is  ignorant  of 
public  affairs,  but,  by  reason  of  the  respect  in 
which  his  famOy  is  held,  exerts,  or  at  all  events 
might  exert  a  certain  amount  of  influence.  I 
used  to  see  a  good  deal  of  him  at  one  time,  but 
eventually,  for  reasons  on  which  I  need  not  dwell, 
I  had  to  drop  his  acquaintance. 


THE  MOSLEMS 


179 


Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdu  was  an  "  Alim  "  of  a 
different  and,  I  should  add,  a  very  superior  type 
to  those  of  his  brethren  whom  I  have  so  far 
described.  He  was  one  of  the  leading  spirits  of 
the  Arabi  movement.  When  I  came  to  Egypt 
in  1883,  he  was  under  a  cloud.  Good-natured 
Tewfik,  acting  under  British  pressure,  pardoned 
him,  and  made  him  a  judge.^  He  did  his  work 
well  and  honestly.  Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdu  was 
a  man  of  broad  and  enlightened  views.  He  ad- 
mitted the  abuses  which  have  sprung  up  under 
Oriental  Governments.  He  recognised  the  neces- 
sity of  European  assistance  in  the  work  of  reform. 
But  he  did  not  belong  to  the  same  category  as  the 
Europeanised  Egyptian,  whom  he  regarded  as  a 
bad  copy  of  the  original.  He  was  anti-Khedivial 
and  anti-Pasha,  not  that  he  would  have  objected 
to  a  certain  degree  of  Pashadom  if  he  could  have 
found  good  Pashas,  but  in  his  experience  he  had 
met  but  few  Pashas  who  were  good.  In  fact, 
Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdu  was  a  somewhat  dreamy 
and  unpractical  but,  nevertheless,  genuine  Egyptian 
patriot ;  it  were  perhaps  well  for  the  cause  of 
Egyptian  patriotism  if  there  were  more  hke  him. 
But,  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  possible 
politicians  of  the  future,  there  were  some  weak 
points  in  the  armour  of  Mohammed  Abdu,  and 
of  those  who  follow  his  teaching.  Mr.  Stanley 
Lane  Poole  remarks  that  an  upper-class  Moslem 
must  be  "  a  fanatic  or  a  concealed  infidel."  ^  This 
dilemma,  in  a  somewhat  different  form,  has 
presented  difficulties  to  those  Christians  who  look 
to  the  letter  rather  than  to  the  spirit  of  Christ's 
teaching.  It  presents  far  greater  difficulties  to 
strictly  orthodox  Moslems,  who  look  almost 
exclusively  to  the  letter  rather  than  to  the  spirit 

•  Mohammed  Abdu  was,  in  1899^  appointed  Grand  Mufld.  He  died 
in  1905.  2  Studies  in  a  Mosque,  p.  11]. 


180  MODERN  EGYPT 


of  their  faith.  I  suspect  that  my  friend  Abdu, 
although  he  would  have  resented  the  appellation 
being  applied  to  him,  was  in  reality  an  Agnostic. 
His  associates,  although  they  admitted  his  abihty, 
were  inclined  to  look  askance  at  him  as  a  "filosouf." 
Now,  in  the  eyes  of  the  strictly  orthodox,  one  who 
studies  philosophy  or,  in  other  words,  one  who  recog- 
nises the  difference  between  the  seventh  and  the 
twentieth  centuries,  is  on  the  high  road  to  perdition. 

The  political  importance  of  Mohammed  Abdu's 
life  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  may  be  said  to  have 
been  the  founder  of  a  school  of  thought  in  Egj'pt 
very  similar  to  that  estabhshed  in  India  by  Syed 
Ahmed,  the  creator  of  the  Alighur  College.  The 
avowed  object  of  those  who  belong  to  this  school 
is  to  justify  the  ways  of  Islam  to  man,  that  is  to 
say,  to  Moslem  man.  They  are  the  Girondists  of 
the  Egyptian  national  movement.  They  are  too 
much  tainted  with  a  suspicion  of  heterodoxy  to 
carry  far  along  with  them  the  staunch  conservative 
Moslem.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  often  not 
sufficiently  Europeanised  to  attract  the  s}Tnpathy 
of  the  Egyptian  mimic  of  European  ways.  They 
are  inferior  to  the  strictly  orthodox  Moslem  in 
respect  to  their  Mohammedanism,  and  inferior  to 
the  ultra  -  Europeanised  Egyptian  in  respect  to 
their  Europeanisation.  Their  task  is,  therefore, 
one  of  great  difficulty.  But  they  deserve  all  the 
encouragement  and  support  which  can  be  given  to 
them.  They  are  the  natural  allies  of  the  European 
reformer.  Egyptian  patriots — sua  si  bona  norint — 
will  find  in  the  advancement  of  the  followers  of 
Mohammed  Abdu  the  best  hope  that  they  may 
gradually  carry  out  their  programme  of  creating 
a  truly  autonomous  Egypt.^ 

*  For  many  years,  I  gave  to  Mohammed  Abdu  all  the  encouragement 
in  my  power  ;  but  it  was  uphill  work,  for,  besides  the  strong  antagonism 
which  he  encountered  from  conservative  Moslems,  he  was  unfortunately 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  181 


I  give  yet  one  further  sketch  of  a  typical 
"Alim."  Sheikh  Mohammed  Beyram,  who  is 
now,  alas !  dead,  was  one  of  my  best  friends  in 
Egypt.  He  was,  moreover,  one  of  the  most  re- 
markable types  with  which  I  have  met  in  the 
course  of  my  Eastern  experience.  He  looked  like 
a  thorough  gentleman.  I  have  rarely  seen  a  more 
striking  figure  than  that  of  this  grave  Oriental, 
with  his  high  intellectual  forehead,  refined  features, 
melancholy  eyes,  dignified  mien,  exquisite  manners, 
and  graceful  costume,  who  would  sit  with  me  by 
the  hour^  and  sing  a  dirge  over  the  decadence 
of  Islam.  Moreover,  Sheikh  Mohammed  Beyram 
not  only  looked  a  gentleman ;  he  was  one.  In 
no  country  have  I  come  across  a  man  of  more 
elevated    and  refined    feelings,   or    one  whose 

on  very  bad  terms  with  the  Khedive,  and  was  only  able  to  retain  his 
place  as  Mufti  by  relying  on  strong  British  support. 

In  my  Annual  Reports  I  frequently  spoke  of  him  in  hig-h  terms,  and 
no  one  regretted  his  premature  death  more  sincerely  than  myself.  At 
the  same  time,  I  must  confess  that  I  experienced  a  shock  in  reading 
some  of  the  revelations  in  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt's  book.  Mr.  Blunt's  views 
on  Egyptian  affairs  appear  to  have  been  mainly  based  on  what  he  heard 
from  Mohammed  Abdu,  whom  he  calls  (Secret  History,  etc.  p.  7)  a  "great 
philosopher  and  patriot."  Notably,  I  read  with  surprise  and  regret 
(p.  489)  the  following  statement  of  Mohammed  Abdu's:  "Sheykh  Jemal 
ed  Din  proposed  to  me,  Mohammed  Abdu,  that  Ismail  should  be  assas- 
sinated some  day  as  he  passed  in  his  carriage  daily  over  the  Kasr-el-Nil 
bridge,  and  I  strongly  approved,  but  it  was  only  talk  between  ourselves, 
and  we  lacked  a  person  capable  of  taking  lead  in  the  affair."  Without 
going  into  the  ethics  of  tyrannicide,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that  the 
civilised  world  generally  is  disposed  to  look  askance  at  patriots,  and 
still  more  at  philosophers,  who  are  prepared  to  further  their  political 
aims  by  resorting  to  assassination. 

1  One  of  the  obstacles  which  lie  in  the  path  of  the  European  when 
he  wants  to  arrive  at  the  true  opinion  of  the  Oriental  is  that  the 
European,  especially  if  he  be  an  official,  is  almost  always  in  a  hurry. 
If,  he  thinks,  the  Oriental  has  anything  to  say  to  me,  why  does  he  not 
say  it  and  go  away  ?  I  am  quite  prepared  to  listen  most  attentively, 
but  my  time  is  valuable  and  I  have  a  quantity  of  other  business  to  do  ; 
I  must,  therefore,  really  ask  him  to  come  to  the  point  at  once.  This 
frame  of  mind  is  quite  fatal  if  one  wishes  to  arrive  at  the  truth.  In 
order  to  attain  this  object,  the  Oriental  must  be  allowed  to  tell  his 
story  and  put  forward  his  ideas  in  his  own  way  ;  and  his  own  way  is 
generally  a  lengthy,  circuitous,  and  very  involved  way.  But  if  any 
one  has  the  patience  to  listen,  he  will  sometimes  be  amply  rewarded 
for  his  pains. 


182 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  IV 


opinions  and  actions  were  less  tainted  with  worldly 
self-interest,  than  this  Tunisian  aristocrat/  Few 
things  have  given  me  a  more  unfavourable  im- 
pression of  native  Egyptian  society  than  that  the 
fine  qualities  of  this  really  eminent  man — whose 
appearance  and  character  were  alike  remarkable, 
whose  private  life  was  irreproachable,  whose 
religious  faith  was  founded  on  a  rock,  whose 
patriotism  was  enhghtened,  and  whose  public 
aims  were  noble  —  should  have  been  scarcely 
recognised  by  the  herd  of  Pashas,  place-hunters, 
and  greedy  Sheikhs,  who  were  not  worthy  to  un- 
loose the  latchet  of  his  shoe.  When  he  went 
down  to  his  grave,  none  but  a  few  knew  that  a 
star,  which  under  happier  auspices  might  perhaps 
have  been  of  some  magnitude,  had  fallen  from  the 
poUtical  firmament  of  Egypt,  or  perhaps,  it  would 
be  more  correct  to  say,  of  Islam.  Pope's  fine  lines 
well  describe  my  honoured  friend  : — 

Statesman,  yet  friend  to  truth  !  of  soul  sincere, 
In  action  faithful,  and  in  honour  clear ! 
Who  broke  no  promise,  served  no  private  end, 
Who  gained  no  title,  and  who  lost  no  friend. 

Mohammed  Beyram  was  a  devout  Moslem.  His 
faith  was  far  more  earnest  than  that  of  Mohammed 
Abdu,  and  men  of  a  similar  type.  The  subject 
which  mainly  interested  him  was  how  to  bring 
Islam  and  its  ways  into  harmony  with  modem 
society ;  in  other  words,  how  to  square  the  circle ; 
and  in  discussing  the  sundry  and  manifold  branches 
of  this  question  with  him,  any  tendency  to  dispar- 
age the  Mohammedan  religion  at  once  disappeared. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  morahst,  criticism 

1  Mohammed  Beyram  belonged  to  the  Beylical  family  of  Tunis,  and, 
on  his  mother's  side,  was  descended  from  the  Moorish  kings  of  Spain. 
His  ancestors  held  the  highest  offices  in  Tunis  without  intermission  for 
300  years. 


CH.XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS 


183 


cannot  be  directed  against  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  faith,  but  only  against  the  abuses 
which  have  sprung  up  and  which  now  obscure 
its  primitive  simplicity.  Mohammed  Beyram,  re- 
garded, not  as  a  practical  pohtician,  but  as  a 
believer  in  the  faith  of  Islam,  was,  in  fact,  a 
type  of  the  best  class  of  Moslem,  a  type  which  is, 
unfortunately,  of  rare  occurrence.  He  looked 
sadly  out  over  a  world  which  appeared  to  him  to 
ha\'e  gone  mad  ;  he  saw  all  that  was  noble  in  the 
faith  which  he  revered  stifled  by  parasitic  growths  ; 
he  noted  that  Islam  was  tottering  to  its  fall  by 
reason  of  internal  decay ;  he  did  not  so  much  fear 
the  advance  of  needy  disreputable  Europe,  for  he 
knew  that,  though  the  Moslem  might  be  robbed 
and  cheated,  there  was  still  a  hope  for  Islam  so 
long  as  its  moral  code  and  the  material  benefits  it 
conferred  were  only  contrasted  wdth  the  practice 
and  principles  of  adventurers  who  were  the  dregs  of 
European  civilisation ;  but  he  knew  that  the  tap 
of  the  northern  drum,  which  had  been  heard  in 
the  streets  of  Cairo  and  might  ere  long  be  heard 
in  those  of  Stamboul,  brought  more  than  the 
dragoon  and  the  rifleman  in  its  wake ;  his  instinct 
taught  him  that  the  institutions,  which  his  fore- 
fathers had  cherished,  must  in  time  crumble  to 
the  dust  when  they  were  brought  face  to  face 
with  the  lofty  principles  which  were  inscribed 
on  the  Englishman's  banner.  He  was  not  blind 
to  these  things  and,  albeit  he  still  clung  tenaciously 
to  the  skirts  of  the  Prophet  of  Arabia,  he  cried 
out  in  the  agony  of  his  spirit :  "  Where  shaU 
wisdom  be  found  ?  and  where  is  the  place  of 
understanding  ?  "  And  the  answer  he  gave  to 
himself  was  that  which  was  delivered  by  the 
patriarch  Job  when  the  world  was  young :  "  The 
fear  of  the  Lord,  that  is  wisdom :  and  to  depart 
from  evil,  that  is  understanding."    On  that  common 


184  MODERN  EGYPT 


ground,  the  Moslem  of  the  Mohammed  Beyram 
type  could  meet  the  Christian,  and  discuss  matters 
of  common  interest  without  stirring  the  fires  of  re- 
ligious strife.  But  when  the  discussion  took  place, 
how  melancholy  was  the  result  1  The  Moslem  and 
the  Christian  would  agree  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
fungus  which  was  stifling  all  that  was  at  one  time 
healthy  in  the  original  growth ;  they  would 
appreciate  in  like  fashion  the  history  of  its  exten- 
sion ;  but,  whilst  the  sympathetic  Christian  would 
point  out  with  courteous  but  inexorable  logic  that 
any  particular  remedy  proposed  would  be  either 
inefficacious  or  would  destroy  not  only  the  fungus 
but  at  the  same  time  the  parent  tree,  the  Moslem, 
too  honest  not  to  be  con\dnced,  however  much  the 
conviction  might  cost  him  pain,  could  only  utter  a 
bitter  wail  over  the  doom  of  the  creed  which  he 
loved,  and  over  that  of  the  baneful  system  to  which 
his  creed  has  given  birth.  We  may  s}Tnpathise, 
and,  for  my  own  part,  I  do  very  heartily  sympathise, 
with  the  Mohammed  BejTams  of  Islam,  but  let 
no  practical  pohtician  think  that  they  have  a  plan 
I  capable  of  resuscitating  a  body,  which  is  not, 
indeed,  dead,  and  which  may  yet  Unger  on  for 
centuries,  but  which  is  nevertheless  politically  and 
socially  moribund,  and  whose  gradual  decay  cannot 
be  arrested  by  any  modern  palliatives  however 
skilfully  they  may  be  applied. 

I  have  dwelt  on  the  characters  of  these  few 
individuals,  not  in  order  to  disparage  some,  or  in 
order  to  deUver  a  panegyric  on  others,  but  because 
each  of  those  who  have  been  depicted  may  to  some 
extent  be  regarded  as  one  type  of  the  hierarchical 
class.  It  must  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  the 
Ulema  are  the  only  members  of  the  hierarchy.  A 
crowd  of  Imams  (preachers),  inferior  Kadis,  and 
others  may  be  considered  as  affiUated  to  the  Ulema. 
These  are  all  so  many  agents  scattered  over  the 


THE  MOSLEMS 


185 


face  of  the  country  who  keep  alive  religious  senti- 
ment and  hierarchical  influence.  The  special  point 
to  be  noted  for  the  purpose  of  the  present  argument 
is  that  the  attitude  of  the  whole  of  the  hierarchy, 
from  the  highest  "  Alim  "  to  the  smallest  teacher  in 
a  "  Kuttab,"  ^  has  generally  been  more  or  less  hostile 
to  the  work  of  the  British  reformer  in  Egypt. 
This  was,  indeed,  inevitable.  The  hostihty  of  the 
hierarchy  is,  however,  based  on  somewhat  different 
grounds  from  that  of  the  Pashas.  In  respect  to 
one  point,  indeed,  the  sentiments  of  the  two  classes 
coincide.  Both  are  inspired  by  an  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  At  the  time  when  the  British  occupa- 
tion took  place,  both  were  in  the  enjoyment  of 
privileges  which  they  had  abused,  and  the  con- 
tinuance of  which  they  thought  was  threatened. 
Both  had  a  pecuniary  interest  in  resisting  reform. 
Whilst  the  Pasha  feared  lest  the  fellaheen,  whom 
he  had  for  so  long  plundered,  should,  under  the 
aegis  of  England,  escape  from  his  grasp,  the 
"  AUm,"  on  the  other  hand,  was  somewhat  nervous 
lest  the  Englishman,  in  spite  of  his  protestations 
that  he  would  not  interfere  in  religious  matters, 
might  some  day  begin  to  ask  unpleasant  questions 
about  the  appropriation  of  funds  belonging  to 
religious  endowments  and  such  hke  matters ;  and 
the  "  Ahm  "  would  resent  this,  for  although  there 
are  some  honourable  exceptions,  he  is  but  too 
often  so  profoundly  self-deceived  that  he  considers 
it  an  essential  portion  of  the  relations  between  man 
and  his  Maker  that  a  few  privileged  persons  should  be 
allowed  to  appropriate  to  their  own  use  funds  which 
were  intended  to  be  applied  to  the  maintenance  of 
Mosques,  the  feeding  of  the  poor,  or  other  charitable 
objects.  But,  in  addition  to  this  cause  of  suspicion, 
based  on  self-interest,  there  is  this  further  point  to 
be  borne  in  mind  that,  as  guardians  of  the  citadel  of 

*  The  school  attached  to  a  Mosque,  where  the  Koran  is  taught. 


186 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Islam,  the  hierarchy  naturally  represent  the  ne 
phis  ultra  of  conservatism.  Hence,  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Mohammedan  rehgion  mistrusted  the 
English  reformer  even  before  he  began  to  reform, 
both  by  reason  of  his  creed,  and  because  they  could 
not  help  suspecting  him  of  some  sinister  intentions 
in  the  direction  of  shaking  the  foundations  of  their 
ancient  faith.  In  spite  of  the  Englishman's  care 
and  tenderness  in  dealing  with  them,  their  religion, 
and  their  vested  interests,  some  of  them  will  mis- 
trust him  all  the  more,  the  more  he  succeeds  in 
introducing  reforms  for  which  they  have  no 
sympathy.  They  will  continually  expect  that  their 
turn  is  coming  next. 

Turning  from  the  hierarchy  to  the  squirearchy, 
it  will  be  found  that,  as  we  descend  the  social 
ladder,  we  enter  strata  where  the  prejudice  enter- 
tained against  the  alien  and  the  Christian  is  more 
or  less  mitigated  by  recognition  of  the  material 
benefits  conferred  by  the  reformer.  The  squire- 
archy consists,  for  the  most  part  of  Omdehs  (village 
mayors)  and  Sheikhs  of  villages.  These  are  gener- 
ally landed  proprietors  on  a  small  scale.  They 
occupy  a  position  midway  between  the  Pasha  and 
the  fellah.  Many  of  them  are  sturdy,  honest 
yeomen  who  are  well  deserving  of  respect.  Others 
are  inclined  to  cringe  before  the  Pashas  and  to 
bully  the  fellaheen.  I  should  add  that  these 
latter  tendencies,  which  were  especially  marked 
in  the  pre-reforming  days,  are  rapidly  disappearing. 

As  to  the  submissiveness  of  the  village  Sheiklis, 
the  following  picture  drawn  by  a  careful  observer 
of  Egyptian  social  life  was,  at  one  time,  by  no  means 
exaggerated.  The  scene  is  the  court  of  a  Mudirieh. 
The  Pasha  is  presiding.  "  Gradually  the  court 
becomes  more  and  more  crowded  with  bro^Mi  - 
skinned  and  brown-mantled  country  people.  The 
village  mayors   and  village  patriarchs  (Sheikhs) 


THE  MOSLEMS 


187 


are  summoned  into  the  divan.  With  a  deep 
obeisance,  they  go  through  the  usual  form  of 
Ufting  dust  from  the  smooth  marble  floor  and 
pressing  it  to  their  hps  as  a  mark  of  respect.  .  .  . 
A  Decree  is  read,  and  the  people  are  required 
to  signify  their  assent  to  it,  and  bind  themselves 
to  obey  it.  '  Right  willingly,'  answer  the  honour- 
able village  mayors  with  one  voice,  'as  your 
Excellency  commands ;  we  are  thy  slaves  and 
the  slaves  of  our  Sovereign ;  nothing  but  good 
comes  from  thee ;  thy  opinion  is  our  opinion.' 
'  Then  seal  the  document,'  says  the  Governor ;  and 
the  heads  of  the  communes,  one  after  the  other, 
give  their  brass  seal  to  the  scribe,  who  smears  it 
with  ink,  and  fills  the  sheet  mth  their  important 
names.  When  the  Sheikh  has  sealed,  the  villager 
does  so  likewise,  although  he  has  only  a  ghmmering 
of  what  it  is  that  he  has  pledged  himself  to."  ^ 

When  the  Enghsh  took  Egyptian  affairs  in 
hand,  the  submissiveness  of  the  Sheikhs  to  the 
Pashas  had  been  somewhat  tempered  by  recent 
events,  for  the  backbone  of  the  Arabist  party,  in  so 
far  as  that  party  represented  a  national  movement 
and  not  a  military  mutiny,  was  to  be  found  amongst 
this  class.  The  greater  part  of  the  yeomanry  of 
the  country  were  sympathisers  with  Arabi ;  he  was 
of  their  kith  and  kin ;  they  looked  to  him  to 
deliver  them  from  the  usurer  and  the  Pasha.  Arabi 
ruled  for  a  moment.    During  that  short  period. 

Chaos  umpire  sat, 
And  by  decision  more  embroiled  the  fray 
By  which  he  reigned. 

Though,  at  the  time  of  the  Arabi  revolt,  the  Sheikh 
class  suffered  from  the  general  disorder,  though 
even  the  short  experience  which  they  gained  of  the 
manner  in  which  Arabist  principles  were  put  in 

*  Klunzinger,  Upper  Egypt,  p.  73. 


188  MODERN  EGYPT 


practice  led  the  most  intelligent  amongst  the 
Sheikhs  to  doubt  whether  it  was  wise  to  hand  them- 
selves and  their  cause  over  to  a  mutinous  army, 
nevertheless,  when  order  was  restored,  they  fell 
back  on  the  recollection  that  Arabi  to  some  extent 
represented  the  ascendency  of  Sheikhdom  in  sub- 
stitution for  that  of  Pashadom.  They  never  forgot 
that,  had  not  England  thrown  her  weighty  sword 
into  the  scale,  the  Turco-Egyptian  Pasha  and  his 
,  satellites  would  have  been  swept  into  the  sea,  and 
that  the  Sheikh  class  would  have  thus  been  left  to 
plunder  the  fellaheen  alone,  instead  of  being  obhged 
to  content  itself  with  whatever  escaped  from  the 
rapacity  of  the  Pashas.  To  all  outward  appearance, 
the  ancient  submissiveness  to  Pashadom  returned 
after  Tel-el- Kebir.  When  the  Pasha  gave  the 
order,  the  village  Sheikh,  with  smiles  on  his  hps 
and  curses  in  his  heart,  would  pay  considerable 
sums  of  money,  which  the  Pasha,  after  levying  a 
contribution  for  his  personal  use,  would  devote  to 
fireworks  in  honour  of  a  ruler  for  whom  the  Sheikh 
in  reality  felt  but  httle  sympathy.  When,  in  1893, 
the  relations  between  the  British  Government  and 
Abbas  II.  were  somewhat  strained,  the  Sheikh, 
always  acting  under  orders,  would  form  part  of  a 
deputation  to  congratulate  the  ruler  of  his  country 
on  his  courage  and  patriotism.^  But  for  all  that, 
his  submissiveness  was  the  old  submissiveness  wdth 
a  difference.  He  was  anxious  to  have  it  whispered 
behind  the  scenes  to  the  diplomatic  representative 
of  England  that,  though  he  was  constrained  to  all 
this  lip-service,  in  reality  he  meant  nothing  by  it ; 
that  he  was  in  deadly  fear ;  and  that  his  one  hope 
was  that  England  would  stand  firm  and  save  him 
from  being  again  cast  into  the  jaws  of  Pashadom. 

*  I  give  in  an  Appendix  to  this  chapter  one  amongst  many  letters 
from  the  Sheikh  class,  which  was  shown  to  me  at  this  time.  It  shows 
a  capacity  for  trimming  which  is  characteristic 


THE  MOSLEMS 


189 


Moreover,  when  Moukhtar  Pasha,  the  representa- 
tive of  the  Khahf,  came  to  Egypt,  very  mixed 
feehngs  were  excited  in  the  minds  of  the  village 
Sheikhs,  who  let  the  British  Consul-General  know 
that,  in  spite  of  the  spiritual  connection,  they  did 
not  want  to  be  brought  into  any  closer  connection 
with  their  Khalif  or  his  agents ;  on  the  contrary, 
that  they  preferred  to  receive  water  for  their  fields 
at  the  hands  of  the  English  engineer.  Moreover, 
as  time  went  on,  the  minds  of  the  squirearchy 
underwent  some  change.  In  spite  of  all  outward 
and  visible  signs  of  submissiveness,  they  are  now 
no  longer  mere  Egyptian  clay  in  the  hands  of  the 
Turkish  potter,  as  in  the  pre-reforming  days.  Years 
of  British  rule  have  taught  them  that  they  too 
have  their  rights,  and  it  may  be  that  they  would 
not  remain  so  passive  as  of  yore  if  those  rights 
were  infringed, 

I  have  said  that  when  the  English  came  to 
Egypt,  many  of  the  village  Omdehs  and  Sheikhs, 
though  they  cringed  before  the  Pashas,  revenged 
themselves  by  bullying  the  fellaheen.  The  latter 
part  of  this  statement  merits  some  further  develop- 
ment. 

The  village  is  the  administrative  unit  in  Egypt. 
The  Omdehs  and  Sheikhs  are  the  corner-stone  on 
which  the  edifice  of  provincial  society  rests.  They 
have  certain  duties  to  perform.  They  are  con- 
sidered responsible  for  public  security.  If,  in  past 
times,  a  crime  was  committed  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  village,  and  if  the  criminal  was  not 
forthcoming,  the  imperious  rulers  of  the  country 
had  some  rude  methods  for  ensuring  his  arrest. 
The  usual  practice  was  to  make  the  Sheikhs 
suffer  vicarious  punishment,^  until  the  criminal  was 

*  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace  (Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  Question, 
p.  261)  tells  a  characteristic  story,  which  was  related  to  him  by  an  old 
fellah,  of  how  Mehemet  All  paid  a  visit  to  his  village  and  ordered  the 


190  MODERN  EGYPT 


produced.  This  generally  had  the  desired  effect. 
The  head  of  the  village  was  responsible  for  the 
assessment  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  for  the  collec- 
tion of  the  taxes.  He  furnished  gangs  for  the 
corvee.  He  was  answerable  for  obtaining  recruits 
for  the  army.  The  exercise  of  these  functions 
supplied  him  with  opportunities  for  iUicit  gain ; 
for,  provided  the  taxes  were  paid,  the  corvee  gangs 
forthcoming,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  youths 
deUvered  annually  to  feed  the  vultures  of  the 
Soudan,  no  questions  were  asked.  The  village 
Sheikhs  were  practically  uncontrolled.  They 
naturally  abused  the  privileges  of  their  position, 
and  developed  into  petty  tyrants. 

The  village  Sheikh,  hke  the  Pasha  and  the 
"Ahm,"  felt  an  instinct  of  self-preservation  aUve 
within  him  at  the  approach  of  the  Enghsh  reformer. 
He  foresaw  that  his  privileged  position  would  be 
shaken.  Neither  did  his  prophetic  instinct  err. 
For,  before  the  Englishman  had  been  long  at 
work,  the  corvee  was  abohshed ;  the  assessment 
and  collection  of  the  taxes,  as  well  as  the  recruit- 
ing for  the  army,  were  taken  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  village  authorities.  So  far,  indeed,  did  the  zeal 
of  the  English  reformer  go,  that  the  Sheikh  began 
to  mutter  Nolo  episcopari.  The  position  of  the 
head  of  a  village  became  no  longer  lucrative.  The 
Sheikh  class  began  to  doubt  whether,  under  these 
circumstances,  it  was  worth  whUe  to  assume 
responsibHities  from  wliich  little  or  no  compensa- 
ting advantage  was  to  be  derived.  The  Enghsh- 
man,  on  the  other  hand,  found  that  not  the  least 

Sheikhs  to  produce  two  robbers,  who  were  supposed  to  be  hiding  in  the 
neighbourhood.  'ITie  Sheikhs  stated  that  they  were  unable  to  do  so. 
"lu  tlie  twinkling  of  an  eye,  all  six  Sheikhs  were  lying  on  the  ground, 
fece  downwards,  receiving  the  bastinado  from  a  dozen  of  His  Highness' 
stalwart  attendants."  Before  the  bastinadoing  process  had  proceeded 
far,  one  of  the  Sheikhs  said  that  he  knew  where  the  criminals  were. 
Two  men  were  accordingly  produced,  and  at  once  hanged. 


THE  MOSLEMS 


191 


difficult  part  of  his  administrative  task  was  to 
preserve  what  was  good  and  useful  in  the  village 
system,  whilst  purging  it  of  all  that  was  bad. 

It  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  in  the  pre-reform- 
ing  days,  the  tyranny  of  the  Sheikhs  over  the 
fellaheen  was  only  one  degree  less  oppressive  than 
that  of  the  Pashas.  In  some  respects,  indeed,  the 
oppression  of  the  former  was  more  burdensome 
and  more  irksome  than  that  of  the  latter ;  for  the 
Sheikh  was  always  present  in  the  village,  whilst 
the  Pasha  was  distant,  and  only  swooped  down 
occasionally  to  plunder  and  to  flog.  There  are  a 
number  of  Arabic  proverbs  which  owe  their  origin 
to  the  sentiments  entertained  by  the  fellaheen  as 
regards  the  Pasha  and  the  Sheikh  respectively. 
For  instance,  "  Let  the  hon  eat  me  at  a  mouthful 
rather  than  the  mosquito  piecemeal."  Another  is, 
"  The  tyranny  of  the  cat  is  better  than  the  justice 
of  the  mouse." 

The  feelings  of  the  Sheikh  class  towards  the 
Enghsh  were,  therefore,  divided.  On  the  one  hand, 
they  were  wiUing  to  rely  on  EngUsh  aid  for  pro- 
tection against  the  tyrarmy  of  the  Pashas ;  on  the 
other  hand,  they  resented  the  interference  which 
curbed  the  exercise  of  their  own  time-honoured 
tyranny  over  the  fellaheen.  As  time  went  on,  and 
the  benefits  of  the  British  occupation  became  year 
by  year  more  apparent,  the  former  of  these  two 
sentiments  probably  predominated  over  the  latter ; 
but  any  praise  which  the  Sheikli  class  might  perhaps 
otherwise  have  accorded  to  Enghsh  efforts  on 
behalf  of  the  Egyptian  population,  was  tempered 
by  the  idea  that  the  Enghshman  was,  after  all, 
only  carrying  out  the  original  programme  of  Arabi. 
A  few  of  the  most  observant  did,  indeed,  recognise 
that  in  Arabi's  hands  the  programme  would  not 
have  been  executed  with  so  much  skill  and  in- 
telligence.   On  the  other  hand,  no  inconsiderable 


192  MODERN  EGYPT 


number  regretted  that  Arabi  was  not  allowed  to  have 
his  way,  not  only  because  he  was  their  compatriot 
and  co-rehgionist,  but  also  because  they  thought, 
and  perhaps  with  some  degree  of  reason,  that  whilst 
Arabi  would  have  executed  that  portion  of  the 
Enghsh  programme  which  involved  placing  a 
restraint  upon  the  Turco-Egj^tian  Pasha,  he  would 
have  been  more  careful  of  their  interests  in  that 
he  would  have  allowed  the  tyranny  of  the  Sheikh 
to  contmue  unchecked.^ 

I  now  turn  to  that  class  of  Egyptian  society 
which,  if  not  the  most  interesting,  is  certainly  more 
deserving  of  sympathy  than  any  other.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  describe  at  any  length  the  character 
and  condition  of  the  blue-shirted  Egyptian  fellah. 
Every  Nile  tourist  knows  what  he  is  Uke.  Any 
handbook  of  Egypt  can  tell  all  that  the  practical 
politician  need  know  of  his  past  history.  Every 
writer  on  Egyptian  affairs  has  touched,  in  a  greater 
or  less  degree,  on  the  sufferings  which  he  has 
undergone  at  the  hands  of  a  long  succession  of 
despotic  rulers.  From  time  immemorial,  his  main 
end  in  life  has  been  to  find  some  means  for  evading 
the  extortionate  demands  of  the  tax-gatherer. 
"  The  Romans,"  Mommsen  says,  "  assure  us  that 
the  Egyptians  were  proud  of  the  scourge-marks 
received  for  perpetrating  frauds  in  taxation."''  As 
it  was  in  the  days  of  Augustus,  so  was  it  in  the 
days  of  Ismail.  "  It  is  a  point  of  honour,"  Mr. 
McCoan  wrote  in  1877,  "to  bear  any  amount  of 
'  stick,'  if,  by  so  doing,  the  impost  or  any  part  of 
it  can  be  evaded.    The  fellah,  indeed,  who  vnR 

•  These  remarks  were  written  some  few  years  ago.  I  leave  them 
unaltered,  as  they  were  at  one  time  quite  correct.  But  they  are  so  to 
a  less  extent  now.  The  recollection  of  the  events  of  1882  is  rapidly 
dying  out.  Other  influences  have  taken  the  place  of  the  Arabi  mytlu 
Further,  whatever  defects  may  still  eirist  generally  amongst  the  Sheikh 
class,  I  have  little  doubt  that  their  moral  and  intellectual  standard  ia 
now  considerably  higher  than  was  the  case  in  1882. 

*  The  Provinces  of  the  Roman  Empire,  voL  ii.  p.  268. 


THE  MOSLEMS 


193 


not  do  so  is  despised  by  even  his  own  wife  as  a 
poltroon,  and  if,  after  only  a  dozen  or  score  of 
blows,  he  disgorges  the  coin  wliich  endurance  of 
fifty  might  perhaps  have  saved,  the  conjugal 
estimate  of  his  spirit  is  generally  shared  by  his 
fellows."^  Next  to  evading  taxation,  the  fellah 
above  all  things  wishes  to  evade  military  service. 
His  favourite  method  of  attaining  this  object  was, 
at  one  time,  not  to  cut  off  a  finger,  as  was  done  by 
the  poltroons  ^  of  the  Roman  army,  but  to  sacrifice 
an  eye. 

In  deahng  Mnth  the  fellah,  the  EngHsh  pohtician 
had  mainly  two  points  to  bear  in  mind.  The  first 
point  was  that  the  immense  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion of  Egypt  are  fellaheen.  The  fellaheen,  there- 
fore, deserve  consideration  on  account  of  their 
numbers.  This  fact  would  at  first  sight  appear 
sufficiently  ob^dous,  but  it  was  at  one  time 
frequently  forgotten  by  Pashas  and  others. 

The  second  point  was  that,  as  the  fellah,  at  the 
time  of  the  British  occupation,  possessed  no 
privileges,  unless  the  habUity  to  be  indiscriminately 
robbed  and  flogged  can  be  called  a  privilege,  there 
would  be  no  difficulty  in  dealing  with  him  on  the 
ground  that  the  reformer  was  laying  a  rash  hand 
on  his  vested  rights.  As  he  stood  on  the  lowest 
rung  of  the  social  ladder,  there  was  no  one  below 
him  over  whom  he  could  tyramiise. 

The  main  problem  which  the  Enghshman  had 
to  solve  was  this  :  How  to  confer  on  the  fellah  the 
privilege  of  no  longer  being  robbed  and  flogged, 
without  shattering  the  edifice,  which,  rotten  as  it 
was,  had  stUl  kept  Egyptian  society  together  for 
centuries  past.  In  dealing  with  this  problem,  one 
thing  was  certain.    The  fellah  had  everything  to 

•  Egypt  as  it  is,  p.  26. 

*  The  derivation  usually  given  for  the  word  "poltroon" — pollice 
truncus — is,  however,  more  than  doubtful.  See  Skeat's  Etymological 
Dictionary. 

VOL.  II  O 


194  MODERN  EGYPT 


gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by  the  work  of  the  Enghsh 
reformer.  There  cannot,  in  fact,  be  a  shadow  of 
doubt  that  the  fellah  has  gained  enormously  o%ving 
to  the  efforts  made  on  his  behalf  by  the  Enghsh- 
man.  He  has  gained  far  more  than  any  other  class 
of  society,  because  in  his  case  there  is  absolutely 
no  disadvantage  to  throw  into  the  scale  against  the 
immense  benefits  which  he  has  received. 

Does  the  Egyptian  fellah  appreciate  the  benefits 
which  have  been  conferred  on  him  ?  Does  he 
entertain  any  feelings  of  gratitude  towards  his 
benefactor  ?  These  are  questions  which  are  inter- 
esting in  themselves,  and,  moreover,  are  not 
altogether  devoid  of  political  importance. 

After   a  fashion,  the   fellah   appreciates  very 
highly  the  benefits  which  have  been  conferred  on 
him.    Ignorant  though  he  be,  he  is  wise  enough  to 
know  that  he  is  now  far  better  off  than  he  was  prior  to 
the  British  occupation.    He  would  shudder  at  any 
notion  that  the  old  regime  was  to  be  re-estabUshed. 
Moreover,  in  a  vague  sort  of  way  he  probably  recog- 
nises that  these  benefits  have  been  conferred  upon 
him  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.    But  he  is  singularly 
wanting  in  the  logical  faculty.    He  is  incapable  of 
estabhshing  clearly  in  his  mind  that,  for  the  time 
being  at  aU  events,  good  administration  and  the 
exercise  of  a  paramount  influence  by  England  are 
inseparably  linked  together.    It  has  been  the  mis- 
fortune of  the  English  in  Egypt  that  the  classes 
who,  under  their  pohtical  programme,  most  bene- 
fited by  British  rule,  were  those  who  were  least  of 
aU  able  to  make  their  voices  heard.    The  fellaheen 
are,  politically  speaking,  ciphers.     They  are  too 
apathetic,  too  ignorant,  and  too  little  accustomed  to 
take  the  initiative,  to  give  utterance  in  any  pohti- 
cally  audible  form  to  their  opuiions  even  when  they 
have  any.    Moreover,  in  the  event  of  a  premature 
withdrawal  of  the  British  garrison,  they  would 


THE  MOSLEMS 


195 


probably  not  form  any  definite  opinion  as  to  the 
results  of  the  measure  until  positive  proof  had  been 
afforded  to  them  that  a  fatal  mistake  had  been 
made.  Then  it  is  possible  that,  having  tasted  the 
fruits  of  good  administration  and  being  emboldened 
by  the  freedom  conferred  on  them  by  the  Enghsh- 
man,  they  might  turn  round  and  rend  the  Pashas. 

As  to  whether  the  fellaheen  are  grateful  or  the  re- 
verse, it  is  to  be  observed  that  gratitude  is  not,  gener- 
ally speaking,  a  national  virtue.  Moreover,  many 
of  those  who  have  mixed  in  native  society  in  Egypt 
consider  that  ingratitude  is  one  of  the  predominant 
features  of  the  Egyptian  character.^  However  this 
may  be,  the  ordinary  fellah  is  kindly  and  jovial. 
If  he  were  left  to  himself  he  would  certainly  not 
entertain  any  unfriendly  feelings  towards  the 
Enghshman,  in  spite  of  the  difference  of  race  or 
creed  ;  indeed,  although  he  might  not  be  effusively 
grateful,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  on  his  own 
initiative  he  would  ever  do  anything  to  render 
himself  open  to  the  charge  of  ingratitude.  Unfor- 
tunately, he  is  emotional,  ignorant,  and  credulous. 
He  is  easily  led  away  by  Ijdng  agitators  and 
intriguers.  Under  the  influence  of  ephemeral 
passion,  his  sense  of  gratitude  for  past  favours  would 
disappear  like  chaff  before  the  wind.  At  such  a 
moment,  the  same  man,  who  was  but  yesterday 
blessing  the  English  engineer  for  watering  his 
fields,  might  to-morrow,  should  the  occasion  arise, 
brain  his  benefactor  with  a  "  nabout "  ^  in  a  fit  of 
savage  passion.  It  should  be  added  that,  imme- 
diately afterwards,  he  would  probably  be  very  sorry 
for  what  he  has  done. 

My  reason  tells  me  that  this  is  so.    Yet  I  hate 

'  "  The  natives  of  Egypt  in  general,  in  common  with  the  Arabs  of 
other  countries,  are  (according  to  our  system  of  morals)  justly  charge- 
able with  a  fault,  which  is  re<?arded  by  us  as  one  of  great  magnitude ; 
it  is  want  of  gratitude." — Lane,  Modern  Egyptians,  vol.  i.  p.  366. 

*  A  "  nabout"  is  a  staflF,  which  is  sometimes  loaded  with  lead 


196 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


to  believe  it.  A  diplomatist,  and  especially  a  diplo- 
matist in  Egypt,  sees  a  good  deal  of  the  ignoble 
side  of  life.  Constant  dealings  with  corrupt  Pashas, 
scheming  adventurers,  and  other  hostile  elements, 
who  think  that  all  is  fair  in  business  or  politics,  are 
apt  to  shake  one's  faith  in  the  goodness  of  human 
nature.  More  than  this,  the  question  of  whether 
the  fellaheen  of  Egypt  are  happy  or  unhappy, 
grateful  or  ungrateful,  though  a  matter  of  some 
interest  to  themselves  and  of  somewhat  more  than 
philanthropic  interest  to  others,  is,  after  all,  only 
one  of  the  factors  which  must  contribute  to  guide 
the  action  of  the  British  diplomatist.  He  has  to 
think,  or  at  all  events  the  Government  whom  he  is 
serving  has  to  think  of  the  interests  of  the  farmers  of 
Yorkshire,  the  fishermen  of  Yarmouth,  the  artisans 
of  Sheffield,  and  their  brother  taxpayers,  who  are 
his  own  countrymen,  and  he  has  to  ask  himself, 
what  is  it  to  these  whether  or  not  the  Egj^tian  fella- 
heen are  flayed  alive  by  greedy  Pashas  and  tyrannical 
Sheikhs  ?  All  this  I  know.  Mais  pour  etre  diplo- 
7nate,  on  nest  pas  moins  homme.  Even  a  matter-of- 
fact  official  may  be  allowed  to  cherish  what  is 
perhaps  an  illusion.  He  may  be  pardoned,  especially 
if  he  has  lived  much  in  the  inconsistent  East,  if  he 
nourishes  a  trace  of  inconsistency  in  the  recesses  of 
his  heart,  if  he  struggles  against  being  reasoned  out 
of  a  noble  hope.  Often  during  the  long  period 
when  my  countrymen  and  myself  were  engaged  in 
what  at  one  time  seemed  the  hopeless  task  of 
evolving  order  out  of  the  Egj^ptian  chaos,  have  I 
repeated  to  myself  those  fine  lines  of  the  Latin  poet 
which  Pitt  quoted  when  he  dealt  the  first  blow 
to  the  infamous  traffic  in  slaves  : 

Nosque  ubi  primus  equis  Oriens  afflaxat  anhelis, 
Illie  sera  rubens  accendit  lumina  Vesper.^ 

1  Stanhope's  Life  of  Pitt,  p.  146.  The  quotation  is  from  the  first 
Georgic,  250-251. 


THE  MOSLEMS 


197 


Was  the  prophecy  of  the  Enghsh  statesman,  I 
asked  myself,  about  to  be  fulfilled  ?  Is  it  destined 
that,  under  the  guiding  hand  of  England,  the  rays 
of  true  civilisation  shall  at  last  pierce  into  the  oldest 
and  most  interesting  corner  of  the  dark  African 
continent,  and  lighten  with  their  sunshine  even  the 
mud  hut  of  the  Egyptian  fellah  ?  Is  the  English- 
man to  show,  by  precept  and  example,  that  usury 
and  drinikenness  are  not  the  only  handmaids  of 
Christian  education  ?  Pray  Heaven  it  may  be  so  ! 
When  Sir  Robert  Peel  committed  that  great  and 
wise  act  of  political  apostasy  for  which  Ills  name  will 
ever  live  in  English  history,  he  said  that  although 
he  had  suffered  much  in  separating  himself  from 
his  former  political  friends,  he  still  hoped  that  he 
would  "  leave  a  name  sometimes  remembered  with 
expressions  of  goodwill  in  those  places  which  are 
the  abode  of  men  whose  lot  it  is  to  labour  and  to 
earn  their  daily  bread  by  the  sweat  of  their  brow." 
I  may  perhaps  be  permitted  to  paraphrase  this 
memorable  passage.  In  spite  of  the  ignorance  and 
alleged  ingratitude  of  the  Egyptians,  I  still  dare  to 
cherish  a  hope  that  the  present  and  future  genera- 
tions of  fellaheen,  who  certainly  earn  and  will 
continue  to  earn  their  daily  bread  by  the  sweat  of 
their  brow,  will  remember  with  some  feeling  akin 
to  gratitude  that  it  was  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  who 
first  delivered  them  from  the  thraldom  of  their 
oppressors,  who  taught  them  that  they  too  had  the 
right  to  be  treated  like  human  beings,  who  conferred 
upon  them  the  material  blessings  which  follow  in 
the  train  of  true  Western  civilisation,  and  who 
opened  out  to  them  the  path  which  leads  to  moral 
progress  and  elevation  of  thought.  The  time,  it 
may  be  hoped,  is  past  when   Egypt  ^  and  the 

*  Hoary  Memphis  boasts  her  tombs  alone. 
The  mouruful  types  of  mighty  power  decayed. 

Shenstone,  Elegy  XIV. 


198 


MODERN  EGYPT 


p-r.  rv 


Egyptians  could  be  cited  as  one  of  the  most  striking 
contrasts  the  world  has  ever  known  between  past 
grandeur  and  modern  decadence. 

In  any  case,  whether  the  Egyptian  fellah  be 
capable  or  incapable  of  gratitude,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  it  was  the  hand  of  England  which  first 
raised  him  from  the  abject  moral  and  material 
condition  in  which  he  had  for  centuries  wallowed. 
If,  now  that  he  is  begirming  to  emerge  from  his 
slough  of  despond,  I  thought  that  he  would  be 
permitted  to  relapse  into  his  former  state,  and  that 
the  work  on  which,  in  common  with  many  of  my 
countrymen,  I  have  spent  the  best  years  of  my  life 
would  be  undone,  then  would  I  say  rore  fwc  -xavoi, 
evpeia  -xdwv.  I  hasten  to  add  that  I  not  merely 
hope,  l3ut  strongly  believe  that  no  such  disappoint- 
ment of  my  pohtical  hopes  is,  in  the  smallest  degree, 
probable. 

The  last  category  of  Moslem  dwellers  in  Egj^t 
of  whom  it  is  necessary  to  speak  is  the  Bedouins, 
semi-sedentary  and  nomad.  Of  these,  but  Uttle 
need  be  said.  A  number  of  proverbs  are  current 
in  Egypt  indicative  of  the  dishke  entertained  by 
the  dwellers  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile  to  those  in 
the  desert.  Of  these,  the  best  known  is,  "  Better 
the  tyranny  of  the  Turk  than  the  justice  of  the 
Bedouins."  The  Bedouins  are,  in  fact,  supposed 
to  be  very  cruel  and  unjust.  Another  proverb  is 
in  the  form  of  a  narrative :  "  The  Bedouin  told  my 
wife  that  there  was  no  water  in  the  well.  She  at 
once  went  hastily  to  the  well  with  four  buckets." 
This  is  in  allusion  to  the  alleged  selfisliness  and 
untruthfulness  of  the  Bedouins.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Bedouins  despise  the 
fellaheen,  whom  they  consider  an  umnanly  race. 
The  Bedouins  occasionally  complain  that  in  the 

*  Burckhardt  {Arabic  Proverbs,  p.  123)  ffives  another:  "Entertaia 
the  Bedouin,  he  will  steal  thy  clothes." 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS 


199 


matter  of  military  service,  from  which  they  are 
exempted,  the  Egyptian  Government  wish  to 
"reduce  them  to  fellaheen."  It  is  wise  pohcy  to 
keep  them  contented  and  to  encourage  them  to 
settle  on  the  cultivated  lands.  Otherwise,  they 
are  apt  to  turn  into  marauders  and  to  cause 
disturbances  of  various  sorts.  Their  ancient 
privileges  have,  therefore,  for  the  most  part,  been 
preserved  to  them.  This  treatment  has  proved 
effective.  The  figures  of  the  census  of  1897 
compared  with  those  of  1882  show  that,  since 
the  British  occupation,  there  has  been  a  strong 
tendency  on  the  part  of  the  Bedouins  to  abandon 
their  nomadic  habits,  and  to  settle  in  the  villages 
bordering  on  the  desert.  Broadly  speaking,  the 
Bedouins,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  narrative 
and  argument,  may  be  considered  a  quantite 
negligeahle.  They  did  not  exercise  any  consider- 
able influence  on  the  course  of  British  policy  in 
Egypt. 


200 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


APPENDIX 

Translation  of  a  Letter  from  a  Sheikh  of  Keneh  to  a 
Sheikh  of  the  Mosque  of  Seyyidna-Hussein  at  Cairo. 

February  2,  1894. 

During  these  days,  the  talk  has  been  great  among  the 
people,  and  tongues  have  wearied  as  to  the  difference  which 
had  sprung  up,  so  they  said,  between  our  Lord  the  Khedive 
and  Baring.  There  were  those  who  said :  "  The  English 
have  many  soldiers,  and  must  prevail."  Others  said,  and 
among  these  many  of  the  Ulema :  "  HE  has  said  (Grace  be 
on  Him  !)  how  often  hath  a  small  force  overcome  a  great  one 
by  the  aid  of  the  Almighty,  be  His  name  exalted  !  " 

Then  it  was  reported  in  our  districts  :  "  Behold  the  Infidel 
is  overcome,  and  Baring  has  fled  in  haste  to  his  own  country. 
The  days  of  Abbas  shall  be  like  those  of  his  forefathers  ;  the 
people  and  the  Pashas  shall  be  bread  for  him  to  eat ;  the 
foreigner  will  be  his  servant." 

So  we  took  counsel,  and  thought  to  send  a  mission  from 
Keneh  to  say  :  "  Good  news  !  Effendina  has  returned  to  his 
fit  place ! "  For  the  poet  has  said  :  "  The  wise  man  gives 
honey  to  the  bear  in  the  day  of  his  fatness,  but  the  fool 
smites  him  on  the  head  with  a  pole." 

Then,  while  we  still  pondered,  came  a  message  from  Cairo 
that  Baring  and  his  English  walked  in  the  city  like  leopards 
among  dogs,  and  that  Abbas  had  withdrawn  into  his 
castle  and  sat  scowling,  for  the  Government  of  Baring  had 
said  :  "  Be  meat  that  we  may  devour  you  ! "  So  we  were 
hushed,  and  resolved  to  say  nothing  of  any  deputation. 
And,  of  a  truth,  I  think  that  it  is  not  easy,  and  will  be  less 
so  in  time  to  come,  to  send  deputations  of  good  tidings  to 
our  Lord  the  Khedive. 

Now,  I  had  myself  thought  that  the  end  could  onlv  be 
thus,  for  I  have  seen  the  English  and  I  know  them.  But 
aloud  1  said :  "  The  blessing  of  God  on  the  deputation,  and 
the  aid  of  His  mighty  arm  !  for  are  we  not  all  Moslems  and 
brethren  ?    (God  increase  the  might  of  Islam  !) 

But,  O  my  friend !  I  beg  you  to  keep  this  letter  very 
secret,  for  the  poet  has  sail:  "111  is  his  lot  in  the  court 
whom  the  Kadi  has  heard  to  whisper,  '  There  is  justice 
amongst  the  unbelievers.''  "  ^ 

'  A  change  has  been  made  in  tlie  last  paragraph  without  altering 
the  general  sense.    The  original  was  too  coarse  to  be  reproduced. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 


THE  CHRISTIANS 

Hie  Copts — The  conservatism  of  their  reli^on — Their  character — 
Their  attitude  towards  the  English — 'I'he  reforni  movement — 
The  Syrians — Their  position — Their  unpopularity — Tlieir  attitude 
towards  the  English — The  Armenians — Their  subserviency  to  the 
Turks — Xubar  Pasha — His  son  Boghos — Yacoub  Pasha  Artin — 
Tigrane  Pasha — The  Egyptians  should  not  be  weighed  in  European 
scales. 

The  Egyptian  native  Christians  may  be  divided  into 
three  categories,  viz.  (1)  the  Copts  ;  (2)  the  Syrians  ; 
and  (3)  the  Armenians.  Of  these,  the  most  important 
in  point  of  numbers  are  the  Copts.  The  census  of 
1897  showed  that  there  were  at  that  time  608,000 
Copts  in  Eg}'pt.  Of  these,  some  few  are  Catliolics 
and  some  Protestants,  but  by  far  the  greater  number 
belong  to  what  is  termed  the  Orthodox  Church. 

Beyond  mentioning  that  the  Orthodox  Copts 
are  Monophysites,  and  that  they  separated  from 
the  main  body  of  the  Christian  Church  subsequent 
to  the  Council  of  Chalcedon  in  a.d.  451,  it  is 
needless  to  dwell  on  the  special  tenets  of  the 
Coptic  creed.  One  point  in  connection  with  the 
rehgion  of  the  Copts  should,  however,  be  men- 
tioned, inasmuch  as  it  is  intimately  connected  with 
an  understanding  of  the  general  characteristics  of 
the  Coptic  community.  The  Christianity  of  the 
Copt  has  been  as  conservative  as  the  Islamism 
of  the  Moslem.  "The  Eastern  Church,"  Dean 
Stanley  says,  "was,  hke  the  East,  stationary  and 

201 


202  MODERN  EGYPT 


immutable ;  the  Western,  like  the  West,  pro- 
gressive and  flexible.  .  .  .  The  theology  of  the 
East  has  undergone  no  systematising  process.  The 
doctrines  remain  in  the  same  rigid  yet  undefined 
state  as  that  in  which  they  were  left  by  Constantine 
and  Justinian."  If  a  reUgious  beUef  cannot  adapt 
itself  to  the  requirements  which  are  constantly 
cropping  up  as  the  world  grows  older,  one  of 
two  things  will  probably  happen.  Either  society 
advances  and  the  religious  belief  is  stranded  and 
eventually  forgotten,  or  the  creed  holds  society  in 
its  grip  and  bars  the  way  to  advancement.  It  is 
the  proud  boast  of  the  Christian  religion,  and 
more  especially  of  the  Protestant  variety  of  that 
religion,  that  it  is  not  obliged  to  choose  between 
either  of  these  alternatives.  It  possesses  sufficient 
elasticity  to  adapt  itself  to  modem  requirements. 

It  is  true  that  the  Coptic  Christian  has  remained 
stagnant,  but  there  is  this  notable  difference  between 
the  stagnation  of  the  Moslem  and  that  of  the  Copt. 
The  Moslem  stands  in  everji;hing  on  the  ancient 
ways  because  he  is  a  ]\loslem,  because  the  customs 
which  are  interwoven  with  his  rehgion,  forbid  him 
to  change.  "  Swathed  in  the  bands  of  the  Koran, 
the  Moslem  faith,  unlike  the  Christian,  is  powerless 
to  adapt  itself  to  varying  time  and  place,  keep 
pace  with  the  march  of  humanity,  direct  and  purify 
the  social  life,  or  elevate  mankind."^  The  Copt, 
on  the  other  hand,  has  remained  iimnutable,  or 
nearly  so,  not  because  he  is  a  Copt,  but  because 
he  is  an  Oriental,  and  because  his  reUgion,  which 
adinits  of  progress,  has  been  surrounded  by  associa- 
tions antagonistic  to  progress.  In  the  case  of 
the  Copt,  it  is  not  necessary,  as  in  that  of  the 
Moslem,  to  strike  off  any  religious  shackles  before 
he  can  proceed  along  the  path  of  political  and 
social  advancement.     The  reformer  in  temporal 

1  Sir  William  Muir,  The  Caliphate,  p.  594. 


CH.  XXXVI        THE  CHRISTIANS  203 


nicatters  does  not  at  every  turn  find  himself  face 
to  face  with  the  priest,  who  in  the  name  of  rehgion 
or  religious  custom  bars  the  way  to  progress. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  principle,  the  difference 
is  immense.  From  the  point  of  view  of  practice, 
the  difference  has  so  far  been  slight.  In  spite  of 
his  religion  wliich,  as  the  history  of  the  world  has 
shown,  admits  of  progress,  the  Copt  has  been  arrested 
by  barriers  very  similar  to  those  which  have  appUed 
in  the  case  of  the  Moslem.  It  is,  indeed,  natural 
that  such  should  have  been  the  case.  The  minority 
must  of  necessity  submit  to  the  influence  of  the 
majority.  In  India,  the  Moslems  have  to  a  certain 
extent  become  Brahminised.  In  spite  of  the 
unbending  tenets  of  their  creed,  custom  and  asso- 
ciation have  been  too  strong  for  them.  The 
Hindoos,  being  in  a  majority  of  five  to  one,  have 
copied  nothing  from  the  Moslems.  The  Moslems, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  insensibly  assimilated 
certain  Hindoo  ideas,  notably  the  idea  of  caste. 
The  Indian  Moslem  will  not  eat  with  the  Chris- 
tian, although  there  is  nothing  in  his  reUgious  code 
which  forbids  him  to  do  so,  and  although  his 
brother- Moslem,  who  is  not  exposed  to  Hindoo 
association,  does  so  willingly.  The  same  principle 
has  appHed  in  the  case  of  the  Egyptian  Copts. 
The  Moslem  has  in  no  way  become  Christianised. 
The  Copt,  on  the  other  hand,  has,  without  know- 
ing it,  assimilated  himself  to  the  Moslem.  "  The 
modern  Copt  has  become  from  head  to  foot,  in 
manners,  language,  and  spirit,  a  Moslem,  however 
unwilling  he  may  be  to  recognise  the  fact."^  Coptic 
women  are  almost  as  secluded  as  Moslems.  Coptic 
children  are  generally  circumcised.  The  marriage 
customs  and  funeral  ceremonies  of  the  Copts  are 
very  similar  to  those  of  Moslems. 

Much  has  been  wTitten  about  the  general 

^  Upper  Egypt,  etc.,  p.  89. 


204 


]MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


characteristics  of  the  Copts.  All  generalisations 
about  the  attributes  of  a  nation  or  of  a  class  are 
apt  to  be  imperfect,  and  must  necessarily  do 
injustice  to  exceptional  individuals.  The  Copts 
have  somewhat  specially  suffered  from  hasty 
generahsation.  Until  of  recent  years,  when  by 
reason  of  the  British  occupation  a  flood  of  light  has 
been  thrown  on  everytliing  connected  with  Egypt, 
most  Enghshmen  who  paid  any  attention  to  the 
national  characteristics  of  the  "Modem  Egyptians" 
took  their  ideas  from  the  classic  work,  which 
has  immortalised  the  name  of  Lane.  Now  Lane 
was  a  strong  Mohammedan  sympathiser.  He  knew 
but  little  about  the  Copts.  All  the  information  he 
supplies  about  them  appears  to  have  been  based  on 
the  testimony  of  one  "  respectable  Copt "  whose 
acquaintance  he  happened  to  make,^  and  who 
certainly  gave  a  most  unfavourable  account  of  his 
co-religionists.  "One  of  the  most  remarkable 
traits,"  Lane  says,  "  in  the  character  of  the  Copts 
is  their  bigotry.  They  bear  a  bitter  hatred  to  aU 
other  Christians,  even  exceeding  that  wdth  which 
the  Moslems  regard  the  unbehevers  in  El- Islam. 
.  .  .  They  are,  generally  speaking,  of  a  sullen 
temper,  extremely  avaricious,  and  abominable 
dissemblers  ;  cringing  or  domineering  according  to 
circumstances.  The  respectable  Copt,  to  whom  I 
have  already  acknowledged  myself  chiefly  indebted 
for  the  notions  which  I  have  obtained  respecting 
the  customs  of  his  nation,  gives  me  a  most 
unfavourable  account  of  their  character.  He  avows 
them  to  be  generally  ignorant,  deceitful,  faithless, 
and  abandoned  to  the  pursuit  of  worldly  gain,  and 
to  indulgence  in  sensual  pleasures."  ^ 

*  "  I  had  the  good  fortune  to  become  acquainted  with  a  character 
of  which  I  had  doubted  the  existence,- a  Copt  of  a  liberal  as  well  as  an 
intelligent  mind  ;  and  to  his  kindness  I  am  indebted  for  the  knowledge 
of  most  of  the  facts  related  in  the  following  brief  memoir." — Modem 
Egyptians,  vol.  ii.  p.  273.  ^  Modern  Egyptians,  vol.  ii.  p.  295. 


THE  CHRISTIANS  205 


This  judgment  appears  to  err  greatly  on  the  side 
of  severity.  Even  if'  it  be  admitted  that  the  un- 
pleasing  qualities,  which  Lane  indicates,  are  some- 
times to  be  found  amongst  the  Copts,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  Copts  have  no  monopoly  of  those 
quahties.  Bigotry,  ignorance,  dissimulation,  deceit, 
faithlessness,  the  pursuit  of  worldly  gain,  and  in- 
dulgence in  sensual  pleasures,  may,  to  a  certain 
extent,  be  Egyptian,  but  it  can  scarcely  be  held 
that  they  are  especially  Coptic  attributes.  They 
are  to  be  found  in  an  equal  degree  amongst 
Egyptian  Moslems. 

Sir  John  Bowring,  who  next  to  Lane  is  probably  . 
the  best  of  the  less  recent  authorities  on  Egyptian 
national  characteristics,  passes  a  more  kindly  judg- 
ment on  the  Copts.  Although,  he  says,  the  Turks 
have  always  considered  the  Copts  as  "the  pariahs 
of  the  Egyptian  people,  yet  they  are  an  amiable, 
pacific,  and  intelligent  race,  whose  worst  vices 
have  grown  out  of  their  seeking  shelter  from 
wrong  and  robbery." 

Lane  appears  to  me  to  be  prejudiced  in  this 
matter.  His  statement  is,  to  say  the  least,  much 
too  highly  coloured  as  regards  the  present  race 
of  Egyptians,  whether  Moslems  or  Copts.  Bow- 
ring,  on  the  other  hand,  hardly  states  the  whole 
case.  My  own  experience  leads  me  to  the  follow- 
ing conclusions :  first,  that,  owing  to  circum- 
stances unconnected  with  the  difference  of  rehgion, 
the  Egyptian  Copt  has  developed  certain  moral 
attributes  which  also  belong  to  the  Egyptian 
Moslem ;  secondly,  that,  owing  to  circumstances 
which  are  accidentally  connected  with,  but  which 
are  not  the  consequences  of  his  rehgion,  the  Copt 
has  developed  certain  intellectual  quahties,  in 
which,  mainly  from  want  of  exercise,  the  Eg^'plian 
Moslem  seems  to  be  deficient ;  thirdly,  that  for 
all  purposes   of  broad   generalisation,  the  only 


20G 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  IV 


difference  between  the  Copt  and  the  Moslem  is 
that  the  former  is  an  Egyptian  who  worships  in 
a  Christian  church,  whilst  the  latter  is  an  Eg}'ptian 
who  worships  in  a  JMohammedan  mosque. 

The  question  now  under  discussion  is  one  of 
great  interest,  for  it  involves  nothing  less  than 
this — has  the  Christian  rehgion,  taken  by  itself 
and  apart  from  all  other  influences,  been  able  in 
the  course  of  centuries  to  develop  moral  quaUties 
in  the  Coptic  community  superior  to  those 
generally  attributable  to  the  non-Christian  com- 
munity by  which  the  Copts  have  been  surrounded  ? 

I  am  reluctantly  constrained  to  answer  this 
question  in  the  negative.*  It  is,  so  far  as  I  am 
aware,  impossible  to  indicate  any  moral  quality 
in  respect  to  which  the  Copt,  with  his  1500  years 
of  Christianity  behind  him,  is  notably  superior 
to  the  Moslem.  The  moral  code  by  which  the 
relations  between  man  and  man  are  regulated  is, 
in  the  case  of  the  Copt,  no  more  ele^  ated  than 
in  the  case  of  the  Moslem.  In  spite  of  his  rehgion 
and  his  monogamous  habits,  the  Copt  has  developed 
no  high  ideal  of  womanhood.  More  than  this, 
in  respect  to  one  important  point  the  Moslem 
occupies  a  more  elevated  moral  position  than  the 
Copt.  The  former,  when  untainted  by  European 
association,  is  distinguished  for  his  sobriety — a 
moral  quality  which  is  noticeable  to  a  less 
extent  amongst  the  Copts.^  It  is,  of  course, 
true  that  the  defects  of  Coptic  character  are  not 
attributable  to  their  rehgion.    It  is  also  true  that 

'  It  is,  however,  to  be  remembered,  looking  to  the  past  history  of 
the  Copts,  that  they  deserve  ^reat  credit  for  the  steadfastness  with 
which  they  have  adhered  to  their  faith  iu  the  face  of  persecution.  As 
to  the  persecution  see,  inter  alia,  Makrizi's  Histon/  (Malan's  translation), 
p.  88.  In  Dr.  Butler's  admirable  work.  The  Arab  Conquest  of  Egypt,  a 
full  account  is  given  of  the  persecution  to  which  the  Copts  were  at  one 
time  subject. 

^  "  Intoxication  is  a  frequent  vice  amongst  the  Copts." — Bowring's 
Report,  p.  8.    See  also  Cairo,  p.  206. 


THE  CHRISTIANS  207 


the  Copt  has  been  exposed  to  the  influence  of  a 
somewhat  debased  form  of  Christianity ;  that 
that  influence  has  been  exerted  under  specially 
unfavourable  conditions ;  and  that  the  defects  in 
the  Coptic  character  are,  more  often  than  not, 
"the  vices  of  servitude."^  Nevertheless,  to  those 
who  beHeve  in  the  morahsing  and  civilising 
influence  of  the  Christian  rehgion,  it  is  dis- 
appointing to  find  that,  in  differentiating  the 
Egyptian  Copt  from  his  compatriots  who  are 
Moslems,  it  is  not  possible  to  indicate  any  one 
special  virtue,  and  to  say  that,  in  spite  of  every 
adventitious  disadvantage,  the  Christian  religion 
has  fostered  and  developed  that  virtue,  and  has 
thus  given  a  certain  moral  superiority  to  the 
Christian  over  the  Moslem.  Such,  however, 
appears  to  be  the  case.  I  fear  it  must  be  admitted 
that  so  far  the  Copt  has  stood  before  the  world 
as  a  Christian  who,  by  reason  of  adverse  circum- 
stances, has  been  unable  to  profit  to  any  great 
extent  by  his  Christianity. 

Turning  from  moral  attributes  to  mental  quali- 
ties, it  cannot  be  said  that,  in  any  of  the  higher 
branches  of  intellectual  life,  the  Copts  have  shown 
any  superiority  over  the  Moslems.  But,  under  the 
stress  of  circumstances,  they  have  developed  certain 
mediocre  aptitudes.  As  compared  with  the  un- 
bending Moslem,  they  have  shown  a  greater  degree 
of  flexibility  in  adapting  themselves  to  a  few  of 
the  elementary  requirements  of  civihsation.  They 
have  seized  on  those  crumbs  from  the  Moslem 
table  which  the  Moslem  was  too  proud,  too 
careless,  or  too  unintelligent  to  appropriate  to 
himself.  They  made  themselves  useful,  indeed 
almost  indispensable  to  their  oppressors,  and 
the  aptitudes  which  they  thus  acquired  during 
the  period  of  oppression,  ought  to  have  stood  them 

*  Cairo,  p.  208. 


208 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


in  good  stead  when  the  flood -tide  of  European 
civihsation  set  in.  For  the  European  will  recog- 
nise that  the  Copt  possesses  in  some  degree  that 
accurate  habit  of  thought  which  is  wanting  in 
the  Moslem,  and  which  is  the  god  at  whose  altar 
the  logical  European  is  an  unceasing  devotee.  He 
will  accord  a  lukewarm  welcome  to  the  Copt,  not 
on  account  of  his  religion,  but  because  the  Copt 
can  add  and  subtract,  because  he  knows  Ins 
multipUcation  table,  because  he  can  measure  the 
length  and  breadth  of  a  plot  of  ground  without 
making  any  gross  error  in  the  measurement,  and 
because,  although  his  system  of  accounts  is  archaic, 
at  the  same  time  it  is  better  to  be  in  possession 
of  a  bad  system  of  accounts  than,  like  the  Egj-ptian 
Moslem,  to  have  scarcely  any  system  at  all.  "  The 
Copts,"  Bowring  said,  "are  the  surveyors,  the 
scribes,  the  arithmeticians,  the  measurers,  the 
clerks,  in  a  word,  the  learned  men  of  the  land. 
They  are  to  the  counting-house  and  the  pen  what 
the  fellah  is  to  the  field  and  the  plough." 

What,  however,  was  the  attitude  of  the  Copts 
towards  the  English  reformer  ? 

The  question  is  of  some  interest  and  import- 
ance, for  although  the  EngUshman,  strong  in  the 
righteousness  of  his  cause,  was  confident  of  the 
ultimate  result,  at  the  same  time,  looking  to  all 
the  obstacles  in  his  path,  to  the  inertia  of  the  mass 
of  the  population  whom  he  Avished  to  befi*iend, 
and  to  the  activity  of  various  hostile  elements  of 
Egyptian  society,  who  would  assuredly  never  cease 
from  harrying  him,  he  would  have  been  glad  to 
welcome  the  most  humble  allies.  And  where 
would  the  Englishman  more  probably  find  aUies 
than  amongst  a  body  of  persons  who  were  bound 
to  him  by  a  general  community  of  reUgion,  who 
had  suffered  from  the  oppression  of  the  Moslem 
and  notably  from  that  of  the  Moslem  Pasha,  and 


OH. XXXVI         THE  CHRISTIANS  209 

who  possessed  various  humble  aptitudes,  which  it 
would  be  in  the  interest  of  the  Englishman  to  turn 
to  account,  and  in  that  of  the  Copt  to  display  to 
the  best  advantage  in  the  presence  of  the  Enghsh- 
man  ?  The  premises  of  this  argument  were  seem- 
ingly correct ;  the  inference  was  plausible  ;  but,  as 
we  are  dealing  with  the  illogical  East,  we  need  not 
be  surprised  to  find  that  it  was  erroneous.  For, 
in  fact,  the  Copt  was,  in  the  first  instance  at 
aU  events,  animated  by  no  very  friendly  feelings 
towards  the  English  reformer. 

The  principles  of  strict  impartiahty  on  which 
the  Englishman  proceeded  were  foreign  to  the 
nature  of  the  Copt.  When  the  British  occupation 
took  place,  certain  hopes  began  to  dawn  in  his 
mind.  I,  said  the  Copt  to  himself,  am  a  Christian  ; 
if  I  had  the  power  to  do  so,  I  would  favour 
Christians  at  the  expense  of  Moslems  ;  the  Enghsh 
are  Christians  ;  therefore — and  it  was  here  that  the 
Copt  was  guilty  of  a  sad  ignoratio  ehnchi — as  the 
English  have  the  power,  they  will  assuredly  favour 
Christians  at  the  expense  of  Moslems.  When  the 
Copt  found  that  this  process  of  reasoning  was 
fallacious,  and  that  the  conduct  of  the  Enghshman 
was  guided  by  motives  which  he  had  left  out  of 
account,  and  which  he  could  not  understand,  he  was 
disappointed,  and  his  disappointment  deepened  into 
resentment.  He  thought  that  the  EngUshman's 
justice  to  the  Moslem  involved  injustice  to  himself, 
for  he  was  apt,  perhaps  unconsciously,  to  hold  that 
injustice  and  absence  of  favouritism  to  Copts  were 
well-nigh  synonymous  terms. 

The  Copt,  moreover,  had  another  cause  of  com- 
plaint against  the  Enghsh  reformer.  Not  only 
was  he  disappointed  that  no  special  favours  were 
accorded  to  him,  but  he  saw  \^^th  dismay  that, 
under  British  auspices,  he  was  in  danger  of  being 
supplanted  by  his  rival,  the   Syrian  Christian. 

VOL.  II  p 


210 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


When  the  Enghsh  took  Egyptian  affairs  in  hand, 
the  accountants  in  the  employment  of  the  Egyp- 
tian Government  were  ahnost  exclusively  Copts. 
Their  system  of  accounts  was  archaic.  Moreover, 
it  was  well-nigh  incomprehensible  to  any  but 
themselves.  All  tendencies  in  the  direction  of 
reform  were  resisted,  partly  from  conservatism, 
and  partly  from  instincts  of  self-preservation,  for 
it  was  clear  that  if  the  system  were  simplified  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  be  comprehensible  to  the 
uninitiated,  the  monopoly,  which  the  Copts  had 
heretofore  enjoyed,  would  be  endangered.  Finding 
that  he  could  not  untie  the  knot,  the  Englishman, 
with  characteristic  energy,  cut  it.  The  Coptic 
system  of  accounts  had  manifestly  to  be  abohshed, 
and  as  the  Copts  either  could  not  or  would  not 
assist  in  the  work  of  aboHtion,  they  had  to  give 
way  to  other  agents.  In  the  early  days  of  the 
English  occupation  a  good  many  Syrians,  there- 
fore, took  the  places  of  Copts.  The  reform  was 
necessary,  but  it  naturally  caused  much  dissatis- 
faction amongst  the  Coptic  community. 

The  English,  therefore,  found  that  the  Copts 
were,  during  the  early  days  of  the  occupation, 
generally  unfriendly,  but  they  did  not  show  their 
unfriendliness  in  any  very  overt  form,  for  there  is 
one  quality  in  which  the  Copt  excelled.  He  was 
an  accompUshed  trimmer.  He  mshed  to  pose  both 
as  Anglophobe  and  as  an  Anglopliile  according  to 
the  requirements  of  his  audience,  and  according 
to  the  part  which  for  the  moment  appeared  to 
be  most  in  harmony  with  his  personal  interests. 
His  remarkable  powers  of  intrigue,  which  were 
developed  in  the  days  of  Moslem  oppression,  here 
came  to  his  assistance.  I  should  add  that,  as  the 
occupation  was  prolonged,  the  benefits  derived 
from  the  British  administration  of  Egypt  were 
gradually  more  and  more  recognised  by  the  Copts. 


THE  CHRISTIANS  211 


They  began  to  understand  that  they  had  to  rely 
mainly  on  their  own  efforts,  and  those  efforts  were 
often  crowned  with  success.  Many  of  the  Copts 
now  in  the  Government  service  are  very  capable 
men.  A  Copt  of  marked  abihty  (Boutros  Pasha 
Ghali)  has  occupied  for  a  long  time,  and  with 
great  credit  to  himself,  the  post  of  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  the  subject,  it 
should  be  mentioned  that  for  many  years  past  a 
large  number  of  Copts  have  been  educated  in  the 
excellent  schools  established  throughout  Egypt  by 
the  American  missionaries.  Many  of  the  younger 
generation  speak  English,  and  show  a  tendency  to 
develop  moral  and  intellectual  qualities  greatly 
superior  to  those  of  their  fathers,  to  whom  the 
description  given  above  mainly  applies.  This  pro- 
cess of  education  has  produced  its  natural  result. 
The  young  Copts  see  that,  unless  they  wish  to  be  left 
behind  in  the  race  of  life,  they  must  bestir  them- 
selves. Once  having  eaten  of  the  txee  of  know- 
ledge, they  begin  to  recognise  the  decrepitude  of 
their  antique  hierarchical  and  educational  systems, 
and  they  are  stimulated  in  the  acquirement  of  this 
knowledge  by  the  fact  that  the  Syrian,  by  reason 
of  his  superior  intellectual  attainments,  is  taking 
away  the  birthright  of  the  Copts.  The  young 
Copt,  starting  with  Christianity  developed  by 
Western  education  in  his  favour,  has  sufficient 
versatUity  to  draw  from  this  fact  the  conclusion 
at  which  the  slow-thinking  Moslem,  weighted  by 
his  leaden  creed,  arrives  more  tardily.  If  I  am  to 
outstrip  the  Syrian,  the  young  Copt  says,  it  is  of  no 
use  simply  cursing  him ;  I  must  abandon  my  ancient 
ways,  and  strive  to  be  his  equal.  So  a  movement 
has  been  developed,  the  object  of  which  is  to  apply 
Coptic  religious  endowments  to  useful  purposes ; 
to  question  the  necessity  of  devoting  funds,  drawn 


212 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


from  the  general  body  of  the  community,  exclu- 
sively to  the  maintenance  of  a  number  of  priestly 
sinecures  ;  to  establish  seminaries,  where  those  who 
wish  to  enter  holy  orders  may  learn  something 
more  than  how  to  mumble  a  few  set  formulae 
expressed  in  an  archaic  language,  which  has  been 
dead  for  the  last  two  centuries ;  ^  to  devote  any 
surplus  funds  to  secular  education  ;  and,  generally, 
to  instil  life  into  a  body  which  has  been  stagnant 
since  its  earliest  creation.  The  movement  natur- 
ally meets  with  resistance  from  the  hierarchy.  At 
first,  it  appeared  as  if  this  resistance  would  be  at 
once  overcome.  The  crisis  happened  to  take 
place  at  the  moment  when  Abbas  II.  succeeded 
to  Tewfik  I.  An  enlightened  Prime  Minister 
(Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi),  acting  in  general  con- 
formity with  English  ideas,  favoured  the  \'iews  of 
the  Coptic  reformers.  The  Coptic  Patriarch,  who 
was  the  incarnation  of  the  most  stoUd  form  of 
conservatism,  was  sent  to  one  of  those  desert 
monasteries,  where  in  the  early  days  of  Christianity 
the  misguided  anchorites  of  Egypt  tortured  their 
bodies  in  the  behef  that  they  were  doing  God 
service.  But  a  turn  in  the  pohtical  wheel  brought 
about  a  different  order  of  tilings.  Riaz  Pasha,  who 
was  a  conservative  Moslem,  succeeded  to  power. 
Moslem  opinion  was  adverse  to  the  cause  of  the 
Coptic  reformers.  This  opposition  was  based  on 
two  grounds.  In  the  first  place,  the  staid  Moslem 
was  shocked  at  rebellion  against  legitimate  hier- 
archical authority,  neither  did  he  care  to  uiquire 
whether  that  authority  was  wdsely  or  unwisely 

*  M.  Cogordan,  at  one  time  French  Consul-General  in  Egypt,  whoso 
premature  death  was  deplored  by  all  who  were  privileged  to  know  liim, 
wrote  :  *'  Le  Pere  Vausleb  a  vu  a  Assiout,  en  1G72,  un  vieillard  qu'on 
lui  presentait  comme  le  dernier  Egyptien  parlant  le  Copte.  Mais  il 
est  probable  que  bieu  d'autres  le  parlerent  apres  celui-ci ;  la  petite 
ville  de  Nagadeh  passe  pour  etre  celle  ou  cet  idiome  se  conserva  le 
plus  tard,  jusqu'a  la  fin  du  XVlIIe  siecle  probablement " — Relation  du 
Voyage  fait  au  Convent  de  Saint  Antoine,  p.  116. 


CH.  XXXVI 


THE  CHRISTIANS 


213 


exercised.  In  the  second  place,  the  Moslem,  con- 
scious of  his  own  defects,  was  alarmed  at  the 
appearance  of  a  new  rival  in  the  shape  of  a  Coptic 
progressionist.  These  influences  being  in  the 
ascendant,  the  Patriarch  was  recalled  from  his 
eremitic  retreat.  The  British  diplomatist,  who 
alone  could  have  prevented  this  consummation, 
stood  aside.  However  much  he  might  sympathise 
with  the  cause  of  Coptic  reform,  his  worldly  know- 
ledge told  him  that  he  would  act  unwisely  in 
thrusting  himself  into  the  midst  of  a  quarrel 
between  the  temporal  and  spiritual  authorities  of  a 
creed  which  was  not  his  own.  For  the  time  being, 
therefore,  the  anti-reformers  triumphed.  But  the 
triumph  is  assuredly  but  temporary.  Time  is  on 
the  side  of  the  reformers ;  they  must  eventually 
gain  the  day  in  spite  of  Patriarchal  opposition. 
The  reformers  themselves  are  not  without  the 
faults  which  belong  to  pohtical  youth  and  inexperi- 
ence. Their  self-esteem  is  somewhat  inflated. 
Nevertheless,  we  may  wish  them  well.  "  The 
Copts,"  Bowring  said,  "  will  probably  occupy  no 
small  part  of  the  field  in  the  future  history  of 
Egypt."  Until  recently,  there  appeared  but  little 
prospect  of  tliis  prophecy  being  fulfilled ;  but  this 
latter-day  movement  of  the  young  Copts  affords 
ground  for  hope.  If  it  be  continued,  the  Coptic 
community  may  in  time  develop  attributes  which 
will  generate  and  foster  self-respect.  When  they 
have  done  this,  they  will  deserve  and  wOl  obtain 
the  respect  of  others.  They  will  be  carried  on  by 
the  stream  of  social  and  pohtical  progress,  instead 
of  being  engulfed  or  remaining  stranded  on  the 
shore. 

Turning  from  the  Copts  to  the  Syrians,  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  there  are  a  certain  number  of 
Moslem  Syrians  resident  in  Egypt,  but,  from  a 
pohtical  point  of  view,  the  Christian  Syrians  are 


214  MODERN  EGYPT 


far  more  important  than  the  Moslems.  In  the 
following  remarks,  therefore,  attention  will  be 
confined  to  the  Christians. 

It  is  not  possible  to  state  how  many  Syrian 
Christians  there  are  in  Egypt.  Without  doubt,  the 
Syrians  constitute  a  very  small  community  as  com- 
pared with  the  Copts.  They  derive  their  import- 
ance, however,  not  from  their  numbers,  but  from 
the  positions  which  they  occupy.  Considerable 
numbers  of  upper  and  upper-middle  class  Syrians 
are  Government  employes.  In  almost  every 
village  in  Egypt,  a  usurer  is  to  be  found  who, 
if  he  is  not  a  Greek,  is  generally  a  Syrian. 
There  are  numerous  Jews  in  Egj'pt ;  nevertheless, 
it  is  correct  to  say  that  the  Syrians  occupy  to  a 
^reat  extent  in  Egypt  the  positions  held  by  the 
Jews  in  many  countries  of  Europe.  Thus,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  Syrians  encounter  the  jealousy  of 
those  JSIoslems  and  Copts  who  are  aspirants  for 
pubhc  employment.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are 
regarded  by  the  mass  of  the  population  with  those 
feeUngs  of  disUke  which  improvident  debtors 
'Usually  entertain  towards  creditors  who  hold  them 
in  their  grip.  The  Syrian  moneylender  has  the 
reputation  of  being  singularly  grasping  and  merci- 
less. Moreover,  his  exactions  have  been  facUitated 
by  the  onward  march  of  ci\alisation  in  Egj'pt,  for 
the  Code  Napoleon,  which  was  suddenly  applied 
without  sufficient  modification  to  the  regulation  of 
the  monetary  transactions  of  the  country,  affords 
little  protection  to  the  poor  and  ignorant  debtor, 
whilst  it  is  capable  of  becoming  a  terrible  engine 
for  legaUsed  oppression  in  the  hands  of  a  grasping 
creditor. 

It  is  only  of  recent  years  that  the  Syrians  have 
acquired  their  present  position  in  Eg}^t.  Lane 
and  Bowring  scarcely  allude  to  them.  When, 
however,  Ismail  Pasha  began  to  Europeanise  the 


CH.  XXXVI        THE  CHRISTIANS  215 

Egyptian  administrative  services,  it  was  natural 
that  a  demand  should  arise  for  intelligent  em- 
ployes, who  could  speak  both  Arabic  and  French, 
in  which  latter  language  most  of  the  European 
work  of  the  country  was  conducted,  and  who,  from 
their  training  and  habits  of  thought,  possessed  some 
aptitude  for  assimilating  European  administrative 
procedures.  It  was  at  the  time  hopeless  to  expect 
much  assistance  from  the  ordinary  unassimilative 
Moslem  who,  as  the  movement  swept  by  him, 
merely  looked  up  for  a  moment  with  a  scowl 
from  the  Koran,  and  then  relapsed  into  a 
state  of  poUtical  torpor.  The  Copt  was  a  Uttle 
more  helpful,  but  he  also  had  developed  no  high 
degree  of  versatility,  and,  moreover,  was  rarely 
acquainted  with  any  foreign  language.  When  the 
demand  for  employes  was  first  felt,  the  supply 
of  Europeanised  Egyptians  was  insufficient,  and 
further,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  was  often  a 
less  useful  agent  than  his  social  and  pohtical  kins- 
man, the  Syrian.  The  Syrian's  opportunity,  there- 
fore, came,  and  he  profited  by  it.  He  possessed  aU 
the  quahfications  required.  Arabic  was  his  mother 
tongue.  He  was  generally  famihar  with  French, 
having  been  educated  at  some  French  college  in 
Syria.  He  was  versatile,  pushing,  and  ambitious. 
His  confidence  in  his  own  capacity  was  as  bound- 
less as  that  of  the  esurient  Greek  of  the  Roman 
satirist.  He  possessed  in  no  small  degree  the 
talent,  which  was  particularly  useful  in  a  cosmo- 
pohtan  society,  of  being  all  things  to  aU  men.  He 
found,  therefore,  little  difficulty  in  jostling  himself 
into  some  position  of  authority,  and  once  there, 
being  animated  by  strong  feelings  of  race  affinity, 
he  opened  the  door  to  others  amongst  his  country- 
men, and  took  little  heed  of  the  charges  of  nepotism 
which  were  brought  against  him. 

When  the  Enghsh  took  Egyptian  affairs  in 


216 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


hand,  circumstances  again  favoured  the  Syrian. 
For  the  Enghshman,  himself  generally  ignorant  of 
Arabic  and  only  semi  -  conversant  with  French, 
looked  over  the  Egyptian  administrative  chaos,  and 
said  to  himself:  Where  am  I  to  find  subordinates 
who  will  assist  me  ?  The  Moslem  is  for  tlie  time 
being,  useless ;  the  Copt  is  little  better.  1  am 
debarred  by  political  and  financial  reasons  from 
employing  Europeans.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  Syrian  was  a  godsend. 

It  is  probable  that  the  employment  of  Syrians 
did  at  one  time  more  towards  rendering  the  British 
regime  unpopular  amongst  certain  classes  in  Egypt 
than  anything  else.  For  the  more  inteUigent 
Moslem,  when  he  gradually  woke  up  to  what  was 
going  on  around  him,  said  to  himself:  The  Eng- 
lishman I  understand ;  I  recognise  his  good  quahties ; 
he  brings  to  bear  on  his  work,  not  only  knowledge, 
but  energy  superior  to  my  own ;  I  do  not  hke  him, 
but  I  am  aware  that  he  means  well  by  me,  and  I 
see  that  he  confers  certain  material  benefits  on  me, 
which  I  am  very  'vvilling  to  accept ;  but  what  of 
this  Syrian  ?  Am  I  not  as  good  as  he  ?  If  native 
agents  be  required,  why  should  not  my  kinsman 
be  employed  rather  than  this  alien,  who  possesses 
neither  the  advantages  of  the  European  nor  those 
of  the  true  Egj^tian  ?  Accordingly,  the  INIoslem, 
followed  at  no  great  distance  by  the  Copt,  poured 
forth  all  the  vials  of  his  wTath  on  the  Syrian. 
Even  Tewfik  Pasha,  whose  views  were  habitually 
temperate,  warmed  to  fever-heat  when  he  spoke  of 
the  Syrians,  whilst  the  same  subject  roused  Riaz 
Pasha's  more  sturdy  Islamism  to  the  boiling-point 
of  vituperation.  In  1890,  Riaz  Pasha  proposed  to 
issue  an  edict,  which  virtually  prohibited  all  Syrians 
from  entering  the  Egyptian  service.  Then  the 
British  diplomatist  had  to  step  forward  and  to 
point  out  in  a  cold-blooded,  accurate,  European 


CH.  XXXVI        THE  CHRISTIANS  217 

fashion  that,  so  long  as  red-coated  soldiers  were 
walking  about  the  streets  of  Cairo,  no  absolute 
proscription  on  the  ground  of  race  or  creed  could 
be  tolerated ;  moreover,  that,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  equity  and  common  sense,  a  distinction 
should  be  drawn  between  those  Syrians  whose 
famiUes  resided  in  Syria,  and  who  had  merely  come 
to  Egypt  to  make  their  fortunes,  and  those  who, 
though  of  Syrian  origin,  had  been  born  and  bred  in 
Egypt,  and  who  were,  therefore,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  Egyptians.  The  result  was  a  compro- 
mise. Syrians  who  had  lived  for  fifteen  years  in 
Egypt  were  admitted  to  the  pubhc  service  on  the 
same  terms  as  Egyptians. 

The  Mohammedan  sentiment  on  this  subject  is 
very  natural.  The  Egyptian  Moslems  are,  in  fact, 
now  in  the  transitionary  phase  through  which  their 
co-rehgionists  in  India  have  already  passed.  When, 
after  the  events  of  1857,  all  the  paraphernalia  of 
European  administrative  systems  were  introduced 
into  India,  the  more  subtle  and  assimilative  Hindoo 
everywhere  got  the  better  of  the  slow -moving 
Moslem.  In  course  of  time,  however,  the  latter 
woke  up  to  the  fact  that  there  was  need  for  self- 
exertion  ;  and  accordingly,  if  all  accounts  be  true, 
he  is  now  running  neck  and  neck  with  the  Hindoo, 
having  possibly  cast  aside  some  of  the  obstructive 
customs  which  hang  on  to  the  skirts  of  his  creed 
before  he  could  attain  the  goal.  The  Egyptian 
Moslem  must  of  necessity  undergo  the  same  pro- 
cess. He  will  find  that  protective  laws  against 
Syrian  and  Coptic  encroachments  wiU  be  of  little 
avail,  but,  if  he  braces  himself  to  the  work,  he 
may  yet  beat  the  Syrian  with  the  latter's  own 
weapons.  He  must,  however,  bestir  himself,  or 
he  will  be  outstripped  in  the  race.  It  is  difficult 
to  predict  what  will  become  of  the  Moham- 
medan  religion  if  the  Moslem  wins.     It  will 


218  MODERN  EGYPT 


possibly  suffer  slightly  in  the  excitement  of  the 
contest. 

The  Syrian,  equally  with  the  Copt,  has  to  a 
certain  extent  developed  "the  vices  of  servitude." 
He  has  been  obhged  to  bend  before  Moslem 
oppression  or  European  intellectual  superiority, 
and  the  process  of  adapting  himself  to  Moslem 
caprice,  or  of  imitating  European  procedures  and 
habits  of  thought,  is  not  calculated  to  develop 
the  manly  quahties.  Nevertheless,  whether  from 
a  moral,  social,  or  intellectual  point  of  view,  the 
Syrian  stands  on  a  distinctly  high  level.  He 
is  rarely  corrupt.  There  are  many  gradations  of 
Syrian  society.  A  high-class  Syrian  is  an  accom- 
plished gentleman,  whose  manners  and  general 
behaviour  admit  of  his  being  treated  on  a  footing 
of  perfect  social  equality  by  high-class  Europeans. 
His  intellectual  level  is  also  unquestionably  high. 
He  can  do  more  than  copy  the  European.  He 
can  understand  why  the  European  does  vhat  he 
does,  and  he  is  able  to  discuss  with  acuteness 
whether  what  is  done  is  wisely  or  unmsely  done. 
He  is  not  by  any  means  wanting  in  the  logical 
faculty.  It  would,  in  a  word,  be  whoUy  incorrect 
to  say  that  he  merely  apes  ci\'ihsation.  It  may 
be  said  mth  truth  that  he  really  is  civilised.  In 
this  respect,  he  is  probably  superior,  not  only  to  the 
Copt,  but  also  to  the  Europeanised  Egyptian,  who 
is  but  too  often  a  mere  mimic. 

There  is  yet  one  further  point  to  be  considered 
as  regards  the  Syrians.  ^Vhat  was  the  attitude 
of  the  Syrian  towards  the  British  reformer  ?  This 
question  was  at  one  time  a  never-ending  source 
of  difficulty  to  the  SjTian  hunself,  for  he  was 
torn  with  conflicting  emotions.  His  French 
education  had  predisposed  him  to  look  askance 
at  everything  English.  The  Enghshman's  direct, 
common -sense  mode  of  procedure,  and  his  scom 


CH.  XXXVI        THE  CHRISTIANS  219 


for  formalities,  were  foreign  to  the  subtle,  formal- 
istic  mind  of  the  Syrian,  whose  tendencies  were 
ultra -bureaucratic.  These  considerations,  coupled 
with  a  certain  amount  of  resentment  at  insular 
haughtiness,  led  the  Syrian  to  dislike  the  English- 
man. On  the  other  hand,  was  it  not  possible 
that  in  the  long  run  it  would  pay  better  to 
show  English  rather  than  French  prochvities  ? 
Amidst  the  doubts  which  hung  over  the  future 
of  Egjrpt,  it  was  difficult  to  give  any  positive 
answer  to  this  question.  Under  the  circum- 
stances, the  best  thing  the  Syrian  could  do  was 
to  be  Anglophile  or  Francoplule  according  to  the 
requirements  of  the  moment.  He  would  even, 
under  the  pressure  of  self-mterest,  occasionaUy  emit 
sparks,  which  to  the  uninitiated  might  appear  to 
emanate  from  the  forge  of  Egj^tian  patriotism. 
But  in  reaUty  his  heart,  or  perhaps  it  should  rather 
be  said  his  head,  was  attracted  by  the  theoretical 
perfection  of  French  administrative  systems.  He 
had  no  sympathy  wdth  the  Enghsh  or  with  Enghsh 
methods,  though  he  rendered  lip-service  to  the 
Enghshman  and  gladly  accepted  anything  which 
the  Enghshman  had  to  give  him.  Tliis  view 
held  good  more  especially  at  the  commencement 
of  the  British  occupation,  for,  as  time  went  on, 
the  Anglophobia  of  the  Syrians  was,  to  say  the 
least,  greatly  diminished  in  intensity. 

Lastly,  something  should  be  said  of  the 
Armenians.  The  Armenian  community  in  Egypt 
is  small.  It  consists  for  the  most  part  of  shop- 
keepers. The  pohtical  importance  of  the  Armenians, 
however,  is  derived  from  the  fact  that,  almost  ever 
since  the  dynasty  of  Mehemet  Ali  was  founded,  a 
few  Armenians  of  distinction  have  occupied  high 
positions  under  the  Egyptian  Government.  The 
Copts  have,  for  the  most  part,  never  occupied 
any  but  subordinate  posts  in  the  Egyptian  adminis- 


220 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  rv 


tration.  The  Syrians,  in  spite  of  their  ability, 
have  so  far  never  been  able  to  push  beyond  places 
of  secondary,  though  considerable,  importance. 
Armenians,  on  the  other  hand,  have  attained  the 
highest  administrative  ranks,  and  have  at  times 
exercised  a  decisive  influence  on  the  conduct  of 
public  affairs  in  Egypt. 

The  number  of  upper-class  Armenians  in  Eg}^t 
is  insufficient  to  justify  my  attempting  any  broad 
generahsation  of  Armenian  characteristics  based  on 
personal  observation.  But  I  may  say  that  those 
few  Armenians  with  whom  I  have  been  brought  in 
contact  appear  to  me  to  constitute,  with  the  Syrians, 
the  intellectual  cream  of  the  near  East. 

There  is  one  point  about  the  Armenians  which  is 
worthy  of  note.  Observe  a  middle-class  Armenian 
enter  the  room  of  a  Turkish  Pasha.  On  arriving  at 
the  door,  he  wiU  make  several  profound  obeisances. 
The  Pasha,  without  rising  from  his  seat,  will,  with 
contemptuous  condescension,  motion  to  him  to  sit 
down,  but  the  Armenian  will  not  do  so  at  once ; 
he  will  cross  his  hands  in  front  of  his  body,  cast  his 
eyes  on  the  ground,  sidle  along  the  wall  or  shuffle 
gradually  forward  without  ever  Ufting  his  feet  from 
the  floor ;  at  last,  he  will  sink  slowly  down  on  the 
edge  of  a  chair  or  divan,  join  his  knees  in  front 
of  him,  cross  his  hands  on  his  breast,  and  in  this 
attitude  of  profound  humility  will  wait  until  the 
lordly  Pasha  thinks  fit  to  address  a  few  words  to 
him.  A  highly  educated  or  highly  placed  Armenian 
will  not,  indeed,  go  through  all  this  pantomime. 
Moreover,  the  younger  Armenians  are  less  defer- 
ential to  the  Turks  than  their  fathers.  But  no 
Armenian,  in  the  presence  of  a  Turkish  Pasha,  can 
ever  forget  that  he  is  a  Christian  raya  and  that  the 
Turk  is  his  oppressor ;  neither  can  this  be  any  matter 
for  surprise,  for  the  oppression  of  the  Turk  has,  in- 
deed, in  the  case  of  the  Armenians,  been  extreme. 


THE  CHRISTIANS 


221 


The  most  distinguished  of  the  present  generation 
of  Armenians  in  Egypt  was  unquestionably  Nubar 
Pasha,  to  whose  character  and  aptitudes  incidental 
allusion  has  already  been  made,  and  of  whom  it 
will  become  necessary  to  speak  more  fully  at  a 
later  period  of  this  narrative. 

Nubar  Pasha's  son,  Boghos  Pasha  Nubar,  is  a 
man  of  marked  abihty.  He  at  one  time  occupied, 
with  great  credit  to  himself,  the  post  of  Egyptian 
member  of  the  Railway  Administration,  and,  since 
his  retirement  from  the  service,  has  taken  a  most 
useful  and  intelligent  interest  in  public  affairs. 

Yacoub  Pasha  Artin  is  a  highly  cultivated  gentle- 
man, who  has  done  excellent  work  in  the  cause  of 
educational  reform. 

But  perhaps  one  of  the  most  typical  Armenians 
in  Egj^t  was  Nubar  Pasha's  son-in-law,  Tigrane 
Pasha,  who  for  a  long  time  occupied  the  post  of 
Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  who  sub- 
sequently became  Foreign  Minister.^  He  was  a 
highly  educated  gentleman  of  polished  manners. 
He  spoke  French  perfectly ;  m  fact,  French  was 
the  language  in  which  he  was  most  at  home. 
He  spoke  English  well.  He  knew  no  Arabic, 
and  but  little  Turkish.  Without  being,  from  a 
pohtical  point  of  view,  a  Gallophile,  his  habits 
of  thought  were  cast  in  a  French  mould.  Most 
of  the  young  Egyptians  of  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation,  although  by  no  means  always  sym- 
pathisers with  the  aims  and  poUcy  of  the  French 
Government,  were  saturated  with  ideas  which  had 
their  origin  in  French  education,  in  association  with 
Frenchmen,  and  in  the  fact  that  they  were  more 
conversant  with  French  than  any  other  European 
literature. 

'  Tigrane  Pasha,  to  the  great  regret  of  all  who  knew  him,  died  in 
1904.  Although  I  often  disagreed  with  him,  I  preserve  the  most 
pleasant  recollection  of  our  long  and  intimate  personal  relations. 


222 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  IV 


One  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race  is  that  when  they  take  possession  or  semi- 
possession  of  a  country,  which  does  not  belong  to 
them,  they  are  apt  in  one  respect  to  forget  the 
position  which  they  occupy  towards  the  inhabitants. 
They  are  conscious  of  their  own  good  intentions ; 
they  earnestly  desire  to  govern  the  people  of  the 
country  well  and  justly ;  they  cannot  understand 
how  any  one  can  question  the  excellence  of  their 
motives  ;  and  they  look  with  much  dishke  and 
suspicion,  which  is  not  at  all  unnatural,  on  all  who 
place  obstacles  in  the  way  of  their  praiseworthy 
designs  being  executed.  Thus,  forgetful  of  the 
fact  that  they  are  not  deahng  with  the  inhabitants 
of  Kent  or  Norfolk,  the  Enghsh  speedily  apply  the 
term  "  loyal "  to  those  who  co-operate  with  them, 
and  the  term  "disloyal"  to  those  who  display 
hostility  or  merely  lukewarm  friendship. 

From  this  point  of  view,  Tigrane  Pasha  was  far 
from  being  "loyal,"  neither  can  any  moral  blame 
be  imputed  to  him  for  the  degree  of  disloyalty 
which  he  at  times  displayed.  He  was  not  an 
Anglophobe  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term, 
but  he  disagreed  with  the  broad  lines  of  British 
policy  in  Egypt.  Personal  ambition  may  have 
had  something  to  do  with  this  mental  attitude. 
It  is  possible  that  the  class  to  which  Tigrane  Pasha 
belonged, — unless,  indeed,  as  is  not  improbable,  it 
was  swept  away  at  the  first  breath  of  discontent 
from  the  alumni  of  the  El-Azhar  University, — 
would  occupy  positions  of  greater  importance  in 
the  world  of  Egyptian  pohtics  if  British  influence 
were  diminished  than  those  to  which  they  can 
attain  whilst  that  influence  remains  paramount.  It 
may  be,  also,  that,  in  order  to  remove  the  taint 
of  being  a  Christian  and  an  alien  ignorant  of  the 
vernacular  language,  Tigrane  Pasha  was  obhged 
to  display  a  somewhat  more  ardent  degi-ee  of 


CH.  XXXVI        THE  CHRISTIANS  223 

patriotism  in  the  cause  of  his  adopted  country 
than  would  have  been  necessary  had  he  been,  in 
fact  as  well  as  in  name,  a  real  hall-marked  Egyptian 
struggling  for  the  cause  of  Egypt.  But  it  is 
doubtful  whether  Tigrane  Pasha  was  consciously 
influenced  by  either  of  these  considerations.  It 
is  more  probable  that  he  honestly  thought  that 
the  Egyptians,  that  is  to  say,  the  Europeanised 
Egyptians,  of  whom  for  all  practical  purposes  he  may 
be  said  to  have  been  one,  were  capable  of  governing 
Egypt  without  any  considerable  degree  of  British 
assistance,  and  certainly  without  the  presence  of 
a  British  garrison  in  the  country.^  In  holding 
this  opinion  he  was  certainly  wrong,  but  the  fact 
that  he  did  entertain  an  opinion  of  this  sort,  though 
it  may  have  afforded  ground  for  criticising  his 
reasoning  powers,  afforded  no  ground  whatever  for 
moral  reprobation.  Tigrane  Pasha  was,  in  fact, 
a  perfectly  honourable  and  straightforward  gentle- 
man, with  somewhat  doctrinaire  views,  whose 
standard  of  pubhc  and  private  moraUty  was  in 
no  way  inferior  to  that  of  men  of  honour  in  any 
European  country. 

It  is,  however,  from  the  intellectual  and  not 
from  the  moral  point  of  view  that  the  study  of 
Tigrane  Pasha's  character  was  mainly  of  interest.  It 
is  here  that  his  national — that  is  to  say,  Armenian, 
not  Egyptian — characteristics  came  out  in  strong 
relief.  Tigrane  Pasha's  mind  may  be  characterised 
as  having  been  Franco-Byzantine,  that  is  to  say,  the 
foundation  was  Byzantine,  whilst  the  superstructure 
was  French.  He  was,  intellectually  speaking,  the 
direct  descendant  of  those  Orientals  who,  in  the 

'  There  is  some  reason  for  believing  that  Tigrane  Pasha's  political 
views  were  a  good  deal  modified  before  his  death.  During  the  last  few 
years  of  his  life,  he  was  not  in  office,  and,  moreover,  suflFered  from 
very  bad  health.  The  consequence  was  that,  to  my  great  regret,  I  saw 
less  of  him  than  at  previous  periods.  I  cannot,  therefore,  speak  with 
confidence  on  this  point. 


224 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


early  days  of  Christianity,  engaged  in  endless  dis- 
putes over  barren  and  almost  incomprehensible 
points  of  theology.  He  would  have  revelled  in 
the  subtleties  submitted  to  the  decision  of  the 
Council  of  Nice,  but  he  would  probably  nev^er 
have  come  to  any  definite  conclusion  as  to  whether 
Arius  or  Athanasius  was  in  the  right.  He  was 
very  intelligent,  particularly  about  matters  of 
detail,  and  quick-witted,  but  was  often  incapable 
of  grasping  the  true  point  at  issue.  When  any 
plain,  practical  question  had  to  be  decided,  he 
would  sometimes  rush  off  into  an  a  prioii  dis- 
cussion of  some  principle,  which  was  only  remotely 
connected  with  the  matter  in  hand.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  some  broad  question  of  principle  was 
at  stake,  Tigrane  Pasha  would  split  hairs  over  a 
minor  issue,  which  was  almost  incomprehensible,  or 
which  was  at  all  events  devoid  of  importance  to 
the  non-Byzantine  mind.  In  poUtical  affairs,  he 
had  but  little  idea  of  proportion.  He  endeavoured 
to  understand  European,  and  especially  British 
politics, — a  rock  on  which  many  Orientals  have 
split, — and  as  the  result  of  his  studies,  he  was 
generally  able  to  give  the  most  plausible  reasons 
for  arriving  at  conclusions,  which  were  usually 
erroneous.  To  make  use  of  a  French  expression, 
II prenait  des  vessies  pour  des  lanternes.  His  minor 
premiss  appeared  to  liim  to  be  of  such  importance, 
that  he  was  apt  to  forget  the  existence  of  his  major 
premiss.  His  mind  refused  to  accept  a  simple 
inference  from  simple  facts,  which  were  patent 
to  all  the  world.  The  very  simphcity  of  the 
conclusion  was  of  itself  enough  to  make  him  reject 
it,  for  he  had  an  elective  affinity  for  ever)i;liing 
that  was  intricate.  He  was  a  prey  to  intellectual 
over-subtlety — Graecorum  ille  morbus,  as  it  was 
termed  by  Seneca. 

Tigrane  Pasha  was  the  dme  damnce  of  a  succession 


CH.  XXXVI        THE  CHRISTIANS  225 

of  Egyptian  Ministries.  He  always  proffered 
advice,  which  he  honestly  considered  was  in  the 
best  interests  of  Egypt ;  yet  on  most  occasions 
of  importance,  the  result  of  following  his  advice 
was  to  produce  an  effect  the  opposite  of  that 
which  he  had  intended.  His  main  desire  for  many 
years  was  to  diminish  the  power  of  the  English 
in  Egypt,  and  he  became  instrumental  in  aug- 
menting their  power.  From  time  to  time,  he 
laboriously  constructed  a  diplomatic  house  of 
cards,  which  he  thought  must  produce  the  required 
result.  When  one  house  of  cards  was  overturned 
by  a  movement  of  the  Englishman's  little  finger, 
he  was  not  dismayed.  He  did  not  see  that  the 
way  to  get  rid  of  the  Englishman  was,  not  to 
oppose  him,  but  to  co-operate  with  him.  Untaught 
by  experience,  he  set  to  work  to  construct  some 
other  flimsy  fabric,  which  also  disappeared  at  the 
first  tiny  blast  of  the  British  diplomatic  horn.  The 
motives,  which  led  Tigrane  Pasha  into  a  number 
of  honest  but  very  palpable  errors,  are  worthy  of 
respect.  Those  errors  were  due  to  the  Franco- 
Byzantine  frame  of  mind,  which  is  hypercritical, 
and  which  is,  moreover,  unwilling  to  adopt  a 
severe  process  of  inductive  reasoning.  In  politics, 
it  is  essential  to  ascertain  the  facts  correctly  before 
coming  to  any  conclusion.  This  Tigrane  Pasha 
was  apt  to  forget.  His  sympathies  drove  him  to  a 
certain  conclusion  ;  he  was  wont  to  accept  that 
conclusion,  and  to  let  the  facts,  on  which  the  con- 
clusion ought  to  have  been  based,  take  care  of 
themselves. 

With  one  exception,  to  which  allusion  will 
presently  be  made,  the  various  elements  which 
make  up  native  Egyptian  society  have  thus  been 
described.  Some  of  the  judgments  which  have 
been  passed    may   appear   harsh.     They  have, 

VOL.  II  Q 


226  MODERN  EGYPT 


however,  been  written  with  an  object,  which  will 
now  be  explained. 

At  the  period  of  history  of  which  this  narra- 
tive treats,  it  happened  that  Egypt  had  to  be 
Europeanised.  The  English  were  the  main  agents 
in  this  process  of  Europeanisation.  It  is  true  that 
the  English  reformers  attempted  in  some  measure 
to  Egyptianise  themselves.  They  were  possessed 
of  Uttle  social,  but  of  much  political  and  adminis- 
trative elasticity,  which  enabled  them  to  adapt 
themselves  and  their  procedures  to  strange  circum- 
stances more  readily  than  would  have  been  the 
case  with  some  other  members  of  the  European 
family.  At  the  same  time,  the  Eg}^tian  had  to 
meet  the  Enghshman  more  than  half-way. 
European  civilisation,  though  not  absolutely  a  bed 
of  Procrustes,  is  not  very  elastic.  Broadly  speaking, 
in  spite  of  every  effort,  the  bed  could  not  be  made 
to  fit  the  Egyptian ;  the  Egyptian  had  to  adapt 
himself  to  lying  on  the  bed.  Viewed  in  this  hght, 
it  is  more  important  to  know  what  the  Eg}^tian  is 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  educated  European, 
than  it  is  to  inquire  what  Europeans,  whether 
educated  or  the  reverse,  are  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Egyptian.  I  have,  therefore,  en- 
deavoured to  depict  the  Egyptians  of  different 
classes  of  society  as  they  appear  in  the  eyes  of 
an  educated  European.  I  have  attempted  to  show 
how  little  suited  the  Egyptian  is  to  he  on  the 
bed  which,  as  an  incident  of  modem  progress,  has 
been  prepared  for  him.  I  have  M-ished  to  bring 
into  rehef  how  his  rehgion,  his  history,  his  moral 
and  intellectual  attributes,  and  his  social  customs 
contribute  to  estabhsh  a  gulf  between  him  and  his 
European  guides.  But  I  have  no  wish  whatever 
to  blame  the  indi^ddual  Egj^tian,  be  he  Moslem 
or  Christian,  for  being  that  which  I  fi'id  him  to  be. 
An  Enghshman  who  had  been  long  resident  in 


THE  CHRISTIANS  227 


China,  once  said :  "  It  is  the  misfortune  of  the 
Chinese  Government  and  people  to  be  weighed  in 
a  balance,  which  they  have  never  accepted,  and  to 
have  their  shortcomings,  so  ascertained,  made  the 
basis  of  reclamations  of  varjdng  degrees  of  gravity."^ 
This  observation  holds  as  good  about  Egypt  as  it 
does  about  China.  I  am  aware  that  in  the  remarks 
made  in  this  and  the  two  preceding  chapters,  the 
Egyptian  has  been  weighed  in  a  balance  which  he 
has  never  accepted,  and  in  which,  moreover,  it  is 
somewhat  unjust  to  weigh  him  ;  for,  from  whatever 
point  of  view  we  look  at  the  Egyptian,  we  should 
never  forget  that  he  is  what  the  accidents  of  his 
history,  climate,  rehgion,  and  geographical  position 
have  made  him.  It  is  useless  and,  indeed,  hurtful 
to  hide  his  defects,  or  to  disguise  from  ourselves 
the  fact  that  the  reception  of  true  European 
civilisation  by  a  population  such  as  that  which  is 
described  above  must  be  the  work  of  generations. 
But  there  is  no  occasion  to  point  the  finger  of 
Pharisaical  scorn  at  the  Egyptians,  whilst  any  feel- 
ing of  self-congratulation  that  we  are  not  as  these 
less  fortunate  political  pubUcans  should  surely  be 
checked  by  the  reflection  that  some,  at  least,  of  the 
defects  in  the  Egyptian  character  are  due  to  associa- 
tion with  European  civiHsation  in  a  debased  form. 
Rather  let  us,  in  Christian  charity,  make  every 
possible  allowance  for  the  moral  and  intellectual 
shortcomings  of  the  Egyptians,  and  do  whatever 
can  be  done  to  rectify  them. 

*  Mr.  Alexander  Micfaie,  China  and  Christianity,  p.  1,  1892. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 


THE  EUROPEANISED  EGYPTIANS 

The  Europeanised  Egyptians  are  generally  Agnostics — Effects  of 
Europeanising  the  East — Gallicised  Egyptians — Attractions  of 
French  civilisation— Unsuitability  of  the  French  system  to  form 
the  Egyptian  character — The  official  classes  generally  hostile  to 
England. 

A  moment's  reflection  will  show  how  it  is  that, 
in  the  peculiar  pohtical  phase  through  which  Egypt 
is  now  passing,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  occupies 
a  position  of  somewhat  special  importance.  If  the 
country  were  still  governed  on  the  lines  of  the  old 
Oriental  despotisms,  a  small  number  of  educated 
Egyptians  might  perhaps  be  employed  in  sub- 
ordinate positions,  but  they  would  be  mere 
adjuncts  ;  they  would  not  truly  represent  the  spirit 
of  the  Government.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Government  and  society  of  Egypt  were  farther 
advanced  on  the  road  to  civilisation,  the  Euro- 
peanised Egyptian  would  probably  be  sometliing 
different  from  what  he  actually  is  ;  he  would  have 
become  in  spirit,  though  not  necessarily  in  senti- 
ment, less  Egyptian  and  more  thoroughly  European. 
But  inasmuch  as  Egyptian  society  is  in  a  state  of 
flux,  the  natural  result  has  been  to  produce  a  class  of 
individuals  many  of  whom  are,  at  the  same  time,  de- 
moslemised  Moslems  and  invertebrate  Europeans. 

In  dealing  with  the  question  of  introducing 
European  civilisation  into  Egypt,  it  should  never 

228 


CH.  XXXVII         YOUNG  EGYPT 


229 


be  forgotten  that  Islam  cannot  be  reformed ;  that 
is  to  say,  reformed  Islam  is  Islam  no  longer ;  it  is 
something  else ;  we  cannot  as  yet  tell  what  it  will 
eventually  be.  "  Christian  nations,"  Sir  William 
Muir  says,  "  may  advance  in  civilisation,  freedom, 
and  morality,  in  philosophy,  science,  and  the  arts, 
but  Islam  stands  still.  And  thus  stationary,  so  far 
as  the  lessons  of  history  avail,  it  will  remain."  ^  But 
httle  assistance  in  the  work  of  reform  can,  therefore, 
be  expected  from  the  steady  orthodox  Moslems,  who 
cUng  with  unswerving  fidehty  to  their  ancient  faith, 
and  whose  disUke  to  European  civihsation  often 
increases  as  that  civihsation  advances.  The  Syrians 
and  Armenians  are  foreigners.  The  Copts,  besides 
being  Christians,  are — or,  at  all  events,  in  1882, 
were — but  httle  better  educated  than  the  ordinary 
Moslems.  Having  regard,  therefore,  to  the  dis- 
quahfications  of  his  competitors,  the  Europeanised 
Egyptian  naturally  becomes,  if  not  the  only  possible, 
at  all  events  the  principal  agent  for  administering 
the  country,  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  administered 
by  Europeans. 

Nominally,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  is  in  the 
majority  of  cases  a  Moslem.  In  reahty,  he  is 
generally  an  Agnostic.  The  gulf  between  him 
and  the  "  Alim  "  of  the  El-Azhar  University  is  as 
great  as  between  the  "  Alim  "  and  the  European. 
Indeed,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  gulf  is  not 
in  reality  greater  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter 
case.  For  a  thoughtful  European  will  not  only 
look  with  interest  at  the  "  Alim  "  as  the  representa- 
tive of  an  ancient  faith,  which  contains  much  that 
is  highly  deserving  of  respect ;  he  will,  if  the 
"  Ahm"  is  a  worthy  specimen  of  his  class,  sympathise 
with  him  because  he  is  religious,  albeit  his  religion 
is  not  that  of  Christ.  The  Europeanised  Egyptian, 
on  the  other  hand,  will  often  look  on  the  "  Alim  " 

»  The  Caliphate,  p.  697. 


230  MODERN  EGYPT 


with  all  the  pride  of  an  intellectual  parvenu.  From 
the  pedestal  of  his  empirical  knowledge,  he  will 
regard  the  "  Ahm  "  as  a  social  derehct,  who  has  to 
be  tolerated,  and  even  occasionally,  for  pohtical 
purposes,  to  be  utihsed,  but  who  need  not  be 
respected. 

The  truth  is  that,  in  passing  through  the 
European  educational  miQ,  the  young  Egyptian 
Moslem  loses  his  Islamism,  or,  at  all  events,  he 
loses  the  best  part  of  it.  He  cuts  himself  adrift 
from  the  sheet-anchor  of  his  creed.  He  no  longer 
beheves  that  he  is  always  in  the  presence  of  his 
Creator,  to  whom  he  will  some  day  have  to  render 
an  account  of  his  actions.  He  may  still,  however, 
take  advantage  of  the  least  worthy  portions  of  his 
nominal  rehgion,  those  portions,  namely,  which, 
in  so  far  as  they  tolerate  a  lax  moral  code,  adapt 
themselves  to  his  tastes  and  to  his  convenience  in 
the  affairs  of  this  world.  Moreover,  in  losing  his 
Islamism,  the  educated  Egj-ptian  very  rarely  makes 
any  approach  towards  Christianity.  There  are 
practically  no  cases  of  Christian  converts  amongst 
the  educated  classes.  More  than  this,  although 
the  Europeanised  Egyptian  is  no  true  JNIoslem,  he 
is  often  as  intolerant,  and  sometimes  even  more 
intolerant  of  Christianity  than  the  old  orthodox 
Moslem,  who  has  received  no  European  education. 
He  frequently  hates  Christians  with  a  bitter  hatred, 
and  he  does  so  partly  because  many  of  the  Christians 
with  whom  he  has  been  brought  in  contact  deserve 
to  be  hated,  and  partly  because  the  Christian,  in 
his  capacity  of  being  a  European,  is  a  rival  who 
occupies  positions,  wliich  the  Europeanised  Egyptian 
thinks  he  should  himself  occupy. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  the  price  which  is  being 
paid,  or  which,  at  aU  events,  may  have  to  be  paid 
for  introducing  European  ci\ihsation  into  these 
backward  Eastern  societies  is  always  recognised 


231 


so  fully  as  it  should  be.  The  material  benefits 
derived  from  Europeanisation  are  unquestionably 
great,  but  as  regards  the  ultimate  effect  on  public 
and  private  moraUty  the  future  is  altogether 
uncertain.^  European  civihsation  destroys  one 
religion  without  substituting  another  in  its  place. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  code  of 
Christian  morahty,  on  which  European  civihsation 
is  based,  can  be  dissociated  from  the  teaching  of 
the  Christian  religion.  This  question  can  only 
be  answered  by  generations  which  are  now  un- 
born. For  the  present,  there  is  little  to  guide 
us  in  any  forecast  as  to  what  the  ultimate  result 
will  be. 

It  may,  however,  be  noted  that  there  is  an 
essential  difference  between  the  de-moslemised 
Moslem  and  the  free-thinker  in  Europe.  The 
latter  is  surrounded  by  an  atmosphere  of  Chris- 
tianity :  he  will  often,  sometimes  with  a  pang  of 
envy,  admire  trustfulness  and  faith,  in  which 
quahties  his  reasoning  faculties  forbid  him  to  share ; 
if  he  is  a  pohtician,  he  will,  or  at  all  events  he 
should  recognise  the  utihtarian  side  of  Christianity  ; 
he  will,  more  often  than  not,  reject  the  idea  that 
there  is  no  alternative  presented  to  him  but  that 
of  being  either  an  atheist  or  a  full  behever  in  the 
Christianity  of  the  schools ;  the  fact  that  he  is  a 
free-thinker  does  not  cut  him  off  from  association 
and  co-operation  with  his  friends,  who  may  not 
share  his  disbehef  or  his  doubts  ;  his  reason,  his 
associations,  and  his  hereditary  quahties  ahke  impel 
him  to  assert,  no  less  strongly  than  the  orthodox 
Christian,  that  the  code  of  Christian  morahty  must 

'  The  whole  of  this  question  has  been  admirably  treated,  from  the 
Hindoo  point  of  view,  in  the  second  series  of  Sir  Alfred  Lyall's  brilliant 
Asiatic  Studies.  Every  European  who  occupies  a  high  position  in 
the  East  should  study  Sir  Alfred  Lyall's  works.  They  display  a  pro- 
found knowledge  of  Eastern  habits  of  thought,  and  a  remarkable 
grasp  of  the  difBculties  underlying  the  treatment  of  Eaiteru  problems. 


232 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


form  the  basis  to  regulate  the  relations  between 
man  and  man  in  modern  society.  That  morality 
has,  indeed,  taken  such  deep  root  in  Europe  that 
if,  as  would  appear  probable,  the  hold  wliich 
revealed  religion  and  theological  dogma  has  on 
mankind  is  destined  to  be  gradually  relaxed,  no 
moral  cataclysm  is  to  be  anticipated. 

Far  different  is  the  case  of  the  Egj^tian  free- 
thinker. He  finds  himself  launched  on  a  troubled 
sea  without  any  rudder  and  without  any  pilot. 
Neither  his  past  history  nor  his  present  associations 
impose  any  effective  moral  restraint  upon  him.  He 
finds  that,  amongst  many  of  his  own  countrymen, 
the  cause  of  religion  is  often  identified  with  opposi- 
tion to  the  most  reasonable  reforms,  and  in  trampling 
indignantly  on  the  particular  rehgion  wliich  can  lead 
to  such  results,  he  is  disposed  to  cast  aside  reUgion 
altogether.  Having  cut  himself  loose  from  his 
creed,  no  barrier,  save  that  of  cynical  self-interest, 
serves  to  keep  him  witliin  the  limits  of  the  moral 
code  which  is  in  some  degree  imposed  on  the 
European,  whose  system  he  is  endeavouring  to 
copy.  The  society  in  which  he  moves  does  not 
seriously  condemn  untruthfulness  and  deceit.  The 
social  stigma  with  which  vice  of  various  kinds  is 
visited  is  too  feeble  to  exercise  much  practical  effect. 
As  he  leaves  the  creed  of  his  forefathers,  he  casts  no 
lingering  look  behind.  He  not  only  leaves  it,  but 
he  spurns  it.  He  rushes  blindfold  into  the  arms 
of  European  civilisation,  unmindful  of  the  fact  that 
what  is  visible  to  the  eye  constitutes  merely  the 
outward  signs  of  that  civiUsation,  whUst  the  deep- 
seated  ballast  of  Christian  morahty,  wliich  regulates 
the  occasionally  eccentric  movements  of  the  vessel, 
is  hidden  beneath  the  surface,  and  is  difficult  of 
acquisition  by  the  pseudo-European  imitator  of  the 
European  system.  He  calls  Heaven  to  v\itness 
that  he  has  cast  aside  all  prejudices  based  on 


CH.  XXXVII         YOUNG  EGYPT 


233 


religion,  and  that  he  despises  the  teachings  of  his 
forefathers.  See,  he  says  to  the  European,  I  have 
my  railw^ays,  my  schools,  my  newspapers,  my  lavs^- 
courts,  and  all  the  other  things  w^hich,  as  I  can 
plainly  see,  go  to  make  up  your  boasted  civilisation  ; 
in  what,  then,  am  I  inferior  to  you  ?  Alas  !  the 
de-moslemised  Moslem,  although  he  is  wholly  un- 
aware of  the  defect,  is  inferior  in  one  respect  wherein 
his  inferiority  cannot  be  removed  by  a  stroke  of  the 
pen,  for  the  civihsed  European,  as  we  understand 
him,  though  he  may  not  be  an  orthodox  Christian, 
is  in  spite  of  himself  to  a  great  extent  the  outcome 
of  Christianity,  and  would  not  be  what  he  is  had 
he  not  1900  years  of  Christianity  behind  him.  "  No 
hostihty  to  Christian  doctrine  can  justify  indiffer- 
ence to  the  truth,  that  the  world  owes  to  Chris- 
tianity the  matured  idea  of  Progress,  and  the  one 
serious  attempt  to  realise  it."  ^ 

It  is  at  present  useless  to  speculate  on  the 
ultimate  product  of  the  forces  which  are  now 
being  brought  into  play  in  the  Moslem  world.^ 
That  any  great  accession  of  strength  will  accrue 
to  Christianity  is  improbable.  A  revival  of  Islam, 
that  is  to  say,  the  Islam  of  the  Koran  and  the 
Traditions,  is  nothing  but  the  dream  of  poetic 
natures  whose  imaginations  are  carried  away  by 
the  attractions  which  hover  round  some  incidents 
of  this  faith.  Yet,  as  has  been  often  observed, 
history  records  no  instance  of  a  nation  being 
without   a  religion.     "  Man  everywhere  shows 

'  Liddon,  University  Sermons,  1873,  p.  33. 

2  M.  Leroy-Beaulieu  makes  the  following  remarks  as  regards  the 
dissolvent  effect  exercised  by  Western  civilisation  on  J udaism  :  "  Qu'est 
ce  qui  a  conserve  le  juif  a  travers  les  siecles  et  I'a  empeche  de  dispa- 
raitre  au  milieu  des  nations  ?  C'est  sa  religion.  Or,  ces  rites  protecteurs, 
cette  cuirasse  ou  celte  carapace  d'observances  qui  I'a  defendu  durant 
deux  mille  ans,  et  que  rien  ne  pourrait  transpercer,  notre  esprit  occi- 
dentall'aentamee.  .  .  .  Si  le  judaisme,  debilite,  venait  a  se  de'composer 
et  a  se  dissoudre,  qu'adviendrait-il  du  juif?  Forme'  et  saufgarde  par  sa 
religion,  le  juif  ne  risque-t-il  point  de  s'evanouir  avec  le  judaisme.''" — 
Israel  chez  les  Nations,  p.  77. 


234 


MODERN  EGYPT 


invincible  religious  tendencies."  ^  It  is  conceivable 
that,  as  time  goes  on,  the  Moslems  will  develop  a 
religion,  possibly  a  pure  Deism,  which  will  not 
be  altogether  the  Islamism  of  the  past  and  of 
the  present,  and  which  will  cast  aside  much 
of  the  teaching  of  Mohammed,  but  which  will 
estabUsh  a  moral  code  sufficient  to  hold  society 
together  by  bonds  other  than  those  of  unalloyed 
self-interest.  The  Europeanised  Egj^ptian,  as  we 
now  see  him,  is  the  first,  not  the  last,  word  of 
reformed  Moslem  society.  It  is  possible  that,  in 
course  of  time,  some  higher  moral  and  intellectual 
ideal  will  be  developed.  In  the  meanwhile,  let  the 
European  poUtician  bear  this  in  mind,  that  in  the 
process  of  his  well-intentioned  and  very  necessary 
reforms  he  will  do  well  to  abstain,  on  utihtarian 
grounds,  from  any  measure  which  is  calculated  to 
undermine  the  Moslem  faith  more  than  the  strict 
requirements  of  the  case  demand.  The  missionary, 
the  philanthropist,  the  social  reformer,  and  others 
of  the  same  sort,  should  have  a  fair  field.  Their 
intentions  are  excellent,  although  at  times  their 
judgment  may  be  defective.  They  will,  if  under 
some  control,  probably  do  much  good  on  a  small 
scale.  They  may  even,  being  carried  away  by  the 
enthusiasm  which  pays  no  heed  to  worldly  pru- 
dence, effect  reforms  more  important  than  those  of 
the  administrator  and  politician,  who  will  follow 
cautiously  in  their  track,  and  perhaps  reap  the 
results  of  their  labours.  Nevertheless,  let  those 
who  have  to  guide  the  machine  of  state  beware 
how  they  wittingly  shake  the  whole  moral  fabric  of 
Eastern  society.  It  is  dangerous  work,  poHtically, 
socially,  and  morally,  to  trifle  with  the  rehgious 
belief  of  a  whole  nation. 

The  first  point,  therefore,  to  be  borne  in  mind 
in  dealing  with  the  Europeanised  Egj^tian  is  that 

1  Boyd  Carpenter,  The  Permanent  Elements  of  Religion,  p.  77. 


CH.  xxxvn         YOUNG  EGYPT 


235 


he  is  generally  an  Agnostic.  The  second  point  is 
that  the  term  Europeanised,  when  applied  to  the 
Egyptian  educated  in  Europe,  though  not  a  mis- 
nomer, is  lacking  in  precision.  For  the  majority 
of  Europeanised  Egyptians  at  the  commencement 
of  the  British  occupation,  and  for  some  years 
subsequent  to  that  event,  were,  in  truth,  GaUicised 
Egyptians. 

When  Mehemet  Ali  took  some  tentative  steps 
towards  introducing  European  civihsation  into 
Egypt,  he  naturally  turned  to  France  for  assist- 
ance. He  was  haunted  with  the  idea  that 
England  would  one  day  take  possession  of 
Egypt.  ^  An  increase  of  French  influence  in 
Egypt  would,  he  thought,  constitute  some  barrier 
against  British  aggression.  A  number  of  young 
Egyptians  were,  therefore,  sent  to  France  to  be 
educated,  and  several  schools  were  estabhshed  in 
Egypt  at  the  heads  of  which  French  professors 
were  placed.  Thus,  the  first  impress  of  civihsa- 
tion given  to  Egypt  was  tlirough  the  medium  of 
the  French  language,  which,  it  may  be  added,  has 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  last  century  been 
supplanting  Itahan  as  a  common  language  for  the 
use  of  divers  nationahties  throughout  the  Levant. 
The  French  thus  obtained  a  start  which  they  have 
never  lost.  The  Government  and  the  people  of 
France,  being  gifted  with  more  political  foresight 
of  a  certain  kind,  and  being  more  capable  of 
grasping  a  general  idea  than  the  English,  saw 
their  advantage,  and  followed  it  up.  They  were 
aware  that,  if  the  youth  of  Egypt  learnt  the 
French  language,  they  would,  as  a  necessary  con- 
sequence, be  saturated  with  French  habits  of  thought, 
and  they  hoped  that  sympathy  with  France  and 

'  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  16,  note.  Sir  Charles  Murray,  in  his  Short 
Memoir  (p.  5),  says  that  Mehemet  Ali's  sympathy  for  the  French  was  in 
some  degree  due  to  the  kindness  shown  to  him  when  a  child  by  a  French 
resident  at  Cawala,  named  Lion. 


236  MODERN  EGYPT 


French  political  aims  would  ensue.  For  half  a 
century  prior  to  the  British  occupation,  therefore, 
during  which  time  the  British  Government  were 
wholly  inactive  in  respect  to  Egyptian  education, 
no  effort  was  spared  to  propagate  a  knowledge  of 
French  in  Egypt.  The  agents  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  object  have  been  mainly  Catholic 
priests.  The  great  apostle  of  anti- clericalism  in 
France,  M.  Gambetta,  was  careful  to  explain  that 
his  anti-clerical  ideas  were  only  intended  for  home 
consumption ;  they  were  not  meant  for  export. 
The  French  Repubhc  claims  to  be  the  defender  of 
the  CathoUc  Church  in  the  East,  and  is  very  sensi- 
tive if  its  right  to  do  so  is  in  any  way  questioned. 
A  Republican  Government  and  their  agents,  be 
they  never  so  anti-clerical  at  home,  are  fully  ahve 
to  the  advantages  of  taking  clericahsm  by  the  hand 
abroad  as  a  useful  instrument  to  further  their 
political  aims. 

Apart,  however,  from  any  consequences  re- 
sulting from  the  action  taken  either  by  JNlehemet 
Ali  or  by  the  French  Government,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  French  civihsation  possesses  a 
special  degree  of  attraction,  not  only  to  the 
Asiatic,  but  also  to  the  European  races  of  the 
Levant.  This  point  is  one  of  considerable  im- 
portance, for  amongst  the  obstacles,  which  have 
stood  in  the  way  of  the  British  reformer  in  Egypt, 
none  is  more  noteworthy  than  that  both  Euro- 
peanised  Egyptians  and  Levantines  are  impregnated 
with  French  rather  than  with  Enghsh  habits  of 
thought. 

The  reasons  why  French  civilisation  presents  a 
special  degree  of  attraction  to  Asiatics  and  Levant- 
ines are  plain.  It  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  more 
attractive  than  the  civihsations  of  England  and 
Germany,  and,  moreover,  it  is  more  easy  of  imita- 
tion.   Compare  the  undemonstrative,  shy  EngUsh- 


YOUNG  EGYPT 


237 


man,  with  his  social  exclusiveness  and  insular  habits, 
with  the  vivacious  and  cosmopoUtan  Frenchman, 
who  does  not  know  what  the  word  shyness  means, 
and  who  in  ten  minutes  is  apparently  on  terms  of 
intimate  friendship  with  any  casual  acquaintance 
he  may  chance  to  make.  The  semi -educated 
Oriental  does  not  recognise  that  the  former  has,  at 
all  events,  the  merit  of  sincerity,  whilst  the  latter 
is  often  merely  acting  a  part/  He  looks  coldly  on 
the  Enghshman,  and  rushes  into  the  arms  of  the 
Frenchman. 

Look,  again,  to  the  relative  intellectual  attrac- 
tions wliich  the  two  Western  races  present.  The 
Enghshman  is  a  follower  of  Bacon  without  knowing- 
it.  Inductive  philosophy  has  become  part  of  his 
nature.  He  instinctively  rejects  a  priori  reasoning. 
He  will  laboriously  collect  a  number  of  facts  before 
arriving  at  any  conclusion,  and,  when  he  has 
collected  his  facts,  he  will  limit  his  conclusion  to 
the  precise  point  which  is  proved.  Compare  this 
frame  of  mind  with  that  of  the  quick-witted 
Frenchman,  who,  on  the  most  slender  basis  of  fact, 
will  advance  some  sweeping  generahsation  with  an 
assurance  untempered  by  any  shadow  of  doubt  as 
to  its  correctness.  Can  it  be  any  matter  for 
surprise  that  the  Egyptian,  with  his  light  intel- 
lectual ballast,  fails  to  see  that  some  fallacy  often 
lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  Frenchman's  reasoning,  or 
that  he  prefers  the  rather  superficial  brilliancy  of  the 
Frenchman  to  the  plodding,  unattractive  industry 
of  the  Englishman  or  the  German  ?  Look,  again, 
at  the  theoretical  perfection  of  French  administra- 
tive systems,  at  their  elaborate  detail,  and  at  the 

1  Shortly  after  the  Franco-German  War,  in  defending  the  French 
against  General  Blumenthal,  I  said,  "You  must  admit,  General,  that 
the  French  are  good  actors."  The  sturdy  old  Gallophobe  replied,  "  It 
is  the  only  thing  they  can  do.  They  are  always  acting."  I  do  not  at 
all  agree  with  the  first  part  of  the  distinguished  General's  view.  The 
French  can  do  a  great  many  things  besides  act  well. 


238  MODERN  EGYPT 


provision  which  is  apparently  made  to  meet  every 
possible  contingency  which  may  arise.  Compare 
these  features  with  the  Englishman's  practical 
systems,  which  lay  down  rules  as  to  a  few  main 
points,  and  leave  a  mass  of  detail  to  individual 
discretion.  The  half-educated  Egyptian  naturally 
prefers  the  Frenchman's  system,  for  it  is  to  all 
outward  appearance  more  perfect  and  more  easy 
of  application.  He  fails,  moreover,  to  see  that 
the  Englishman  desires  to  elaborate  a  system 
which  will  suit  the  facts  with  which  he  has 
to  deal,  whereas  the  main  objection  to  appljing 
French  administrative  procedures  to  Egj-pt  is 
that  the  facts  have  but  too  often  to  conform  to 
the  ready-made  system.  From  whatever  point  of 
view  the  subject  be  regarded,  the  same  contrast  will 
be  found.  On  the  one  side,  is  a  damsel  possessing 
attractive,  albeit  somewhat  artificial  charms ;  on 
the  other  side,  is  a  sober,  elderly  matron  of  perhaps 
somewhat  greater  moral  worth,  but  of  less  pleasing 
outward  appearance.  The  Egyptian,  in  the  heyday 
of  his  political  and  intellectual  youth,  naturally 
smiled  on  the  attractive  damsel,  and  turned  his 
back  on  the  excellent  but  somewhat  ill-favoured 
matron. 

In  some  respects  it  is,  for  his  own  sake,  greatly 
to  be  regretted  that  he  did  so.  What  the  Eg}'ptian 
most  of  all  requires  is,  not  so  much  that  his  mind 
should  be  trained,  as  that  his  character  should  be 
formed.  It  is  certain  that  a  very  liigh  tone  of 
morahty  pervades  those  admirable  educational 
institutions  which  spring,  Pallas-hke,  from  the 
fertile  brain  of  the  Vatican,  and  most  of  wliich,  in 
Egypt,  are  under  French  control.  It  is  also  certain 
that  those  who  base  their  opinion  of  French 
character  and  morals  on  the  light  French  literature 
of  the  day  are  wholly  in  error.  I  beheve  that  in 
no  country  are  the  domestic  virtues  more  generally 


CH.  xxxvn         YOUNG  EGYPT  239 

cherished  than  in  France.  It  has,  however,  to 
be  remembered  ^  that  the  Oriental  has  a  remark- 
able capacity  for  assimilating  to  himself  the  worst 
and  rejecting  the  best  parts  of  any  European 
civihsation  with  which  he  may  be  brought  in 
contact.  It  is  not  from  the  best,  but  rather  from 
the  least  admirable  traits  in  the  French  character 
that  those  young  Egyptians  who  have  been  brought 
under  French  influences,  have  generally  drawn 
their  moral  inspirations. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  educated 
Egyptian  fails  to  note  the  defects  of  his  European 
monitors,  be  they  French  or  English.  He  often 
sees  those  defects  clearly  enough,  and  the  result 
not  unfrequently  is  that,  even  though  he  may 
himself  become  partially  Europeanised,  he  will 
despise  European  civilisation.  In  what  respect, 
he  says  to  himself,  are  we  Egyptians  morally 
inferior  to  our  teachers  ?  We  may  be  deceitful, 
untruthfiil,  and  unchaste,  but  we  are  not  one 
whit  worse  than  those  whom  we  are  told 
to  regard  as  the  ultimate  product  of  European 
civihsation.^  The  result  is  that  the  Europeanised 
Egyptian  often  returns  to  Egypt  in  order  to 
become,  both  by  precept  and  example,  an  apostle 
of  anti-European  ideas.  The  conservatism  of  older 
Moslems,  who  regard  him  as  a  living  warning  that 
they   should   beware    of  European  civilisation, 

^  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  69. 

^  The  moral  superiority  of  English  over  French  training  is  recognised 
by  the  Egyptians  themselves,  and  has  at  times  been  recognised  by  culti- 
vated Frenchmen.  Senior  (Conversations,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  213)  relates  the 
following  conversation :  "  Uekekt/an.  It  is  remarkable  that  all  the 
Egyptians  and  Asiatics  whom  Mehemet  All  sent  to  England  for 
education  came  back,  like  myself  and  young  Stephan,  Anglomaniacs ; 
while  all  whom  he  sent  to  France  returned  disgusted  with  Europe.  .  .  . 
Clot  (the  founder  of  the  Egyptian  School  of  Medicine).  I  have  made 
the  same  remark.  .  .  .  Our  students  see  only  bad  company  in  Paris, 
and  are  disgusted  with  it.  In  London  they  get,  if  not  into  the  fashion- 
able world,  at  least  into  a  respectable  world,  infinitely  superior  in 
morals,  knowledge,  and  intelligence  to  anything  in  the  East 


240 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


becomes  stereotyped  on  observing  his  behaviour 
and  on  hearing  his  language  ;  whilst  he  himself,  in 
spite  of  his  partial  Europeanisation,  will,  with  an 
inconsistency  which  would  be  strange  were  we  not 
dealing  with  the  "  Land  of  Paradox,"  hate  the 
Europeans  quite  as  much  as  the  less  educated 
sections  of  his  own  countrymen. 

The  question  of  the  effect  of  European,  and 
notably  French  education  on  the  risuig  generation 
of  Egyptians  has  to  be  considered  from  another 
point  of  view.  The  tendency  of  every  Egj^tian 
official  is  to  shirk  responsibility.  He  tliinks  less 
of  what  should  be  done  than  of  acting  in  such  a 
manner  that  no  personal  blame  can  be  attached 
to  himself.  This  habit  of  thought  makes  the 
Egyptian  official  instmctively  shrink  from  the  British 
system  of  administration,  for  under  that  system 
much  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  individual,  who 
is,  therefore,  obliged  to  think  for  himself.  He 
ffies  for  refuge  to  the  French  system,  and  there 
he  finds  administrative  procedures  prescribed  which 
exactly  suit  his  character  and  habits  of  thought. 
He  finds  that  provision  is  apparently  made  for 
everything,  to  the  most  minute  detail,  in  a  series 
of  elaborate  codes.  Entrenched  beliind  these 
codes,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  is,  to  his  joy, 
relieved  in  a  great  degree  from  the  necessity 
of  thinking  for  himself.  Some  emergency  may, 
indeed,  occur  which  requires  prompt  action  and 
the  exercise  of  common  sense.  The  Europeanised 
Egyptian,  however,  but  too  often  does  not  recog- 
nise emergencies,  and  he  spurns  common  sense. 
He  refers  to  some  article  in  his  regulations,  and 
maintains  that  he  cannot  depart  from  the  provisions 
of  that  article  by  one  hair's -breadth.  The  result 
may  be  disastrous,  but  he  is  indiffisrent  as  to  the 
result ;  for,  having  conformed  strictly  to  his  orders, 
he   cannot    be  blamed  by  his   superiors.  The 


CH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  241 

Egyptian  official  was  always  predisposed  to  be  an 
automaton.^  Once  Europeanised — more  especially 
if  he  be  Gallicised — his  automatic  rigidity  becomes 
more  wooden  than  it  was  before. 

It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that,  from  this  point 
of  view,  French  training  has  done  little  to  rectify 
the  defects  of  the  Egyptian  national  character.  In 
everything,  it  has  tended  to  stereotype  the  Egyptian 
predisposition  to  look  to  the  letter  which  killeth, 
and  neglect  the  spirit  which  giveth  hfe. 

Scores  of  cases  could  be  mentioned  illustrative 
of  the  tendency  to  which  allusion  is  here  made. 
One  or  two  instances  will,  however,  suffice, 

A  case  occurred  of  a  stationmaster  declining  to 
send  a  fire-engine  by  a  train  which  was  about  to 
start,  in  order  to  help  in  putting  dovm  a  serious 
fire.  He  pointed  with  inexorable  logic  to  the 
regulations,  which  did  not  permit  of  trucks  being 
attached  to  that  particular  train.  No  exception 
was  to  be  found  in  the  code,  with  which  he  had 
been  furnished,  to  meet  the  case  of  a  burning  town 
to  which  a  fire-engine  had  to  be  despatched. 
Again,  at  one  time  it  was  the  practice,  if  an 
accident  occurred  in  the  streets,  not  to  transport 
the  individual  who  had  been  injured  at  once  to  the 
hospital,  but  to  leave  him  lying  on  the  ground, 
whatever  might  be  his  condition,  until  the  proper 
official  had  arrived  to  make  a  "  Proces-verbal "  of  the 
facts  connected  with  the  accident.  On  one  occasion, 
a  doctor  was  sent  to  examine  into  the  condition 

1  It  has  been  conclusively  shown  by  Taine  and  others  that  many  of 
the  administrative  methods  generally  practised  on  the  continent  of 
Europe  are  not,  as  is  very  commonly  supposed,  the  result  of  the  French 
Revolution,  but  that  they  existed — often  under  a  different  form — in 
pre-Revolutionary  days.  Similarly,  the  idea,  which  is  somewhat 
prevalent,  that  the  extreme  formalism  which  characterises  Egyptian 
oflBcial  life  is  the  result  of  contact  with  Europe,  though  it  may  be 
partially  correct,  does  not  convey  the  whole  truth.  Mr.  St.  John 
{Egypt  and  Mohammed  AH,  vol.  ii.  p.  419)  gives  a  remarkable  instance 
of  the  extreme  formalism  with  which  Egyptian  official  work  was  con- 
ducted in  his  time. 

VOL.  II  K 


242 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  rv 


of  a  stationmaster,  supposed  to  be  insane.  On 
entering  the  room,  he  was  attacked  and  nearly 
strangled  by  the  madman.  He  was  able,  after  a 
sharp  struggle,  to  caU  on  two  orderlies,  who  had 
been  present  all  the  time,  to  seize  the  man.  They 
saluted  and  did  so.  On  being  asked  why  they  had 
not  interfered  sooner,  they  repUed  that  they  had 
received  no  orders  to  that  effect.  Without  doubt, 
they  considered  that  the  struggle  on  the  floor, 
which  they  had  witnessed,  was  part  of  some  strange 
European  process,  with  which  they  were  unfamiliar, 
for  dealing  with  insane  stationmasters.^ 

I  may  mention  that  a  subordinate  Egj'ptian 
official,  notably  a  policeman,  regards  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  "  Proces- verbal "  as  a  proceeding  of 
peculiar  sanctity.  It  matters  httle  what  the  docu- 
ment contains.  Provided  he  can  get  a  "  Proces- 
verbal "  prepared  in  due  form,  the  Egj'ptian  official 
considers  that  he  is  free  from  responsibility,  and  he 
is,  therefore,  happy.  Otherwise,  he  feels  that  a 
certain  amount  of  personal  responsibihty  weighs 
upon  him,  and  he  is  miserable.  This  plethora 
of  "  Proces -verbaux "  has  done  a  good  deal  to 
nip  in  the  bud  any  feeble  tendencies  towards 
individualism  which  might  otherwise  have  been 
developed. 

In  a  word,  the  French  bureaucratic  and  legal 
systems,  although  there  is  much  to  be  said  in  their 
favour  when  they  are  carried  into  execution  by  a 
highly  civUised  and  intelligent  race  such  as  the 
French,  are  little  adapted  to  the  formation  of  either 
competent  officials  or  useful  citizens  in  a  country 
such  as  Egypt. 

Such,  therefore,  is  the  Europeanised  Egyptian. 
His  intellectual  qualities   have,   of   late  years, 

'  These  cases  have  already  been  cited  in  my  Report  for  the  year 
1903  {Egypt,  No.  1,  of  1904,  p.  78).  An  endless  number  of  similar 
illustrations  of  the  tendency  to  which  allusion  is  made  above,  might 
be  given. 


YOUNG  EGYPT 


243 


certainly  been  developed.  His  moral  attributes 
have  generally  been  little,  if  at  all,  improved  by 
contact  with  Europe.  The  old  orthodox  Moslem 
is  bound  hand  and  foot  by  ancient  custom  based  on 
his  rehgion.  The  Europeanised  Egyptian  is  often 
bound  almost  as  fast  by  a  set  of  rigid  formulae, 
which  he  mistakes  for  the  substance,  whereas  they 
are  in  reality  but  some  fortuitous  incidents  of 
European  civilisation. 

Although  the  description  given  above  holds 
generally  good  as  regards  the  class  now  under 
discussion,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  there  are  excep- 
tions, and,  moreover,  that  the  exceptions  are  year 
by  year  becoming  more  numerous.  Some  of  the 
younger  generation  of  Egyptians  are  turning  into 
excellent  officials,  especially  those  employed  under 
the  Department  of  Justice.  In  view  of  the 
character  of  the  modern  Egyptian,  it  is  obviously 
more  easy  to  develop  a  certain  amount  of  judicial 
capacity  than  it  is  to  train  good  executive  officers. 
The  judge  merely  has  to  interpret  his  code.  The 
executive  official  must  of  necessity  rely  to  a  greater 
extent  on  his  individual  resource  and  judgment. 

One  point  remains  to  be  considered.  What 
was  the  attitude  of  the  Europeanised  Egyptian 
towards  the  British  reformer?  After  what  has 
been  already  said,  it  is  needless  to  dilate  on  this 
subject.  Envy,  dishke  of  British  administrative 
systems,  ignorance  of  the  EngHsh  language,^  resent- 
ment at  the  stand-off  manners  and  at  the  airs  of 
conscious  superiority  which  the  Enghshman,  some- 
what unwisely,  is  prone  to  give  himself,  and  want 
of  appreciation  of  the  better  side  of  the  English 
character,  all  drove  the  Europeanised  Egyptian 
in  one  direction.    With  a  few  exceptions,  the  whole 

^  This  fertile  source  of  misunderstanding  is^  it  may  be  hoped,  rapidly 
disappearing.  The  number  of  young  Egyptians  who  understand  English 
is  steadily  increasing,  as  also  the  number  of  British  officials  who  speak 
Arabic. 


244  MODERN  EGYPT 


class  was,  at  the  commencement  of  the  British 
occupation,  Anglophobe. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  of  late  years  this 
Anglophobia  has  diminished.  Indeed,  indications 
are  not  wanting  that,  mainly  by  reason  of  the 
misrepresentations  of  the  vernacular  press,  it  has 
somewhat  increased  in  intensity.  It  is  the  duty  of 
the  British  officials  in  the  service  of  the  Eg^-ptian 
Government  to  use  their  utmost  endeavours  to 
mitigate  feelings  of  this  description  by  sympathetic 
treatment,  and  by  abstaining  from  passing  too  harsh 
a  judgment  on  whatever  defects  they  may  find  to 
exist  amongst  the  rising  generation  of  Egyptians. 
Those  defects  are  the  natural  outcome  of  the  pecu- 
liar poUtical  conditions  under  which  the  country  is 
governed,  and  of  the  unhealthy  influences  to  which 
the  young  Egyptians  are  often  exposed. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII 


THE  EUROPEANS 

Number  of  Europeans — The  Levantines — Their  characteristics — The 
Greeks— Their  commercial  enterprise — The  English — The  Army 
of  Occupation — Anglo-Egyptian  officials — Feelings  entertained  by 
other  Europeans  towards  the  English — Summary  of  the  classes 
friendly  and  hostile  to  England. 

According  to  the  census  of  1897,  there  were  at  that 
time  about  113,000  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt.^ 
These  113,000  persons  were  divided  as  follows  : 

Greeks  ......  38,000 

Italians            .....  24,000 

French  ......  14,000 

Austrians        .....  7,000 

English  (including  Maltese  and  other  British 

subjects,  as  well  as  the  Army  of  Occupation)  20,000 

Other  nationalities      ....  10,000 


Total       .  .  .  113,000 


The  classification  by  nationahties,  though  im- 
portant in  many  respects,  is  misleading  to  this 
extent,  that  when  it  is  said  that  there  are  24,000 
Italians,  14,000  Frenchmen,  7000  Austrians,  and 
so  on  in  Egypt,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  there 
are  that  number  of  Italians,  Frenchmen,  or  Aus- 
trians in  the  country  possessing  the  special  national 

*  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  since  the  census  of  1897  was  taken,  the 
number  of  Europeans  in  Egypt  has  largely  increased.  I  have  already 
stated  (vide  ante,  p.  129,  note)  that  the  detailed  figures  of  the  census 
taken  in  1007  are  not  yet  available. 

245 


246 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PI'.  IV 


characteristics,  which  are  generally  held  to  belong 
to  the  inhabitants  of  Italy,  France,  or  Austria. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  there  are  a  large  number  of 
protected  subjects,  who  are  often  Orientals,  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  in  many  cases  the  Frenchman  resi- 
dent in  Egypt  is  only  technically  a  Frenchman,  the 
Itahan  may  in  reahty  be  only  half  an  ItaUan  in  so 
far  as  his  national  characteristics  are  concerned,  the 
Austrian  is  often  merely  a  subject  of  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  for  purposes  of  Consular  protection  and 
nothing  more.  For,  in  truth,  many  individuals  of 
these  and  of  other  nationahties  are,  above  all 
things,  Levantines,  and  the  Levantines,  though  not 
a  separate  nation,  possess  characteristics  of  their 
own  which  may  almost  be  termed  national. 

Every  one  who  has  hved  in  the  Eastern  part  of 
the  Mediterranean  knows  what  is  meant  by  a 
Levantine,  though  a  precise  definition  of  this  term 
is  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  The  Levantine  can, 
of  course,  be  described  as  a  European  resident  in 
the  Levant,  generally  in  the  Ottoman  dominions 
situated  in  the  Levant.  Tliis  definition  is,  how- 
ever, not  satisfactory,  for  some  Europeans  may  be 
born  and  bred  in  the  East  and  pass  all  their  lives 
in  the  Levant,  without  losing  the  special  character- 
istics of  their  country  of  origin,  or  acquiring  in  any 
considerable  degree  those  of  the  Levantine.  In 
the  case  of  others,  a  short  residence  in  the  Levant 
will  suffice  to  produce  typical  Levantine  character- 
istics. Others,  again,  already  approached  so  nearly 
to  Levantines  in  their  country  of  origin,  that  they 
may  almost  be  said  to  have  been  Levantines  before 
they  emigrated  to  the  Levant.  In  fact,  inasmuch 
as  the  Levantines  are  more  or  less  Orientalised 
Europeans,^  just  as  Egyptian  Moslems  educated  in 

1  The  process  of  manufacturing  Levantines  is  at  least  as  old  as  the 
Crusades.  Thus,  Mr.  Stanley  Lane  Poole  says  {Sahtdin,  p.  28):  ''The 
early  Crusaders,  after  thirty  years'  residence  in  Syria,  had  become  very 
much  assimilated  in  character  and  habits  to  the  people  whom  they  had 


cH.xxxvm       THE  EUROPEANS 


247 


France  are  Gallicised  Egyptians,  they  necessarily 
present  every  gradation  of  character,  from  the 
European  with  no  trace  of  the  Oriental  about  him, 
to  the  European  who  is  so  thoroughly  orientahsed 
as  scarcely  to  have  preserved  any  distinctive 
European  characteristics.  A  considerable  number 
of  Levantines  he  midway  between  these  two 
extremes.  Starting  sometimes  with  national  char- 
acteristics which  bear  some  resemblance  to  those 
of  Easterns,  they  develop  those  characteristics  to  a 
stiU  greater  degree  by  residence  in  the  East.  They 
become  semi-orientalised  Europeans.  If  compared 
with  the  northern  races  of  Europe,  the  predomi- 
nance of  the  Oriental  portion  of  their  characters 
will  come  out  in  strong  rehef.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  are  compared  with  the  southern  Euro- 
pean races,  any  process  of  differentiation  will  bring 
out  their  distinctive  Oriental  characteristics  in  a  less 
striking  manner.  The  majority  of  Levantines  are 
recruited  from  the  southern  races  of  Europe,  and, 
in  respect  to  these  more  especially,  their  technical 
nationality  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  present 
argument,  of  shght  importance.  The  particular 
Consulate  at  which  the  Levantine  is  inscribed  is  a 
mere  accident.  He  is,  above  all  things,  a  Levan- 
tine, though  he  dishkes  to  be  designated  by  that 
appellation  ;  for,  partly  because  he  is  aware  that  the 
Levantines  do  not  generally  bear  a  high  character, 
partly  because  he  dislikes  to  merge  his  national 
individuahty  in  a  cosmopolitan  expression,  and 
partly  because  he  is  sensible  of  the  material  benefits 
which  he  derives  from  his  foreign  nationality,  the 
Levantine  wiU  often  develop  a  specially  ardent 
degree  of  patriotism  for  the  country  which  affords 
him  Consular  protection. 

partly  conquered,  among  whom  they  lived,  and  whose  daughters  they 
did  not  disdain  to  marry  ;  they  were  growing  into  Levantines ;  they 
were  known  as  Pullani  or  Creoles." 


248 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


Germans  and  Englishmen,  however  long  they 
may  reside  in  the  Levant,  rarely  become  typical 
Levantines.  Starting  with  strongly  marked  national 
characteristics,  they  generally  preserve  those  char- 
acteristics more  or  less  intact.  As  a  class,  they  do 
not  differ  materially  from  their  fellow-countrymen 
of  the  same  social  standing  in  Germany  or  England. 

The  case  of  the  Itahans,  of  whom  there  are  a 
large  number  in  Eg\^t,  is  different.  INI  any  of  the 
skilled  artisans  in  Egypt,  the  bricklayers,  masons, 
carpenters,  etc.,  are  Italians.  They  are,  as  a  rule,  a 
steady,  industrious  race,  whose  presence  is  very  use- 
ful to  the  Egyptians,  as  it  enables  the  latter  to  learn 
various  crafts  requiring  skill  in  their  application. 
As  a  body,  these  Itahans  do  not  differ  from  their 
countr}TTien  of  the  same  social  position  in  Italy. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some  middle-class 
Italians,  who,  with  their  famihes,  have  been  long 
resident  in  Egypt,  and  who  may,  as  a  class,  be  con- 
sidered representative  Levantines.  The  transition 
from  being  Italian  to  being  Levantine  is,  in  these 
cases,  more  easy  than  in  the  case  of  the  Englishman 
or  the  German. 

Much  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  Austrians, 
who  do  not  generally  come  from  Austria  proper, 
but  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Trieste.  Many  of 
these  are  Jews.  Their  language  is  generally  not 
German  but  Itahan. 

The  French  occupy  a  pecuhar  position.  The 
French  colony  contains  every  gradation  of  t^-pe, 
from  the  most  Gallic  Gaul  to  the  ultra-Levantinised 
Levantine.  In  respect  to  the  latter  class,  however, 
the  question  arises  of  whether  the  Frencliman  has 
become  Levantinised,  or  whether  the  counter- 
process  has  not  taken  place ;  whether  it  is  not 
that  the  Levantine  has  become  Gallicised.  The 
fact  is  that  both  processes  are  constantly  in 
operation. 


CH.  XXXVIII       THE  EUROPEANS  249 


Next,  what  are  the  main  characteristics  of  the 
Levantines  ?  There  are,  of  course,  many  Levan- 
tines— merchants,  professional  men,  shopkeepers, 
and  others — who  are  highly  respectable  members 
of  society,  and  who  carry  on  their  business  upon 
the  same  principles  as  they  would  adopt  were  they 
living  at  Trieste,  Genoa,  or  Marseilles.  But  these 
are  not  representatives  of  the  class,  which  is  con- 
jured up  in  the  mind  of  the  Egyptian  Minister 
or  his  British  adviser,  when  the  word  Levantine 
is  mentioned.  It  is  the  misfortune  of  the  Levan- 
tines that  they  suffer  in  reputation  by  reason  of 
qualities  which  are  displayed  by  only  a  small 
minority  of  their  class.  It  cannot,  in  fact,  be 
doubted  that  amongst  this  minority  are  to  be 
found  individuals  who  are  tainted  with  a  remark- 
able degree  of  moral  obhquity.  These  are  the 
Levantines  who  regard  the  Egyptians,  from  prince 
to  peasant,  as  their  prey.  In  days  now  happily 
past,  they  brought  aU  their  intellectual  acuteness, 
which  is  of  no  mean  order,  to  bear  on  the  work 
of  depredation.  Whatever  national  defects  they 
may  have  possessed  in  their  country  of  origin, 
appear  to  have  been  enhanced  when,  on  arrival  in 
Egypt,  they  had  to  deal  with  a  people  who  were 
ignorant,  credulous,  and  improvident,  and,  there- 
fore, easily  despoiled  ;  who,  by  reason  of  their  own 
low  moral  standard,  seemed,  to  a  perverted  mind,  in 
some  degree  to  justify  reciprocity  of  low  morals  in 
dealing  with  them ;  and  who,  being  weak  and 
defenceless,  invited  spoliation  at  the  hands  of  the 
unprincipled  adventurer  armed  with  all  the  strength 
which  he  drew  from  intellectual  superiority,  diplo- 
matic support,  and  intimate  acquaintance  with  all 
the  forms  and  back-alleys  of  the  Civil  Code.  This 
is  the  class  which  has  to  a  certain  extent  made 
European  civiUsation  stink  in  the  nostrils  of  the 
Egyptians.     The  Levantines  of  this  description 


250 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


have  done  a  small  amount  of  good  by  introducing 
European  capital  on  a  limited  scale  into  the 
country.  They  have  done  a  vast  amount  of 
harm  by  associating  the  name  of  European  in 
the  minds  of  the  Egyptians  with  a  total  absence 
of  scruple  in  the  pursuit  of  gain.  The  upper-class 
Levantine  naturally  used  to  consider  the  upper- 
class  Egyptian  as  his  prey.  The  lower-class 
Levantine  tricked  the  fellaheen. 

The  Greeks  are  so  numerous  that  they  deserve 
consideration  by  themselves.  In  1897,  there  were 
38,000  Greeks  in  Egypt.  The  question  of  who  is 
and  who  is  not  a  subject  of  the  King  of  the 
Hellenes  is  a  never-ending  cause  of  dispute 
between  the  Ottoman  and  Greek  Governments. 
Under  what  conditions  of  birth  and  residence  are 
the  Greeks,  who  were  born  and  bred  outside 
Greece  and  who  have  only  casually  Hved  in  that 
country,  to  be  considered  Greek  subjects  ?  It  is 
needless  to  dwell  on  the  details  of  tliis  wearisome 
question.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that,  in  spite 
of  the  resistance  of  the  Egyptian  authorities,  most 
Greek-speaking  Greeks  generally  manage  to  produce 
sufficient  evidence  to  enable  them  to  claim  the 
privileges  attachmg  to  Greek  nationahty. 

In  Alexandria,  which  may  almost  be  said  to 
be  a  Greek  town,  a  great  many  influential  and 
higlily  respectable  Greeks  are  to  be  found.  Their 
presence  in  Egypt  is  an  unmixed  benefit  to  the 
country.^     More  than  this,  many  of  the  small 

'  I  wish  to  insist  very  strongly  on  this  point.  None  have  suffered 
more  than  the  Greeks  from  the  practice,  which  is  but  too  common,  of 
condemning  a  whole  class  or  community  because  the  conduct  of  certain 
individuals  belonging  to  it  is  worthy  of  condemnation.  I  have  the  best 
reasons  for  knowing  that  none  regret  more  than  the  very  numerous 
high -class  Greeks  established  in  Egypt  the  fact  that  their  national 
reputation  should  at  times  be  tarnished  by  the  behaviour  of  some 
individuals  belonging  to  their  nation.  In  spite  of  the  blemishes 
recorded  in  these  pages,  it  may  be  said  with  truth  that  the  Greeks 
in  Egvpt  have,  as  of  old,  carried  high  the  torch  of  civilisation  in  their 
adopted  couutry. 


CH.  XXXVIII       THE  EUROPEANS 


251 


Greek  traders  are  fully  deserving  of  respect.  StiU 
the  fact  remains  that  a  portion  of  the  Greek  colony 
in  Egypt  consists  of  low-class  Greeks  exercising  the 
professions  of  usurer,  drink-seUer,  etc.  The  Greek 
of  this  class  has  an  extraordinary  talent  for  retail 
trade.  He  will  risk  his  hfe  in  the  pursuit  of 
petty  gain.  It  is  not  only  that  a  Greek  usurer 
or  a  bakal  (general  dealer)  is  estabUshed  in  almost 
every  village  in  Egypt ;  the  Greek  pushes  his  way 
into  the  most  remote  parts  of  the  Soudan  and  of 
Abyssinia.  Wherever,  in  fact,  there  is  the  smallest 
prospect  of  bupng  in  a  cheap  and  seUing  in  a  dear 
market,  there  will  the  petty  Greek  trader  be  found. 
In  1889,  I  visited  Sarras,  some  thirty  miles  south 
of  AVadi  Haifa.  It  was  at  that  time  the  fartliest 
outpost  of  the  Egyptian  army,  and  is  situated  in  the 
midst  of  a  howling  wilderness.  The  post  had  only 
been  estabhshed  for  a  few  days.  Nevertheless,  there 
I  found  a  Greek  already  seUing  sardines,  biscuits, 
etc.,  to  a  very  Umited  number  of  customers,  out  of 
a  hole  in  a  rock  in  which  he  had  set  up  a  temporary 
shop. 

We  may,  therefore,  give  the  low-class  Greek 
credit  for  his  enterprising  commercial  spirit. 
Nevertheless,  his  presence  in  Egypt  is  often  hurtful. 
Whatever  healthy  moral  and  pohtical  influences 
remain  untouched  after  the  Turco-Egyptian  Pasha, 
the  tyrannical  Sheikh,  and  the  fanatical  "  Alim " 
have  done  their  worst,  these  the  low-class  Greek 
seeks  to  destroy.  He  tempts  the  Egyptian  peasant 
to  borrow  at  some  exorbitant  rate  of  interest,  and 
then,  by  a  sharp  turn  of  the  legal  screw,  reduces 
him  from  the  position  of  an  allodial  proprietor  to 
that  of  a  serf.  He  undermines  that  moral  quality 
of  which  the  Moslem,  when  untainted  by  European 
association,  has  in  some  degree  a  speciahty.  That 
quality  is  sobriety.  Under  Greek  action  and 
influence,  the  Egyptian  villagers  are  taking  to 


252  MODERN  EGYPT 


drink.  Mr.  Gladstone,  in  a  speech  which  has 
become  historical,  once  said  that  it  would  be  a 
good  thing  if  the  Turks  were  turned  "  bag  and 
baggage  "  out  of  Europe.^  This  may  or  may  not 
be  the  case.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  a 
counter -proposition  of  a  somewhat  similar  nature 
holds  good.  It  would  be  an  excellent  thing  for 
Turkey  and  its  dependencies  if  some  of  the  low- 
class  Greeks,  who  inhabit  the  Ottoman  dominions, 
could  be  turned  bag  and  baggage  out  of  Turkey. 

Before  passing  on  to  a  consideration  of  the 
sentiments  entertained  by  the  Europeans  resident 
in  Egypt  towards  the  Enghsh  reformer,  it  will  be 
as  well  to  say  something  of  the  Enghsh  themselves. 

The  English  in  Egypt  may  be  divided  into 
three  categories,  viz.  (1)  the  non-official  residents; 
(2)  the  army  of  occupation ;  (3)  the  officials  in  the 
Egyptian  service. 

The  permanent  British  colony  in  Egypt  is 
small.  It  consists  mainly  of  a  few  merchants 
who  reside  at  Alexandria,  and  who  employ  a 
small  number  of  subordinate  English  agents  to 
watch  over  their  business  in  the  provinces.  The 
greater  part  of  the  export  trade  is  in  the  hands 
of  British  firms.  The  Alexandrian  Enghshman, 
like  most  of  his  countrymen,  is  somewhat  exclusive. 
He  mixes  little  in  foreign  society.  The  general 
standard  of  probity  in  business  matters  amongst 

*  Mr.  Gladstone  was  guilty  of  an  unconscious  plagiarism.  Few 
people  probably  know  that  the  expression,  as  applied  to  the  Turks, 
originated  with  Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  whose  opinions  have  passed 
down  to  posterity  as  representing  the  ne  plus  ultra  of  Turcophilism. 
Such,  however,  is  the  case.  \V'riting  to  Mr.  Canning  on  September  20, 
1821,  Lord  Stratford  said  :  "As  a  matter  of  humanity,  I  wish  with  all 
my  soul  that  the  Greeks  were  put  in  possession  of  their  whole  patri- 
mony, and  that  the  Sultan  was  driven,  bag  and  baggage,  into  the  heart 
of  Asia"  (The  Life  of  Stratford  Canning,  vol.  i.  p.  30").  Canon 
MacColl  says  (Fortnightli/  Review,  June  1898) :  "  What  Mr.  Gladstone 
proposed  was  that  the  Turkish  administration  should  'all,  bag  and 
baggage,  clear  out' — not  'from  Europe,  but  from  the  provinces 
which  they  had  desolated  and  profaned.'  "  The  difference  does  not 
appear  very  material. 


CH.  XXXVIII       THE  EUROPEANS  253 


the  English  in  Egypt  is  high.  The  Enghsh  are, 
for  the  most  part,  eminently  fair  and  reasonable. 
They  never  give  any  trouble.  They  have  the 
great  merit  of  attending  exclusively  to  their  own 
affairs.  During  the  many  years  that  I  was  Consul- 
General  in  Egypt,  I  do  not  remember  an  instance 
in  which  I  was  asked  by  an  Englishman  resident  in 
Egypt  to  support  any  manifestly  unfair  or  pre- 
posterous claim.  The  Englishman  knows  his  rights ; 
he  knows  that  if  they  are  infringed  he  has  his  legal 
remedy,  and  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  apply  for  the 
support  of  his  Consul-General.  I  doubt  whether 
the  representative  of  any  other  Power  in  Egypt 
could  say  the  same. 

Passing  to  a  different  stratum,  there  are  a 
certain  number  of  Enghshmen  in  Egypt,  who  are 
employed  in  various  unofficial  capacities,  and  who 
are  generally  vigorous,  honest,  straightforward 
specimens  of  humanity,  but  who  in  exceptional 
cases  sometimes  make  the  British  race  unpopular 
by  their  bad  manners  and  self-assertion.  Their 
conduct  is  in  this  respect  highly  reprehensible. 
Nevertheless,  taken  as  a  whole,  the  English 
dwellers  in  Egypt  are  a  sturdy,  self-respecting, 
and,  therefore,  respected  race,  who  do  credit  to 
their  country  of  origin,  and  whose  presence  is  useful 
to  their  country  of  adoption. 

Little  need  be  said  of  the  army  of  occupation. 
The  disciphne  and  good  conduct  of  the  British 
army  in  all  its  ranks  are  recognised  by  the  most 
bitter  Anglophobes.  The  worst  that  can  be  said 
of  the  soldiers  is  that  some  of  them  disgrace  them- 
selves by  getting  drunk  off  the  vile  liquor  supplied 
to  them  in  the  bazaars.  From  the  political  point 
of  view,  the  main  characteristic  of  the  British 
officer  is  his  exclusiveness.  In  whatever  clime  he 
may  serve,  he  carries  his  insular  habits  and  national 
pastimes  with  him.    In  Egypt,  he  rarely  mixes  in 


254 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  rv 


any  society  which  is  not  English,  and  he  abstains 
from  doing  so,  partly  because  of  his  ignorance  of 
any  language  but  his  own,  and  partly  because  his 
social  habits  differ  from  those  of  the  cosmopoUtan 
society  of  the  Egyptian  towns.  What  does  the 
Frenchman  or  Itahan  care  for  horse-races,  polo, 
cricket,  golf,  and  all  the  other  quasi -national 
institutions,  wliich  the  British  officer  estabUshes 
Avherever  he  goes,  whether  his  residence  be  in  the 
frigid  or  the  torrid  zone  ?  This  exclusiveness  has 
its  advantages  and  also  its  disadvantages.  If  a 
French  army  had  been  in  Egypt,  the  officers  would 
have  fraternised  with  the  European  residents. 
They  would  have  been  seen  sitting  outside  ev^ery 
cafe.  The  result  would  have  been,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  creation  of  greater  social  sympathy 
between  the  army  and  certain  classes  of  the  urban 
population,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  occurrence 
of  more  frequent  quarrels.  The  British  officer  does 
not  attract  the  sympathy,  but  he  avoids  the  quarrels. 
He  is  respected.  On  the  other  hand,  he  does  not 
excite  any  Hvely  sentiment  of  sympathy  or  friend- 
ship. On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  politician,  the  advantages 
predominate  over  the  disadvantages.  The  British 
officers  obey  orders ;  they  neither  know,  nor  care 
to  know  anything  about  local  pohtics ;  they  rarely 
cause  any  trouble ;  they  behave  for  the  most  part 
like  English  gentlemen.  Under  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  these  are  ideal  quahties.  They 
are  qualities  which  were  appreciated  by  the  most 
astute  of  Egyptian  statesmen,  Nubar  Pasha. 

I  was  once  talking  to  a  Levantine  in  a  Cairo 
street  when  a  young  British  officer  rode  by.  INly 
friend  stopped  in  the  middle  of  his  conversation 
and  said :  "  Che  bella  razza !  Come  sono  forti  e 
puliti ! "  That  was  what  most  struck  him — that 
the  British  officers  were  physically  strong,  and. 


CH.  XXXVIII       THE  EUROPEANS 


255 


moreover,  that  they  were  washed.  I  was  struck 
with  the  expression.  I  fancy  it  represents  the 
opinions  of  a  good  many  Southerners. 

At  a  later  period  of  this  narrative,  the  positions 
held  by  the  British  officials  in  the  Egyptian  service 
will  be  more  fully  treated.  For  the  present  all 
that  need  be  said  is  that,  being  for  the  most  part 
better  linguists,  they  are  generally  less  exclusive 
than  the  officers  of  the  army  of  occupation.  At 
the  same  time,  the  society  in  which  they  move  is 
mainly  English. 

The  next  point  to  consider  is  the  attitude  of  the 
Europeans  resident  in  Egypt  towards  the  EngUsh, 
and  more  particularly  towards  the  small  band  of 
EngUshmen  who  were  instrumental  in  carrying  out 
the  work  of  Egyptian  reform. 

Enough  has  been  already  said  to  show  that 
there  is  little  social  sympathy  between  the  Enghsh, 
and  any  class  of  Europeans  in  Egypt.  The  best 
amongst  the  Europeans  respect  the  British  officials ; 
they  admire  their  good  qualities — their  honesty, 
their  energy,  and  above  all  their  tenacity.  But 
few  hke  them.  Moreover,  few  understand  them. 
To  the  European  resident  in  Egypt  the  British 
officials  were,  in  the  first  instance  at  all  events, 
somewhat  of  an  enigma.  Being  generally  accus- 
tomed to  Continental  official  procedure,  they  could 
not  understand  a  member  of  a  bureaucracy  who 
rather  despised  forms  and  had  no  bureaucratic 
tendencies,  and  who,  moreover,  did  his  work  in  an 
unobtrusive  way  without  any  unnecessary  fuss. 
But  as  the  occupation  was  prolonged,  and  the 
effects  of  British  predominance  became  year  by 
year  more  apparent,  the  ways  of  the  British  official 
became  better  understood. 

The  usurer,  the  drink  -  seller,  and  others  of 
the  same  species,  naturally  looked  askance  at 
the  Englishman  and  his  reforms  from  the  very 


256 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


first.  Though  these  classes  recognised  that  the 
presence  of  a  British  army  in  Egypt  afforded 
security  to  their  hves  and  properties,  and  thougli 
they  were  aware  that,  in  the  event  of  an  ebulhtion 
of  Moslem  fanaticism,  they  would  be  the  first  to 
suffer,  still  they  would  not  readily  forgive  the 
Englishman  for  standing  between  them  and  their 
prey ;  they  could  not  forget  that,  had  British 
influence  not  been  predominant,  the  rate  of  interest 
would  have  been  quadrupled  ;  they,  therefore,  at 
one  time  looked  back  regretfully  to  those  halcyon 
days  before  the  British  occupation,  when  they 
were  able  to  plunder  the  Egyptian  Government  at 
will,  and  when  they  and  the  Egyptian  Government 
agreed  together  to  plunder  the  Egyptians. 

The  political  sympathies  of  the  various  nation- 
alities count  also  for  a  good  deal  in  the  formation 
of  European  public  opinion  as  regards  the  action 
of  the  British  officials  in  Egypt.  On  these,  I 
need  not  dwell.  Inasmuch  as  they  depend  on 
the  occurrence  of  political  events  outside  Egypt, 
they  naturally  varied  greatly  during  the  period  ot 
my  tenure  of  office. 

In  this,  and  in  the  four  preceding  chapters,  an 
attempt  has  been  made  to  describe  the  principal 
elements  of  Egyptian  society  with  special  reference 
to  the  attitude  which  each  section  assumed  towards 
the  English  reformer,  more  especially  in  the  early 
days  of  the  occupation.  It  is  now  possible  to 
marshal  the  opposing  forces  and  to  distinguish 
between  friends  and  foes.  Some  were  avowedly 
hostile.  Some  vacillated  between  lukewarm  friend- 
ship and  covert  hostility.  Others,  constituting  a 
large  numerical  majority,  were  friendly,  but  dared 
not  give  expression  to  their  friendship,  and  were, 
moreover,  powerless  to  help  the  cause  of  their 
benefactors.   Lastly,  a  small  minority  were  friendly 


CH.xxxvm       THE  EUROPEANS  257 

and  had  the  courage  of  their  opinions,  but  the 
occasion  for  asserting  them  was  generally  wanting. 

The  Turco  -  Egyptian  Pashas,  the  Moslem 
hierarchy,  the  Europeanised  Egyptians,  and  the 
French  were,  in  the  first  instance,  for  various 
reasons  hostile. 

The  squirearchy,  the  Copts,  the  Syrians,  and 
the  Levantines  hovered  between  friendship  and 
hostility,  being  torn  by  conflicting  sentiments  and 
driven  hither  and  thither  by  every  passing  breeze  of 
self-interest. 

The  mass  of  the  population,  that  is  to  say,  the 
fellaheen,  were  certainly  from  the  very  first  friendly, 
but  they  were  politically  speechless,  and,  moreover, 
were  so  credulous  and  ignorant  that,  had  they 
attempted  to  make  their  voices  heard,  they 
would  just  as  likely  as  not  have  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  frothy  demagogues  or  unprincipled  news- 
paper editors,  who  would  have  made  them  say  the 
opposite  of  what  they  really  thought. 

A  small  body  of  respectable  and  intelligent 
Europeans  were  friendly,  but  their  friendship  was 
platonic.  They  took  little  part  in  local  politics, 
and  were,  for  the  most  part,  mere  spectators  of 
w^hat  was  passing  on  the  political  stage. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  hostile,  quasi -hostile 
and  apathetic  forces,  though  less  numerous,  were 
more  powerful  than  those  who  were  friendly.  On 
the  one  side,  stood  the  stolid  conservatism  of  the 
East,  religious  prejudice,  ignorance,  international 
jealousy,  and  a  number  of  powerful  vested  interests, 
some  of  an  ignoble  type.  On  the  other  side,  stood 
the  force  derived  from  an  honest  endeavour  to 
secure  the  well  -  being  of  a  whole  population, 
which  had  been  trodden  under  foot  for  centuries. 

The  battle  seemed  in  some  respects  unequal. 
Yet  the  Englishman  took  heart  of  grace.  He 
proceeded  with  caution  and   he  won   the  day. 

VOL.  II  s 


258 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


He  felt  from  the  first  that  he  was  fi<;htinn: 
m  a  good  cause.  "  He  had  the  goodwill  of 
intelligent  and  impartial  Europe.  He  had  a  mili- 
tary force  behind  him  to  prevent  any  premature 
upset  of  the  whole  machine.  He  was  able  to 
employ  agents  of  experience  trained  in  all  the 
intricacies  of  Oriental  government.  Ten  years  after 
the  battle  of  Tel-el- Kebir  a  competent  observer 
was  able  to  write:  "Even  our  superb  administra- 
tion of  India  is  hardly  a  brighter  jewel  in  our 
imperial  crown  than  the  marvellous  regeneration  of 
Egypt."  ^  More  than  this.  As  the  occupation 
continued,  a  great  change  came  over  tlie  opinions 
of  various  sections  of  Egj'ptian  society.  The 
benefits  conferred  by  the  exercise  of  British 
influence  were,  indeed,  so  palpable  that  they  could 
not  be  denied.  Amongst  both  European  and 
Egyptian  society,  all  but  a  very  small  class  ranged 
themselves,  either  actively  or  passively,  on  the  side 
of  England.'^  Notably,  both  Italian  and  Greek 
sympathy  was  on  many  occasions  displayed  in  a 
very  remarkable  degree.  The  representatives  of 
the  various  Christian  communities  resident  in 
Egypt  seized  every  possible  opportunity  for  ex- 
pressing their  friendliness  to  England.  With  a 
few  exceptions,  even  the  Moslems  acquiesced  in 
the  policy  of  reform. 

The  open  or  covert  hostility  of  various  sections 
of  society  in  Eg}^t  has  not  been  the  only,  neither, 
indeed,  has  it  been  the  principal  difficulty  which 
has  beset  the  path  of  the  Enghsh  reformer.  Under 

»  Cairo,  p.  243. 

2  I  wrote  these  remarks  in  1903,  and,  in  spite  of  any  appearances  to 
the  contrary,  my  conviction  is  that  they  still  (1907)  hold  good.  During 
the  last  three  or  four  years,  a  strong  and  very  legitimate  desire  to  take 
a  greater  part  than  heretofore  in  the  administration  of  the  country  has 
made  itself  felt  among  intelligent  Egyptians,  but  my  belief  is  that  the 
number  of  those  who  would  really  wish  the  reforming  work  of  England 
in  Egypt  to  be  brought  prematurely  to  a  close  still  comprise  a  "  very 
small,"  and,  I  may  add,  a  wholly  unrepresentative,  class. 


CH.  XXXVIII       THE  EUROPEANS  259 


the  combined  influences  of  rival  diplomatists, 
bondholders,  foreign  jurists,  and  others,  who  have 
from  time  to  time  borne  a  part  in  Egyptian  affairs, 
a  variety  of  fantastic  institutions  grew  up,  many  of 
which  were  originally  devised  to  check  misgovern- 
ment,  but  which,  under  altered  circumstances, 
have,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  acted  as  powerful  obstacles 
to  reform.  An  endeavour  will  now  be  made  to 
guide  the  reader  through  some  of  the  intricate 
windings  of  this  administrative  labyrinth. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

THE  MACHINERY  OF  GOVERNMENT 

Nature  of  the  machinery — Parts  of  the  machine — 1.  The  Sut,tah — 
The  Firman  of  1892 — The  Sinai  Peninsula — 2.  The  Khedive — 
Rescript  of  August  28,  1878 — Constitutionalism  of  Tewfik  Pasha 
— 3.  The  Ministers — The  Departments — Position  of  an  Eg'yptian 
Minister — i.  The  Organic  Law  of  May  1,  1883 — The  Provincial 
Councils — The  Legislative  Council — The  Legislative  Assembly. 

If  any  one  unacquainted  with  mechanics  enters  a 
factory  where  a  quantity  of  steam  machinery  is  at 
work,  he  is  for  a  moment  deafened  with  the  noise, 
and  his  first  impression  will  not  improbably  be  one 
of  surprise  that  any  deUcate  bit  of  workmanship 
can  result  from  the  apparent  confusion  which  he 
sees  before  him.  Gradually,  however,  he  comes  to 
understand  that  the  rate  at  which  each  wheel  turns 
is  regulated  to  a  nicety,  that  the  piston  of  the 
steam-engine  cannot  give  a  stroke  by  one  hair's- 
breadth  shorter  or  longer  than  that  which  it  is 
intended  to  give,  that  the  strength  with  which  the 
hammer  is  made  to  descend  is  capable  of  the  most 
perfect  adjustment,  that  safety-valves  and  a  variety 
of  other  checks  and  counterchecks  exist  which  are 
sufficient  guarantees  against  accident,  and  that, 
generally,  each  portion  of  the  macliinery  is  adapted 
to  perform  a  certain  specified  bit  of  work  and  is 
under  such  perfect  control  that  it  cannot  interfere 
with  the  functions  of  any  other  portion.  He  wiH 
then  no  longer  be  surprised  that,  with  a  little  care 
in  oiling  the  different  parts  of  the  machinery,  a 


200 


t 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT  261 

higlily  finished  piece  of  workmanship  is  eventually 
produced. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  finds  on  examination 
that  the  confusion  is  even  worse  than  at  first  sight 
appeared,  that  the  movement  of  each  wheel  is 
eccentric  in  the  highest  degree,  that  the  piston  is 
hable  at  any  moment  to  stop  working,  that  there  is 
no  adequate  machinery  for  adjusting  the  strength 
of  the  stroke  to  be  given  by  the  hammer,  that 
safety-valves  and  other  guarantees  against  accident 
are  wanting,  that  the  work  to  be  performed  by 
each  separate  portion  is  uncertain  and  variable, 
that  some  portions  are  of  the  latest  and  most 
improved  patterns  whilst  others  are  old,  rusty,  and 
obsolete,  that  a  strong  centrifugal  force  is  con- 
stantly at  work  impelling  the  different  parts  of  the 
machinery  to  fly  out  of  their  own  orbits,  and  that 
a  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  engineer  in  not 
removing  any  small  particle  of  grit  betimes,  or  not 
applying  the  right  amount  of  oil  at  the  right 
moment,  may  bring  about  a  collapse  of  the  whole 
fabric, — he  wiU  then  no  longer  look  for  the 
production  of  any  liighly  finished  article.  Indeed, 
he  will  be  surprised  that  the  mechanical  chaos 
before  him  is  capable  of  producing  any  article 
at  all. 

The  Egyptian  administrative  system  bears  to 
the  administration  of  any  highly  civilised  European 
State  much  the  same  relation  as  the  second  factory 
described  above  bears  to  the  first.  In  Europe,  we 
know  what  a  despotism  means,  and  we  know  what 
constitutional  government  means.  The  words 
absolute  monarchy,  liinited  monarchy,  repubhc, 
parliamentary  government,  federal  council,  and 
others  of  a  hke  nature,  when  apphed  to  the 
government  of  any  country,  will  readUy  convey 
to  an  educated  European  a  general  idea  of  how  the 
government  of  the  particular  country  in  question 


262  MODERN  EGYPT 


is  conducted.  But  the  political  dictionary  may  be 
ransacked  in  vain  for  any  terse  description  of  the 
Government  of  Egypt. 

In  the  first  place,  that  Government  is,  in 
reality,  not  a  Government  at  aU.  Nubar  Pasha 
frequently  said  :  "  Ce  n'est  pas  un  Gouvernement ; 
c'est  une  administration."  Tliis  is  quite  true.  The 
Khedive  is  deprived  by  the  Egyptian  constitutional 
charter  of  all  rights  of  external  sovereignty,  neither 
does  he  possess  to  the  fuU  those  rights  of  internal 
sovereignty  which  are  inherent  in  the  rulers  of  all 
independent,  and  even  of  some  semi-independent 
states. 

In  the  second  place,  the  manner  in  which  the 
legislative  power  is  exercised  in  the  Ottoman 
dominions,  of  which  Egypt  forms  a  part,  is  unique. 
We  readily  understand  what  a  Ukase  issued  by 
the  Czar  of  Russia  means.  An  intelligent  foreigner 
will  at  once  seize  on  what  is  meant  when  it  is  said 
that  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  has  given  his  assent  to  a  Bill 
which  has  passed  through  both  Houses  of  ParUa- 
ment.  But  the  Khedive's  power  is  dissimilar  to 
that  of  either  a  despotic  or  a  constitutional  ruler. 
He  cannot,  on  his  own  authority,  issue  any  Decree 
the  provisions  of  which  will  be  binding  on  all 
the  inhabitants  of  Egj^t.  Legislation  has  to  be 
conducted  by  diplomacy.  The  President  of  the 
United  States  and  the  King  of  Sweden  have  to 
give  their  consent  before  the  provisions  of  any  new 
law  can  be  apphed  to  the  subjects  of  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  or  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  for  in 
legislation  by  diplomacy  unanimity  amongst  the 
diplomatic  legislators  is  required ;  otherwise  no 
legislation  can  take  place.  The  system,  as  Lord 
SaUsbury  once  wrote  to  me,  "  is  like  the  liberinn 
veto  of  the  Pohsh  Diet,  without  the  resource  of 
cutting  off  the  dissentient's  head." 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT  263 


In  the  third  place,  the  executive  power  is  so 
disseminated  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  say- 
where  it  resides.  In  certain  matters,  the  Khedive 
and  his  Ministers  are  practically  vested  with 
despotic  power.  In  others,  their  hands  are  tied  to 
a  greater  extent  than  those  of  the  Governors  of 
the  most  democratic  States.  Moreover,  it  often 
happens  that,  although  the  text  of  the  document 
which  confers  some  special  power  may  be  clear, 
it  will  be  found,  on  closer  inspection,  that  some 
international  or  other  ligament  exists,  which  is 
apparently  so  flimsy  as  to  be  only  visible  to  the 
eye  of  a  trained  diplomatist,  but  which  is  in  reality 
of  so  tough  a  texture  as  to  place  an  effectual 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  practical  exercise  of  the 
power. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  judicial  system  is  a 
tangle  of  conflicting  jurisdictions.  The  law  is  at 
times  applied  by  a  body  of  foreign  judges  who, 
being  free  from  the  restraints  of  any  legislature, 
are  practically  a  law  unto  themselves.  At  times, 
again,  the  law  is  administered  by  Egyptian  judges. 
Each  Consul  judges  his  own  countrymen  for  criminal 
offences  according  to  the  laws  of  his  own  country, 
whilst  close  by  the  Kadi  is  endeavouring  to  settle 
some  dispute  over  a  will  according  to  the  rusty 
principles  laid  down  thirteen  centuries  ago  by 
Mohammed. 

The  compUcated  machinery,  whose  general  nature 
is  described  above,  will  now  be  explahied  in  detail. 
It  will  be  as  well,  in  the  first  instance,  to  enumerate 
the  parts  of  the  machine.    They  are  as  follows  : — 

1.  The  Sultan.  2.  The  Khedive.  3.  The 
Ministers.  4.  The  Legislative  Council  and  As- 
sembly. 5.  The  superior  European  officials,  mostly 
British,  who  are  attached  in  various  capacities  to 
the  different  Ministries. 

The  above  constitute  the  Turkish,  Egyptian,  and 


264 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  rv 


Anglo -Egyptian,  as  opposed  to  the  International 
portions  of  the  administration.  The  International, 
or,  as  they  are  usually  called,  tlie  Mixed  Administra- 
tions were  created  in  virtue  of  arrangements  made, 
from  time  to  time,  between  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment and  the  Powers.  Neither  their  functions  nor 
their  constitution  can  be  changed  without  the 
assent  of  the  Powers.  In  1882,  when  the  British 
occupation  commenced,  they  were  as  follows : — 
1.  The  Commission  of  the  PubUc  Debt.  2.  The 
Railway  Board,  under  which  was  also  placed  the 
administration  of  the  Telegraph  Department  and 
of  the  Port  of  Alexandria.  3.  The  Daira  Ad- 
ministration.   4.  The  Domains  Administration. 

Lastly,  justice  is  administered  by  the  following 
law-courts: — 1.  The  Mixed  Tribunals.  2.  The 
Native  Tribunals.  3.  The  Consular  Courts.  4. 
The  Mehkemeh  Sheraieh. 

1.  The  Sultan. 

The  relations  between  the  Sultan  and  the 
Khedive  are  laid  do^vn  in  a  variety  of  Firmans 
dating  from  1841  to  1892.  Of  these,  the  most 
recent  is  naturally  the  most  important.  It  was 
issued  to  Abbas  II.  on  March  27,  1892.  Save  in 
respect  to  one  point,  to  which  allusion  will  presently 
be  made,  this  Firman  does  not  differ  from  that  of 
August  7,  1879,  granted  to  Tewfik  Pasha. 

The  main  provision  of  the  Firman  of  1892  is 
that  under  certain  restrictions,  the  civil  and  financial 
administration  of  Egypt  is  confided  to  the  Khedive 
Abbas  II.  and  his  male  descendants  taken  in  order 
of  primogeniture.  The  restrictions  are  as  follows : — 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  laid  do"vvn  that  all 
Egyptians  are  Ottoman  subjects.  The  taxes  are 
to  be  levied  in  the  name  of  the  Sultan.  There  can, 
therefore,  conformably  with  the  Firman,  be  no 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT 


265 


such  thing  as  a  separate  Egyptian  State,  or  a 
separate  Egyptian  nationality. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  taken  for  granted  that 
the  Khedive  has  no  right  to  make  political  Treaties 
with  foreign  states.  Conventions  dealing  with  com- 
mercial affairs,  or  with  those  which  relate  solely  to 
matters  of  purely  internal  administration,  may, 
however,  be  made.  Mr.  James  Scott,  the  lecturer 
at  the  Khedivial  School  of  Law,  says :  "  In  regard 
to  the  right  of  the  Egyptian  Government  to  make 
International  Conventions,  it  would  appear  that  it 
has  power  to  make  Conventions  in  reference  to 
every  question  except  the  cession  of  territory,  or 
the  making  of  peace  or  war."^  As  a  natural 
result  of  this  pohtical  relationship,  the  Khedive 
has  no  right  to  appoint  a  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative to  any  European  court.  Further,  as 
a  general  rule,  when  the  European  Powers  meet 
in  conclave,  Egjrpt  is  represented  by  the  Ottoman 
delegate.  Separate  Egyptian  representation  has, 
however,  been  allowed  at  Conferences  assembled 
to  deal  with  special  subjects,  in  which  Egypt 
is  interested.  It  is  not  easy  to  lay  down  any 
very  precise  rule  on  this  subject.  Thus,  when, 
in  1884,  a  Conference  was  assembled  in  London 
to  consider  the  financial  affairs  of  Egypt,  the 
Egyptian  Government  were  denied  any  separate 
representation.  Musurus  Pasha,  the  Turkish  Am- 
bassador in  London,  sat,  and  often  slept  at  the 
Council  table,^  whilst  the   Egyptian  delegates, 

^  The  Law  affecting  Foreigners  in  Egypt,  as  the  Result  of  the 
Capitulations,  p.  145. 

^  I  cannot  refrain  from  relating  a  somewhat  amusing  incident  which 
happened  at  this  Conference.  At  that  time,  all  the  Powers,  except 
perhaps  Italy,  were  acting  in  concert  against  England.  England  was 
defending  Egyptian  interests.  Count  Munster  proposed  that  the 
quarantine  question,  in  which  Germany  at  that  moment  took  much 
interest,  should  be  discussed.  Lord  Granville  pointed  out  that,  if  once 
the  Conference  went  beyond  the  limits  for  which  it  had  been  assembled, 
there  was  no  reason  wliy  every  description  of  Eastern  question  should 
not  be  brought  within  its  cognisance.     ITius,  an  undesirably  wide 


266  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

Tigrane  Pasha  and  Blum  Pasha,  occupied  a  side 
table,  and  were  not  allowed  to  take  any  direct  part 
in  the  discussions.  On  the  other  hand,  at  the 
Conference,  which  met  at  Venice  in  1892  to  discuss 
quarantine  affairs,  the  Egyptian  Government  were 
accorded  the  right  of  separate  representation  to 
this  extent,  that  the  Egyptian  delegates  could 
speak  but  could  not  vote.  A  further  step  in 
advance  was  made  at  the  Sanitary  Conference  held 
at  Paris  in  1904.  The  Egyptian  delegates  were 
accorded  the  right  of  voting  in  Committee,  but  not 
at  the  plenary  sittings  of  the  Commission. 

In  the  third  place,  the  Khedive  cannot  abandon 
to  a  third  party  any  of  the  territorial  riglits  of  the 
Sultan.  In  respect  of  this  matter,  theory  and  fact 
came  into  collision  when  the  Italians  occupied 
Massowah. 

In  the  fourth  place,  traditional  Turkish  jealousy 
of  Egypt  is  shown  by  the  provision  that  the 
Egyptian  army  cannot,  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances, exceed  18,000  men.  If,  however,  Turkey 
is  at  war,  the  Egyptian  army  may  be  called  upon 
to  fight  in  the  cause  of  the  Sultan,  in  which  case  it 
may  be  increased  according  to  the  requirements  of 
the  moment.    Following  on  the  same  order  of 

field  would  be  opened  up  for  discussion.  TTie  French  and  Russian 
representatives  pointed  out  that  no  danger  of  this  sort  was  to  be  feared, 
for  that  no  one  wished  to  raise  any  other  question  save  that  of 
quarantine.  The  question  was  put  to  the  vote,  which  proceeded  on 
what  may  be  termed  strictly  party  lines,  until  it  came  to  the  turn  of 
Musurus  Pasha.  A  true  emblem  of  the  country  which  he  represented, 
Musurus  Pasha  was  fast  asleep,  and  had  heard  nothing  of  the  discussion 
which  led  to  the  vote.  He  was  awakened,  and  was  informed  that  he 
had  to  vote  on  the  question  of  whether  quarantine  matters  should  or 
should  not  be  brought  before  the  Conference.  He  was  at  the  time 
acting  in  general  concert  with  the  anti-English  party,  but.  as  he  had 
not  been  told  beforehand  what  he  had  to  do,  he  gave  utterance  to  a 
perfectly  independent  opinion.  "  Parfaitemeut,"  he  said,  "je  suis  de 
cet  avis  ;  mais  alors  j'ai  beaucoup  d'autres  questions  que  je  voudrais 
porter  a  la  connaissance  de  la  Conference."  Lord  Granville  had  found 
an  unconscious  and  involuntary  ally.  He  carried  his  point.  Quarantine 
affairs  were  not  discussed. 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT  267 


ideas,  it  is  provided  that  the  Khedive  cannot 
construct  any  ironclads  {bdtiments  blindes)  without 
the  authority  of  the  Sultan.  The  Turkish  flag 
is  to  be  the  Egyptian  flag.  The  distinctive  marks 
of  military  rank  are  to  be  identic  in  the  two  armies. 
The  Khedive  may  grant  the  rank  of  Colonel  to 
military,  and  that  of  Sanieh  (second-class  Bey)  to 
civil  officials,  but  he  may  not  confer  any  higher 
titles. 

In  the  fifth  place,  the  coinage  of  Eg}^t  is  to  be 
issued  in  the  name  of  the  Sultan. 

In  return  for  concessions  made  at  various  times 
by  the  Sultans,  Ismail  Pasha  undertook  to  pay  a 
Tribute  of  £682,000  a  year  to  the  Porte.'  The 
original  sum  paid  in  1841  by  Mehemet  Ali  was 
£377,000,  but  under  the  combined  influence  of 
ambitious  Khedives  and  of  impecunious  Sultans, 
the  figure  was  nearly  doubled  at  subsequent 
periods. 

It  has  been  already  stated  that,  save  in  respect 
to  one  point,  the  Firman  of  1892  was  a  repro- 
duction of  that  of  1879.  It  will  be  as  well  to 
allude  briefly  to  the  exception. 

The  Firman  of  1879  laid  down  that  the 
Khedivate  of  Egypt  w^as  to  be  "  tel  qu'il  se  trouve 
forme  par  ses  anciennes  limites  et  en  comprenant 
les  territoires  qui  y  ont  ete  annexes."  When  the 
Firman  of  1892  was  in  course  of  preparation,  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  was  assured 
that  it  was  identic  with  that  of  1879.  There  was, 
however,  reason  to  believe  that  this  statement  was 
incorrect.  The  Porte  had  always  been  sensitive 
as  regards  European  interference  in  or  near  the 
Hedjaz.  Indeed,  the  law  allowing  foreigners  to 
acquire  real  property  in  the  Ottoman  dominions 
forbids  any  European  to  settle  in  the  Hedjaz. 

1  Practically  the  whole  of  the  Tribute  is  mortgaged  to  the  Ottoman 
bondholders. 


268  MODERN  EGYPT 


More  than  this,  the  Sultan's  suspicions  had  been 
aroused  by  two  recent  incidents.  One  was  that 
Turkish  misgovernment  had  produced  a  revolt 
in  the  province  of  the  Yemen,  which  was,  without 
a  shadow  of  foundation,  attributed  to  British 
intrigue.  The  second  was  that  a  weU-intentioned 
German  enthusiast,  named  Friedmann,  of  Jewish 
origin,  was,  at  the  moment  when  the  Firman 
was  under  discussion,  endeavouring  to  establish 
a  settlement  of  some  couple  of  dozen  Jews, 
who  had  been  expeUed  from  Russia,  on  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Akaba.  This  was 
suspicious.  Moukhtar  Pasha  pointed  out  that  the 
Jews  had  always  been  waiting  for  a  Messiah  to 
reconquer  Jerusalem,  and  that,  ^vithout  doubt,  they 
would  think  he  had  now  appeared  in  the  person  of 
Mr.  Friedmann.  It  was  not  difficult  to  convince 
Moukhtar  Pasha  that  Mr.  Friedmann  was  devoid  of 
any  such  pretensions.^  But  the  suspicions  of  the 
Sidtan  were  not  so  easily  calmed.  The  result  was 
that  the  Firman  laid  doAvn  the  Egyptian  frontier 
as  drawn  from  Suez  to  El-Arish.  The  Peninsula 
of  Sinai,  which  had  been  administered  by  the 
Khedives  of  Egypt  for  the  last  forty  years,  would 
thus  have  reverted  to  Turkey.  It  was  undesirable 
to  bring  Turkish  soldiers  down  to  the  banks  of  the 
Suez  Canal.  When,  therefore,  the  Firman  arrived, 
the  British  Government  interposed  and  placed  a 
veto  on  its  promulgation.  After  a  short  dela}  ,  the 
Grand  X^izier  telegraphed  to  the  Khedive  accepting 
a  proposal,  which  had  been  offered  to  the  Sultan 
some  weeks  previously,  but  which  His  Imperial 
Majesty  had  then  refused  to  entertain.^  Under 

>  Mr.  Friedmann  maybe  known  to  some  Englishmen  as  the  author 
of  a  history  of  Anne  Boleyn. 

^  The  settlement  of  this  question  was  in  a  great  measure  due  to  the 
skill  with  which  the  negotiations  at  Constantinople  were  conducted  by 
the  late  Sir  Edmund  Fane,  who  was  at  the  time  in  charge  of  the 
Embassy, 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT  269 


this  arrangement,  the  frontier  of  Egypt  was  drawn 
from  El-Arish  to  the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  Akaba. 
The  incident  was  thus  for  the  time  being  termin- 
ated, and  the  Firman  was  promulgated  with  all 
customary  pomp.  Occasion  was  taken  to  lay  down 
again  the  principle  that  "no  alteration  could  be 
made  in  the  Firmans  regulating  the  relations 
between  the  Sublime  Porte  and  Egypt  without  the 
consent  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government." 

In  1905,  another  and  more  determined  effort 
was  made  by  the  Sultan  to  occupy  the  Sinai 
Peninsula,  but  after  a  brief,  and  somewhat  stormy 
negotiation,  the  arrangement  made  in  1892  was 
confirmed.  Shortly  afterwards,  the  Turco-Egyptian 
frontier  was  delimitated  by  a  Joint  Commission. 

Such,  therefore,  are  the  official  relations  between 
the  Sultan  and  the  Khedive.  From  the  observa- 
tions which  have  been  made  in  the  course  of  this 
narrative,  it  will  have  been  gathered  that  the 
constant  endeavour  of  the  Sultan  has  been  to 
encroach  on  the  rights  of  the  Khedive.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  sentiments  of  the  ruling  classes  in 
Egypt  towards  the  Sultan  may  be  described  as  a 
compound  of  fear,  religious  sympathy,  and  political 
dislike.  Which  of  these  sentiments  is  predominant 
depends  on  the  fleeting  circumstances  of  the 
moment. 

2.  The  Khedive. 

It  was  explained  in  the  first  part  of  this  work 
how  an  unwilling  recognition  of  the  principle  of 
ministerial  responsibihty  was  wrung  from  Ismail 
Pasha.  Ismail's  Rescript  of  August  28, 1878,^  was, 
indeed,  violated  almost  immediately  after  its  issue. 
Nevertheless,  it  forms  to  this  day  the  Magna 
Charta  of  Egypt. 

Naturally  enough,  more  depends  on  the  spirit 

*  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  62. 


270  MODERN  EGYPT 


in  which  the  Rescript  is  apphed  than  on  the  terms 
of  the  document  itself.  By  a  fortunate  accident, 
IsmaU  Pasha  was  succeeded  by  a  Khedive  who 
had  a  natural  turn  for  constitutionahsm.  Tewfik 
Pasha  acted  up  to  the  spirit  of  his  father's  declara- 
tions. He  asserted  his  legitimate  prerogatives,  but 
he  governed  "  through  and  with  his  Council  of 
Ministers."  The  terms  of  the  Rescript  are,  how- 
ever, sufficiently  elastic  to  enable  all  the  most 
objectionable  abuses  of  personal  government  to  be 
re-established  without  any  apparent  violation  of 
the  letter  of  Ismail  Pasha's  declaration.  So  long 
as  the  British  occupation  lasts,  a  sohd  guarantee 
exists  that  any  tendency  towards  the  re-estabhsh- 
ment  of  a  bad  form  of  personal  government  will  be 
cheeked  before  disastrous  consequences  ensue. 

3.  The  Ministers. 

The  Egyptian  administrative  machine  is  divided 
into  seven  Departments,  over  each  of  which  a 
Minister  presides.  These  are  Foreign  Affairs, 
Finance,  Justice,  War,  PubUc  Works,  Education, 
and  the  Interior. 

The  Post  Office,  the  Customs,  and  the  Light- 
houses are  under  the  Financial  Department.  The 
Sanitary  Department  and  the  Prisons  are  attached 
to  the  Interior.  The  Wakfs  (religious  endowments) 
are  administered  by  a  Director -General,  who  in 
practice  takes  his  orders  direct  from  the  Khedive. 

The  proceedings  of  the  Council  are  conducted 
partly  in  Arabic  and  partly  in  French,  the  latter 
language  being  employed  to  suit  the  convenience 
of  those  European  officials  who  have  a  right  to  be 
present  at  the  meetings  of  Council,  and  of  Eg\^tian 
Ministers  ^  who  are  not  acquainted  with  the  Arabic 
language. 

*  E.g.  Nubar  and  Tigprane  Patihas. 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT 


271 


The  position  of  an  Egj^tian  jNIinister  is  difficult 
and  delicate.  There  are  usually  in  his  Department 
one  or  more  liigh  European  officials,  who  are 
subordinate  to  him.  The  ideal  state  of  things 
would  be  if  the  JNIinister  showed  no  jealousy  of  his 
subordinate,  worked  cordially  with  him,  followed 
his  advice  when  it  was  sound,  and  stated  his  objec- 
tions intelligently  when  he  thought  it  was  question- 
able ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  European 
official  was  careful  never  to  be  aggressive,  or  to  press 
unduly  lor  the  adoption  of  his  \'iews  in  doubtful 
cases.  It  has  not  always  been  easy  to  find  Egyptian 
Ministers  who  will  carry  out  the  first,  or  Europeans 
who  wiU  carry  out  the  second  part  of  this  pro- 
gramme. Nevertheless,  the  system  has  on  the 
whole  worked  smoothly.  More  especially  of  late 
years,  the  relations  between  the  Egyptian  Ministers 
and  their  British  coadjutors  have  been  most  cordial 
and  friendly. 

4.  The  Organic  Law  of  May  1,  1883. 

Briefly  stated,  the  provisions  of  the  Organic 
Law  of  May  1,  1883,  which  was  framed  under 
Lord  Dufferin's  auspices,  are  as  follows  : — 

A  Provincial  Council,  composed  of  from  eight 
to  three  members,  according  to  the  size  of  the 
province,  is  established  in  each  Moudirieh.  The 
Moudir  is  the  President.  The  functions  of  these 
Councils  are  to  deal  with  local  matters,  such  as  the 
alignment  of  roads  and  canals,  the  establishment 
of  markets,  etc.  The  total  number  of  Provincial 
Councillors  is  seventy.  When  we  are  liberal  in 
Egypt,  we  do  not  content  ourselves  with  half- 
measures.  The  members  of  the  Council  are  elected 
by  universal  suffrage. 

The  Legislative  Council  is  composed  of  thirty 
members.     Of    these,    fourteen,    including  the 


272 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  rv 


President,  are  named  by  the  Egyptian  Government. 
Of  the  remainder,  fourteen  are  elected  by  the  Pro- 
vincial Councils  from  amongst  their  own  members, 
one  is  elected  by  the  town  of  Cairo,  and  one  by 
Alexandria  and  some  other  less  important  towns. 
No  Law  or  Decree  "  portant  reglement  d'adminis- 
tration  publique"  can  be  promulgated  without  its 
having  been  previously  submitted  to  the  Council. 
The  Government  are  not  obhged  to  adopt  the  views 
of  the  CouncQ,  but,  in  the  event  of  their  not  doing 
so,  the  reasons  for  the  rejection  must  be  com- 
municated to  the  Council.  "  L'exposition  de  ces 
motifs  ne  peut  donner  lieu  a  aucune  discussion." 
The  Budget  has  to  be  submitted  to  the  Council, 
who  may  "  emettre  des  avis  et  des  voeux  sur 
chaque  chapitre  du  Budget."  The  Government  are, 
however,  not  obliged  to  conform  to  any  views 
which  may  be  expressed  by  the  Council  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Budget,  nor  may  the  latter  discuss 
any  financial  charge  incumbent  on  the  Egyptian 
Treasury,  which  results  from  an  international 
arrangement.  The  Egj^tian  JNIinisters  may  take 
part  in  the  discussions  of  the  Council,  or  may 
cause  themselves  to  be  represented  by  any  high 
functionaries  of  their  respective  Departments. 

The  Legislative  Assembly  consists  of  eighty-two 
members,  viz. :  The  six  JMinisters,  the  thirty  members 
of  the  Legislative  Council,  and  forty-six  delegates 
who  are  elected  by  tlie  population.  Certain  quali- 
fications are  necessary  in  order  to  become  a  candidate 
for  election  to  the  Assembly.  The  candidate  must 
be  not  less  than  thirty  years  old,  he  must  be  able 
to  read  and  write,  and  he  must  pay  direct  taxes 
to  the  amount  of  not  less  than  £E.30  a  year.  No 
new  direct  tax  can  be  imposed  without  the  approval 
of  the  Assembly.  The  Assembly  must  also  be 
consulted  about  any  public  loans,  about  the  con- 
struction of  canals  and  railways,  and  about  the 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT 


273 


classification  of  lands  in  connection  with  the  pay- 
ment of  the  land-tax.  The  Assembly  may  also 
spontaneously  express  its  views  on  all  economic, 
administrative,  and  financial  questions.  As  in  the 
case  of  the  Legislative  Council,  the  Government 
are  not  under  any  obligation  to  adopt  the  opinions 
of  the  Assembly  in  such  matters,  but  the  reasons 
for  not  adopting  them  must  be  stated.  The 
Assembly  must  meet  at  least  once  in  two  years. 
The  public  are  not  admitted  to  the  sittings  either 
of  the  Council  or  of  the  Assembly. 

In  the  last  Report  I  wrote  before  leaving  Egypt  ^ 
I  expressed  myself  favourably  to  the  proposal  that 
reporters  should  be  admitted  to  the  sittings  of  the 
Council.  If  this  proposal  encounters  opposition, 
it  will  come,  not  from  any  European  authority, 
but  from  the  members  of  the  Council  themselves. 
I  have  reason  to  believe  that,  amongst  these,  a 
good  deal  of  difference  of  opinion  exists  as  to  the 
desirability  of  effecting  this  reform. 

Besides  these  institutions,  the  Organic  Law  of 
May  1,  1883,  provided  for  the  establishment  of  a 
Council  of  State  (Conseil  d'Etat)  whose  organisa- 
tion and  functions  were  to  be  explained  in  a 
subsequent  Decree.  This  institution  was  borrowed 
from  France.  Its  alleged  object  was  to  prepare 
draft  laws  for  submission  to  the  legislature.  When 
I  arrived  in  Egypt,  in  September  1883,  I  found 
that  the  formation  of  the  Council  of  State  was  a 
burning  question.  It  very  soon  became  apparent 
that,  under  cover  of  this  institution,  international 
government  was  to  be  introduced  into  every  branch 
of  the  Egyptian  administration.  The  discussion 
went  on  for  several  months  until,  on  January  19, 
1884,  I  informed  Lord  Granville  that  the  Council 
of  State  would  be  a  useless  and  expensive  body. 
Nubar  Pasha  was  of  the  same  opinion.  Egypt 

1  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  p.  29. 
VOL.  II  T 


274  MODERN  EGYPT 


was  thus  mercifully  saved  from  this  particular 
form  of  international  plague. 

Such,  therefore,  are  the  constitution  and  func- 
tions of  the  Egyptian  Houses  of  Parliament 
Lord  Dufferin's  law  was  conceived  in  a  liberal 
and  statesmanlike  spirit.  The  leading  idea  was 
to  give  the  Egyptian  people  an  opportunity  of 
making  their  voices  heard,  but  at  the  same  time 
not  to  bind  the  executive  Government  by  parlia- 
mentary fetters,  which  would  have  been  out  of 
place  in  a  country  whose  political  education  was 
so  little  advanced  as  that  of  Egypt. 

The  question  of  the  extension  of  representative 
institutions  in  Egypt  has  recently  formed  the 
subject  of  much  public  discussion.  I  do  not 
propose  to  deal  with  this  question  at  any  length. 
The  main  object  of  this  work,  which  will,  I  fear, 
extend  to  greater  length  than  I  originally  intended, 
is  to  narrate  the  history  of  the  past,  rather  than  to 
discuss  questions  which  now  occupy  the  attention 
of  the  public,  and  of  the  responsible  Egyptian 
authorities.  Moreover,  my  views  on  this  particular 
issue  have  already  been  fully  and  pubhcly  ex- 
pressed.^ My  remarks  will,  therefore,  be  very 
brief. 

In  the  first  place,  I  wish  to  say  that  Lord 
DufFerin  was  under  no  delusion  as  to  the  time 
which  would  elapse,  and  as  to  the  difficulties  which 
would  have  to  be  encountered  before  free  institu- 
tions could  take  root  in  the  somewhat  micongenial 
soil  of  Egypt.  All  he  hoped  to  do  w^as  "  to  erect 
some  sort  of  barrier,  however  feeble,  against  the 
intolerable  tjTanny  of  the  Turks."  He  hoped  that, 
"  under  British  superintendence,"  the  legislative 
bodies  which  he  created  "might  be  fostered,  and 
educated  into  fairly  useful  institutions,  proving  a 

'  Vide,  inter  alia,  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  pp.  11-13  ;  Egypt,  No.  1  of 
1907,  pp.  3-8,  26-32,  aud  66 ;  and  Egypt,  No.  3  of  1907. 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT  275 


convenient  channel  through  which  the  European 
element  in  the  Government  might  obtain  an 
insight  into  the  inner  mind  and  the  less  obvious 
wants  of  the  native  population."^  There  cannot 
be  a  shadow  of  doubt  that,  far  from  considering 
that  progress  had  been  objectionably  slow,  Lord 
DufFerin  was  not  merely  gratified,  but  also  some- 
what astonished  at  the  extent  to  which,  up  to  the 
time  of  liis  death,  the  services  of  the  institutions, 
of  wliich  he  was  the  creator,  had  been  utihsed. 

Next,  I  have  to  observe  that,  if  anything  is  to 
be  done  in  the  direction  of  a  further  development 
of  the  institutions  created  in  1883,  by  far  the 
wisest  course  will  be  to  begin  at  the  bottom  of 
the  legislative  ladder.  "  It  is  certain,"  Lord 
Dufferin  very  truly  said  in  his  Report,  "  that  local 
self-government  is  the  fittest  preparation  and  most 
convenient  stepping-stone  for  anything  approaching 
to  a  constitutional  regime."  During  the  last  twenty- 
four  years,  a  good  deal  more  has  been  done  in  the 
way  of  developing  local  self-government  than  many 
of  those  who  write  on  Egyptian  affairs  seem  to  be 
aware  of.^ 

In  many  of  the  most  important  provincial  towns, 
Mixed  Municipahties  —  that  is  to  say,  municipal 
bodies  of  which  some  of  the  members  are  European 
and  others  are  Egyptian — have  been  established. 
The  difficulty  of  extending  the  system  lies  in  the 
fact  that  whilst,  on  the  one  hand,  no  very  great  or 
rapid  progress  can  be  made  unless  the  Municipal 
Commissioners  are  invested  with  certain  powers  of 
local  taxation,  on  the  other  hand,  no  local  taxes 
can  be  imposed  on  Europeans  without  the  consent 
of  the  Powers.    Hence,  until  the  regime  of  the 

^  These  passages  are  quoted  from  a  letter  addressed  to  me  by  Lord 
Dufferin.  It  is  given  in  Sir  Alfred  Lyall's  Life  of  the  Marquis  of 
Dufferin,  vol.  ii.  p.  260. 

2  This  bi-anch  of  the  subject  is  more  fully  treated  in  my  Report  for 
the  year  1906.    See  ±:gyiJt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  29-32. 


27G 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Capitulations  is  modified,  it  will  not  be  possible  to 
create  JNIixed  Municipalities  in  any  towns  unless 
the  whole  of  the  population  are  willing  to  submit 
to  a  system  of  voluntary  taxation. 

In  a  large  number  of  other  towns,  Local  Com- 
missions have  been  appointed  who  administer  the 
funds  placed  at  their  disposal  by  the  Egyptian 
Government. 

It  is,  I  think,  in  the  direction  of  increasing  the 
numbers  and  extending  the  powers  of  the  Munici- 
palities and  Local  Commissions  that  the  principal 
development  of  local  self-government  is,  in  the  near 
future,  to  be  anticipated.  Care,  however,  will  have 
to  be  taken  in  dealing  with  this  matter.  One  of 
the  greatest  errors  into  which  Europeans  employed 
in  the  East  are  liable  to  fall  is  to  imagine  that 
Orientals  are  as  much  impressed  as  they  are  them- 
selves with  the  necessity  of  speedily  providing 
roads,  drains,  lighting,  and  all  the  other  parapher- 
nalia of  civilisation.  The  present  race  of  Egyptians 
are,  indeed,  willing  enough  to  profit  by  all  these 
things,  if  they  are  provided  for  them  from  the  pro- 
ceeds of  general  taxation,  but  the  crucial  ques- 
tion is  whether  they  are  themselves  willing  to 
pay  additional  taxes  in  order  to  attain  these 
objects.  They  have  not,  up  to  the  present  time, 
shown  much  disposition  to  do  so.  It  will  be  wise, 
therefore,  not  to  force  the  pace.  It  should  always 
be  remembered  that  what  the  mass  of  the  popula- 
tion in  a  backward  Eastern  country  care  for  above 
almost  all  things  is  that  taxation  should  be  light. 

As  regards  the  Provincial  Councils,  a  detail 
which  slipped  into  the  Organic  Law  of  1883 — very 
possibly  without  its  effect  being  fully  realised — has 
done  a  good  deal  to  impair  their  utility.  It  was 
laid  down  that  no  Provincial  Council  could  meet 
without  being  convoked  by  the  JNl oudir,  and  that 
the  latter  could  not  convoke  the  Council  without  the 


CH.  XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT  277 


issue  of  a  Khedivial  Decree,  laying  down  both  the 
time  and  duration  of  the  meeting.  The  practical  re- 
sult of  this  arrangement  has  been  that  the  Councils 
have  never  met  more  than  once  a  year.  The  time 
has  certainly  come  when  the  whole  of  this  question 
may  usefully  be  considered.  One  of  the  last  pro- 
posals I  made  before  leaving  Egypt  ^  was  that  the 
Provincial  Councils  should  be  reorganised,  their 
powers  somewhat  increased,  and  that  steps  should 
be  taken  to  carry  out  more  fully  what  was  unques- 
tionably Lord  DufFerin's  intention,  viz.  that  the 
Councils  should  be  real  working  bodies,  acting  as 
advisers  to  the  Moudir.  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  has  this 
matter  in  hand,  and  will,  I  do  not  doubt,  with  the 
help  of  the  British  and  Egyptian  officials,  be  able 
to  devise  a  scheme  suitable  to  the  requirements 
and  present  condition  of  the  country. 

The  question  of  whether  the  powers  and  con- 
stitution of  the  Legislative  Council  may  advan- 
tageously be  changed  is  one  of  far  greater  difficultv. 
As  I  have  already  said,  I  do  not  propose  to  discuss 
it  at  length.  I  will,  therefore,  only  say  that  whilst 
I  am  not  prepared  to  maintain  that  some  cautious 
steps  in  this  direction  might  not  before  long  be 
prudently  taken,  I  am  very  strongly  of  opinion 
that  any  attempt  to  confer  full  parliamentary 
powers  on  the  Council  would,  for  a  long  time  to 
come,  be  the  extreme  of  folly  and  would  be  highly 
detrimental  to  the  true  interests  of  the  Egyptians 
themselves.  The  facts  that  many  of  the  members 
of  the  Council  are  men  of  unquestionable  honesty 
and  intelligence,  and  that  some  are  personal  friends 
of  my  own,  cannot  blind  me  to  the  fact  that,  as  a 
whole,  the  Council, — as  would,  indeed,  be  the  case 
with  any  similar  body  which  could,  under  present 
circumstances,  be  constituted  in  Egypt, — possesses 
two  great  defects. 

»  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  29-32. 


278  MODERN  EGYPT 


The  first  is  one  which  they  share  with  repre- 
sentative bodies  in  some  other  countries.  It  is 
that,  acting  under  pubHc  pressure,  they  are  too  apt 
to  propose  important  changes  in  the  fiscal  system, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  to  advocate  large  additional 
expenditure  on  public  objects,  without  sufficient  con- 
sideration of  the  financial  results  which  would  ensue 
were  effect  given  to  their  proposals.  It  should 
never  be  forgotten  that  any  extension  of  repre- 
sentative institutions,  which  was  obtained  at  the 
risk  of  again  plunging  Egypt  into  aU  the  financial 
embarrassment  from  which  the  country  has  been 
so  hardly  and  so  recently  rescued,  would  be  far  too 
dearly  bought. 

The  second  defect,  which  in  the  eyes  of  any  one 
acquainted  with  the  past  history  of  modern  Egj^t  is 
extremely  pardonable,  is  that  the  most  enhghtened 
members  of  the  Council  have  not,  as  yet,  acquired 
all  those  qualities  necessary  to  give  them  the  moral 
courage  to  assert  their  true  opinions  fearlessly. 
Notably,  many  of  them  are  terrorised  by  the  local 
press.  To  the  European  mind,  it  may  seem  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms  to  say  that  freedom  of  speech  is 
checked  by  the  freedom  of  the  press.  But  in  the 
Land  of  Paradox  all  things  are  possible.  I  have 
no  doubt  whatever  that  a  large  number — probably 
a  majority  —  of  the  members  of  the  Legislative 
Council  would  welcome  the  enactment  of  a  rigorous 
press  law  as  a  measure  calculated  to  free  them  from 
the  moral  shackles  which  now  hamper  their  liberty 
of  speech  and  action. 

Of  all  the  institutions  created  by  Lord  Dufferin, 
the  Legislative  Assembly  has,  in  practice,  turned 
out  to  be  the  least  useful  and  eflficient.  It  was, 
and  stiU  is,  too  much  in  advance  of  the  require- 
ments and  political  education  of  the  country.  No 
real  harm  would  be  done  if  it  were  simply  abolished, 
and,  indeed,  the  cause  of  representative  government 


CH.XXXIX      THE  GOVERNMENT  279 


would,  I  believe,  benefit  if,  simultaneously  with 
its  abolition,  the  Legislative  Council  were  re- 
organised, and  its  powers  somewhat  increased. 
Without  doubt,  however,  the  adoption  of  this 
course  would  be  regarded  by  many — erroneously, 
in  my  opinion — as  a  retrograde  measure.  It  may, 
therefore,  be  politically  desirable  not  to  entertain 
the  idea.  In  that  case,  I  hold  that,  for  the  time 
being,  the  Legislative  Assembly  should  be  left 
alone.  I  deprecate  any  attempt  to  enlarge  its 
powers,  and  I  think  it  would  be  extremely  difficult 
to  amend  its  constitution. 

The  purely  Egj^tian  portion  of  the  machinery 
of  government  has  now  been  described.  This  part 
of  the  machinery  would,  however,  never  get  into 
motion  were  it  not  impelled  by  some  strong  motive 
power.  That  motive  power  is  furnished  by  the 
British  officials  in  the  service  of  the  Egyptian 
Government.  The  special  functions  of  these 
officials  win  be  described  in  the  next  chapter. 


> 


CHAPTER  XL 


THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS 

Qualifications  required  of  an  Anglo-Egyptian  official — Positions  of  the 
civil  and  miliUiry  officials — The  French  in  Tunis — 'l"he  Financial 
Adviser — Sir  Edgar  Vincent— The  Judicial  Adviser — History  of 
his  appointment — Sir  Raymond  West — Justice  under  Egyptian 
management — Sir  John  Scott — The  Public  Works  Department — 
Sir  Colin  Scott-MoncrieflF — Sir  ^Filliam  Garstin — The  Financial 
Secretary  —  Blum  Pasha  — Lord  Milner — Sir  Eldon  Gorst  —  Sub- 
Departments  of  Finance — The  Interior — Public  Instruction — 
European  and  Egyptian  officials. 

It  is  related  that  a  lady  once  asked  Madame  de 
Stael  to  recommend  a  tutor  for  her  boy.  She 
described  the  sort  of  man  she  wished  to  find.  He 
was  to  be  a  gentleman  with  perfect  manners  and  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  world  ;  it  was  essential 
that  he  should  be  a  classical  scholar  and  an  accom- 
plished linguist ;  he  was  to  exercise  supreme 
authority  over  his  pupil,  and  at  the  same  time 
he  was  to  show  such  a  degree  of  tact  that  his 
authority  was  to  be  unfelt ;  in  fact,  he  was  to 
possess  almost  every  moral  attribute  and  intellectual 
faculty  which  it  is  possible  to  depict,  and,  lastly, 
he  was  to  place  all  these  qualities  at  the  service 
of  Madame  de  Stael's  friend  for  a  very  low  salary. 
The  witty  Frenchwoman  listened  with  attention 
to  her  friend's  list  of  indispensable  qualifications 
and  eventually  replied :  "  JNIa  chere,  je  comprends 
parfaitement  bien  le  caractere  de  I'homme  qu'il 
vous  faut,  mais  je  dois  vous  dire  que  si  je  le  trouve, 
je  I'epouse." 

280 


CH.  XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  281 


This  story  is  applicable  to  the  qualifications 
demanded  of  an  ideal  Anglo-Egyptian  official. 

The  Anglo-Egyptian  official  must  possess  some 
technical  knowledge,  such  as  that  of  the  engineer, 
the  accountant,  or  the  lawyer ;  otherwise,  he  will 
be  unable  to  deal  with  the  affiiirs  of  the  Depart- 
ment to  which  he  is  attached.  At  the  outset  of 
his  career,  he  is  usually  })laced  at  a  great  disadvan- 
tage. He  must  often  explain  his  ideas  in  a  foreign 
language,  French,  with  which  he  has  probably  only 
a  limited  acquaintance.  Unless  he  is  to  run  the 
risk  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  some  subordinate, 
often  of  doubtful  trustworthiness,  it  is,  at  all  events 
in  respect  to  many  official  posts,  essential  that  he 
should  acquire  some  knowledge  of  a  very  difficult 
Oriental  language,  Arabic.  These,  however,  are  all 
faculties  to  which  it  is  possible  to  apply  some  fairly 
accurate  test.  The  Anglo-Egyptian  official  must  be 
possessed  of  other  qualities,  which  it  is  more  difficult 
to  gauge  with  precision,  but  which  are  in  reality  of 
even  greater  importance  than  those  to  which  allusion 
is  made  above.  He  must  be  a  man  of  high  character. 
He  must  have  sufficient  elasticity  of  mind  to  be 
able  to  apply,  under  circumstances  which  are 
strange  to  him,  the  knowledge  which  he  has 
acquired  elsewhere.  He  must  be  possessed  of  a 
sound  judgment  in  order  to  enable  him  to  distin- 
guish between  abuses,  which  should  be  at  once 
reformed,  and  those  which  it  will  be  wise  to 
tolerate,  at  all  events  for  a  time.  He  must  be 
versatile,  and  quick  to  adapt  any  local  feature  of 
the  administration  to  suit  his  own  reforming 
purposes.  He  must  be  well-mannered  and  con- 
ciliatory, and  yet  not  allow  his  conciliation  to 
degenerate  into  weakness.  He  must  be  firm,  and 
yet  not  allow  his  firmness  to  harden  into  dictation. 
He  must  efface  himself  as  much  as  possible.  In 
fact,  besides  his  special  technical  knowledge,  he 


282  MODERN  EGYPT 


must  possess  all  the  qualities  which  we  look  for  in 
a  trained  diplomatist,  a  good  administrator,  and  an 
experienced  man  of  the  world. 

It  is  not  easy  in  any  country  to  produce  a 
number  of  officials,  who  have  undergone  a  depart- 
mental training,  and  who  at  the  same  time  possess 
all  these  qualities.  It  is  especially  difficult,  when 
they  are  found,  to  attract  them  to  Egypt  on 
salaries  of  £2000  a  year  and  less.  The  efficient 
working  of  the  administrative  machine  depends, 
however,  mainly  on  choosing  the  right  man  for  the 
right  place.  What  often  happens  when  any  place 
has  to  be  filled  is  this, — on  the  one  hand,  are  a 
number  of  candidates  who  wish  to  occupy  the  post, 
but  who  do  not  possess  the  qualifications  necessary 
to  fill  it  with  advantage  to  the  public  interests  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  are  a  very  small  number  of 
persons,  who  possess  the  necessary  qualifications, 
but  who,  for  one  reason  or  another,  are  reluctant 
to  accept  the  appointment.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  is  a  matter  for  congratulation  that 
administrative  successes  have  been  the  rule,  whilst 
the  failures  have  been  the  exceptions. 

Looking  to  the  anomalous  positions  occupied 
by  the  Anglo -Egyptian  officials,  it  is,  indeed, 
greatly  to  their  credit  that,  as  a  body,  they  should 
have  succeeded  in  performing  the  several  tasks 
allotted  to  them.  Without  doubt,  they  have  had 
diplomatic  support  behind  them.  JNIoreover,  and 
this  is  perhaps  more  important  than  the  support 
itself,  it  has  been  felt  by  all  concerned  that  the 
possibility  of  stronger  support  than  that  which  was 
actually  affi)rded  lay  in  the  background.  Neverthe- 
less, the  British  officials  in  Egypt  have  had  to  rely 
mainly  on  their  individual  judgment  and  force  of 
character.  The  British  Consul-General  can  occa- 
sionally give  advice.  He  may,  when  speaking  to 
the  British  official,  temper  the  zeal  of  the  latter  for 


cu.  XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS 


283 


reform,  or,  when  talking  to  the  Egyptian  Minister, 
advocate  the  views  of  the  reformer.  But  he  cannot 
step  seriously  upon  the  scene  unless  there  is  some 
knot  to  be  untied  which  is  worthy  of  a  serious 
effort.  He  cannot  at  every  moment  interfere  in 
matters  of  departmental  detail.  The  work  done 
by  the  Anglo-Egyptian  official  is,  therefore,  mainly 
the  outcome  of  his  own  resource  and  of  his  own 
versatility.  If  he  is  adroit,  he  can  make  the  fact 
that  the  soldiers  of  his  nation  are  in  occupation  of 
the  country  felt  without  flaunting  their  presence  in 
any  brusque  fashion  before  the  eyes  of  his  Egyptian 
superior.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  most  successful 
Anglo-Egyptian  officials  have  been  those  who  have 
relied  most  on  their  own  powers  of  persuasion,  and 
have  rarely  applied  for  diplomatic  support. 

In  describing  more  particularly  the  position  of 
the  Anglo-Egyptian  officials,  a  distinction  must  be 
drawn  between  civilians  and  soldiers.  The  British 
officers  of  the  Egyptian  army  have  had  to  contend 
against  considerable  difficulties,  but,  as  compared 
with  their  civilian  colleagues,  they  have  from  one 
important  point  of  view  been  at  an  advantage. 
There  is  a  reality  about  the  position  of  the  soldier 
which  does  not  exist  in  the  case  of  the  civilian. 
The  Egyptian  Commander-in-Chief,  or,  to  call  him 
by  his  Egyptian  title,  the  Sirdar,  not  only  com- 
mands the  army.  It  is  recognised  by  the  Egyptian 
Government  and  by  the  public  that  he  commands  it. 
There  is  thus  no  flagrant  contradiction  between  his 
real  and  his  nominal  position.  Most  of  the  superior 
officers  of  the  army,  whether  departmental  or  regi- 
mental, are  British.  The  Sirdar  is,  therefore, 
master  of  the  situation.  He  can  decide  on  what 
orders  to  give,  and  he  can  rely  on  his  orders  being 
obeyed,  not  only  in  the  letter  but  in  the  spirit. 
He  is  not  obliged  to  trim  his  sails  to  every  passing 
political  breeze. 


284  MODERN  EGYPT 


Far  other  is  the  position  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian 
civilian.  Some  of  the  most  important  civil 
functionaries  possess  no  executive  functions.  They 
can  only  advise.  No  special  system  exists  to 
enforce  the  acceptance  of  their  advice.  All  that 
can  be  said  is  that,  in  the  event  of  their  advice 
being  systematically  rejected,  the  British  Govern- 
ment will  be  displeased,  and  that  they  will  probably 
find  some  adequate  means  for  making  their  dis- 
pleasure felt.  Further,  of  those  Anglo-Egyptian 
civil  officials  who  possess  executive  power,  few  can 
be  certain  that  their  power  is  effective  ;  they  cannot 
rely  confidently  on  their  subordinates,  who  are 
rarely  British,  to  carry  out  the  letter,  and  still  less 
the  spirit  of  their  instructions.  The  Anglo- 
Egyptian  official  is  also  driven  by  the  necessities  of 
his  position  into  being  an  opportunist.  The  least 
part  of  his  difficulties  lies  in  deciding  what  should 
be  done.  That  is  usually  easy.  When  once  he 
clearly  sees  before  him  the  action  which  ought  to 
be  taken,  he  has  to  decide  the  more  difficult 
questions  of  when  to  act  and  how  to  conduct 
himself  in  order  to  get  others  to  act  with  him. 
And,  in  deciding  on  these  latter  points,  he  often 
has  to  take  into  consideration  matters  which  at 
first  sight  appear  to  be  not  even  remotely  connected 
with  the  immediate  subject  under  discussion. 
Every  Anglo-Egyptian  civil  official,  therefore,  has 
not  only  to  be  guided  by  the  general  impulse  given 
by  British  diplomacy  to  Egyptian  affairs,  but  he 
also  has  to  do  a  good  deal  of  diplomatic  work  on 
his  own  account. 

Comparisons  have  been  occasionally  instituted 
between  the  position  of  the  English  in  Egypt  and 
that  of  the  French  in  Tunis.  In  1890,  a  report  on 
Tunisian  affairs  was  prepared  by  M.  Ribot.  A 
glance  at  this  report  is  sufficient  to  show  that,  for 
all  practical  purposes,  the  French  Government  have 


CH.XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  285 


annexed  Tunis.  Scarcely  a  semblance  of  native 
authority  remains.  The  French  officials  have  a 
free  hand  in  dealing  with  the  administration  of  the 
country.  The  French  Resident-General  presides 
at  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  directs  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs.  No  law  is  valid  which  has  not 
been  countersigned  by  him.  The  Ministry  of  War 
is  in  the  hands  of  the  General  in  command  of  the 
French  army  of  occupation.  All  the  important 
offices  of  the  State  are  held  by  Frenchmen.  A 
French  Secretary-General  receives  all  the  letters 
addressed  to  the  Tunisian  Government  and  pre- 
pares the  answers.  "Ainsi,"  it  is  said,  "aucune 
affaire  ne  pent  echapper  a  sa  surveillance,  et  dans 
toutes,  il  peut  donner  ses  conseils  et  faire  prevaloir 
la  pensee  du  Protectorat."  By  the  side  of  each  of 
the  "  Caids,"  who  answer  to  the  Egyptian  Moudirs, 
is  placed  a  French  Controller  who,  amongst  other 
functions,  has  the  Police  under  his  command. 

M.  Ribot  concluded  his  account  of  the  system 
of  administration  in  the  following  terms :  "  II 
fallait  ensuite  qu'aucun  detail  dans  1  application  de 
ces  decisions  ne  put  nous  echapper.  Aucun  docu- 
ment n'entre  dans  les  bureaux  de  I'Administration 
centrale  ou  n'en  sort,  aucune  lettre  n'est  })resentee 
a  la  signature  du  Premier  Ministre,  aucune  corre- 
spondance  n'est  envoyee  aux  destinataires  sans 
passer  par  I'intermediaire  du  Secretaire  general  et 
etre  soumis  a  son  examen.  Tout  ce  qui  arrive 
aux  Caids  ou  emane  d'eux  est  de  la  meme  maiiiere 
soumis  a  I'examen  des  Controleurs  civils.  Rien  ne 
peut  done  se  faire  dans  la  Regence  qui  ne  soit 
approuve  par  nous."  This  is  sufficiently  explicit. 
In  point  of  fact,  Tunis  is  just  as  much  a  part 
of  France  as  the  Department  of  the  Seine.  A 
qualified  Tunisian  has  explained  the  position  of 
the  Bey  of  Tunis  in  the  following  terms  :  "  Ees 
attributions  du  Bey  de  Tunis  se  rdduisent  seule- 


286 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


ment  a  la  nomination  de  quelques  employes  sub- 
alternes  et  meme  ces  nominations  sont  soumises 
a  Tapprobation  du  JNIinistre  Resident  de  France,  ou 
de  son  premier  secretaire,  qui  est  en  meme  temps 
Secrdtaire-General  du  Gouvernement  Tunisien." 

More  than  this,  the  attitude  of  the  other 
Powers,  and  notably  of  England,  towards  the 
French  administration  of  Tunis  has  been  per- 
sistently friendly.  The  British  Government 
speedily  abandoned  the  Capitulations  at  the 
instance  of  France,  an  example  which  was  followed 
by  Italy  and  other  Powers.^ 

It  is,  therefore,  clear  that  no  analogy  exists 
between  the  conditions  under  which  France  took 
in  hand  the  Tunisian  problem  and  those  which 
obtained,  and  still  obtain,  in  respect  to  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  administration  of  Egypt. 

The  most  important  British  official  in  Egypt  is 
the  Financial  Adviser.  After  the  Arabi  revolt,  the 
question  of  how  to  place  the  financial  administra- 
tion of  Egypt  under  European  control  had  to  be 
reconsidered.  It  was  decided  to  appoint  a  British 
official  with  the  title  of  Financial  Adviser.  He 
was  to  have  no  executive  functions,  but  he  was 
to  be  present  at  the  meetings  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  No  attempt  has  ever  been  made  to 
define  his  duties  in  any  very  precise  manner. 
Broadly  speaking,  however,  it  may  be  said  that, 
as  his  official  title  implies,  he  has  to  advise  on 
all  important  financial  matters,  without  unduly 
encroaching  on  the  prerogatives  of  the  Finance 
Minister.  Outside  his  special  duties,  his  position 
is  also  of  importance.  As  he  is  present  at  all  the 
meetings  of  the  Council,  he  has  the  best  oppor- 
tunities for  knowing  what  is  going  on  in  Egyptian 

'  The  friendly  attitude  of  England  and  Germany  towards  France  in 
Tunis  lias  been  recognised  in  a  work  entitled  La  Politique  Franfoise  en 
Tanixie  (p.  374),  which,  though  published  anonymously,  was,  it  is  well 
knowu^  written  by  a  member  of  the  French  diplomatic  corps. 


CH.  XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  287 


ministerial  circles.  He  can  often  guide  the  JMinis- 
ters  on  matters  which  are  unconnected  with  finance. 
He  can  keep  the  British  Consul-General  well  in- 
formed. Being  an  Egyptian  official,  he  can  often 
give  advice  on  his  own  behalf  in  a  form  which  is 
more  palatable  than  if  it  were  tendered  with  all 
the  weight  of  the  British  diplomatic  representative 
speaking  on  behalf  of  his  Government. 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin  was  the  first  Financial 
Adviser.  In  the  autumn  of  1883,  he  was  succeeded 
by  Sir  Edgar  Vincent.  At  the  time,  some  doubts 
were  expressed  as  to  whether  Sir  Edgar  Vincent 
was  not  too  young  for  the  post.  These  doubts 
were  soon  removed.  A  more  fortunate  selection 
could  not  have  been  made.  Sir  Edgar  Vincent 
possessed  in  a  high  degree  the  quality  specially 
necessary  for  the  performance  of  his  duties.  He 
was  eminently  resourceful  ;  he  never  despaired 
during  the  blackest  period  of  the  Egyptian  financial 
chaos.  He  was  sanguine  of  ultimate  success,  and 
as  at  every  turn  new  and  unexpected  difficulties 
had  to  be  encountered,  he  was  always  ready  with 
some  ingenious  device  to  stave  off  the  evil  day  of 
bankruptcy,  and  thus  to  gain  breathing  time  during 
which  the  financial  ship  would,  at  all  events,  have 
a  chance  of  righting  herself.  He  stayed  long 
enough  to  see  that  his  labours  had  not  been  in 
vain.  The  rehabilitation  of  Egyptian  finance  is 
in  a  large  degree  the  work  of  Sir  Edgar  Vincent. 
After  his  departure  in  October  1889,  he  was 
succeeded  by  Sir  Elwin  Palmer,  who  again  was 
succeeded  in  1898  by  JNIr.  (afterwards  Sir  Eldon) 
Gorst.  In  1904,  Sir  Eldon  Gorst's  place  was  taken 
by  Sir  Vincent  Corbett.  On  the  latter's  resigna- 
tion in  1907,  he  was  succeeded  by  Mr.  Harvey. 

I  now  turn  to  the  Judicial  Department.  When 
I  arrived  in  Egypt,  in  September  1883,  I  found 
that  Native  Tribunals,  based  on  a  French  model. 


288 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  IV 


were  about  to  be  established,  and  that  Sir  Benson 
Maxwell  had  been  appointed  to  the  post  of 
Procureur- General.  He  did  not  remain  lonj;. 
Mr.  (afterwards  Sir)  Raymond  West,  an  Indian 
judge  of  distinction,  was  named  to  succeed  him. 
He  was  a  man  of  great  learning  and  capacity. 
No  one  could  be  better  qualified  to  devise  a  sound 
judicial  system  for  Egypt.  For  several  months, 
he  studied  his  subject,  and  then  produced  a 
voluminous  report.  It  contained  many  valuable 
suggestions,  some  of  which  were,  after  a  consider- 
able lapse  of  time,  carried  into  execution.  Nubar 
Pasha,  who  was  at  the  time  in  office,  did  not, 
however,  concur  in  Mr.  West's  views.  The  result 
was  that  the  latter  returned  to  India. 

This  happened  in  1885,  that  is  to  say,  at  the 
most  involved  period  of  Egyptian  history  since  the 
British  occupation.  It  was  necessary  to  throw 
overboard  a  certain  amount  of  cargo  in  order  to 
lighten  the  political  ship.  Nubar  Pasha  enjoyed  a 
reputation  as  a  judicial  reformer.  There  was  much 
to  be  said  in  favour  of  leaving  the  Department  of 
Justice  in  Egyptian  hands.  It  was  resolved,  there- 
fore, not  to  press  for  any  British  successor  to  Mr. 
West,  but  to  see  what  the  Egyptians  could  do  in 
the  way  of  judicial  reform  if  left  to  themselves. 

The  experiment  had  a  fair  trial,  and  proved  a 
complete  failure.  For  the  next  five  years,  con- 
stant complaints  were  made  as  regards  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  but  it  was  desirable  to  give 
public  opinion  time  to  mature  before  taking  any 
definite  action  in  the  matter.  In  the  meanwhile, 
Nubar  Pasha,  fearful  of  Enghsh  interference, 
named  a  Belgian,  M.  Le  Grelle,  to  be  Procureur- 
General.^     M.  Le  Grelle  brought  to  light  the 

1  M.  Le  Grelle  resigned  his  appointment  in  1895,  and  was  succeeded 
by  an  Eg^yptian.  In  1897,  an  Englishman  (Mr.  Corbet)  was  appointed 
to  the  place. 


CH.XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  289 


existence  of  some  serious  abuses.  Notably,  he  dis- 
covered that  for  several  years  past  the  ordinary 
Tribunals  had  not  been  dealing  with  the  most 
important  cases  of  crime  which  occurred  in  the 
country.  They  had  been  practically  superseded 
by  certain  "  Commissions  of  Brigandage,"  which 
were  in  reality  Courts- Martial  sitting  under  the 
presidency  of  the  Moudirs.  Under  the  auspices 
of  these  Commissions,  every  species  of  abomina- 
tion had  been  committed.  Witnesses  had  been 
tortured.  Some  700  or  800  people  had  been  con- 
demned to  imprisonment,  and  a  certain  number  had 
been  hung.  In  many  cases,  the  evidence  was  wholly 
insufficient  to  justify  a  conviction  ;  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  a  good  many  innocent  persons  were 
punished.  After  a  good  deal  of  rather  acrimonious 
discussion,  the  Commissions  of  Brigandage  were 
abolished.  The  evidence  in  the  most  doubtful 
cases  was  re-examined  ;  some  of  the  prisoners  were 
released,  either  at  once  or  subsequently.^ 

'  Mr.  Morice,  an  English  official  attached  to  the  Department  of 
Justice,  who  was  subsequently  deputed  to  inquire  into  the  cases  of 
these  prisoners,  reported  as  follows  : — "  I  may  liere  state  that  in  the 
126  cases  examined,  I  have  never  once  come  across  any  witnesses  for 
the  defence  ;  it  would,  therefore,  seem  to  have  been  generally  decided 
that  this  was  not  of  any  importance  ;  individuals  once  arrested  and 
brought  before  the  Commission  seem  to  have  had  very  little  chance  of 
regaining  their  liberty.  1  was  so  struck  by  the  total  absence  of  any 
defence  being  set  up  by  the  accused,  apart  from  a  denial  of  the  charge, 
that  1  closely  questioned  those  men  in  whose  cases,  after  a  careful 
examination  of  the  documents,  I  had  formed  a  conviction  that  they 
had  been  most  unjustly  sentenced,  and  I  was  invariably  informed  that 
although  they,  at  the  time  of  their  trial,  stated  that  they  could  produce 
witnesses  to  prove  their  innocence,  tlieir  demands  were  never  listened 
to,  but  they  were  informed  that  one  thief's  word  was  as  good  as 
another's,  and  that  witnesses  produced  would  be  treated  as  accomplices, 
etc.  Indeed,  it  was  sufficient  for  one  man,  whose  guilt  was  fully 
established,  either  by  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  victim  of  the 
assault  or  robbery,  or  by  the  finding  of  stolen  property  in  his  posses- 
sion, to  accuse  another,  for  this  latter  to  be  sentenced  to  a  very  severe 
term  of  imprisonment.  I  have  been  told  the  most  pitiful  stories  by 
convicts  I  have  interrogated  concerning  the  horrible  treatment  they 
received  when  in  prison,  a  treatment  which,  it  is  needless  to  say,  in- 
varialily  ended  in  a  confession  being  obtained.  One  has  only  to 
examine  the  preliminary  inquiries  in  order  to  be  convinced  of  this." 
VOL.  II  U 


290 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


This  episode  is  very  Egyptian,  and  is  illustrative 
of  the  extent  to  which  an  Egyptian  Minister  often 
cares  more  for  theory  than  for  practice.  An 
elaborate  system  of  justice  existed  in  aj)pearance. 
In  reality,  the  system  was  inoperative.  Persons 
accused  of  crime  were  condemned  to  death  or  to 
lifelong  imprisonment  at  the  will  of  some  ignorant 
and  tyrannical  Moudir. 

With  the  suppression  of  the  Commissions  of 
Brigandage,  crime  of  a  serious  nature  increased. 
This  had  been  anticipated.  It  became  daily  more 
and  more  clear  that  no  Egyptian  Minister  was 
capable  of  coping  with  the  situation.  The  Egyp- 
tian Government,  therefore,  reluctantly  consented 
to  appoint  an  Englishman  to  the  post  of  Judicial 
Adviser.  It  was  not  easy  to  find  a  competent 
man,  for  few  English  lawyers  have  made  a  study 
of  the  French  legal  system.  A  fortunate  selection 
was,  however,  made  in  the  person  of  Mr.  (after- 
wards Sir  John)  Scott.  His  appointment  created 
a  flutter  in  the  Egyptian  political  dovecot.  Riaz 
Pasha  shortly  afterwards  resigned,  and  his  resigna- 
tion was  in  some  measure  due  to  his  dislike  to 
Sir  John  Scott's  nomination.  The  establishment 
of  a  sound  judicial  system  in  Egypt  may  be  said 
to  date  from  the  time  of  Sir  John  Scott  s  assump- 
tion of  the  office  of  Judicial  Adviser.  In  1898, 
Sir  John  Scott  resigned  his  place  to  take  up  an 
appointment  in  London.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Sir  Malcolm  Mcll wraith. 

Previous  to  the  British  occupation,  the  Public 
Works  Department  had  been  mainly  in  French 
hands.  In  1883,  it  was  resolved  to  appoint  a 
British  Under-Secretary  to  this  Department,  and 
to  brinff  a  staff  of  British  officials  from  India  to 
superintend  the  improvements  in  the  canalisation 
of  the  country.  Sir  Colin  Scott -^SJoncrieff  was 
named  Under  -  Secretary.     The  selection  was  a 


CH.  XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  291 


most  happy  one.  Apart  from  his  very  remarkable 
technical  attainments,  Sir  CoHn  Scott -Moncrieff 
was  a  man  of  the  highest  character.  The  most 
prejudiced  Pasha  respected  quahties  which  were 
so  dissimilar  to  any  which  he  himself  possessed. 
The  most  venomous  journalist  paused  before  he 
threw  his  political  vitriol  over  a  character  so  trans- 
parently honest.  No  Englishman  employed  in  the 
Egyptian  service  during  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation  did  more  to  make  the  name  of  England 
respected  than  Sir  Colin  Scott-Moncrieff,  who,  by 
the  way,  is  not  an  Englishman,  but  one  of  that 
race  which  so  frequently  succeeds  in  foreign  parts 
by  virtue  of  its  sterling  good  qualities.  Sir  Colin 
Scott -Moncrieff  comes  from  well  north  of  the 
Tweed. 

In  1892,  Sir  Colin  Scott  -  Moncrieff  found  a 
very  worthy  successor  in  the  person  of  Sir  William 
Garstin,  under  whose  intelligent  auspices  very  large 
sums  of  money  were,  to  the  great  advantage  of 
the  country,  spent  on  public  works  of  various 
descriptions.  It  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate 
the  debt  of  gratitude  which  the  people  of  Egypt 
owe  to  Sir  William  Garstin. 

The  Financial  Secretary  also  occupies  a  post  of 
great  importance.  He  is  an  executive  officer.  He 
performs  the  duties  of  the  Financial  Adviser  when 
the  latter  is  absent.  During  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation  this  post  was  held  by  Blum  Pasha,  a 
very  intelligent  Austrian,  who  had  the  rare  merit 
of  having  served  the  Egyptian  Government  during 
the  lax  and  corrupt  rule  of  I  smti  il  Pasha  without 
the  most  censorious  critic  being  able  to  whisper  a 
word  against  his  honesty.  He  was  a  most  capable 
official  and  worked  cordially  with  the  English. 
On  his  retirement  in  1889,  he  was  succeeded  by 
Mr.  (now  Lord)  Milner,  the  well-known  author  of 
Erigland  in  Egypt.    Of  Lord  Milner  all  that  need 


292  MODERN  EGYPT 


be  said  in  this  place  is  that  he  is  one  of  the  most 
able  Englishmen  who  have  served  the  Egyptian 
Government  Not  only  was  he  versed  in  all  the 
technicalities  of  his  own  Department,  but  he  had 
a  wide  grasp  of  the  larger  aspects  of  Egyptian 
affairs.  On  his  being  named,  in  1892,  to  an 
appointment  in  England,  he  was  succeeded  by  Sir 
Eldon  Gorst,  who  belonged  to  the  diplomatic 
service.  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  had  occupied  his  leisure 
time  in  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  Arabic.  Being 
endowed  with  a  singular  degree  of  tact  and 
intelligence,  he  generally  managed  to  get  all  he 
wanted  done  without  applying  for  diplomatic 
support.  Since  1894,  when  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  was 
appointed  Adviser  to  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior, 
the  post  of  Financial  Secretary  has  changed  hands 
more  than  once,  but  it  has  always  been  held  by  a 
very  carefully  selected  British  official. 

There  are  three  sub -departments  attached  to 
the  Ministry  of  Finance.  These  are  the  Customs, 
the  Lighthouses,  and  the  Post  Office.  The  first 
two  of  these  are  under  superior  British  super- 
vision. The  Post  Office  was  reorganised  by  an 
English  Director- General,  who  was  eventually 
succeeded  by  an  extremely  competent  Syrian, 
Saba  Pasha,  under  whose  direction  various  postal 
reforms  of  great  importance  and  utility  have  been 
introduced. 

Until  1894,  the  Police  was  commanded  by  an 
English  Inspector-General  who  had  a  small  staff 
of  British  officers  under  him.  In  the  autumn  of 
1894,  a  change  of  system  was  effected.  The 
post  of  Inspector- General  was  abolished  and  an 
Adviser  (Sir  Eldon  Gorst)  was  appointed  to  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior.  In  1898,  Mr.  Machell 
was  appointed  to  succeed  Sir  Eldon  Gorst.  The 
duties  attached  to  the  post  of  Adviser  underwent, 
at  the  same  time,  some  modifications  of  no  great 


CH.  XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  293 


importance.  The  head  of  the  Sanitary  Depart- 
ment is  English,  as  is  also  the  Director-General  of 
Prisons. 

The  supreme  direction  of  the  Educational 
Department  has  always  been  in  Egyptian  hands, 
but,  in  1906,  an  English  Adviser  (Mr.  Dunlop) 
was  appointed  to  this  Department.  A  considerable 
number  of  Europeans  are  employed  as  school- 
masters.^ 

Allusion  has  so  far  only  been  made  to  the 
highest  appointments.  It  will,  however,  be  as  well 
to  speak  briefly  of  the  total  number  of  Englishmen 
employed  in  Egypt.  The  subject  is  one  of 
importance,  for  it  has  at  times  given  rise  to  much 
exaggeration,  and,  moreover,  the  employment  of 
Europeans  is  naturally  viewed  with  jealousy  by 
those  Egyptians  who  are  aspirants  for  official 
positions. 

It  is  generally  recognised  that  European  assist- 
ance, to  a  certain  extent,  is  necessary  to  carry  on 
the  work  of  government  in  Egypt.  Differences 
of  opinion,  however,  arise  when  any  attempt  is 
made  to  lay  down  with  any  degree  of  precision  the 
extent  to  which  recourse  should  be  had  to  European 
agency.  Weighty  arguments  may  be  advanced  on 
both  sides.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  frequently 
urged  that  the  efficiency  of  the  service  suffers  by 
reason  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  European  staff ; 
that  the  welfare  of  the  mass  of  the  population  must 
be  placed  before  all  other  considerations  ;  that  the 
vast  majority  of  voiceless  Egyptians  prefer  good 
administration  to  national  government ;  and  that, 
therefore,  for  the  present,  and  probably  for  a  long 
time  to  come,  the  employment  of  a  large  number 
of  Europeans  is  absolutely  necessary.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  stated  that  the  Egyptians  prefer 

*  'ITie  numbers  were,  in  1896,  Egyptians,  631  ;  Europeans,  92 ;  and, 
in  1906,  Egyptians,  794  ;  Europeans,  160. 


294  MODERN  EGYPT 


a  defective  system  of  government  administered  by 
their  own  countrymen  to  a  relatively  perfect  system 
administered  by  aliens ;  that  it  is  in  the  highest 
degree  impolitic  to  push  on  education  and  at  the 
same  time  to  close  the  door  of  hi<>h  Government 
employment  to  the  educated  classes  ;  that  the 
Egyptians  can  never  learn  to  govern  themselves 
unless  they  are  allowed  to  make  the  attempt ;  that 
any  causes  which  tend  towards  maladministration 
will  be  temporary  and  will  gradually  disappear  as  a 
result  of  the  experience  which  will  be  gained  ;  and 
that,  therefore,  the  number  of  Europeans  in  the 
service  of  the  Government  should  not  merely 
be  reduced  to  the  lowest  limit  compatible  with 
efficiency,  but  that  that  limit  should  be  exceeded, 
and  that  temporary  inefficiency,  even  in  a  somewhat 
marked  degree,  should  be  tolerated  in  order  to 
attain  the  desired  end. 

There  is  not  much  to  be  gained  by  dwelling  at 
length  on  the  abstract  principles  enunciated  above. 
The  subject  under  discussion  is  eminently  one  as 
to  which,  for  all  purposes  of  practical  politics,  a 
compromise  has  to  be  effiscted  between  the  extremes 
of  the  conflicting  principles  invoked  on  either  side. 
What  is  quite  clear  is,  that  if  Western  civilisation 
is  to  be  introduced  into  Egypt,  it  can  only  be  done 
by  Europeans,  or  by  Egyptians  who  ha\  e  imbibed 
the  spirit  of  that  civilisation,  and  have  acquired  the 
knowledge  necessary  in  order  to  apply  Western 
methods  of  government.  The  extent  to  which 
Europeans,  or  Egyptians  who  have  received  a 
European  training,  should  respectively  be  employed, 
depends  mainly  on  the  supply  which  is  available  of 
the  latter  class.  The  main  difficulty  of  dealing 
with  the  question  is  that,  for  the  present,  the 
demand  for  qualified  Egyptians  of  this  class  is 
greatly  in  excess  of  the  su])ply. 

The  general  policy  which  has  been  pursued  since 


CH.  XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  295 


the  British  occupation  of  the  country  took  place, 
in  1882,  lias  been  to  hmit  the  number  of  Europeans 
in  the  employment  of  the  Government  as  much  as 
possible,  to  employ  Egyptians  in  the  very  great 
majority  of  the  subordinate  and  in  a  large  number 
of  the  superior  administrative  posts,  and  gradually 
to  prepare  the  ground  for  increasing  the  number  of 
Egyptians  in  high  employment.  This  policy  is 
thoroughly  understood  by  all  the  leading  British 
officials  in  Egypt.  Some,  possibly,  have  been  more 
successful  than  others  in  training  their  Egyptian 
subordinates.  Some,  again,  may  be  inclined  to  insist 
on  a  rather  excessive  standard  of  efficiency  on  the 
part  of  the  Egyptian  before  they  will  readily 
acquiesce  in  foregoing  the  appointment  of  a  Euro- 
pean. But  the  higher  British  officials  in  Egypt 
have  never  shovv^n  any  tendency  to  question  the 
wisdom  of  the  policy,  or  the  least  reluctance  to 
give  effisct  to  it  when  once  they  were  convinced 
that  a  qualified  Egyptian  could  be  found  to  take 
any  post  which  might  happen  to  be  vacant. 

This  matter  is  frequently  discussed  on  the 
assumption  that  a  number  of  places  under  Govern- 
ment are  now  occupied  by  Europeans  for  which 
competent  Egyptians  could,  without  difficulty,  be 
found.  I  will  not  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  this 
assumption  is  absolutely  unfounded,  but  it  certainly 
gives  a  very  incorrect  view  of  the  facts  of  the 
situation.  I  do  not  doubt  that  tliere  are  a  few 
cases  as  to  which  it  may  be  said  that,  if  the 
European  occupant  of  some  post  vacated  his  place, 
a  competent  Egyptian  might  at  once  be  found  to 
replace  him.  But,  in  the  very  large  majority  of 
cases,  the  reason  why  the  European  holds  the  post 
is  that  to  which  I  have  already  alluded,  namely, 
that  the  supply  of  competent  Egyptians  is  not 
nearly  equal  to  the  demand. 

To  any  one  who  will  calmly  and  impartially 


296 


MODERN  EGYPT 


consider  the  recent  history  and  the  present  situation 
in  Egypt,  the  state  of  things  which  I  have  described 
above  can  be  no  matter  for  surprise.  I?atl;er  would 
it  be  astonishing  if  the  difficulties  to  which  I  have 
alluded  had  not  occurred. 

European  agency  is  required  in  Egypt  for  two 
reasons  :  in  the  first  place,  to  supply  the  technical 
knowledge,  which,  until  very  recently,  the  Egyptians 
have  had  no  opportunity  of  acquiring  ;  in  the  second 
place,  to  remedy  those  defects  in  the  Egyptian 
character  which  have  been  developed  by  a  long 
course  of  misgovernment. 

In  so  far  as  numbers  are  concerned,  the  first  is 
by  far  the  more  contributory  cause.  The  rapidity 
with  wiiich  the  material  prosperity  of  Egypt  has 
advanced  during  the  last  fifteen  or  twenty  years 
is  probably  without  a  parallel  in  history.  The 
suddenness  of  the  movement  has  proved  by  no 
means  an  unmixed  blessing  to  the  country.  I  will 
not  dwell  on  the  moral  aspect  of  this  question 
beyond  saying  that  it  is  a  commonplace  of  economics 
to  hold  that  a  great  and  sudden  accretion  of  wealth, 
without  any  corresponding  increase  of  knowledge 
as  to  how  the  newly  acquired  wealth  should  be 
used,  is  a  very  doubtful  benefit,  whether  to  an 
individual  or  a  nation. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  question  im- 
mediately under  discussion,  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  this  sudden  leap  from  poverty  to  affluence 
greatly  increased  the  difficulties  of  executing  the 
policy  of  employing  Egyptian  rather  than  European 
agency  in  administrative  work.  For,  when  once 
the  full  tide  of  prosperity  set  in,  demands  arose  on 
all  sides  for  the  employment  of  agents  possessing 
technical  knowledge  of  all  sorts.  European  lawyers 
were  required  to  deal  with  the  numerous  legal 
questions  w^hich  arose,  and  in  which  a  knowledge 
of  Europeans  and  their  laws  was  indispensable. 


CH.XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  297 


Hydraulic  engineers  were  required  to  deal  with 
irrigation  questions  ;  medical  men,  to  look  after  the 
hospitals  and  the  sanitary  condition  of  the  country  ; 
veterinary  surgeons,  to  arrest  the  cattle  plague  ; 
trained  surveyors,  to  map  the  fields ;  mechanical 
engineers  and  mechanics,  to  perform  a  great  variety 
of  work  —  and  so  on.  All  these  demands  fell 
suddenly  on  a  country  almost  wholly  unprepared 
to  meet  them.  Neither,  although  the  difficulties 
which  have  subsequently  arisen  were  in  some 
degree  foreseen,  were  the  Britisli  advisers  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  able,  during  the  early  years 
of  the  occupation,  to  do  much  towards  providing 
for  them.  For  at  least  six  years,  all  that  could  be 
done  was  to  struggle  against  bankruptcy,  to  throw 
off  the  incubus  of  the  Soudan,  and  by  scraping 
together  funds  in  order  to  improve  the  system  of 
irrigation,  to  lay  the  foundations  of  the  prosperity 
which  the  country  now  enjoys. 

I  shall,  at  a  later  period  of  this  work,  deal  more 
fully  with  the  question  of  education.  Here  I  will 
only  say  that,  for  some  years,  educational  progress 
was,  owing  to  the  financial  difficulties  against  which 
the  Government  had  to  contend,  necessarily  slow. 
Recently  it  has  been  more  rapid,  and  I  now  take 
a  somewhat  sanguine  view  of  the  possibility  of 
gradually  substituting  Egyptian  for  European 
agency  in  those  offices  where  the  necessity  for 
employing  Europeans  is  at  present  based  on  the 
want  of  technical  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 
Egyptians.  But  any  attempt  to  hurry  can  only 
lead  to  disappointment,  and,  eventually,  in  all  prob- 
ability, to  a  reaction  which  will  be  to  the  detriment 
of  Egyptian  interests. 

I  have  said  that,  besides  those  Europeans  who 
are  employed  on  the  ground  that  their  technical 
knowledge  is  indispensable,  the  services  of  others 
are  necessary  to  act  as  some  corrective  to  the 


298 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


defects  of  the  Egyptian  character.  The  number 
of  those  who  may  be  classed  in  this  category  is 
comparatively  small.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
often  occupy  positions  of  greater  importance  than 
those  who  are  employed  merely  by  reason  of  their 
technical  skill.  The  substitution  of  Egyptian  for 
European  agency  must  necessarily  take  even  more 
time  in  these  cases  than  in  those  where  the  transfer 
depends  on  the  acquisition  of  technical  knowledge 
by  the  Egyptians.  National  character  is  a  plant 
of  slow  growth.  Such  instruction  as  can  be  afforded 
in  schools  and  colleges  only  constitutes  one  of  the 
elements  which  contribute  to  its  modification  and 
development.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  no  effort 
should  be  spared  to  foster  the  growth  of  all  those 
moral  and  intellectual  qualities  which,  collectively, 
tend  to  the  formation  of  character.  I  may  add 
that  amongst  the  defects  which,  for  purposes  of 
administration,  appear  most  of  all  to  require  recti- 
fication, are,  the  fear  of  assuming  individual  re- 
sponsibility ;  the  absence  of  adequate  capacity  to 
exercise  with  firmness,  intelligence,  and  considera- 
tion for  others,  such  functions  as  are  usually  vested 
in  responsible  agents  ;  and  the  tendency,  so  common 
amongst  Egyptians,  of  running  to  extremes  both 
in  thouffht  and  action. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  the  subject,  it  may 
be  as  well  that  I  should  give  some  figures  showing 
the  extent  to  which  Europeans  are  now  employed 
in  the  Egyptian  service.^ 

The  following  table  shows  the  composition  of 
the  Egyptian  Civil  Service  at  the  close  of  the  years 
1896  and  1906  respectively  :— 


'  A  more  detailed  analysis  of  these  fig'ures  was  given  in  my  Report 
for  the  year  1906,  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  33-44.  The  remarks 
made  above  are  quoted  almost  textually  from  this  Report. 


CH.XL     THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  299 


Year. 

Egyptians. 

Europeans. 

Total. 

1896 
1906 

8444 
12,027 

690 
1252 

9134 
13,279 

In  the  course  of  the  decade,  therefore,  the  total 
number  of  officials  increased  by  4145.  Of  these, 
3583  were  Egyptians,  and  562  were  Europeans. 
I  should  mention  that,  out  of  the  total  increase  of 
562  Europeans,  no  less  than  303  belonged  to  the 
Railway  Administration,  over  which,  until  quite 
recently,  the  Egyptian  Government  have  been  able 
to  exercise  little  or  no  control.  Further,  it  is  to 
be  remembered  that  not  only  the  convenience,  but 
also,  to  a  great  extent,  the  lives  of  the  travelling 
public  depend  on  efficient  railway  administration. 
Hence,  there  is  in  this  case  relatively  little  scope 
for  the  application  of  the  general  and  semi-political 
arguments  involved  in  the  issues  now  under  dis- 
cussion. 

These  figures  bear  eloquent  testimony  to  the 
fact  that  the  number  of  Europeans  appointed  to 
the  Egyptian  public  service  has  been  strictly  con- 
trolled. It  may  be  that  in  some  few  cases  addi- 
tional Europeans  will  be  required,  but  these  will 
be  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  increase 
of  Egyptians  in  other  Departments.  In  view  of 
the  rapid  strides  being  made  in  education — more 
especially  in  technical  education — there  now  appears 
for  the  first  time  to  be  a  prospect  of  carrying  out 
more  fully  than  heretofore  what  has  always  been 
the  real  policy  of  the  British  Government  in  Egypt. 
The  execution  of  that  policy  was  retarded  by 
financial  difficulties  which,  since  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement  was  signed,  have  been  to  a  great  extent 
removed. 


300 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PI'.  IV 


One  observation  may  be  added  before  leaving 
this  branch  of  the  subject.  It  is  that  in  countries 
such  as  India  and  Egypt  the  best  pohcy  to  pursue 
is  to  employ  a  small  body  of  well-selected  and  well- 
paid  Europeans.  Everything  depends  on  finding 
the  right  man  for  the  right  place.  If  he  can  be 
found,  it  is  worth  while  to  pay  him  well.  It  is  a 
mistake  to  employ  second  or  third-rate  Europeans 
on  low  salaries.  They  often  do  more  harm  than 
good.  Public  opinion  generally  condemns  high 
salaries,  but  on  this  particular  point  the  European 
administrator  in  the  East  will  do  well  to  follow 
his  own  judgment  and  not  to  be  unduly  influenced 
by  outside  criticism.  It  is  worth  while  to  pay 
something  extra  in  order  to  secure  the  services 
of  a  really  competent  and  thoroughly  trustworthy 
official. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATIONS 

luternationalism — 1.  The  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt — Functions 
of  the  Commission — The  Egyptian  Accounts— The  Reserve  Fund 
— Uselessness  of  the  Commission — 2.  The  Railway  Administra- 
tion— 8.  The  Daira  Sanieh — 4.  The  Domains  Administration. 

Cosmopolitanism,  as  opposed  to  exclusive  patriot- 
ism, has  ever  been  the  dream  of  theorists  and  the  butt 
of  practical  statesmen.  Probably,  few  lines  of  any 
British  poet  have  been  more  frequently  quoted — 
especially  of  late  years — than  those  in  which  Can- 
ning ridiculed  the  "  friend  of  every  country  but  his 
own."  Of  recent  years,  although  there  has  been 
no  diminution  but  rather  a  recrudescence  of  inter- 
national rivalry,  a  tendency  towards  the  inter- 
national treatment  both  of  European  and  of 
extra -European  questions  has  become  manifest, 
not  only  amongst  theorists,  but  amongst  practical 
statesmen.  This  tendency  is  the  natural  outcome 
of  the  circumstances  which  obtained  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  There  appears 
little  prospect  that  the  Utopia  of  the  early  free- 
traders will  be  realised.  Trade,  with  its  hand- 
maids, the  railway  and  the  telegraph,  does  not  so 
far  appear  to  have  bound  nations  together  in  any 
closer  bonds  of  amity  than  existed  in  the  days  of 
slow  locomotion  and  communication.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  European  body  politic  has  become 

301 


302  MODERN  EGYPT 


more  sensitive  than  heretofore.  National  interests 
tend  towards  cosmopoHtanism,  liowever  much 
national  sentiments  and  aspirations  may  tend 
towards  exclusive  patriotism.  The  whole  world  is 
quickly  informed  of  any  incident  which  may  occur 
in  any  part  of  the  globe.  Not  only  in  the  cabinet 
of  every  ]\Iinister,  but  in  the  office  of  every  news- 
paper editor  the  questions  to  which  its  occurrence 
instantly  give  rise  are,  how  does  this  circumstance 
affect  the  affairs  of  my  country  ?  What  course 
should  be  taken  in  order  to  safeguard  our  interests  ? 
It  is  more  difficult  than  heretofore  to  segre<rate  a 
quarrel  between  any  two  States.  In  a  certain  sense 
Europeans,  in  spite  of  themselves,  have  become 
members  of  a  single  family^  though  not  always  of 
a  happy  family.  They  are  all  oppressed  by  one 
common  dread,  and  that  is  that  some  accident  may 
precipitate  a  general  war,  of  which  not  the  wisest 
can  foretell  the  final  issue.  If  any  minor  State 
shows  a  tendency  to  light  the  match  which  may 
lead  to  a  general  conflagration,  the  voice  of  inter- 
national rivalry  is  to  some  extent  hushed  in 
presence  of  the  danger,  and  the  diplomatic  fire- 
engine  is  turned  on  from  every  capital  in  Europe 
in  order  to  quench  the  flame  before  it  can  spread. 
A  certain  power  of  acting  together  has  thus  been 
developed  amongst  the  nations  and  Governments 
of  Europe,  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
world  has  benefited  by  the  change.  In  all  the 
larger  affairs  of  state,  internationalism  constitutes 
a  guarantee  for  peace.  It  in  some  measure  obliges 
particular  interests  to  yield  for  the  general  good  of 
the  European  community. 

Internationalism  has,  however,  done  more  than 
group  together  certain  States  and  ensure  common 
or  quasi-common  action  on  occasions  of  supreme 
importance.  Semi-civilised  countries,  in  which  the 
rulers  are  sometimes  only  possessed  of  incomplete 


INTERNATIONALISM  303 


sovereign  rights,  open  up  a  wide  field  for  the  de- 
velopment of  internationalism.  In  such  countries, 
some  European  Powers  have  interests  which  they 
wish  to  safeguard  without  arousing  the  jealousy  of 
their  rivals  by  too  open  an  assertion  of  strength, 
whilst  others  are  led  to  claim  a  seat  at  the  inter- 
national table  in  order  to  assert  their  political  exist- 
ence and  to  remind  the  world  that  their  interests, 
albeit  they  are  of  relatively  slight  importance,  cannot 
be  altogether  netjlected.  Cases  sometimes  arise 
which  involve  prolonged  supervision  and  control  in 
the  interests  of  the  European  Powers,  but  which  do 
not  justify  exclusive  action  on  the  part  of  any  one 
of  them,  or  which,  if  they  justify  it,  are  of  a 
nature  not  to  allow  of  exclusive  action  without 
a  risk  of  discord  in  respect  to  the  particular  nation 
by  whom  it  is  to  be  exercised.  What  can  be 
more  natural  in  cases  of  this  kind  than  for  the 
Powers  to  say — we  are  agreed  as  to  all  that  is 
essential ;  certain  points  of  detail  remain  to  be 
settled  locally ;  let  us  each  appoint  an  expert 
who  will  represent  our  interests  and  see  that 
they  get  fair  play,  but  who  at  the  same  time 
will  have  no  very  marked  political  bias,  and 
who  will  treat  the  technical  questions  which  come 
under  his  consideration  on  their  own  merits  ? 
Nothing  could  in  appearance  be  more  equitable 
or  more  calculated  to  obviate  the  risk  of  serious 
friction. 

But  alas !  however  much  exclusiveness  may  in 
appearance  be  expelled  by  the  cosmopolitan  pitch- 
fork, it  but  too  often  comes  back  again  to  its 
natural  resting-place.  The  experiment  of  adminis- 
trative internationalism  has  probably  been  tried  in 
the  No  Man's  Land  of  which  this  history  treats  to 
a  greater  extent  than  in  any  other  country.  The 
result  cannot  be  said  to  be  encouraging  to  those 
who  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  international  action 


304  MODERN  EGYPT 


in  administrative  matters.  What  has  been  proved 
is  that  international  institutions  possess  admirable 
negative  qualities.  They  are  formidable  checks  to 
all  action,  and  the  reason  why  they  are  so  is  that, 
when  any  action  is  proposed,  objections  of  one  sort 
or  another  generally  occur  to  some  member  of  the 
international  body.  Any  action  often  involves  a 
presumed  advantage  accorded  to  some  rival  nation, 
and  it  is  a  principle  of  internationalism,  which  is 
scornfully  rejected  in  theory  and  but  too  often 
recognised  as  a  guide  for  practical  action,  that  it  is 
better  to  do  nothing,  even  though  evil  may  ensue, 
than  to  allow  good  to  be  done  at  the  expense  of 
furthering  the  interests,  or  of  exalting  the  reputa- 
tion of  an  international  rival.  For  all  purposes 
of  action,  therefore,  administrative  international- 
ism may  be  said  to  tend  towards  the  creation  of 
administrative  impotence. 

1.  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt. 

The  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt  originally 
consisted  of  four  members,  an  Englishman,  a 
Frenchman,  an  Austrian,  and  an  Italian.  In 
1885,  a  German  and  a  Russian  Commissioner 
were  added,  thus  bringing  the  total  number 
of  Commissioners  up  to  six.  Until  1904,  the 
functions  of  the  Commission  were  briefly  as 
follows. 

The  officials  responsible  for  the  collection  of 
the  revenues  pledged  to  the  service  of  the  Debt 
were  under  an  obligation  to  pay  all  monies 
collected  by  them  into  the  hands  of  the  Com- 
missioners, and  to  furnish  them  with  the  informa- 
tion necessary  in  order  to  enable  an  effective 
financial  control  to  be  exercised.  The  Commis- 
sioners had  a  right  to  name  and  dismiss  their 
own  employes.     No  loan   could   be  contracted 


INTERNATIONALISM  305 


without  their  consent.  Lastly,  and  this  was  a 
provision  of  the  highest  importance,  the  Com- 
missioners, in  their  capacity  of  legal  representatives 
of  the  bondliolders,  were  empowered  to  sue  the 
Egyptian  Government  in  the  Mixed  Courts  in 
the  event  of  any  infringement  of  the  Law  of 
Liquidation  taking  place. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  powers  thus  conferred 
on  the  Commissioners  were  extensive.  Neverthe- 
less, those  portions  of  the  Law  of  Liquidation  to 
which  allusion  has  so  far  been  made,  did  not  in 
practice  give  rise  to  much  difficulty  subsequent  to 
the  British  occupation.  They  were  provisions  in- 
tended to  guard  against  an  act  of  bankruptcy,  and 
inasmuch  as  the  result  of  the  British  occupation  was 
to  place  the  Egyptian  Treasury  in  a  state  of  assured 
solvency,  any  preventive  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Commission  of  the  Debt  became  unnecessary  when 
once  the  first  few  years  of  acute  crisis  were  passed. 

Other  functions  were,  however,  vested  in  the 
Commissioners,  which  were  of  greater  practical 
importance. 

The  Law  of  Liquidation,  coupled  with  the 
Decree  of  July  27,  1885,  which  was  promulgated 
on  the  occasion  of  the  issue  of  an  Egyptian  Loan 
of  £9,000,000  guaranteed  by  the  Powers  of  Europe, 
laid  down  a  method  for  balancing  the  accounts  of 
the  Egyptian  Treasury  at  the  end  of  each  year 
which  was  a  triumph  of  financial  cumbersomeness 
and  ineptitude.  At  the  time  of  the  London  Con- 
ference, the  French,  who  were  supported  by  some 
other  Continental  Powers,  were  politically  hostile 
to  England,  and,  moreover,  looked  almost  ex- 
clusively to  the  interests  of  the  bondholders. 
The  British  Treasury  officials  could  see  but  one 
point,  namely,  that  the  Government  of  Egypt  were 
embarrassed  by  having  spent  too  much  money  in 
the  past ;  therefore,  it  was  held,  a  stringent  control 

VOL.  II  X 


306  MODERN  EGYPT 


should  be  exercised  to  prevent  extravagant  ex- 
penditure in  the  future.  The  argument  was 
sound,  but  it  was  forgotten  at  the  time  that  the 
expenditure  was  being  incurred  under  conditions 
wholly  different  from  those  which  had  obtained  in 
the  past.  A  wise  foresight  would  have  given  greater 
latitude  to  the  British  advisers  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  than  could  have  been  prudently 
accorded  to  Ismail  Pasha.  It  was,  however,  im- 
possible to  obtain  a  hearing  for  arguments  of  this 
nature.  The  Egyptian  Government  did,  indeed, 
manage  to  obtain  a  sum  of  £1,000,000  to  spend  on 
Irrigation,  but  beyond  this  it  was  found  impossible 
to  shake  the  mistrust  of  the  French  and  the  pre- 
conceived ideas  of  the  British  Treasury  officials. 
The  latter  aided  in  establishing  a  system  which 
proved  subsequently  to  be  a  fertile  source  of 
embarrassment  to  their  own  countrymen  in  Egypt. 

It  had  been  laid  down  by  the  Decrees  of  1876 
that  certain  revenues  should  be  pledged  to  the 
service  of  the  Debt,  whilst  other  revenues  should 
be  left  at  the  disposal  of  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment to  provide  for  their  administrative  expenditure. 
When  the  Guaranteed  Loan  of  1885  was  contracted, 
the  distribution  of  what,  in  Gallicised  English,  are 
called  the  "affected"  and  the  " non  -  affected " 
revenues,  had  to  be  reconsidered.  Care  was  taken 
to  increase  the  relative  amount  of  the  former,  so 
that  the  bondholders  should  not  run  any  risk,  with 
the  result  that  the  amount  of  the  latter  was  rela- 
tively diminished.  The  administrative  expenditure 
was  fixed  at  a  certain  figure,  the  only  concession, 
which  was  with  difficulty  obtained,  being  that  the 
working  expenses  of  the  Railway  administration 
should  not  be  unalterable,  but  should  be  taken  at 
45  per  cent^  of  the  gross  receipts.    If  the  non- 

'  In  1902,  after  prolonged  negotiations,  this  figure  was  increased  to 
a  maximum  of  55  per  cent. 


INTERNATIONALISM  307 


affected  revenues  did  not  yield  the  sum  at  which 
the  administrative  expenditure  was  fixed,  the 
deficit  had  to  be  made  good  from  the  affected 
revenues.  The  surplus  on  the  whole  account  con- 
sisted of  the  money  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Debt  from  the  affected 
revenues  after  the  deficit  in  the  non  -  affected 
revenues,  if  any,  had  been  made  good.  This 
surplus  was  divided  into  two  portions.  One 
portion  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Commis- 
sioners ;  the  other  was  paid  to  the  Egyptian 
Government.  The  result  was  that,  if  the  Govern- 
ment wished  to  spend  £lO  in  excess  of  the  adminis- 
trative limit  prescribed  by  international  agreement, 
revenue  to  the  extent  of  £20  had  to  be  collected 
in  order  to  meet  the  expenditure.  As  the  country 
progressed,  legitimate  demands  for  fresh  expendi- 
ture arose,  but  under  the  system  devised  in  1885, 
the  anomaly  was  presented  that  the  Government 
had  to  pay  double  for  everything  in  the  nature  of 
an  improvement  involving  fresh  expenditure ;  that 
the  administration  was  starved  ;  that  money  was 
plentiful ;  but  that  no  one  benefited  in  any 
adequate  degree  from  its  abundance. 

It  would  be  tedious  to  describe  in  detail 
the  involved  calculation  which  had  to  be  made 
before  the  true  surplus  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Egyptian  Treasury  could  be  ascertained.  It  will 
be  sufficient  to  quote  the  figures  of  one  year 
as  an  example  of  the  results  obtained  under  the 
system. 

In  1892,  the  revenue  of  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment amounted  to  £E.  10,364,000,  and  the  expen- 
diture to  £E.9,595,000.  It  would  naturally  be 
supposed  by  any  one  unacquainted  with  the  intri- 
cacies of  Egyptian  finance  that  a  surplus  remained 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Government  amounting  to 
the  difference  between  these  two  sums,  namely. 


308  MODERN  EGYPT 


£E. 769,000.  Any  such  conclusion  would  have 
been  altogether  erroneous. 

After  winding  through  the  financial  labyrinth, 
which  was  constructed  by  the  Powers,  and  which 
is  a  typical  instance  of  the  results  of  international 
administration,  it  was  found  that  the  real  surplus 
in  the  hands  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury  was  only 
£E.  179,000,  a  difference  of  no  less  than  £E.590,000. 
Ap])earances  in  Egypt  are  deceptive. 

It  was  originally  intended  that  any  surplus 
remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  Commissioners 
should  be  applied  to  the  extinction  of  debt.  For 
the  first  few  years  of  the  British  occupation,  this 
matter  was  not  of  much  practical  importance,  as  no 
surplus  was  available.  But  when  financial  affairs 
became  more  settled,  Sir  Edgar  Vincent's  inven- 
tive mind  gave  birth  to  a  scheme  under  which 
the  surplus  at  the  end  of  each  year  was  to  be 
allowed  to  accumulate  in  a  Reserve  Fund.  Extinc- 
tion of  debt  was  not  to  begin  until  the  Reserve 
Fund  amounted  to  £E. 2,000,000.  Thus,  the 
Treasury  would,  it  was  hoped,  eventually  have  a 
large  sum  of  money  in  hand  to  guard  against  any 
unforeseen  contingencies  which  might  occur. 

The  idea  was  excellent.  It  obtained  the  assent 
of  the  Powers,  and  was  embodied  in  a  Decree  dated 
July  12,  1888.  Article  3  of  this  Decree  described 
how  the  money  belonging  to  the  Reserve  Fund 
might  be  spent.  Inter  alia,  it  was  to  be  applied 
to  "extraordinary  expenditure  undertaken  with 
the  previous  assent  of  the  Commission  of  the 
Debt."  This  was  a  provision  of  great  importance, 
for  as  the  Reserve  Fund  increased,  it  was  found 
possible  to  turn  the  money  over,  and,  by  making 
advances  to  the  Government,  to  allow  various 
works  of  public  utility  to  be  constructed.  As, 
however,  it  rested  with  the  Commission  to  decide 
whether  any  advance  should  be  made,  it  is  obvious 


CH.XLI        INTERNATIONALISM  309 

that,  under  the  Decree  of  1888,  the  powers  vested 
in  the  Commissioners  were  notably  increased.^ 

Such,  therefore,  were  the  attributes  of  the 
Commission  of  the  PuMic  Debt.  During  Ismail 
Pasha's  time,  this  institution,  though  its  organisa- 
tion was  in  many  respects  defective,  played  an 
important  and  useful  part  in  Egyptian  affairs. 
Subsequent  to  the  British  occupation,  the  inutility 
of  the  Commission  became,  year  by  year,  more 
apparent.  It  cost  the  Treasury  some  £E.  40,000 
a  year.  All  the  necessary  work  of  a  National  Debt 
Office  could  have  been  done  by  one  official  and  a 
small  staff  of  clerks. 

In  blaming  the  institution,  however,  it  would 
be  unjust  to  cast  indiscriminate  blame  on  the 
individuals  concerned.  Some  of  the  Commis- 
sioners have  been  intelligent  and  capable  men  who 
have  performed  their  duties  in  a  reasonable  spirit 
of  impartiality.  Indeed,  the  Egyptian  authorities 
have  always  preferred  dealing  with  the  Commission 
of  the  Debt  to  dealing  with  the  Powers.  The 
Commissioners,  being  on  the  spot,  are  exposed 
to  local  influences,  and  possess  a  certain  amount 
of  local  knowledge.  They  are,  therefore,  more 
likely  to  judge  financial  matters  on  their  own 
merits  than  those  who,  sitting  at  a  distance, 
look  at  Egyptian  affairs  from  a  wholly  political 
point  of  view.  It  is,  however,  none  the  less  true 
that  whatever  reforms  have  been  accomplished 
with  the  co-operation  of  the  Caisse  could  have 
been  equally  well  and  probably  better  accomplished 
had  the  Caisse  not  existed.  The  only  purpose 
which  this  institution  eventually  served  was  to 
act  as  an  obstacle  to  progress,  and  occasionally 
as  an  agency  for  the  manifestation  of  hostility 

1  The  question  of  how  this  Decree  should  he  interpreted  gave  rise  to 
a  lawsuit  when,  in  1806,  a  majority  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt 
made  a  grant  of  £K.  500,000  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  Dougola 
campaign. —  Vide  p.  85  et  seq. 


310 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PI'.  IV 


towards  England.  It  often  happens  that  an 
institution  survives  after  the  circumstances  to 
which  it  owes  its  origin  have  passed  away.  The 
result  is  that  the  institution  becomes  hurtful, 
although  the  individuals  associated  with  it  may 
be  deserving  of  respect.  This  is  what  took  place 
with  regard  to  the  Commission  of  the  Public 
Debt. 

In  1904,  as  a  result  of  negotiations  with  the 
Powers,  the  functions  of  the  Commission  of  the 
Debt  underwent  a  radical  change.  Without 
going  into  any  elaborate  detail,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  Commissioners  are  now  merely  receivers 
on  the  part  of  the  bondholders.  They  cannot  in 
any  way  interfere  with  admhiistrative  affairs. 

In  1912,  the  Egyptian  Government  Avill  be  free 
to  convert  the  whole  of  the  Debt  If  the  con- 
version takes  place,  the  Commission  of  the  Debt 
will  presumably  disappear  altogether. 

2.  Railway  Administration. 

Under  the  Decree  of  November  18,  1876,  a 
Board  was  constituted  to  administer  the  Railways, 
the  Telegraphs,  and  the  Port  of  Alexandria.  It 
originally  consisted  of  two  Englishmen,  of  whom 
one  was  President,  a  Frenchman,  and  two  Egyp- 
tians. Subsequently,  the  number  of  English  and 
of  Egyptian  members  was  reduced  to  one  of  each 
nationality. 

The  English  and  French  members  were  named 
on  the  proposal  of  their  respective  Governments. 
The  Board  made  appointments  to  all  subordinate 
places  in  the  administration.  The  superior  officials 
were  nominated  by  the  Khedive  on  the  proposal 
of  the  Board.  Changes  of  tariff  weie  made 
by  the  Board  with  the  sanction  of  the  Egyptian 
Government. 


INTEHNATIONALISM  311 


Two  very  competent  Englishmen,  Colonel 
Marindin  and  Mr.  (now  Lord)  Farrer,  were  em- 
ployed in  1887  to  report  on  the  Egyptian  Railways. 
This  is  the  judgment  which  they  passed  on  the 
system  of  administration  : — 

"  The  administration  of  the  Egyptian  Railways, 
as  at  present  constituted,  differs  considerably  from 
any  with  which  we  are  acquainted.  The  control 
is  vested  in  three  members  whose  functions  are 
undefined  as  regards  the  different  branches  of  the 
working  of  the  railway.  We  understand  that 
there  is  no  one  individual  who  is  separately 
responsible  for  the  management  of  the  railways. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  result  of  this  divided 
responsibility  has  been  especially  injurious  to  the 
working  of  a  commercial  business  such  as  railways 
must  necessarily  be,  and  we  are  of  opinion  that  it 
is  absolutely  essential  for  the  satisfactory  working 
of  the  Egyptian  Railways,  and  for  the  maintenance 
of  discipline  upon  them,  that  the  management  of 
them,  as  a  whole,  together  with  the  control  of 
heads  of  Departments,  should  be  vested  in  one 
person  with  a  position  analogous  to  that  of  the 
Managing  Director  or  General  Manager  of  Rail- 
ways in  other  countries." 

Obviously,  the  management  should  have  been 
vested  in  one  person,  but  internationalism  abhors 
the  one-man  system  as  much  as  nature  abhors  a 
vacuum.  The  sheet-anchor  of  internationalism  is, 
indeed,  that  several  men  should  be  set  to  do  the 
work  of  one. 

It  was,  however,  said  of  Richelieu,  by  one  of 
his  enemies,  "il  est  capable  de  tout,  meme  du 
bien."  So  also  it  may  be  noted  that  international 
administration,  although  it  can  never  yield  fruits 
at  all  comparable  with  those  which  may  be 
obtained  under  more  rational  administrative 
systems,   may   at   times   be   forced  into  some 


812 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  IV 


degree  of  action,  and  will  then  produce  results 
which  the  casual  observer  may  think  are  due  to 
the  excellence  of  the  system,  whereas  they  are 
in  reality  for  the  most  part  obtained  by  the 
occurrence  of  adventitious  circumstances  in  spite 
of  the  system.  Administrative  internationalism, 
like  Richelieu,  is  occasionally  capable,  if  not  of 
absolute  good,  at  all  events  of  assuming  a  fictitious 
appearance  of  goodness. 

Tims,  the  Egyptian  Railways  benefited  by  the 
increase  of  prosperity  and  by  the  general  reform- 
ing impulse  which  was  imparted  to  the  Egyptian 
administrative  machine  by  the  predominance  of 
British  influence  in  the  country.  They  would 
have  benefited  still  more  had  the  British  reformers 
been  from  the  first  allowed  a  free  hand  in  dealing 
with  their  administration. 

In  1904,  as  a  consequence  of  the  arrangements 
with  the  Powers,  to  Avhich  allusion  has  already 
been  made,  the  Egyptian  Government  acquired 
full  right  to  deal  with  the  Railway  Administration 
in  any  way  they  might  think  fit. 

Few,  save  those  behind  the  scenes,  have  prob- 
ably recognised  fully  that  the  Anglo  -  French 
Agreement  was  only  signed  just  in  time  to  prevent 
a  complete  breakdown  of  the  Railway  Administra- 
tion. Such,  however,  is  unquestionably  the  case. 
If  means  had  not  been  found  to  spend  a  large 
amount  of  capital  on  developments  and  improve- 
ments, the  railways  of  Egypt  would  have  been 
wholly  unable  to  cope  with  the  growing  require- 
ments of  the  country. 

Towards  the  close  of  1905,  Sir  Charles  Scotter 
visited  Egypt  and  made  a  full  report  on  the  con- 
dition of  the  Egyptian  Railways.^  His  suggestions 
are  now  being  carried  out.  The  Railway  Adminis- 
tration is  being  thoroughly  reorganised.  Capital 

1  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  pp.  110-113. 


INTERNATIONALISM  313 


expenditure  to  the  extent  of  £3,000,000  has  been 
sanctioned,  of  which  £1,635,000  was  expended 
before  the  close  of  1906.  It  is  probable  that  an 
additional  grant  of  £1,000,000  will  be  eventually 
required.  Thus,  it  may  be  hoped  that  before  long 
the  Egyptian  Railway  Administration  will  be  in 
thoroughly  good  order. 

Looking  back  to  one  of  my  earliest  Reports  ^  I 
notice  that  in  1890,  the  Egyptian  Railways  carried 
4,700,000  passengers  and  1,683,000  tons  of  goods. 
In  1906,  they  carried  no  less  than  22,550,000 
passengers  and  20,036,000  tons  of  goods.  These 
figures  serve  as  a  striking  illustration  of  the  im- 
mense improvement  in  the  material  condition  of 
the  country  which  has  taken  place  during  the  last 
few  years.  They  also  afford  an  ample  justification 
for  the  large  reductions  which  have  been  made  in 
the  rates. ^ 

In  addition  to  the  State  Railways,  a  network  of 
1145  kilometres  of  Agricultural  Railways,  which 
are  owned  by  private  companies,  exists  in  Egypt. 
These  railways  are  largely  used.  In  1906,  they 
carried  6,924,000  passengers  and  929,000  tons  of 
goods. 

3.  Daira  Sanieh. 

The  Daira  properties  formed  part  of  the  huge 
estates  which  Ismail  Pasha  contrived,  generally  by 
illicit  and  arbitrary  methods,  to  accumulate  in  his 
own  hands.  They  originally  extended  over  an 
area  of  more  than  half  a  million  of  acres.  When 
Ismail  got  into  financial  difficulties,  he  borrowed 

1  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1892,  p.  20. 

2  1  may  remark  that  tlie  same  lesson  is  to  be  learnt  from  an 
examination  of  the  statistics  of  the  Post  Office  and  Telegraph  Depart- 
ments, in  both  of  which  the  rates  liave  been  largely  reduced.  In  1885, 
only  i2, 500,000  letters  and  83,000  parcels  passed  through  the  Post 
Office.  In  1905,  the  figures  were  :  letters,  50,700,000  ;  parcels,  250,000. 
In  1906,  no  less  than  1,925,000  telegrams,  of  which  1,248,000  were  in 
Arabic,  passed  over  the  lines,  as  compared  to  about  311,000  in  1890. 


314 


MODERN  EG\'PT 


£9,500,000  on  the  security  of  these  properties. 
They  were  administered  by  a  Board  of  Directors, 
consisting  of  an  Egy  ptian  Director-GeneraL  and 
two  Controllers,  one  British  and  one  French.  The 
Director-General  was  the  executive  officer,  but  the 
Controllers  had  ample  powers  of  supervision  and 
inspection.  They  alone  were  the  legal  representa- 
tives of  the  bondholders. 

Until  the  year  1891,  the  Daira  expenditure 
was  always  in  excess  of  the  revenue.  On  several 
occasions  the  deficits  exceeded  £200,000.  With 
the  exception  of  the  year  1895,  when  there  was  a 
deficit  amounting  to  £102.000,  the  accounts  of 
evers-  year  subsequent  to  1890  showed  a  surplus. 
In  the  two  years  1904-5,  the  revenue  exceeded 
the  expenditure  by  no  less  than  £817.000. 

In  1898,  an  arrangement  was  made  under  which 
the  Daira  estates  were  sold  to  a  company,  who 
again  refold  them  in  lots.  The  sales  are  now  com- 
plete Most  of  the  purchasers  were  Egyptians. 
The  Government  share  in  the  profits  of  the 
liquidation  amounted  to  about  £3,280,000. 

4.  The  Domains  Administration. 

The  properties,  known  by  the  name  of  the 
Domains,  comprise  the  estates  ceded,  under  pres- 
sure, by  Ismail  Pasha  in  1878.^  On  the  security 
of  these  estates,  a  loan  of  £8,500,000  was  negoti- 
ated with  Messrs.  Rothschild.  It  was,  at  the  same 
time,  arranged  that  the  Domains  should  be  ad- 
ministered by  a  Commission  consisting  of  an 
Enghshman,  a  Frenchman,  and  an  Egyptian. 

Up  to  the  year  1899.  the  revenue  yielded  by 
the  estates  was  invariably  less  thaii  the  expendi- 
ture. In  one  year  (1885)  the  deficit  amounted  to 
no  less  than  £275,000.     From  1900  onwards,  a 

>  Tide  amUf  roL  L  p.  63. 


IXTERXATIOXALISM 


315 


surplus,  varying  from  £26,000  to  £150,000,  was 
always  realised. 

Bv  gradual  sales  ^  the  extent  of  the  Domains 
properties,  which  originally  consisted  of  nearly 
426,000  acres  of  land,  was  reduced  by  the  close  of 
1906  to  about  147,000  acres.  Simultaneously,  the 
outstanding  capital  of  the  loan  was  reduced  from 
£8,500,000  to  about  £1,316,000.-  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  the  whole  of  this  loan  will  be  paid 
off  before  long,  and  that,  when  this  is  done,  some 
ver\-  valuable  lands  will  remain  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Government.' 

With  the  sale  of  the  Daira  and  Domains  lands, 
almost  the  last  traces  of  the  injury  which  Ismail 
Pasha  indicted  on  his  countrv.  bv  accumulatinof 
1,000,000  acres  of  the  best  land  in  Eg^  pt  m  the 
hands  of  himself  and  his  family,  will  disappear. 

Some  comprehension  of  these  institutions  is 
necessary  in  order  to  understand  the  extent  to 
which  the  freedom  of  action  of  the  British  officials 
in  Egypt  was  at  one  time  crippled.  A  brief 
examination  of  that  curious  mosaic  termed  the 
Judicial  System  of  Eg^-pt  will  tend  to  bring  into 
still  stronger  relief  the  anomalous  position  occupied 
by  the  Anglo-Eg}-ptian  reformer.  In  the  case  of 
those  institutions  of  which  I  have  so  far  treated,  the 
shackles  have  now  been,  for  the  most  part,  struck 
off.  In  the  case  of  those  with  which  I  am  about  to 
deal,  they  stUl  remain  and  bar  the  way  to  reform. 

^  The  great  majority  of  the  purchasers  have  been  Egj-ptians.  The 
land  was.  for  the  most  part,  sold  in  small  lots. 

-  (hi  November  30,  1907,  the  outstanding  capital  of  this  loan 
amounted  to  ouly  £1,0.50,940. 

^  If  the  present  price  of  land  is  maintained,  the  value  of  the  estates 
which  will  remain  over  after  the  complete  liquidation  of  the  loan  will 
probably  be  about  £5,000,00a 


CHAPTER  XLII 


THE  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM 

The  Mixed  Courts — Nubar  Pasha's  objects  in  creating  them — Attributes 
and  composition  of  the  Mixed  Courts — Defects  in  the  institution — 
The  Consular  Courts — The  Native  Tribunals  and  the  Kadi's  Courts 
— Summary  of  jurisdictions  in  Egypt. 

In  creating  the  International  Tribunals,  or,  as 
they  are  more  frequently  called,  the  Mixed  Courts, 
Nubar  Pasha  had  two  objects  in  view.  In  the 
first  place,  he  was  struck  with  the  fact  that, 
inasmuch  as  the  European  adventurers  who  flocked 
to  Egypt  during  the  reigns  of  Said  and  of  Ismail  had 
no  legal  means  for  obtaining  a  redress  of  any  real  or 
imaginary  grievances,  they  fell  back,  in  case  of  need, 
on  diplomatic  support,  with  results  that  were  not 
unfrequently  disastrous  to  the  Egyptian  Treasury. 
Nubar  Pasha,  therefore,  conceived  the  statesmanlike 
project  of  creating  law-courts,  which  should  com- 
mand the  confidence  of  Europe,  and  which  should 
be  empowered  to  try  civil  suits  between  Europeans, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Egyptians  or  the  Egyptian 
Government,  on  the  other  hand.  In  the  second 
place,  although  in  dealing  with  Ismail  Pasha  this 
aspect  of  the  case  was  kept  in  the  background, 
Nubar  Pasha  wished  to  erect  a  legal  barrier  between 
the  population  of  Egypt  and  the  capricious 
despotism  of  the  Khedive.  His  original  intention 
was  to  place  all  the  inhabitants  of  Egypt,  whether 
Europeans  or  Egyptians,  under  the  jurisdiction  of 

316 


CH.XLII     THE  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM  317 


the  INIixed  Courts.  This  part  of  the  project, 
however,  fell  to  the  ground  owing  to  the  strong 
opposition  which  it  encountered  at  Constantinople, 
and  perhaps  it  was  as  well  that  it  did  so,  for  the 
complete  realisation  of  Nubar  Pasha's  idea  would 
have  entailed  the  internationalisation  of  the  whole 
judicial  system  of  the  country. 

Nubar  Pasha's  first  object  was,  however,  attained. 
From  1875  onwards,  any  European  who  has  had  a 
claim  either  against  an  Egyptian  or  against  the 
Egyptian  Government,  has  no  longer  been  under  the 
necessity  of  seeking  diplomatic  support.  He  has 
been  referred  both  by  the  Egyptian  Government 
and  by  the  diplomatic  agent  of  his  country  to  a 
properly  constituted  law-court  in  which  it  was  com- 
petent for  him  to  make  good  his  claim,  if  it  was  a 
just  one.  From  every  point  of  view,  the  result  has 
been  beneficial.  The  claimant,  with  the  Egyptian 
code  before  him,  has  been  able  to  form  a  fair  idea  of 
what  he  might  expect  from  the  law-courts.  The 
Egyptian  Government  have,  on  the  one  hand,  been 
obliged  to  acknowledge  their  legal  and  contractual 
obligations ;  on  the  other  hand,  they  have  been  re- 
lieved from  capricious  diplomatic  pressure  on  behalf 
of  individuals,  and  they  have  not  unfrequently  in- 
voked the  law  with  success  in  order  to  be  saved  from 
the  exorbitant  demands  of  contractors  and  others. 
The  diplomatic  agent  has  been  relieved  from  the 
unpleasant  obligation  of  supporting  claims,  which 
were  often  of  doubtful  validity  from  a  technical, 
and  of  more  than  doubtful  morality  from  an 
equitable  point  of  view. 

By  the  irony  of  fate,  the  institution  to  which 
Ismail  Pasha  was  induced  to  assent,  probably  with 
only  a  half  knowledge  of  what  it  meant,  was  the 
instrument  which  dealt  him  his  political  death- 
blow. When  the  law-courts,  to  whose  creation 
the  Powers  of  Europe  had  been  parties,  condemned 


318 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  IV 


him  to  pay  certain  sums  of  money,  and  when  he 
found  himself  unable  to  pay  them,  the  cup  of  his 
iniquity  overflowed,  and  Europe — legally  outraged, 
and  politically  timorous  of  what  the  future  might 
bring  forth — spoke  out  and  said,  "  You  must  pay 
or  go."  Ismail  Pasha  could  not  pay.  After  a  few 
ineffectual  struggles,  he  went. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  at  length  the  attri- 
butes and  composition  of  the  Mixed  Courts.  It 
will  be  sufficient  to  say  that  a  Court  of  Appeal 
sits  at  Alexandria,  and  that  three  Courts  of  First 
Instance  exist,  one  at  Cairo,  one  at  Alexandria, 
and  one  at  Mansourah.  Egyptian  judges  sit  on 
all  these  Courts,  but  most  of  the  real  work  is  done 
by  Europeans.  The  European  judges  of  the 
Court  of  Appeal  are  for  the  most  part  chosen  from 
amongst  the  subjects  of  the  Great  Powers.  All  the 
Powers,  without  distinction,  are  represented  on 
the  Courts  of  First  Instance.  The  choice  of  judges 
rests  nominally  with  the  Egyptian  Government. 
In  reality,  the  judges  have  until  quite  recently 
been  nominated  by  their  respective  Governments. 
The  jurisdiction  of  the  Mixed  Courts  extends  over 
all  civil  cases  between  Europeans  and  Egyptians, 
whether  the  European  appears  as  plaintiff  or 
defendant ;  also,  over  civil  cases  between  Europeans 
of  different  nationalities. 

The  principal  defect  of  the  Mixed  Courts  is 
that  the  judges  are  not  merely  interpreters  of  the 
law ;  they  are  also  to  a  great  extent  makers  of  it. 
They  are  not  under  the  effective  control  of  any 
legislature.  If,  as  is  both  natural  and  occasionally 
almost  unavoidable,  they  attempt,  by  a  some- 
what strained  interpretation  of  their  charter, 
to  usurp  functions  which  do  not  belong  to  them, 
there  is  no  one  to  restrain  them.  In  order 
tliat  any  new  law  should  be  recognised  by  the 
Mixed  Courts,  it  must  receive  the  assent  of  all  the 


CH.  xLii     THE  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM 


319 


Powers,  and  experience  has  shown  that  it  is 
generally  impossible,  and  always  difficult  and 
tedious,  to  ensure  the  required  unanimity.  Legis- 
lation by  diplomacy  is  probably  the  worst  and 
most  cumbersome  form  of  legislation  in  the  world. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
that  the  judges  of  the  Mixed  Courts  are  practically 
a  law  unto  themselves. 

When  the  Indian  code  was  framed,  some  of 
the  most  acute  intellects  of  the  time  devoted 
themselves  to  a  lengthy  examination  of  the 
subject  with  a  view  to  deciding  what  provisions 
of  European  law  and  procedure,  whether  British 
or  Roman,  could  be  adapted  to  the  circumstances 
and  requirements  of  India.  The  result  was  the  pro- 
duction of  an  admirable  code,  which  was  essentially 
Indian.  No  such  care  was  taken  in  Egypt.  The 
Egyptian  code  was  originally  little  more  than  a 
textual  copy  of  the  French  code,  and,  moreover, 
it  was  applied  by  judges  who,  although  in  some 
instances  men  of  ability,  were  necessarily  ignorant 
of  Egyptian  manners  and  customs.  The  result 
was  that  great  hardship  was  at  times  inflicted, 
more  especially  in  respect  to  the  application  of  the 
laws  regulating  the  relations  between  debtor  and 
creditor.  The  ignorant  Egyptian  debtor  found 
himself,  before  he  was  aware  of  it,  gripped  in  the 
iron  hand  of  the  law,  which  was  mercilessly  applied 
by  his  Levantine  creditor.  Eventually,  some 
modifications  were  made,  but  even  now  the  law 
and  procedure  are  too  European  for  the  country. 

The  JNl ixed  Courts  only  exercise  criminal  juris- 
diction over  Europeans  in  a  certain  number  of 
specified  cases,  most  of  which  are  of  rare  occurrence. 
For  the  most  part,  any  European  resident  in  Egypt 
who  is  accused  of  crime  is  tried  by  his  Consul 
according  to  the  laws  of  his  own  country. 

The  Native  Tribunals  instituted  under  Lord 


320 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


DufFerin's  auspices  exercise  civil  and  criminal 
jurisdiction  over  Ottoman  subjects,  save  in  respect 
to  matters  relating  to  personal  status,  which  are 
decided  by  the  Kadi  according  to  the  system  of 
ecclesiastical  jurisprudence  embodied  in  the  Sacred 
Law  of  Islam.  The  working  of  these  Tribunals 
will  be  di  scussed  at  a  later  period  of  this  work. 

To  sum  up,  if  an  Egyptian  and  a  European 
wish  some  civil  cause  of  dispute  between  them  to 
be  decided,  they  go  to  the  Mixed  Courts.  If  an 
European  commits  a  criminal  offence  against  an 
Egyptian,  he  is  tried  by  his  Consul,  with  an  appeal 
possibly  to  Aix,  Ancona,  Odessa,  or  elsewhere, 
according  to  the  nationality  of  the  accused. 
If  an  Egyptian  brings  a  civil  suit  against  another 
Egyptian,  or  if  he  commits  any  criminal  offence 
whether  against  a  European  or  another  Egyptian, 
he  comes  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Native 
Tribunals,  which  administer  the  French  code, 
modified  in  some  respects  to  suit  Egypt.  If  an 
Egyptian  wishes  to  prove  a  will  or  to  dispute  a 
succession,  he  has  to  go  to  the  Kadi,  who  will 
decide  according  to  the  Sheriat. 

Enough  has  now  been  said  to  give  an  idea  of 
the  main  features  of  the  judicial  labyrinth  which 
time  and  international  rivalry  have  built  up  in 

Egypt. 


CHAPTER  XLIII 


THE  WORKERS  OF  THE  MACHINE 

Importance  of  persons  rather  than  of  systems — The  British  Consal- 
General — Tewfik  Pasha — The  Prime  Ministers — Cherif  Pasha — 
Nubar  Pasha — Riaz  Pasha — Mustapha  Pasha  FehmL 

An  endeavour  has  been  made  in  the  four  preceding 
chapters  to  give  some  idea  of  the  machinery  of 
Government  in  Egypt  in  so  far  as  the  different 
parts  of  the  machine  can  be  described  by  reference 
to  documents  setting  forth  the  official  functions 
which  are  assigned  to  the  various  individuals  and 
corporations  who  collectively  make  or,  at  one  time, 
made  up  the  governing  body.  This  description  is, 
however,  incomplete  ;  indeed,  in  some  respects  it 
is  almost  misleading ;  for  allusion  has  so  far  only 
been  made  to  those  portions  of  the  State  machinery 
whose  functions  can  be  described  with  some  degree 
of  precision.  There  are,  however,  other  portions! 
of  that  machinery  whose  functions  are  incapable  oi 
exact  definition,  but  whose  existence  is  none  the 
less  real.  Whether,  in  fact,  the  whole  machine 
works  well  or  ill  depends  in  no  small  degree  upon 
the  action  of  those  parts  of  the  machinery  which, 
to  a  superficial  observer,  might  appear  unnecessary, 
if  not  detrimental  to  its  efficient  working.  In  the 
Egyptian  body  politic,  the  unseen  is  often  more 
important  than  the  seen.  Notably,  of  late  years 
a  vague  but  preponderant  power  has  been  vested 
in  the  hands  of  the  British  Consul- General.  The 
VOL.  II  321  y 


322  MODERN  EGYPT 


defects  in  this  system  of  government  are  obvious. 
Its  only  justification  is  that,  under  the  existing 
condition  of  affairs  in  Egypt,  it  is  impossible  to 
substitute  anything  better  in  its  place. 

I  proceed  to  give  a  sketch  of  the  duties  of  the 
British  Consul-General,  but  inasmuch  as  during  the 
greater  portion  of  the  period  of  which  this  history 
treats,  I  occupied  the  post  of  Consul-General,  I 
must,  for  obvious  reasons,  leave  it  to  others  to 
appreciate  the  manner  in  which  those  duties  were 
performed. 

Looking  to  the  general  condition  of  Egyptian 
society ;  to  the  unscrupulous  methods  by  which  it 
was  customary  to  advance  personal  aims ;  to  the 
untruthfulness,  corruption,  and  intrigue  with  which 
Egyptian  society  was  honeycombed  ;  and  finally,  to 
the  fact  that  whatever  pseudo-civilisation  existed 
in  Egypt  was  often  tainted  by  reason  of  its  having 
drawn  its  inspirations  from  those  portions  of  the 
European  social  system  which  are  least  worthy  of 
imitation, — it  always  appeared  to  me  that  the  first 
and  most  important  duty  of  the  British  representa- 
tive in  Egypt  was,  by  example  and  precept,  to  set 
up  a  high  standard  of  morality,  both  in  his  public 
and  private  life,  and  thus  endeavour  to  raise  the 
standard  of  those  around  him.  If  I  have  in  any 
way  succeeded  in  this  endeavour  ;  if  I  have  helped 
to  purge  Egyptian  administration  of  corruption  ;  if 
it  is  gradually  dawning  on  the  Egyptian  mind  that 
honesty  is  not  only  the  most  honourable  but  also 
the  most  paying  policy,  and  that  lying  and 
intrigue  curse  the  liar  and  intritjuer  as  well  as  his 
victim, — I  owe  the  success,  in  so  far  as  public 
matters  are  concerned,  to  the  co-operation  of  a 
body  of  high-minded  British  officials  who  have 
persistently  held  up  to  all  with  whom  they  have 
been  brought  in  contact  a  standard  of  probity 
heretofore  unknown  in  Egypt,  and,  in  so  far  as 


cH.xLin  THE  WORKERS 


323 


social  life  is  concerned,  I  owed  it,  until  cruel  death 
intervened  to  sever  the  tie  which  bound  us  together, 
mainly  to  the  gentle  yet  commanding  influence  of 
her  who  first  instigated  me  to  write  this  book. 

The  duty  of  a  diplomatic  agent  in  a  foreign 
country  is  to  carry  out  to  the  best  of  his  ability 
the  policy  of  the  Government  which  he  serves. 
My  main  difficulty  in  Egypt  was  that  the  British 
Government  never  had  any  definite  policy  which 
was  capable  of  execution  ;  they  were,  indeed,  at 
one  time  constantly  striving  to  square  the  circle, 
that  is  to  say,  they  were  endeavouring  to  carry  out 
two  policies  which  were  irreconcilable,  namely,  the 
policy  of  reform,  and  the  counter-policy  of  evacua- 
tion. The  British  Government  are  not  to  be  blamed 
on  this  account.  Tiie  circumstances  were  of  a 
nature  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  adopting  a 
clear-cut  line  of  action,  which  would  have  enabled 
the  means  to  be  on  all  occasions  logically  adapted 
to  the  end. 

I  never  received  any  general  instructions  for  my 
guidance  during  the  time  I  held  the  post  of  British 
Consul-General  in  Egypt,  and  I  never  asked  for 
any  such  instructions,  for  I  knew  that  it  was 
useless  for  me  to  do  so.  My  course  of  action  was 
decided  according  to  the  merits  of  each  case  with 
which  I  had  to  deal.  Sometimes  I  spurred  the 
unwilling  Egyptian  along  the  path  of  reform.  At 
other  times,  I  curbed  the  impatience  of  the  British 
reformer.  Sometimes  I  liad  to  explain  to  the  old- 
world  Mohammedan,  the  Mohammedan  of  the 
Sheriat,  the  elementary  differences  between  the 
principles  of  government  in  vogue  in  the  seventh 
and  in  the  nineteenth  centuries.  At  other  times,  I 
had  to  explain  to  the  young  Gallicised  Egyptian  that 
the  principles  of  an  ultra-Republican  Government 
were  not  applicable  in  their  entirety  to  the  exist- 
ing phase  of  Egyptian  society,  and  that,  when  we 


324  MODERN  EGYPT 


speak  of  the  rights  of  man,  some  distinction  has 
necessarily  to  be  made  in  practice  between  a  Euro- 
pean spouting  nonsense  through  the  medium  of 
a  fifth -rate  newspaper  in  his  own  country,  and 
man  in  the  person  of  a  ragged  Egyptian  fellah, 
possessed  of  a  sole  garment,  and  who  is  unable  to 
read  a  newspa])er  in  any  language  whatsoever.  I 
had  to  support  the  reformer  sufficiently  to  prevent 
him  from  being  discouraged,  and  sufficiently  also 
to  enable  him  to  carry  into  execution  all  that  was 
essential  in  his  reforming  policy.  I  had  to  check 
the  reformer  when  he  wished  to  push  his  reforms 
so  far  as  to  shake  the  whole  political  fabric  ^  in  his 
endeavour  to  overcome  the  tiresome  and,  to  his 
eyes,  often  trumpery  obstacles  in  his  path,  and 
thus  lay  bare  to  the  world  that  measures  which 
were  dictated  in  the  true  interests  of  Egypt  were 
opposed  by  many  who  had,  by  accident  or  by 
the  political  cant  of  the  day,  been  elevated  to  the 
position  of  being  the  putative  representatives  of 
Egyptian  public  opinion.  I  had  to  support  the 
supremacy  of  the  Sultan  and,  at  the  same  time, 
to  oppose  any  practical  Turkish  interference  in  the 
administration,  which  necessarily  connoted  a  relapse 
into  barbarism.  I  had  at  one  time  to  do  nothing 
inconsistent  with  a  speedy  return  to  Egyptian  self- 
government,  or,  at  all  events,  a  return  to  govern- 
ment by  the  hybrid  coterie  of  Cairo,  which  flaunts 
before  the  world  as  the  personification  of  Egyptian 
autonomy ;  whilst,  at  the  same  time,  I  was  well 
aware  that,  for  a  long  time  to  come,  European 
guidance  will  be  essential  if  the  administration  is  to 
be  conducted  on  sound  principles.  I  had  at  times  to 

1  Sir  John  Seeley  (Growth  of  British  Policy,  ii.  p.  323),  speaking  of 
William  111.,  says:  "Tlie  main  reason  why  his  work  has  proved  so 
strangely  durable  is  that  it  was  never  excessive.  He  had  a  wise 
parsimony  in  action.  .  .  .  The  masterpieces  of  the  statesman's  art  are 
for  the  most  part  not  acts,  but  abstinences  from  action."  A  somewhat 
similar  view  was  frequently  advanced  by  Burke. 


CH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS 


325 


retire  into  my  diplomatic  shell,  and  to  pose  as  one 
amongst  many  representatives  of  foreign  Powers. 
At  other  times,  I  had  to  step  forward  as  the 
representative  of  the  Sovereign  whose  soldiers  held 
Egypt  in  their  grip.  At  one  time,  I  had  to  defend 
Egypt  against  European  aggression,  and,  not  un- 
frequently,  I  had  in  the  early  days  of  the  occupa- 
tion to  defend  the  British  position  against  foreign 
attack.  I  had  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  well- 
intentioned,  generally  reasonable,  but  occasionally 
ill-informed  public  opinion  of  England,  when  I 
knew  that  the  praise  or  blame  of  the  British 
Parliament  and  press  was  a  very  faulty  standard 
by  which  to  judge  the  wisdom  or  unwisdom  of  my 
acts.  I  had  to  maintain  British  authority  and,  at 
the  same  time,  to  hide  as  much  as  possible  the  fact 
that  I  was  maintaining  it.  I  had  a  military  force 
at  my  disposal,  which  I  could  not  use  save  in  the 
face  of  some  grave  emergency.  I  had  to  work 
through  British  agents  over  whom  I  possessed  no 
control,  save  that  based  on  personal  authority  and 
moral  suasion.  I  had  to  avoid  any  step  which 
might  involve  the  creation  of  European  difficulties 
by  reason  of  local  troubles.  I  had  to  keep  the 
Egyptian  question  simmering,  and  to  avoid  any 
action  which  might  tend  to  force  on  its  premature 
consideration,  and  I  had  to  do  this  at  one  time  when 
all,  and  at  another  time  when  some  of  the  most 
important  Powers  were  more  or  less  opposed  to 
British  policy.  Lastly,  the  most  heterogeneous 
petty  questions  were  continually  coming  before  me. 
If  a  young  British  officer  was  cheated  at  cards,  I  had 
to  get  him  out  of  his  difficulties.  If  a  slave  girl 
wanted  to  marry,  I  had  to  bring  moral  pressure  on 
her  master  or  mistress  to  give  their  consent.  If  a 
Jewish  sect  wished  for  official  recognition  from  the 
Egyptian  Government,  I  was  expected  to  obtain 
it,  and  to  explain  to  an  Egyptian  Minister  all  I 


326  MODERN  EGYPT 


knew  of  the  difference  between  Ashkenazian  and 
Sephardic  practices.  If  the  inhabitants  of  some 
remote  villa<;e  in  Upper  Egypt  were  discontented 
with  their  Sheikh,  they  appealed  to  me.  I  have 
had  to  write  telegrams  and  despatches  about  the 
most  miscellaneous  subjects — about  the  dismissal 
of  the  Khedive's  English  coachman,  about  pre- 
serving the  lives  of  Irish  informers  from  the  Clan- 
na-Gael  conspirators,  and  about  the  tenets  of  the 
Abyssinian  Church  in  respect  to  the  Procession  of 
the  Holy  Ghost.  I  have  been  asked  to  interfere 
141  order  to  get  a  German  missionary,  whtrha#=%¥¥eflr 
guilty  of  embezzlement,  out  of  prison ;  in  order  to 
get  a  place  for  the  French  and  Italian  Catholics  to 
bury  their  dead ;  in  order  to  get  a  dead  INIohammedan 
of  great  sanctity  exhumed  ;  in  order  to  prevent  a 
female  member  of  the  Khedivial  family  from  striking 
her  husband  over  the  mouth  with  a  slipper  ;  and  in 
order  to  arrange  a  marria";e  between  two  other 
members  of  the  same  family  whom  hard-hearted 
relatives  kept  apart.  I  have  had  to  take  one 
English  maniac  in  my  own  carriage  to  a  Lunatic 
Asylum  ;  I  have  caused  another  to  be  turned  out  of 
the  English  church ;  and  I  have  been  informed 
that  a  third  and  remarkably  muscular  madman  was 
on  his  way  to  my  house,  girt  with  a  towel  round 
his  loins,  and  bearing  a  poker  in  his  hands  with  the 
intention  of  using  that  implement  on  my  head.  I 
have  been  asked  by  an  Egyptian  fellah  to  find  out 
the  whereabouts  of  his  wife  who  had  eloped ;  and 
by  a  German  professor  to  send  him  at  once  six  live 
electric  shad-fish,  from  the  Nile.  To  sum  up  the 
situation  in  a  few  words,  I  had  not,  indeed,  to 
govern  Egypt,  but  to  assist  in  the  government  of 
the  country  without  the  appearance  of  doing  so 
and  without  any  legitimate  authority  over  the 
agents  with  whom  I  had  to  deal. 

Under   these   somewhat  bewildering  circumi- 


CH.XLII1  THE  WORKERS 


327 


stances,  the  only  general  principles  which  I  was 
able  to  lay  down  for  my  own  guidance  were, 
first,  to  settle  all  purely  local  matters  on  the  spot, 
with  as  little  reference  as  possible  to  London ; 
secondly,  to  refer  for  instructions  in  respect  to  any 
matter  which  was  calculated  either  to  raise  diplo- 
matic questions  outside  the  local  sphere  of  interest, 
or  to  attract  serious  attention  in  Parliament.  On 
the  whole,  I  think  it  may  be  said  that  this  system 
worked  as  well  as  could,  under  the  very  peculiar 
circumstances  of  the  situation,  have  been  expected. 
A  middle  course  was  steered  between  the  extremes 
of  centralisation  and  decentralisation. 

It  is  clear  that  the  working  of  a  nondescript 
Government,  such  as  that  which  has  existed  in 
Egypt  since  1882,  must  depend  mainly  on  the 
personal  characteristics  of  the  individuals  who  are 
at  the  head  of  affairs.  The  principal  person  who 
figured  on  the  Egyptian  stage  during  the  first 
nine  years  of  the  British  occupation  was  the  late 
Khedive,  Tewfik  Pasha. 

The  best  friends  of  Tewfik  Pasha  would  probably 
not  contend  that  he  was  a  great  man  or  an  ideal 
Khedive.  There  was,  in  fact,  no  real  greatness 
about  him.  He  was  a  monogamist,  and  thus  set 
a  good  example  to  his  countrymen.  He  was  an 
indulgent  and  well-intentioned  father  who  en- 
deavoured to  educate  his  children  well.  He  acquired 
a  reputation  for  devotion,  wliilst  he  was  devoid  of 
any  tinge  of  the  intolerance  with  which  devout 
Islamism  is  sometimes  tainted.  His  piety  kept 
him  in  touch  with  his  Moslem  subjects,  and  thus 
constituted  a  political  factor  of  some  importance. 
Judged  by  the  standard  of  his  surroundings,  he 
was  loyal  and  straightforward.  Like  most  of  his 
countrymen,  he  would  shirk  responsibility,  and 
would  endeavour  to  throw  as  much  as  he  could  on 
the  shoulders  of  others.    He  would  complain  of  the 


828  MODERN  EGYPT 


number  of  Europeans  in  the  Egyptian  service,  and 
when  any  European  asked  him  for  a  place,  he 
would  reply  that  personally  he  would  be  delighted 
to  grant  the  request,  but  that  some  British 
authority  prevented  him  from  following  the 
benevolent  dictates  of  his  heart.  He  was  apathetic, 
and  wanting  in  initiative,  but,  when  forced  to  take 
a  decision,  would  not  unfrequently  show  a  good 
deal  of  dignified  common  sense  and  shrewdness. 
He  was  kind-hearted,  and  even  at  times  displayed 
some  signs  of  gratitude  for  services  rendered  to 
him,  a  quality  which  is  rare  in  an  Oriental  ruler. 
Warned  by  the  example  of  his  father,  he  shunned 
extravagance  to  the  extent,  indeed,  of  being 
occasionally  accused  of  avarice,  but  he  sometimes 
performed  acts  of  real  generosity.  There  was 
little  of  the  typical  Oriental  despot  in  Tewfik 
Pasha's  character.  He  professed  a  deep,  and, 
without  doubt,  genuine  dislike  to  all  arbitrary, 
oppressive,  or  cruel  acts.  He  was  never  personally 
responsible  for  the  commission  of  any  such  act, 
although  it  may  well  be  that  from  apathy  and 
negligence  he  allowed  injustice  to  be  occasionally 
perpetrated  in  his  name.  He  was  not  highly 
educated.  He  rarely,  if  ever,  read  a  book,  but  he 
studied  the  newspapers ;  he  conversed  with  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  men  ;  he  was  fairly  quick 
in  mastering  any  facts  which  were  explained  to 
him,  and  in  picking  up  the  thread  of  an  argument. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  intellectual  acuteness, 
he  was  probably  rather  above  the  average  of  his 
countrymen.  He  obtained,  not  by  study  but  by 
practical  experience  in  dealing  with  men  and  things, 
a  fair  education  of  a  nature  which  is  useful  to  a 
man  occupying  a  high  public  position.  Like  most 
of  his  countrymen,  he  would  yield  a  ready  assent 
to  any  high-sounding  general  principle.  In  practice, 
he  would  often  fail  to  see  that  some  action,  which 


CH.XL1II  THE  WORKERS 


329 


it  was  proposed  to  take,  was  at  variance  with  the 
principle  to  which  he  had  assented ;  nevertheless, 
when  the  dissonance  between  the  particular  act 
and  the  principle  was  brought  home  to  him,  he 
would  generally,  by  some  process  of  reasoning, 
which  would  be  unfamiliar,  if  not  incomprehensible, 
to  the  clear-cut  European  mind,  arrive  at  the 
conclusion  that  the  commission  of  the  act 
was  reprehensible.  His  conduct  during  the  events 
of  1882  showed  that  he  was  not  wanting  in 
courage.  On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that,  if 
Tewfik  Pasha's  virtues  were  mediocre,  his  faults 
were  of  a  venial  character.  If  he  excited  none  of 
the  admiration  due  to  moral  greatness  or  to  high 
intellectual  qualities,  neither  did  he  excite  repro- 
bation by  sinking  below  the  moral  and  intellectual 
standard  of  his  surroundings.  He  was  morally 
and  intellectually  respectable,  and,  considered  as  a 
man  rather  than  as  a  ruler  of  men,  he  met  with  the 
qualified  commendation  which  is  usually  meted 
out  to  respectability.  His  character  and  conduct 
were  not  of  a  nature  to  excite  enthusiasm  on  his 
behalf  On  the  other  hand,  they  rarely  formed 
the  subject  of  severe  condemnation.  In  the 
majority  of  cases  which  attracted  public  attention, 
the  faint  praise,  which  is  scarcely  distinguishable 
from  an  implication  of  blame,  was  accorded  to  him. 
He  probably  deserved  more  praise  than  he  ever 
obtained.  He  honestly  wished  to  do  his  duty. 
He  was  really  interested  in  the  welfare  of  his 
subjects,  but  he  was  bewildered  by  the  involved 
nature  of  his  position,  and  did  not  see  clearly  how 
his  duty  could  best  be  performed.  For  this  he 
may  be  pardoned,  more  especially  when  it  is 
remembered  that  he  had  no  experience  of  the 
world  outside  Egypt.  Tewfik  Pasha  never  visited 
Europe. 

If  he  was  not  a  great  man,  neither  was  he  an 


330  MODERN  EGYPT 


ideal  Khedive.  If  he  had  been  a  man  of  excep- 
tionally firm  will,  high  character,  and  acute 
intellect,  he  would  have  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  policy  of  reform  in  Egypt ;  he  would  have 
asserted  his  own  authority ;  he  would  have  shown 
no  jealousy  of  the  Englishmen  who  were  employed 
in  his  service ;  he  would  have  co-operated  actively 
with  them  in  the  cause  of  reform,  and  he  would 
have  forced  the  Egyptians  in  his  service  to  yield 
a  similar  loyal  co-operation.  Tewfik  Pasha  did 
not  possess  the  strength  of  character  to  adopt  a 
bold  policy  of  this  sort,  and  perhaps  it  would  have 
been  Utopian  to  expect  that  he  should  have 
done  so. 

Although,  however,  Tewfik  Pasha  was  not  an 
ideal  Khedive,  nevertheless,  looking  to  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  time,  and  to  the  character- 
istics of  Oriental  rulers  generally,  it  may  be  said 
that  he  possessed,  in  a  somewhat  exceptional 
degree,  many  qualities  which  singularly  fitted  him 
to  occupy  the  post  he  held  during  the  time 
he  held  it.  Under  the  regime  of  a  fanatical 
Moslem,  or  of  a  man  of  arbitrary  temperament 
and  despotic  tendencies,  or  of  a  feeble  voluptu- 
ary indifferent  to  everything  which  did  not 
minister  to  his  own  pleasures — all  types  which  are 
common  in  the  history  of  Oriental  countries — the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  launching  Egypt  on  the 
path  of  progress  would  have  been  greatly  increased. 
Tewfik  Pasha  possessed  the  negative  virtue  that  he 
answered  to  none  of  these  descriptions,  and,  under 
the  circumstances,  this  was  a  virtue  of  incalculable 
value.  But  he  possessed  more  than  negative 
virtues.  He  could  lay  claim  to  some  good  qualities 
of  a  positive  character.  If  he  did  not  take  any 
active  part  in  initiating  reforms,  he  was  content 
that  others  should  do  so  for  him.  If  he  could  not 
lead  the  reformers,  he  had  no  objection  to  follow- 


CH.XLIU  THE  WORKERS  331 

ing  their  lead.  If  he  did  not  afford  any  very  active 
assistance  to  the  small  band  of  Englishmen  who 
were  laying  the  foundations  of  a  prosperous  future 
for  Egypt,  neither  did  he  interfere  actively  to 
place  obstacles  in  their  path ;  indeed,  he  often 
used  his  influence  to  remove  obstacles.  His 
position  was  one  of  great  difficulty.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  was  dangerous  to  oppose  tlie  English,  and, 
moreover,  he  was  sufficiently  intelligent  to  see  that 
it  was  contrary  to  his  own  interests  and  to  those  of 
his  country  to  do  so.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he 
threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  the  English,  he  was 
sure  to  lose  popularity  amongst  certain  influential 
sections  of  his  own  countrymen.  The  natural 
result  was  that  Tewfik  Pasha  developed  a  coDsider- 
able  talent  for  trimming.  The  circumstances  of 
the  time  were,  indeed,  such  that  he  could  scarcely 
with  prudence  adopt  any  other  line  of  policy  ;  and, 
as  a  trimmer,  he  played  his  part  remarkably  well. 
He  afforded  an  admirable  link  between  the 
Englishman  and  the  Egyptian,  and  he  often  per- 
formed useful  work  in  moderating  the  views  of 
either  side.  In  the  performance  of  this  task,  he 
naturally  came  in  for  a  good  deal  of  criticism  from 
both  quarters.    He  might  often  have  said  : 

In  moderation  placing  all  my  glory. 

While  Tories  call  me  Whig,  and  Whigs  a  Tory. 

Moreover,  Tewfik  Pasha  possessed  another  very 
valuable  quality.  He  knew  his  country  and  his 
countrymen  well.  It  was  not  in  vain  that  Arabi 
had  marched  with  horse,  foot,  and  artillery  into  the 
square  of  Abdin  Palace,  and  had  imposed  his  will 
on  his  reluctant  Sovereign.  It  was  not  in  vain  that 
he  had  listened  to  the  inflated  rubbish  talked  by 
would-be  patriots  about  free  institutions,  which  were 
uncongenial  to  the  soil  of  Egypt.  He  had  laid 
these  matters  to  heart.    He  knew  the  ignorance 


332  MODERN  EGYPT 


and  credulity  of  the  mass  of  the  population.  He 
recognised  the  danger  of  fanning  the  smoulder- 
ing embers  of  Moslem  fanaticism.  He  appreciated 
the  difficulties  of  his  position,  and  he  knew  that  if  he 
did  not  lean  on  the  strong  arm  of  England,  many 
of  those  who  knelt  at  his  feet  would  be  ready, 
should  the  occasion  arise  and  should  they  see  their 
own  profit  in  doing  so,  to  turn  on  him  and  rend 
him.  He  was  deeply  impressed  with  the  fact 
that  he  owed  his  position  to  British  interference. 
He  recognised  his  weakness,  and  he  knew  that, 
should  he  ever  incur  the  serious  displeasure  of 
England,  that  two-handed  engine  at  the  door,  in  the 
shape  of  the  British  fleet  and  the  British  army, 
stood  ready  to  strike  once  and  strike  no  more. 
Tiius,  though  he  would  coquette  with  those  who 
urged  him  to  oppose  the  English,  he  never  allowed 
himself  to  be  pushed  too  far  in  this  direction.  I 
once  had  to  remind  him  that  Ismail  Pasha  was  on 
the  shores  of  the  Bosphorus,  and  that  his  return 
to  Cairo  was  not  altogether  outside  the  verge  of 
practical  politics,  upon  which  Tewfik  Pasha  made 
the  significant  remark :  "  Un  Ministre  on  peut 
toujours  changer,  mais  le  Khedive — c'est  autre 
chose."  A  change  of  INIinistry  shortly  afterwards 
occurred,  for  Tewfik  Pasha  was  wise  enough  never 
to  identify  himself  fully  with  the  policy  of  any 
]\Iinister.  He  knew  that  a  change  of  IVlinistry  was 
an  admirable  political  safety-valve,  and  when  he 
felt  his  own  position  in  any  danger,  he  very  wisely 
did  not  hesitate  to  send  a  ministerial  scapegoat 
into  the  wilderness. 

I  bear  Tewfik's  name  in  kindly  and  respectful 
remembrance,  for  though  I  daresay  he  winced  under 
the  pressure,  which  I  occasionally  brought  to  bear 
on  him,  my  relations  with  him  were  very  pleasant 
and  friendly,  neither  did  they  in  any  way  redound 
to  his  discredit.   The  idea,  which  under  the  influence 


CH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS 


333 


of  the  Anglophobe  party  took  some  root  in  Egypt, 
to  the  effect  that  he  was  a  mere  tool  in  my  hands, 
is  wholly  untrue  and  most  unjust  to  his  memory. 
I  used  to  discuss  matters  with  him.  When  any 
difference  of  opinion  occurred,  I  yielded  to  him 
quite  as  often — indeed,  I  think  more  often — than 
he  yielded  to  me.  We  generally  came  to  some 
equitable  compromise  between  our  conflicting 
views. 

AVhen  he  died,  he  was  just  beginning  to  reap 
the  fruits  of  the  reforming  policy.  He  had  become 
popular  by  reason  of  the  reforms,  although,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  he  had  not  taken  any  leading  part 
in  effecting  them.  He  acquiesced  in  them  of  his 
own  free  will,  but  sometimes  with  an  unwilling 
mind, — kKo)v  deKovrC  <ye  6vfxS.  His  death  was  a 
great  loss  to  Egypt.  Whatever  may  have  been 
his  faults,  he  deserves  a  somewhat  prominent  niche 
in  the  Valhalla  of  Oriental  potentates.  Posterity 
will  be  unjust  if  they  forget  that  it  was  during  the 
reign  of  Tewfik  Pasha  that  Egypt  was  first  started 
on  the  road  to  prosperity,  and  that  he  took  not, 
indeed,  the  most  leading  part  in  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  his  country,  but  still  a  part  of  which  his 
descendants  may  well  be  proud  ;  for,  without  his 
abstention  from  opposition,  and  without  his  sup- 
port, albeit  it  was  at  times  rather  lukewarm,  the 
efforts  of  the  British  reformer  would  have  been  far 
less  productive  of  result  than  has  actually  been  the 
case.  Had  he  been  a  man  of  stronger  character 
and  more  marked  individuality,  it  is  possible  that 
his  country  would  have  progressed  less  rapidly.  He 
should  be  remembered  as  the  Khedive  who  allowed 
Egypt  to  be  reformed  in  spite  of  the  Egyptians. 

The  leading  personage  in  the  Egyptian  political 
world  is  the  Khedive.  The  Prime  Minister,  how- 
ever, also  occupies  a  position  of  great  import- 
ance.   After  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria  in 


334 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


1882,  Chdrif  Pasha  was  named  to  this  office.  In 
January  1884,  he  was  succeeded  by  Nubar  Pasha, 
who  remained  in  office  till  June  1888.  On 
Nubar  Pasha's  fall,  Riaz  Pasha  became  Prime 
Minister.  His  Ministry  lasted  till  May  1891. 
His  successor  was  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi.  On 
January  7,  1892,  Tewfik  Pasha  died.  His  son 
and  successor,  Abbas  Pasha,  kept  Mustapha  Pasha 
Fehmi  in  office  till  January  1893,  when  he  was 
succeeded  by  Riaz  Pasha,  who,  again,  in  April 
1894,  was  succeeded  by  Nubar  Pasha.  In  the 
autumn  of  1895,  Nubar  Pasha's  failing  health 
obliged  him  to  quit  office.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi. 

Of  Cherif  Pasha  little  need  be  said.  He  was 
a  Minister  of  the  pre  -  occupation  days  rather 
than  of  the  occupation.  His  character  is  almost 
sufficiently  described  in  the  narrative  given  in  a 
previous  portion  of  this  work.  To  what  has  been 
already  said  it  is  only  necessary  to  add  that  Cherif 
Pasha  was  the  least  Egyptian  of  any  of  the  Moslem 
Prime  Ministers  of  recent  times.  He  was  a  pure 
Turk  who,  in  early  life,  had  come  from  Constanti- 
nople. The  ordinary  Turco-Egyptian  is  generally 
more  Egyptian  than  Turk.  Cherif  Pasha,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  a  Turco-Egyptian  in  the  first  stage 
of  Egyptianisation.  It  is  true  that  he  favoured 
Egyptian  semi-autonomy,  and  that  he  viewed 
with  dislike  any  increased  interference  by  the 
Sultan  in  Egyptian  affairs ;  but  he  was  out  of 
sympathy  with  the  pure  Egyptians,  whom  he 
regarded  as  a  conquered  race ;  he  was,  in  fact, 
the  incarnation  of  the  policy  of  "  Egypt  for  the 
Turco- Egyptians."  Whatever  was  not  Turkish 
in  his  character,  was  French.  He  had  assimilated 
a  good  deal  of  the  bonhomie  which  sometimes,  and 
of  the  keen  sense  of  the  ridiculous  which  more 
frequently  is  to  be  found  amongst  the  French,  but 


CH.XLIII  THE  WORKERS 


335 


he  never  lost  the  predominant  characteristics  of  a 
Turkish  aristocrat.  He  was  proud,  courageous, 
honest  after  his  way,  and,  in  his  pubhc  hfe,  always 
neghgent  of  detail  and  sometimes  of  principle. 
Occasionally,  he  would  emit  flashes  of  true  states- 
manship, but  he  was  too  careless,  too  apathetic, 
and  too  wanting  in  persistence  to  carry  out  his 
own  principles  in  practice.  With  all  his  faults,  he 
was,  on  the  whole,  one  of  the  most  sympathetic 
figures  on  the  political  stage  of  Egypt  during 
recent  times. 

Nubar  Pasha  was  by  far  the  most  interesting  of 
latter-day  Egyptian  politicians.  Intellectually,  he 
towered  above  his  competitors.  Bearing  in  mind, 
however,  the  intellectual  calibre  of  those  com- 
petitors, he  deserves  more  than  such  faint  praise 
as  this.  He  was,  indeed,  a  bad  administrator,  and 
this  defect  detracted  from  his  political  usefulness, 
more  especially  by  reason  of  the  fact  that,  according 
to  his  own  admission,^  Egypt  stood  in  need  of 
administrators  rather  than  of  statesmen.  Never- 
theless, even  in  Egypt  some  statesmanlike  qualities 
are  demanded  from  those  who  are  at  the  head  of 
affairs,  and  Nubar  Pasha  could  unquestionably  lay 
claim  to  the  possession  of  quahties,  which  can  be 
characterised  as  statesmanlike. 

He  was  a  thorough  Oriental,  but,  unlike  many 
Orientals,  his  foreign  education  had  not  resulted  in 
his  assimilating  the  bad  and  discarding  the  more 
worthy  portions  of  European  civilisation.  He 
was  far  too  great  a  man  to  be  attracted  by  all  the 
flimsy  tinsel  and  moral  obliquity  which  lie  on  the 
surface  of  European  civilisation,  that  is  to  say, 
the  civilisation  of  the  Paris  Boulevards,  whose 
principal  apostles  are  usually  European  or  Levant- 
ine adventurers.  He  saw  all  these  things,  but 
unlike  the  Gallicised  Egyptian,  who  is  too  often 

>  Vide  ante,  p.  262. 


836  MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


lured  to  his  moral  destruction  by  them,  the  only- 
effect  which  they  produced  on  his  more  elevated 
mind  was  to  make  him  ask  himself — how  can  I 
protect  my  country  of  adoption  against  the  inroads 
of  the  quick-witted  but  unscrupulous  European  ? 
It  is  clear  that  Egypt  is  to  be  Europeanised  ;  how 
can  this  process  best  be  effected  ? 

The  answer  which  Nubar  Pasha  gave  to  these 
questions  was  worthy  of  a  statesman.  He  rightly 
differentiated  the  divergences  between  Eastern 
and  Western  systems  of  government.  Personal 
rule,  he  said  to  himself,  must  give  way  before  a 
reign  of  law.  The  Egyptians  must  learn  from 
Europe  how  to  protect  themselves  both  against 
the  arbitrary  caprices  of  their  rulers,  and  against 
the  advancing  and  somewhat  turbid  tide  of  Euro- 
peans with  whom  they  are  destined  to  be  associated. 
They  can  only  do  so  by  assimilating  that  respect 
for  the  law  which  forms  the  keystone  of  the  arch 
on  which  European  systems  of  government  rest. 
It  cannot  be  contended  that  this  idea  was  very 
original,  or  that  any  great  mental  effort  was 
required  for  its  conception.  But  to  Nubar  Pasha 
belongs  the  credit  that  he  was  the  first  Egyptian 
statesman  who  conceived  it,  or,  at  all  events,  who 
endeavoured  to  carry  it  into  practice.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  blemishes  in  Nubar  Pasha's 
character,  and  whatever  may  be  the  defects  in  the 
judicial  institutions  which  he  created,  it  should 
never  be  forgotten  that  he  first  endeavoured  to 
bring  home  to  the  Egyptian  governing  class  and  to 
the  Egyptian  people  that,  whereas  might,  whether 
in  the  person  of  despotic  Khedives  or  dictatorial 
diplomatists,  had  heretofore  been  right  in  Egypt, 
the  foundation  of  good  government  in  any  com- 
munity pretending  to  call  itself  civilised  is  that  the 
maxim  should  be  reversed,  and  that  might  should 
yield  to  right. 


THE  WORKERS 


339 


parison  with  the  past,  of  little  practical  utility.  It 
was  Nubar  Pasha's  misfortune  that,  during  the 
latter  part  of  his  career,  he  had  to  deal  princi- 
pally with  a  European  nation  whose  members  are 
distinguished  for  their  straightforward  mode  of 
conducting  business.  In  a  way,  he  understood 
the  English  character.  He  once  made  a  signi- 
ficant  and  characteristic  remark.  "  L'Anglais," 
he  said,  "  est  tr^s  naif,  mais  lorsqu'on  pense  qu'on 
I'a  tromp^,  tout  d'un  coup  il  se  tourne  et  il  vous 
flanque  un  terrible  coup  de  pied  quelque  part." 
But  although  he  knew  that  intrigue  was  of  little 
real  use  against  the  Englishman,  he  could  not 
resist  the  temptation  of  intriguhig.  He  could 
not  abandon  his  favourite  weapon  of  offence 
and  defence.  The  natural  result  ensued.  In 
spite  of  his  real  talents,  his  suavity,  his  earnest 
devotion  to  civilised  principles  of  government,  and 
his  profuse  professions  of  friendship  and  esteem, 
he  inspired  but  little  confidence  amongst  those 
Englishmen  with  whom  he  was  brought  in  con- 
tact. They  mistrusted  him,  perhaps  more  than  he 
deserved  to  be  mistrusted.  He  could  never  under- 
stand the  feelings  which  his  behaviour  excited 
in  the  minds  of  Englishmen.  He  went  to  his 
grave  with  a  hardy  and  unimpaired  belief  in  the 
political  virtues  of  finesse  bordering  on  duplicity. 

Nubar  Pasha's  political  views  during  the  early 
period  of  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt  were 
characteristic.  He  was  in  favour  of  the  occupa- 
tion. He  saw  that  a  British  garrison  was  necessary 
to  maintain  order.  "  If,"  he  frequently  said,  "  the 
British  troops  are  withdrawn,  I  shall  leave  Egypt 
with  the  last  battalion."  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
he  was  opposed  to  what  he  termed  the  "adminis- 
trative occupation."  In  other  words,  what  he 
wanted  was  a  military  force,  in  whom  perfect 
reliance  could  be  placed,  to  keep  him  in  power. 


340  MODERN  EGYPT 


whilst  he  was  to  be  allowed  a  free  hand  in  every- 
thing connected  with  the  civil  administration  of 
the  country.  Hence  his  extreme  civility  to  all 
British  military  officers,  whose  praises  he  was 
never  weary  of  singing.  What,  indeed,  for  all 
the  purposes  which  he  had  at  heart,  could  be 
more  perfect  than  the  presence  in  Egypt  of  a 
thoroughly  disciplined  force,  commanded  by  young 
men  who  took  no  interest  in  local  politics,  and 
who  occupied  themselves  exclusively  with  polo 
and  cricket  ?  Hence,  also,  his  constant  opposition 
during  his  first  period  of  office  (1884-88)  to  the 
British  civilians  in  the  Egyptian  service  and  to 
myself,  as  the  British  diplomatic  representative 
who  supported  them.  Our  action  jarred  terribly  with 
the  Nubarian  programme.  It  is  strange  that  a  really 
able  man,  such  as  Nubar  Pasha,  should  have  thought 
his  programme  capable  of  realisation,  and  that  he 
should  not  have  seen  the  impossibility  of  the  British 
Government  looking  on  as  passive  spectators  whilst 
a  British  force  was  in  Egypt,  and  allowing  the 
maladministration  of  the  Egyptian  Pashas  to  remain 
practically  unchecked.  And  this  would  certainly 
have  been  the  result  of  acquiescence  in  Nubar 
Pasha's  system  of  government.^ 

With  any  ordinary  degree  of  prudence,  Nubar 
Pasha  could  have  remained  Prime  Minister  for 
an  indefinite  period,  and  it  is  a  pity  that  he  did 
not  do  so,  for  his  talents  were  far  superior  to  those 
of  his  competitors.  His  fall  in  1888  came  about  in 
this  fashion.  For  some  four  years,  I  got  on  fairly 
well  with  him.  On  many  occasions,  I  afforded 
him  strong  support.  I  shut  my  eyes  to  a  good 
deal  of  intrigue,  which  I  knew  was  going  on 
around  me.    In  an  evil  moment  for  himself,  Nubar 

1  In  illustration  of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  I  may  refer  to  what 
happened  about  the  Commissions  of  Brigandage  {vide  ante,  p.  289  and 
injra,  p.  405). 


THE  WORKERS 


337 


Nubar  Pasha  had,  therefore,  no  difficulty  in 
grasping  a  European  principle.  Indeed,  the  wider 
the  principle,  the  more  readily  he  grasped  it, 
for  he  dearly  loved  dealing  in  generalities.  His 
defect  was  that,  having  once  got  hold  of  a  sound 
principle,  he  would  not  unfrequently  ride  it  to 
death.  He  did  not  sufficiently  adapt  it  to  the 
circumstances  with  which  he  had  to  deal.  Or, 
again,  he  would  sometimes  think  that,  having 
enunciated  the  principle,  he  had  done  all  that  was 
required  of  him.  He  rarely  endeavoured  to  acquaint 
himself  thoroughly  with  facts,  or  to  see  that  the 
practice  was  made  to  conform  with  the  principle 
which  he  had  adopted.  INIoreover,  he  would  some- 
times readily  assent  to  some  wide  general  principle 
without  any  serious  intention  of  applying  it  at  all, 
and  he  was  led  to  do  this  all  the  more  because 
his  subtle  intellect  was  not  slow  to  perceive  that 
Europeans,  and  especially  Englishmen,  are  liable 
to  be  soothed  by  plausible,  albeit  often  fallacious 
generalities. 

Nubar  Pasha  was  a  brilliant  conversationalist. 
He  possessed  a  marvellous  power  of  imparting  a 
character  of  perfect  verisimilitude  to  the  series  of 
half  -  truths,  bordering  on  fiction,  which  he  was 
wont  to  pour  into  the  ears  of  his  interested  listener. 
The  educated  European  was  struck  by  his  ap- 
parently wide  grasp  and  bold  generalisations,  the 
fallacies  of  which  could  often  only  be  detected  by 
those  who  had  a  perfect  acquaintance  with  the 
facts.  The  European  would  readily  fall  a  victim 
to  the  fascinating  manners,  the  graceful  diction, 
the  subtle  reasoning,  and  deferential  deportment, 
which  distinguish  the  peculiar  type  of  Oriental 
of  whom  Nubar  Pasha  was  perhaps  the  most 
typical  representative.  It  was  only  after  experi- 
ence and  reflection  that  he  would  perceive  that, 
the  premises  being  incorrect,  the  conclusions  of  his 

VOL.  II  z 


338 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


teacher  in  Egyptian  affairs  were  often  erroneous, 
and  that  the  broad  enunciations  of  principle  with 
which  he  had  been  charmed  were  intended  more 
for  academic  discussion  in  the  closet  than  for 
practical  decision  in  the  Council  Chamber. 

Nubar  Pasha's  readiness,  his  versatility,  the 
audacity  with  which  he  would  defend  the  most 
glaring  fallacies,  and  his  great  command  of 
language,  acquired  for  him  some  reputation  as  a 
diplomatist.  To  a  certain  extent,  this  reputation 
was  well  deserved.  On  many  occasions,  he  showed 
himself  to  be  a  skilful  negotiator.  He  was  especi- 
ally skilful  in  throwing  a  cloud  of  ambiguity  over 
his  meaning  and  his  intentions.  He  was  a  master 
of  the  French  language,  and  one  of  the  peculiarities 
of  that  language  is  that,  although  it  is  eminently 
precise  when  the  writer  or  speaker  wishes  to  give 
precision  to  his  thoughts,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
is  full  of  ambiguous  expressions,  which  afford  a 
powerful  help  to  a  diplomatist  who  wishes  to  leave 
open  some  back  door  through  which  to  retreat 
from  the  engagements  which  he  is  apparently 
taking,  and  this  was  not  unfrequently  Nubar 
Pasha's  case.  He  would  probably  have  been  more 
successful  as  a  diplomatist  in  the  eighteenth  than 
in  the  nineteenth  century.  Modern  diplomacy  is 
not  mere  jugglery,  neither  is  the  most  successful 
diplomatist  he  who  can  best  throw  dust  in  the  eyes 
of  his  opponent.  Under  the  influence  of  publicity, 
and  perhaps  to  some  extent  of  Prince  Bismarck, 
the  whole  art,  if  diplomacy  can  be  dignified  by 
such  a  name,  has  been  simplified ;  perhaps  some, 
including  Nubar  Pasha  himself,  would  say  that  it 
has  been  brutalised.  The  affairs  between  nation 
and  nation  are  now  conducted  on  more  business-like 
principles  than  heretofore.  A  plain  answer  is 
required  to  a  plain  question,  and  although  some 
tricks  of  the  trade  still  survive,  they  are,  by  com- 


cH.  xLiii         THE  WORKERS 


343 


political  and  social  thought.  Nubar  Pasha  recognised 
the  fact  that  there  was  only  one  true  civilisation  in 
the  world,  and  that  was  the  civilisation  of  Europe. 
Accordingly,  he  set  to  work  to  Europeanise  the 
main  framework  of  Egyptian  institutions  by  means 
which  were  sometimes  wise,  and  sometimes,  possibly, 
the  reverse,  but  he  never  entertained  any  doubt  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  object  to  be  attained.  Riaz 
Pasha,  on  the  other  hand,  represented  the  apotheosis 
of  Islamism.  Why,  he  thought,  should  not  the 
Saturnia  regna,  when  Moslems  were  really  great, 
return  ?  He  would  barely  recognise  the  necessity 
of  the  least  European  assistance  in  the  process 
of  Egyptian  regeneration.  "  Seul,"  he  said  to 
himself,  "je  ferai  le  bonheur  de  mon  peuple." 
He  held  that  Mohammedans  and  Mohammedanism 
contain  within  themselves  all  that  is  needed  for 
their  own  regeneration.  It  would  be  both  unjust 
and  ungenerous  not  to  extend  some  sympathy  to 
views  of  this  sort.  It  would  be  too  much  to  expect 
that  a  fervid  Moslem  and  a  sincere  Egyptian 
patriot — and  Riaz  Pasha  answers  both  of  these 
descriptions — should  readily  accept  the  facts,  which 
are  almost  certainly  true,  namely,  that  Islamism 
as  a  social  and  political  system — though  not  as  a 
religion — is  moribund,  that  the  judicial  and  admin- 
istrative procedures  common  amongst  Moslems  are 
so  closely  interwoven  with  their  religion  as  to  be 
almost  inseparable  the  one  from  the  other,  and  that 
for  many  a  long  year  to  come  the  Egyptians  will 
be  incapable  of  governing  themselves  on  civilised 
principles. 

Riaz  Pasha's  political  life  may  be  divided  into 
four  different  phases  :  first,  as  a  Minister  and  as 
a  Commissioner  of  Inquiry  under  Ismail  Pasha ; 
secondly,  as  Prime  Minister  under  Tewfik  Pasha 
during  the  period  of  the  Anglo-French  Control ; 
thirdly,  as  Prime  Minister  under  Tewfik  Pasha 


344  MODERN  EGYPT 


during  the  time  of  the  British  occupation ;  and, 
fourthly,  as  Prime  Minister  under  Abbas  II. 

He  appeared  to  most  advantage  in  the  first 
phase.  He  was  indignant  at  the  ruin  which  Ismail 
Pasha  brought  on  his  country.  He  stood  out 
boldly  as  a  reformer  at  a  time  when  a  reforming 
Egyptian  could  not  state  his  true  opinions  without 
risk  to  his  life  and  property.  Whatever  faults  Riaz 
Pasha  may  have  subsequently  committed,  it  should 
never  be  forgotten  that  during  this  phase  of  his 
career  he  showed  a  great  deal  of  real  courage  and 
foresight.^ 

In  the  early  portions  of  the  second  phase,  that 
is  to  say,  the  period  of  the  Anglo-French  Control, 
Riaz  Pasha  also  showed  to  advantage.  He  was 
placed  in  such  a  position  that  his  dislike  to 
European  interference  was  of  necessity  tempered 
by  the  consideration  that  the  Europeans,  with 
whom  he  was  principally  associated,  were  very 
useful.  The  Controllers  stood  between  him  and 
the  hungry  creditors  of  the  Egyptian  Government, 
and  Riaz  Pasha  was  aware  that  he  did  not  possess 
sufficient  technical  knowledge  to  evolve  order  out 
of  the  existing  financial  chaos  without  European 
assistance.  During  the  later  portion  of  the  Control 
period,  he  had  to  deal  with  a  question  which  possibly 
required  higher  qualities,  and  a  greater  degree  of 
political  insight,  than  any  that  he  possessed.  He 
was  swept  off  his  legs  by  the  Arabi  movement,  of 
which  he  failed  to  see  the  importance  until  too  late. 

The  third  phase  of  Riaz  Pasha's  political  career 
was  when,  in  succession  to  Nubar  Pasha,  he  was 
made  Prime  Minister  by  Tewfik  during  the  period 
of  the  British  occupation.  At  first  matters  went 
fairly  well.  Riaz  had  some  advantages  over  Nubar 
Pasha.  He  was  by  far  the  better  administrator  of 
the  two.    He  knew  Egypt  well ;  he  was  himself  a 

'  Vide  ante,  voL  i.  p.  45. 


cn.  xLin  THE  WORKERS 


341 


Pasha  went  to  England.  He  had  an  interview 
witli  Lord  Salisbury  at  which  I  was  present.  To 
my  surprise,  for  he  had  not  given  me  any  warning 
of  his  intentions,  he  burst  out  into  a  violent  tirade 
against  the  British  officials  in  Egypt  in  general, 
and  against  Sir  Edgar  Vincent  and  myself  in 
particular.  All  this  produced  very  little  effect  on 
Lord  Salisbury,  but  the  ultimate  result — for  this 
was  only  the  beginning  of  a  breach  which  sub- 
sequently widened  —  was  such  as  Nubar  Pasha 
hardly  anticipated.  He  thought  he  was  doing  a 
clever  stroke  of  business.  What  he  really  did 
was  to  bring  about  his  own  downfall.  He  thought 
to  pose  as  the  defender  of  Egyptian  rights  against 
British  aggression,  and  thus  to  mitigate  the  pre- 
judices entertained  against  him  by  the  Mohammedan 
population  by  reason  of  his  race  and  creed.  What 
he  really  did  was  to  open  the  mouths  of  all  his 
numerous  enemies  in  Egypt,  who  had  only  remained 
silent  because  they  thought  that,  strong  in  the 
support  of  England,  his  position  was  unassailable. 
Nubar  Pasha  failed  to  see  that  which  was  apparent 
to  others  possessed  of  none  of  his  intellectual 
subtlety,  namely,  that  the  English  were  his  natural 
allies,  and  that  directly  he  broke  up  the  alliance 
his  fall  was  inevitable.  When  once  it  became 
apparent  that  he  could  no  longer  rely  on  British 
support,  Tewfik  Pasha  seized  on  some  trivial 
pretext  for  dismissing  him.^ 

1  I  did  nothing  to  hasten  the  downfall  of  Nubar  Pasha.  The 
European  situation  was  at  that  time  (1888)  somewhat  critical.  Lord 
Salisbury,  who  was  then  in  office,  was,  therefore,  rather  desirous  of 
postponing  any  crisis  in  Egyptian  affairs.  On  February  17,  1888,  he 
wrote  to  me  :  "  I  have  asked  you  by  telegraph  to  try  and  manage  to 
postpone  any  breach  with  Nubar  to  a  more  convenient  season.  ...  I 
believe  you  are  right  in  this  controversy,  but  if  I  thought  you  wrong, 
I  should  still  think  it  impossible  to  retreat  before  Nubar  in  the  face 
of  the  whole  East.  It  is  not,  therefore,  from  any  doubt  about  support- 
ing you  that  1  urge  you  to  keep  the  peace  for  the  present,  but  because 
I  do  not  wish  our  administration  in  Egypt  to  be  the  cause  to  which  the 
long  European  war  is  to  be  ascribed  by  the  future  historian." 


342 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


I  really  believe  that  I  regretted  Nubar  Pasha's 
fall  more  than  he  did  himself.  His  Protean  changes, 
his  emotional  character,  and  his  ignorance  of  the 
rudiments  of  many  of  the  administrative  questions 
with  which  he  had  to  deal,  were  at  times  exasper- 
ating. Nevertheless,  I  could  not  help  liking  him. 
It  was  pleasant  to  have  to  deal  with  a  man  of  real 
ability,  who  could  converse  rationally  and  who,  if 
he  did  not  understand  much  which  should  be 
familiar  to  any  politician  and  administrator,  could 
at  all  events  grasp  the  main  lines  of  action  which 
should  guide  the  Government  of  a  civilised  com- 
munity. Moreover,  there  was  an  indescribable 
charm  about  Nubar  Pasha  which  was  almost 
irresistible.  I  have  never  known  any  one  more 
persuasive,  or  more  skilled  in  the  art  of  making  the 
worse  appear  the  better  reason.  I  used  often  to 
half  believe  him,  when  I  knew  full  well  that  he  was 
trying  to  dupe  me.  I  felt  towards  him  much  what 
Shakespeare  felt  towards  his  faithless  mistress  : — 

When  my  love  swears  that  she  is  made  of  truth, 
I  do  believe  her,  though  I  know  she  lies. 

I  admired  his  talents,  and  I  never  could  forget 
that,  in  spite  of  his  defects,  he  possessed  some 
unquestionably  statesmanlike  qualities.  If  he  had 
only  recognised  the  fact  that  in  the  government  of 
the  world  mere  intellectual  gifts  are  not  all-powerful, 
and  that  high  character  and  reputation  also  exercise 
a  potent  influence  over  mankind,  he  would  have 
been  a  really  great  man. 

I  find  some  difficulty  in  \vriting  about  Riaz 
Pasha,  not  only  because,  I  am  glad  to  say  (1907), 
he  is  still  living,  but  also  because  he  is  a 
personal  friend  for  whom  I  entertain  the  highest 
regard  and  esteem.  I  may  say,  however,  that 
Nubar  Pasha  and  Riaz  Pasha  were  the  Egyptian 
representatives  of  two  widely  different  schools  of 


PART  V 


BRITISH  POLICY  IN  EGYPT 


We  trtist  it  may  he  granted  to  us  to  labour  for  mamtahung 
the  interests  of  the  Empire,  for  promoting  the  welfare  of  the 
Egyptian  people^  and  for  doing  honest  work  towards  the 
establishment  of  the  peace  and  order  of  the  world. 

Speech  of  Mr.  Gladstone  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
July  27,  1882. 


U7 


THE  WORKERS 


345 


first-rate  practical  agriculturist,  and  could  discuss  all 
matters  bearing  on  the  condition  of  the  agricultural 
classes  with  a  thorough  knowledge  of  his  subject. 
He  exercised  great  authority  over  the  Egyptian 
officials.  The  fact  that  a  devout  Mohammedan  was 
at  the  head  of  affairs  produced  a  tranquillising 
effect  on  Mohammedan  public  opinion.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  was  too  inelastic  to  manage  so 
delicate  a  machine  as  the  government  of  Egypt 
during  the  occupation  period.  He  did  not  altogether 
appreciate  the  change  which  time  and  the  political 
situation  of  the  day  had  effected  in  the  system  of 
governing  the  country.  He  failed  to  see  that, 
under  a  reign  of  law,  he  could  not  always  have 
his  own  way,  for  Riaz  Pasha,  although  he  had  a 
certain  rough  idea  of  justice,  had  but  little  respect 
for  the  law.  He  thought  that  when  laws  or 
regulations  clashed  with  his  ideas  of  what  was 
right  and  wrong,  they  should  be  broken.  The 
result  of  his  peculiar  temperament  and  habits 
of  thought  was  that,  after  a  while,  he  quarrelled 
with  almost  every  one,  European  and  Egyptian,  and 
produced  a  state  of  administrative  friction,  which 
rendered  his  retirement  from  office  inevitable. 

The  fourth  phase  of  Riaz's  career  was  when  he 
was  Minister  under  Abbas  II. — a  period  with  the 
history  of  which  I  am  not  attempting  to  deal  in 
the  present  work. 

To  sum  up,  Riaz  Pasha  is  a  staunch  Moslem, 
possessed  of  intellectual  qualities  which  are  certainly 
equal,  and  of  moral  qualities  which  are  decidedly 
superior  to  those  of  the  class  to  which  he  belongs. 
Notably,  his  physical  and  moral  fearlessness  deserve 
high  commendation.  It  were  well  for  the  cause  of 
Egyptian  patriotism,  if  there  were  more  patriots 
endowed  with  the  sterling  qualities  which  are 
conspicuous  in  Riaz  Pasha's  rugged,  yet  very 
sympathetic  character. 


346 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  IV 


The  simplicity  of  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi's 
character  renders  it  unnecessary  to  allude  to  him 
at  any  length.  I^oyal,  tlioroughly  honest,  truthful, 
and  courteous,  he  possesses  all  the  qualities  which 
Englishmen  usually  associate  with  the  word  gentle- 
man. He  has  been  statesmanlike  enough  to  see 
that  the  interests  of  his  country  would  best  be 
served  by  working  loyally  with  the  British  officials, 
instead  of  opposing  them.  During  his  tenure  of 
office,  Egypt  has  made  greater  progress,  both  moral 
and  material,  than  at  any  previous  period. 

Having  now  described  the  machinery  of  the 
Government,  and  the  principal  individuals  who 
were  entrusted  with  its  working,  it  would  appear 
logical  to  deal  with  the  work  which  the  machine 
produced.  Before,  however,  describing  what  the 
Enghsh  did  in  Egypt,  it  will  be  as  well  to  say 
something  of  what  they  wished  to  do.  The  next 
chapters  will,  therefore,  be  devoted  to  describing 
that  strange  phantom  which,  under  the  name  of 
British  Policy  in  Egypt,  was  constantly  eluding  the 
grasp  both  of  those  to  whom  it  owed  its  being  and 
of  others  who  endeavoured,  from  time  to  time,  to 
understand  its  true  significance.  It  was  not  until 
1904  that  this  phantom  disappeared,  and  that  a 
more  substantial  political  creation  was  substituted 
in  its  place. 


CH.XLIV    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY  351 


and  I  doubted  whether  the  Ministers  themselves 
fully  realised  its  gravity.    They  saw,  indeed,  the 
obvious  objections  to  a  permanent  occupation  of 
Egypt ;  they  held  to  the  broad  lines  of  Lord  Palmer- 
ston's  policy  ;  ^  but  they  underrated  the  difficulties 
of  getting  out  of  the  country.    Nevertheless,  all 
history  was  there  to  prove  that  when  once  a  civilised 
Power  lays  its  hand  on  a  weak  State  in  a  barbarous 
or  semi-civilised  condition,  it  rarely  relaxes  its 
grasp.    I  was  in  favour  of  the  policy  of  evacua- 
tion, and  I  saw  that,  if  the  British  troops  were  to 
be  withdrawn,  no  long  delay  should  be  allowed 
to  ensue ;  otherwise,  the  occupation  might  drift 
insensibly  into  a  condition  of  permanency.  Total 
and  immediate  evacuation  was,  indeed,  impossible 
for  the  reason  given  by  Sir  Edward  Malet,  that  is 
to  say,  that  by  the  adoption  of  such  a  measure, 
public  tranquillity  would   be  endangered.  But 
although  the  maintenance  of  public  tranquillity 
stood  first  in  the  order  of  importance,  the  question 
of  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrison  could  not  be 
decided  with  reference  to  a  consideration  of  this 
point  alone.    The  question  had  to  be  considered 
in  another  aspect.     What  would  be  the  effect 
of  the  withdrawal  on  the  future  of  the  country  ? 
What  prospect  was  there   of  Lord  Dufferin's 
programme  being  carried  out  if  the  British  troops 
were  withdrawn  ?    I  did  not  see  so  clearly  as  at  a 
later  period  that  the  alternative  policies  of  reform 
and  evacuation  were  absolutely  irreconcilable,  but 
I  had  some  fairly  clear  perception  of  the  fact.  1 
saw  that  the  system  of  government  in  Egypt  had 
been  shaken  to  its  base,  and  that,  if  once  the  British 
troops  were  withdrawn,  it  would  be  necessary  to  leave 
to  the  Khedive  a  tolerably  free  hand  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country.    I  saw  more  especially  that 
the  Egyptian  Government  should  be  allowed  full 

'  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  92. 


852 


MODERN  EGYPT 


freedom  in  the  direction  of  suppressing  any  attempt 
to  disturb  public  tranquillity.  What  at  the  time 
I  most  feared  was  that  the  British  Government, 
under  the  influence  of  public  opinion  in  England, 
would  first  withdraw  their  troops  and  then  cry  out 
if  the  use  of  the  courbash  increased,  and,  generally, 
if  the  rough-and-ready  means  dear  to  the  hearts  of 
Oriental  rulers  were  employed  for  the  maintenance 
of  public  order.  I  wished  to  warn  the  Government 
that  if  they  decided  on  a  policy  of  evacuation,  they 
must  be  prepared  to  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  the  cries, 
which  would,  without  doubt,  be  raised  both  in 
Parliament  and  in  the  press,  when  the  Egyptian 
Government  proceeded  to  govern  according  to  their 
own  liglits. 

It  was  with  these  feelings  uppermost  in  my  mind 
that  on  October  9,  that  is  to  say,  about  a  month 
after  my  arrival  in  Cairo,  I  answered  the  question 
which  Lord  Granville  had  addiessed  to  me  on  Sep- 
tember 6.  I  began  by  stating  that,  after  consultation 
with  Sir  Frederick  Stephen^^on,  I  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  British  garrison  could  safely 
be  withdrawn  from  Cairo,  and  that  the  total  force 
in  Egypt  might  be  reduced  to  about  3000  men, 
who  should  be  concentrated  at  Alexandria.  I  did 
not  express  any  opinion  on  the  question  of  when  it 
would  be  possible  to  withdraw  the  whole  of  the 
garrison,  but  in  a  private  telegram  to  Lord  Gran- 
ville, dated  October  8,  I  told  him  that  "for  the 
present  there  could  be  no  question  of  total  with- 
drawal from  Egypt."  I  dwelt  at  some  length  on 
the  state  of  the  country,  and,  writing  with  a  view  to 
ultimate  publication,  I  indicated  in  a  manner  which 
was  sufficiently  clear  that,  if  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment were  to  be  left  to  themselves,  they  must  be 
allowed  to  maintain  order  in  their  own  way. 

AVhen  my  despatch  reached  London,  it  created 
a  considerable  stir  in  official  circles.     It  became 


CHAPTER  XLIV 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY 
1882-1883 

Intentions  of  the  British  Government — Proposal  to  reduce  the  garrison 
— Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — Difficulty  of  combining  reform 
and  evacuation — 1  recommend  reduction  and  concentration  at 
Alexandria — The  Government  approve  of  this  recommendation — 
The  reduction  is  countermanded. 

It  is  probable  that,  if  any  one  had  told  Lord  Gran- 
ville on  the  morrow  of  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir 
that  twenty-five  years  later  a  British  force  would 
still  be  garrisoned  in  Egypt,  and  that  for  twenty- 
two  out  of  those  twenty-five  years  the  Egyptian 
question,  in  its  political  aspects,  would  remahi 
unsettled,  he  would  have  ridiculed  the  idea.  For, 
in  truth,  in  1882  the  British  Government  had  a 
tolerably  clear  policy.  Its  execution  was  very 
difficult,  but  at  the  time  the  difficulties  did  not 
appear  absolutely  insurmountable.  Their  policy 
was  to  restore  order,  to  introduce  some  elementary 
reforms,  and  then  to  withdraw  the  British  troops. 
The  sound  of  the  guns  at  Tel-el-Kebir  had  scarcely 
died  away,  when  Lord  Granville  requested  Sir 
Edward  Malet  to  send  "  as  soon  as  possible,  sugges- 
tions as  to  the  army,  finances,  and  the  administration 
for  the  future."  At  that  time,  "Her  Majesty's 
Government  contemplated  shortly  commencing 
the  withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from  Egypt." 
During  the  summer  of  1883,  the  British  force 

349 


350  MODERN  EGYPT 


numbered  about  7000  men.  On  August  25,  1883, 
Chdrif  Pasha  addressed  a  Memorandum  to  Sir 
Edward  Malet  urging,  on  grounds  of  economy, 
that  the  force  should  be  reduced  to  2000  men. 
Sir  Edward  Malet  agreed  that  there  could  be  no 
doubt  as  to  the  necessity  of  economy.  "  The 
question,"  he  added,  "which  unfortunately  presents 
itself,  and  to  which  there  can  be  no  decisive  answer, 
is  whether  the  existing  tranquillity  is  not  mainly 
due  to  the  presence  of  the  troops."  He  was  unable 
to  recommend  so  large  a  reduction  as  that  proposed 
by  Cherif  Pasha.  "An  immediate  reduction  of 
2000  men  was,"  he  thought,  "the  most  that  should 
be  effected." 

On  September  6,  Lord  Granville  wrote  me  a 
despatch,  which  reached  Cairo  simultaneously  with 
my  arrival  from  India.  In  this  despatch,  after 
alluding  to  Sir  Edward  Malet's  communication, 
which  is  quoted  above,  he  went  on  to  say  : — 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  entirely  concur  in 
the  desire  to  reduce  the  force  as  far  as  is  consistent 
with  the  preservation  of  public  order,  but  they 
have  been  unwilling  to  take  any  fresh  step  for  the 
purpose  until  they  could  have  the  advantage  of 
your  opinion.  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  has  expressed  to 
me  personally  his  belief  that  the  British  garrison 
might  be  entirely  withdrawn  from  Cairo  without 
disadvantage.  The  number  of  troops  to  be  retained 
elsewhere  and  their  disposition,  would  be  matter 
for  careful  consideration.  I  have  to  request  that 
you  will  consult  the  military  authorities,  and  report 
fully  to  me  on  the  subject." 

From  recollection,  and  from  a  perusal  of  con- 
temporaneous despatches  and  private  letters,  I  am 
able  to  give  an  accurate  account  of  my  frame  of 
mind  at  this  time.  I  was  deeply  penetrated  with 
the  importance  of  the  step  taken  by  the  British 
Government  in  sending  a  military  force  to  Egypt, 


CH.XLIV    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY  353 


apparent  that,  although  perhaps  the  INIinisters  were 
themselves  aware  that  they  could  not  attain  two 
irreconcilable  objects,  they  thought  it  undesirable 
to  place  this  view  of  the  case  before  the  public. 
Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  me  asking  that  my 
despatch  should  be  divided  into  two,  and  that 
the  portion  which  spoke  of  non-interference  with 
vigorous  measures  after  the  withdrawal  of  the 
British  garrison  should  be  treated  separately  and 
confidentially. 

I  accordingly  wrote  two  despatches.  The  first, 
which  was  very  short,  dealt  with  the  proposed 
reduction  of  the  garrison  and  the  withdrawal  of 
the  troops  from  Cairo.  This  was  published.^  The 
second,  which  was  longer,  dealt  with  the  probable 
consequences  of  withdrawal.  This  was  not 
published.  It  is,  from  a  historical  point  of  view, 
a  document  of  some  interest.  It  is  reproduced 
in  an  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 

On  November  1,  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  me 
that  the  British  Government  approved  of  my 
recommendation  that  the  British  force  in  Egypt 
should  be  reduced  to  3000  men,  who  were  to  be 
concentrated  at  Alexandria.  *'  The  British  garrison 
being  thus  withdrawn  from  Cairo,"  it  was  added, 
"the  main  responsibility  for  preserving  order 
throughout  Egypt  will,  as  you  point  out,  devolve 
upon  the  Government  of  the  Khedive,  and  in  the 
execution  of  that  task  they  may  rely  upon  the  full 
moral  support  of  Her  Majesty's  Government." 

Three  weeks  later,  and  before  any  practical 
steps  had  been  taken  to  withdraw  the  garrison 
from  Cairo,  news  arrived  of  the  annihilation  of 
General  Hicks's  army.  Lord  Granville  telegraphed 
on  November  22  directing  me,  after  consultation 
with  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  and  Sir  Evelyn 
Wood,  to  state  my  opinion  as  to  whether  the  existing 

1  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1884,  pp.  60-51. 
VOL.  II  2  A 


354  MODERN  EGYPT 


state  of  affairs  in  the  Soudan  was  a  cause  of  dancrer 
to  Egypt.  In  that  case,  I  was  requested  to  state  my 
views  as  to  what  measures  were  desirable.  In  my 
reply,  dated  November  24,  I  said  that  Sir  Frederick 
Stephenson,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  and  myself  were  of 
opinion  that  "the  recent  success  of  the  JNIahdi  was 
a  source  of  danger  to  Egypt,"  that  the  withdrawal 
of  the  garrison  from  Cairo  should  be  postponed, 
and  that  for  the  time  being  no  reduction  should  be 
made  in  the  strength  of  the  British  force.  On 
November  25,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  that 
"the  preliminary  steps  for  the  withdrawal  of  the 
British  troops  were  to  be  postponed."  The  post- 
ponement has  lasted  until  the  day  on  which  I  am 
writing. 

It  will  be  observed  that  during  all  this  time  there 
was  no  question  of  total  and  immediate  evacuation. 
Every  responsible  authority  on  the  spot  was  opposed 
to  any  such  measure,  and  the  Government,  although 
anxious  to  withdraw  entirely,  saw  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  carry  the  policy  of  total  withdrawal 
into  execution  at  once.  The  only  question 
under  discussion  was  whether  the  garrison  should 
be  reduced  and  the  British  force  concentrated  at 
Alexandria  with  a  view  to  eventual  withdrawal 
at  no  remote  period.  It  may  be  doubted  whether, 
even  if  the  Hicks  disaster  had  not  occurred,  it 
would  have  been  possible  within  a  short  while  to 
have  withdrawn  the  whole  of  the  British  troops. 
This,  however,  is  mere  conjecture.  AVhat  is  more 
certain  is  that,  when  the  military  power  of  Egypt 
in  the  Soudan  was  crushed,  the  last  chance  of 
immediate,  or  nearly  immediate,  evacuation  dis- 
appeared. ]\Ioreover,  it  is  historically  interesting 
to  note  that  the  deathblow  to  the  policy  of  speedy 
evacuation  was  dealt  by  a  statesman  who  was 
earnestly  desirous  to  withdraw  the  British  troops. 
If  Lord  Granville  had  not  been  so  fearful  of 


cH.xLiv    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY  355 


incurring  any  responsibility  in  respect  to  the 
Soudan  on  the  ground  that,  in  doing  so,  he  might 
prolong  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt,  and  if  he 
had  placed  a  veto  on  the  Hicks  expedition,  it  is 
conceivable  that  the  British  garrison  might  have 
been  withdrawn  after  a  short  time.  As  it  was, 
Lord  Granville,  in  his  desire  to  shorten  the  occupa- 
tion, contributed  by  his  action  to  its  prolongation. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  my  subject,  I 
should  mention  that  on  October  28,  that  is,  between 
the  time  when  I  recommended  the  concentration 
at  Alexandria,  and  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the 
Hicks  disaster,  I  again  urged  on  Lord  Granville, 
in  a  private  letter,  the  impossibility  of  reconciling 
the  two  policies  of  speedy  evacuation  and  reform. 
I  reproduce  the  whole  of  this  letter.  It  was  as 
follows  : — 

"  I  have  now  been  here  long  enough  to  take 
stock  of  the  main  elements  of  the  situation.  There 
is  an  immense  deal  to  be  done,  and  there  are  many 
difficult  questions  to  be  solved.  Looking  at  these 
questions  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  intrinsic 
merits,  there  is  no  reason  why  most  of  them,  at  all 
events,  should  not  be  solved  within  a  reasonable 
period.  But  there  is  one  obstacle  which  stands  in 
the  way  of  almost  every  move  forward,  and  that  is 
the  necessity  of  consulting  every  Power  in  Europe 
before  any  important  steps  can  be  taken. 

"To  take  a  single  instance,  the  Blue  Book  on 
the  appointment  of  the  Indemnity  Commission 
last  year  is  a  positive  curiosity  in  its  way.  This 
question  was  so  simple  that  three  or  four  people 
sitting  round  a  table  ought  to  have  been  able  to 
settle  it  in  half  an  hour.  Yet  a  voluminous  corre- 
spondence ensued,  and  endless  delays  occurred 
before  Stockholm,  Brussels,  etc.,  could  be  got  to 
agree. 

"As  matters  stand,  it  will  be  scarcely  possible 


356  MODERN  EGYPT 


to  carry  out  the  whole  of  our  programme.  On  the 
one  hand,  we  are  bound  before  we  go  to  start 
Egypt  on  the  high  road  to  good  government.  We 
ought  not  to  leave  the  Egyptian  Government  in 
such  a  position  as  that  they  may  plead  as  an  excuse 
for  future  bad  government  that  their  hands  are  so 
tied  as  to  render  them  powerless  to  execute  reforms. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not,  for  European, 
Egyptian,  and  purely  English  reasons,  stay  too 
long. 

"  Under  present  conditions,  it  is  scarcely  con- 
ceivable that  both  of  these  objects  should  be 
attained.  In  fact,  the  one  is  almost  a  contradiction 
in  terms  to  the  other.  If  we  are  to  wait  until  all 
the  essential  reforms  have  been  carried  out  by  the 
slow  process  of  consulting  each  Power  separately 
on  every  question  of  detail,  we  shall  wait  a  very 
long  time,  and  there  will  be  danger  of  drifting  into 
-a  policy  of  annexation,  or  something  tantamount 
to  it. 

"  If  we  cut  the  knot  by  withdrawing  without 
having  done  our  work,  and  leaving  Egypt  to  stew 
in  its  own  juice  of  administrative,  financial,  and 
economic  anarchy,  there  will  be  a  very  considerable 
risk  that  something  will  occur  before  our  backs 
have  long  been  turned,  which  will  raise  up  the 
whole  Egyptian  question  again.  I  confess  I  do 
not  see  my  way  out  of  this  dilemma. 

"We  may,  indeed,  before  long  retire  without 
any  absolute  danger  to  public  order  and  tranquillity 
in  the  immediate  future.  But  surely  more  than 
this  is,  under  all  the  circumstances,  expected  of  us 
both  by  Europe  and  by  English  public  opinion.  If 
we  leave  a  crop  of  unsettled  burning  questions 
behind  us,  we  can  never  feel  any  confidence  that 
our  hands  will  not  be  forced,  that  is  to  say,  that  we 
may  again  find  ourselves  in  the  position  of  being 
obliged  to  interfere  or  stand  aside  whilst  others. 


CH.  xLiv    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY  357 


probably  the  French,  take  up  the  work  which  we, 
as  it  w  ould  then  appear,  had  failed  to  accom})lish. 

"  Getting  out  of  Egypt  is  a  very  different 
problem  from  getting  out  of  Afghanistan.  In  the 
latter  case,  we  had  to  deal  with  a  country  in  whose 
internal  administration  no  one  but  the  Afghans 
was,  to  any  very  considerable  extent,  concerned. 
There  was  no  very  great  difficulty  in  leaving  this 
quasi-barbarous  people  to  be  governed  after  their 
own  fashion  by  their  quasi-barbarous  Governors. 
Here  the  foundations  of  the  edifice,  which  are  to 
be  found  in  the  moral  and  material  condition  of 
the  people,  are  scarcely  less  barbarous  than  in 
Afghanistan.  But,  on  these  foundations  is  built 
a  top-heavy  and  exotic  superstructure,  such  as 
an  enormous  external  debt.  Western  law-courts, 
complete  liberty  of  contract,  and,  in  fact,  all  the 
paraphernalia  of  European  civilisation  with  some 
of  its  worst  and  not  many  of  its  best  features,  I 
do  not  suppose  that  Europe  will  stand  by  and  let 
this  superstructure  fall  to  pieces. 

"  We  are  making  very  fair  progress  in  all  matters 
which  fall  within  the  competence  of  the  Egyptian 
Government,  such  as  prison  reform,  local  tribunals, 
etc. 

"  But  as  regards  international  subjects — and  all 
the  most  important  subjects  are  international — we 
are  almost  at  an  absolute  standstill. 

"In  spite  of  every  effort,  we  have  not  yet 
succeeded  in  getting  the  house  tax  through.  After 
the  house  tax,  comes  the  professional  tax  and  the 
stamp  duty,  each  with  its  own  peculiar  difficulties. 

"  The  reforms  in  the  Mixed  Tribunals  and  the 
abolition  of  the  Consular  jurisdiction  in  criminal 
cases,  will  probably  involve  interminable  negotia- 
tions. 

"  Then  there  is  the  great  question  of  the  Law 
of  Liquidation,  with   all  its  attendant  political 


358  MODERN  EGYPT 


difficulties.  There  is  not,  I  fear,  the  least  chance 
of  our  being  able  to  regulate  the  financial  situation 
without  modifying  that  law.  I  thought  at  one 
time  we  might  manage  to  arrange  matters  by 
getting  the  consent  of  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt,  but  the  political  objections  to  the  adoption 
of  this  course  are  scarcely  less  great  than  if  we  tried 
to  get  the  Powers  to  consent  to  alter  the  law  itself. 

"  The  question  of  the  debts  of  the  fellaheen 
cannot  be  settled  without  going  to  the  Powers,  for 
whatever  is  done  will  almost  certainly  involve  some 
changes  in  the  code  administered  by  the  JNlixed 
Tribunals.^ 

"  There  are  several  questions  connected  with 
the  Daira  Sanieh  and  the  Domains  which  ou^ht  to 
be  settled,  but  here  again  the  international  difficulty 
bars  the  way. 

"  Even  some  subjects  which  have  no  direct 
international  character,  depend  indirectly  upon  the 
concord  of  the  Powers.  Thus,  a  considerable  capital 
expenditure  on  irrigation  is  almost  a  necessity  ;  so 
also  is  the  Soudan  Railway.  But  for  both  of  these 
money  is  wanted,  and  it  will  be  very  difficult  to 
find  any  money  until  the  financial  situation  is  placed 
on  a  sound  footing. 

"  You  may  well  ask  me  why  I  say  all  this,  which 
you  already  know.  JNly  reason  is  to  ask  you  to 
consider  whether  it  is  not  possible  to  apply  some 
remedy  to  this  state  of  things.  Would  it  not  be 
possible  to  issue  a  Circular  to  the  Powers  explaining 
our  difficulties,  and  saying  that  we  did  not  propose 
to  consult  them  any  more  on  each  detail,  but  that, 
when  we  had  put  matters  straight,  we  should  ask 
them  to  accept  the  settlement  en  bloc,  and  that  we 
should  then  at  once  withdraw  our  troops  ? 

^  This  question  was,  many  years  subsequently,  settled  without 
reference  to  the  Powers.  An  Agricultural  Bank  was  established  (see 
p.  452).  In  1883,  it  would  have  been  scarcely  possible  to  have  called 
such  an  institution  into  existence. 


CH.XLIV    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY  359 


"  Give  me  2000  men  and  power  to  settle  matters 
between  the  English  and  Egyptian  Governments, 
and  I  will  guarantee  that  in  twelve  months  there 
shall  not  be  a  British  soldier  in  Egypt,  and  that  the 
country  is  put  in  such  a  position  as  to  render  it 
very  improbable  that  any  Egyptian  question  will 
be  raised  again  for  many  years  to  come  at  all 
events/  But  if  we  adhere  to  our  present  procedure, 
I  really  despair  of  doing  much  within  any  reasonable 
time — I  mean,  of  course,  as  regards  international 
questions.  As  regards  purely  Egyptian  questions, 
there  are  plenty  of  difficulties,  but  they  are  not 
insurmountable. 

"  I  put  forward  this  suggestion  with  much 
hesitation.  I  am  aware  that  the  matter  cannot 
be  regarded  wholly  from  the  point  of  view  of 
Egyptian  internal  reform.  The  general  political 
situation  has  to  be  considered,  and  from  this  point 
of  view  there  may  be  insuperable  obstacles  to  the 
adoption  of  any  course  such  as  that  which  I 
suggest.  Anyhow,  I  think  it  right  to  submit  to 
you  the  aspect  of  the  case  which  I  have  set  forth 
in  this  letter.  Your  wider  knowledge  and 
experience  may  possibly  be  able  to  hit  upon 
some  other  plan  superior  to  my — possibly  crude — 
suggestion. 

"  I  may  add  that  I  am  confident  that  I  could,  by 
developing  the  arguments  I  have  briefly  stated 
here,  make  out  a  very  strong  case  for  taking  a  new 
point  of  departure,  but  it  would,  of  course,  be 
useless  for  me  to  write  a  public  despatch  in  this 
sense,  unless  I  thought  that  some  practical  good 
might  come  out  of  it." 

In  other  words,  what  I  proposed  amounted  to 
the  temporary  assumption  on  the  part  of  England 
of  the  task  of  governing  Egypt.    On  November  9, 

'  This  forecast  of  what  was  possible  was  uuquestionably  much  too 
sanguiue. 


360 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  V 


Lord  Granville  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  this 
letter.  "  It  would  require,"  he  said,  "  some  time 
to  consider  and  answer  your  powerful  but  gloomy 
view  of  the  situation  in  Egypt.  I  am  afraid  the 
remedy  you  suggest  is  too  drastic,  but  I  will  reflect 
over  what  you  say,  and  let  you  know  my  impres- 
sions, and  those  of  others.  I  have  escaped  the 
Lord  Mayor's  dinner.  Gladstone  will  speak 
shortly,  and  will  only  deal  with  generalities  on 
Egyptian  questions." 

On  November  14,  Lord  Granville  again  wrote 
to  me  as  follows  :  "  I  go  to  Stratton  ^  on  Saturday, 
when  I  hope  to  talk  over  with  Gladstone  and 
Northbrook  your  very  important  letter  of,  I  think, 
the  24th  October.  I  hope  you  will  think  what 
Gladstone  said  in  concert  with  me  about  Egypt  at 
the  Mansion  House  was  harmless." 

Finally,  on  November  30,  Lord  Granville 
wrote  :  "  I  have  talked  over  your  views  on  the 
Liquidation  Law  with  Gladstone  and  with  North - 
brook.  We  do  not  see  our  way  to  acting  en  bloc, 
but  it  might  be  possible,  particularly  after  recent 
events,  for  you  to  perfect  a  scheme  on  any  of 
the  most  important  subjects,  with  a  view  to  our 
getting  the  consent  of  the  Powers." 

This  was,  of  course,  tantamount  to  a  rejection  of 
my  proposal.  I  did  not  for  many  years  make  any 
other  having  for  its  object  a  radical  change  in  the 
political  status  of  Great  Britain  in  Egypt.  Hence- 
forward, I  devoted  myself  entirely  to  the  task  of 
evolving  order  out  of  chaos,  under  such  political 
and  administrative  conditions  as  existed  at  the  time 
when  the  occupation  took  place.  It  was  not  for 
some  years  that  I  felt  at  all  sanguine  of  success. 

From  the  time  when  the  orders  for  concen- 
tration at  Alexandria  were  countermanded,  all 
idea  of  speedy  evacuation  was  abandoned.  The 

*  Lord  Northbrook's  couutry  seat  in  Hampshire. 


CH.XLIV    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY  361 


attention  of  the  British  and  Egyptian  Govern- 
ments was  for  the  next  two  years  almost  wholly 
directed  to  the  affairs  of  the  Soudan.  During 
this  period,  the  British  officials  in  Cairo  were  slowly 
and  laboriously  taking  some  tentative  steps  in  the 
direction  of  reducing  the  Egyptian  administrative 
chaos  into  order.  By  the  time  the  Soudan  question 
had  passed  out  of  an  acute  stage,  Egypt  had  been 
fairly  launched  on  the  path  of  reform.  The  policy, 
which  as  a  pis  aller  I  had  suggested  as  possible  in 
1883,  of  allowing  the  Khedive  and  the  Turco- 
Egyptians  to  govern  after  their  own  fashion,  had 
become  more  than  ever  difficult  of  execution,  for 
the  country  had  advanced,  whilst  the  intelligence 
and  governing  capacity  of  the  ruling  classes  had 
almost  stood  still.  The  Turco  -  Egyptians,  who 
might  perhaps  have  been  able  to  govern  the  country 
after  a  rude  fashion  in  1883,  were  incapable  of  doing 
so  when  once  the  full  tide  of  civilisation  had  set 
strongly  in.  Before  long,  we  had  drifted  into  a 
position  which  necessitated  the  presence  of  a  British 
garrison,  not  in  order  to  admit  of  reforms  being 
initiated  and  carried  out,  but  in  order  to  prevent  a 
relapse  into  the  confusion  which  existed  in  the  pre- 
reforming  days.  That  is  the  present  stage  of  the 
Egyptian  question. 

Two  effiarts  were  made  subsequent  to  1883,  one 
by  Mr.  Gladstone's  Government,  and  the  otiier  by 
the  Government  of  Lord  Salisbury,  to  deal  with 
the  larger  aspects  of  the  Egyptian  question.  To 
these  reference  will  now  be  made. 


362 


MODERN  EGYPT 


APPENDIX 

Despatch  from  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  to  Earl  Granville 

Cairo,  October  9,  1883. 

My  Lord — It  may  be  advisable  that  in  a  separate 
despatch  I  should  offer  some  further  observations  on  the 
question  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from  Eg^'pt 
beyond  those  which  are  contained  in  my  separate  despatch 
of  this  day's  date.^ 

I  propose,  in  the  first  instance,  to  make  some  remarks 
upon  the  question  of  the  total  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of 
Occupation.  The  frequent  declarations  which  have  been 
made  by  Her  Majesty's  Ministers  on  this  subject,  have 
weakened,  but  have  not  altogether  eradicated  the  belief 
entertained  by  some  sections  of  the  community  in  Egx-pt 
that  the  country  will  be  permanently  occupied  by  British 
troops.  I  have  lost  no  opportunity  of  stating  that  there  is 
no  intention  whatever  of  departing  from  the  policy  in  pur- 
suance of  which  the  whole  of  the  British  troops  will  eventu- 
ally be  withdrawn  from  Egypt.  In  spite,  however,  of  the 
very  cordial  sympathy  with  which  I  regard  that  policy,  I 
regret  that  I  am  at  present  unable  to  i-ecommend  the  total 
withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  Occupation.  I  consider  that  it 
would  be  at  present  premature  to  discuss  the  question. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  only  practical  questions  to 
be  considered  are  those  which  are  discussed  in  my  separate 
despatch.  In  making  the  proposals  contained  in  that 
despatch,  it  may  be  desirable  that  I  should  add  some 
observations  of  a  general  nature  on  the  political  situation  of 
the  moment. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  the  existence  of  a 
worse  Government  than  that  of  the  late  Khedive,  Ismail 
Pasha.  But  that  Government  possessed  one  single  merit — it 
preserved  order.  The  methods  by  which  it  preserved  order 
were  cruel  and  oppressive  in  the  highest  degree,  but  the  general 

1  This  was  the  despatch  to  which  allusion  is  made  on  pp.  352-353, 
ami  in  which  it  was  recommended  that  the  British  garrison  should  be 
reduced  and  the  troops  concentrated  at  Alexandria. 


CH.XLIV   STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY  363 


result  was  that  life  and  property  were  secure  from  all  attacks 
save  those  dictated  by  the  action  of  the  Government  tlicm- 
selves.  Recent  events  have  completely  shattered  the  system 
of  government  which  prevailed  under  Ismail  Pasha  and  his 
predecessors.  The  use  of  the  "  courbash  "  has  been  nearly,  if 
not  completely,  abolished.  Measures  are  being  taken  under 
which  it  may  be  reasonably  hoped  that  arbitrary  arrest  and 
imprisonment  will  no  longer  be  possible.  Properly  con- 
stituted tribunals  are  about  to  be  established,  under  whose 
jurisdiction  it  may  be  hoped  that  but  few  persons  will  suffer 
for  crimes  of  which  they  are  innocent,  although  possibly  in 
the  first  instance  some  guilty  persons  may  escape  punishment. 
In  a  word,  a  reign  of  law  is  being  introduced. 

The  period  of  transition  from  the  old  to  the  new  order  of 
things  would,  under  any  circumstances,  have  been  somewhat 
critical.  It  is  rendered  more  so  from  the  fact  that  recent 
events  must  have  imbued  the  people  with  the  idea,  hereto- 
fore unfamiliar  to  them,  that  properly  constituted  authority 
may,  for  a  time  at  least,  be  successfully  resisted. 

The  present  position  of  the  country  is  that  the  old  order 
of  things  has  either  passed  or  is  rapidly  passing  away. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  new  systems  of  administration  or 
of  judicial  procedure  are  either  in  process  of  organisation,  or 
have  not  yet  acquired  the  stability  which  time  alone  can 
give  to  them. 

I  believe  His  Highness  the  Khedive  and  his  Ministers  to 
be  sincerely  desirous  of  introducing  the  reforms,  whose  main 
featui'es  were  set  forth  in  Lord  Duft'erin's  report,  and  of 
which  the  country  stands  so  much  in  need.  But  the  intro- 
duction of  those  reforms  must  necessarily  occupy  some  time. 
During  the  period  of  their  introduction  it  may  be  anticipated 
that  many  persons,  imperfectly  appreciating  the  difficulties 
of  the  situation,  may  be  impatient  that  more  rapid  progress 
is  not  made.  On  the  other  hand,  the  turbulent  and  lawless 
portion  of  the  community  may  not  improbably  learn  to  dis- 
respect a  Government  which  does  not  manifest  its  authority, 
or  impose  its  legitimate  orders,  by  the  use  of  those  arbitrary 
methods  to  which  the  country  has  for  generations  been 
accustomed.  If  the  system  of  government  in  Egypt  is  to 
be  reformed,  it  is  above  all  things  necessary  that  order  should 
be  preserved  during  the  process  of  reformation,  and  that  any 
changes,  whether  in  the  existing  laws  or  in  the  form  of 
government  or  in  the  composition  of  the  ministry,  should  be 
effected  by  legal  and  constitutional  methods.    Force  should 


364 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  V 


be  put  down  by  force,  and  inasmuch  as  the  lesson  has  scarcely 
yet  been  learnt  in  Egypt  that  the  arm  of  the  law  is  as  strong 
as  that  of  arbitrary  and  capricious  power,  it  might,  under 
certain  circumstances,  become  desirable  in  the  interests  of 
the  country  that  a  greater  degree  of  severity  should  be 
exercised  in  the  suppression  of  disturbance  than  would  be 
necessary  amongst  a  population  which  had  for  long  been 
accustomed  to  a  law-abiding  and  orderly  system  of  govern- 
ment. 

The  main  responsibility  for  preserving  order  throughout 
Egypt  will,  as  I  have  said  in  my  separate  despatch,  devolve 
on  the  Egyptian  Government.  Under  these  circumstances, 
I  venture  to  think  that,  within  any  reasonable  limits,  full 
freedom  should  be  left  to  the  Egyptian  Government  in  the 
exercise  of  that  power,  the  possession  of  which  is  a  necessary 
condition  to  the  assumption  of  responsibility. 

I  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that,  should  any  disturbance 
occur  at  Cairo  or  elsewhere,  the  Egyptian  Government  would 
be  disposed  to  use  excessive  or  unnecessary  severity  in  its 
suppression.  The  personal  character  of  the  Khedive  is, 
indeed,  of  itself  almost  a  sufficient  guarantee  that  no  such 
tendency  exists.  At  the  same  time,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  events  of  the  last  few  years  have  shaken  the  authority  of 
the  Government  in  Egypt,  a  result  which  is  not,  I  believe, 
due  to  any  change  in  the  personal  character  of  the  individuals 
who  compose  the  Government,  but  to  the  change  of  system, 
which,  most  fortunately  for  the  country,  has  been  in 
course  of  progress  since  the  abdication  of  Ismail  Pasha. 

In  order  to  reassert  that  authority,  the  existence  of  which 
is  essential  to  the  progress  of  orderly  reform,  it  might  be 
deemed  necessary  by  the  Egyptian  Government  to  exercise  a 
degree  of  severity  in  the  suppression  of  disturbance  which 
might  possibly  not  commend  itself  to  public  opinion  in 
England. 

Under  these  circumstances,  I  venture  to  think  that  it 
would  be  desirable  that  both  the  Egyptian  Government  and 
the  public  in  Egypt  should  fully  understand  that,  whilst 
Her  Majesty's  Government  would  \Tew  with  serious  dis- 
pleasure any  attempt  to  return  to  the  system  of  government 
which  prevailed  in  the  past,  they  would  not,  save  in  some 
very  exceptional  case,  be  inclined  to  interfere  with  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  Egyptian  Government  in  the  adoption  of  such 
measures  as  the  latter  might  consider  desirable  for  the  pre- 
servation of  public  order  and  tranquillity. 


CH.XLIV   STRUGGLE  FOR,  A  POLICY  365 


I  make  these  observations  not  because  I  have  any  reason 
to  suppose  that  any  disturbance  is  likely  to  ensue  upon  the 
partial  withdrawal  of  the  British  force,  but  because  it 
appears  to  me  desirable  that,  before  the  British  garrison 
is  reduced,  the  responsibility  and  the  power  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  should  alike  be  somewhat  clearly  defined. 

The  considerations  which  I  have  thus  ventured  to  lay 
before  your  Lordship  will,  of  course,  apply  with  even  greater 
force  when  the  time  eventually  arrives  for  dealing  with  the 
question  of  the  total  withdrawal  of  the  British  garrison. — I 
have,  etc,  E.  Baking. 


CHAPTER  XLV 


THE  NORTHBROOK  MISSION 
September-November  1884 

It  is  decided  to  send  a  Special  Commissioner  to  Cairo — The  policy  of 
reporting;' — Lord  Nortlibrook  arrives  in  Egypt — His  financial  pro- 
posals— His  General  Report — Tlie  Government  reject  his  proposals. 

The  difficulties  and  complications  of  the  Egyptian 
question  were,  of  course,  greatly  increased  by  the 
events  in  the  Soudan.  Amongst  other  causes  for 
anxiety,  the  bankruptcy  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury 
appeared  imminent.  A  Conference  of  the  Powers 
assembled  in  London  in  the  summer  of  1884  to 
consider  the  financial  situation,  but  separated  with- 
out arriving  at  any  practical  conclusions.^  Under 
the  circumstances,  what  was  a  well  -  intentioned 
Government,  which  had  drifted  into  a  position 
which  it  very  imperfectly  understood,  to  do  ? 
Undoubtedly,  the  question  was  difficult  to  answer. 

After  a  short  period  of  hesitation,  Mr.  Gladstone 
resorted  to  his  favourite  device.  He  determined 
to  send  to  Cairo  a  Special  Commissioner  to  "report 
and  advise  Her  JNlajesty's  Government  touching 
the  counsel  which  it  might  be  fitting  to  offer  the 
Egyptian  Government  in  the  present  situation  of 
affairs  in  Egypt,  and  as  to  the  measures  which 

'  Subsequently,  some  decisions  were  taken  as  regards  the  matters 
discussed  at  the  Conference.  They  were  embodied  in  an  Agreement 
signed  in  London  by  the  representatives  of  all  the  Great  Powers  OQ 
March  17,  1883.    See  Egypt,  No.  6  of  1885. 

366 


CH.XLV  THE  NORTHBROOK  MISSION  367 


should  be  taken  in  connection  with  them."  The 
Commissioner's  special  attention  was  to  be  directed 
to  the  "present  exigencies  of  Egyptian  finance." 

There  was  really  little  about  which  to  report. 
The  main  facts  with  which  the  Government  had 
to  deal  were  patent  to  all  the  world.  Only  a  year 
previously,  a  Special  Commissioner  of  great  ex- 
perience and  ability  had  compiled  an  elaborate 
Report  on  the  condition  of  Egypt.  Since  then,  a 
detailed  Report  on  the  financial  situation  had  been 
prepared  by  a  Committee  of  experts  sitting  in 
London.  The  subject  had  also  been  thoroughly 
discussed  at  the  Conference.  No  further  collection 
of  facts  was,  therefore,  required.  Any  detailed 
information  which  might  have  been  necessary 
before  deciding  on  what  policy  to  adopt,  could 
easily  have  been  furnished  by  the  various  authorities 
on  the  spot.  What  was  required  was  the  decision 
of  character  necessary  to  arrive  at  a  definite  con- 
clusion, when  once  the  facts  had  been  collected. 

Lord  Northbrook  was  designated  as  the  Special 
Commissioner.  A  better  choice  could  not  have 
been  made.  His  high  character,  his  wide  adminis- 
trative experience,  the  knowledge  of  the  East 
which  he  had  gained  as  Viceroy  of  India,  his 
power  of  rapidly  acquiring  a  mastery  over  com- 
plicated financial  questions,  and  the  breadth  and 
statesmanlike  nature  of  his  views — all  pointed  him 
out  as  exceptionally  qualified  to  fulfil  the  duties 
entrusted  to  him.  To  myself,  the  appointment 
was  especially  pleasing.  The  relationship  between 
Lord  Northbrook  and  myself,  and  the  mutual 
esteem  and  affection  which  we  entertained  for  each 
other,  were  of  themselves  a  suflftcient  guarantee 
that  we  should  work  cordially  together.  It  was, 
without  doubt,  the  knowledge  that  the  appoint- 
ment would  not  be  displeasing  to  me  which  to 
some    extent    led    Lord    Granville,   with  that 


368  MODERN  EGYPT 


courteous  consideration  for  others  which  never 
failed  him,  to  nominate  Lord  Northbrook. 

Lord  Northbrook  possessed  another,  and  very 
important  quahfication  for  successfully  carrying  out 
the  duties  assigned  to  him.  He  did  not  blind  him- 
self to  facts.  He  had  the  courage  of  his  opinions. 
When  he  had  studied  his  facts  and  come  to  some 
definite  conclusions,  he  was  in  the  habit  of  stating 
them  without  reference  to  whether  they  harmonised 
with  any  preconceived  theories. 

The  policy  of  reporting,  which  was  so  dear  to 
Mr.  Gladstone's  Government,  appears  always  to 
have  brought  about  results  w'hich  were  in  each 
case  somewhat  similar.  Under  the  graceful  diction 
of  Lord  Dufferin's  Report,  in  spite  of  the  apparent 
ease  with  which  the  skilled  diplomatist  glided  over 
difficulties  and  eluded  burning  questions,  it  was  easy 
to  observe  that  the  main  facts  of  the  situation  did 
not  escape  the  statesmanlike  eye  of  the  author,  and 
that  he  in  reality  expected  the  Government  to 
recognise  them.  Connected,  as  I  was,  by  general 
political  sympathy  with  a  Liberal  Government, 
and  by  ties  of  long-standing  family  friendship  and 
relationship  with  some  members  of  Mr.  Gladstone's 
Cabinet,  I  came  to  Egypt  with  a  hearty  desire  to 
aid  to  the  best  of  my  ability  in  the  successful 
execution  of  his  Egyptian  policy.  I  thought  I 
understood  that  policy,  and,  if  I  understood  it 
rightly,  I  felt  sure  that  it  met  with  my  general 
concurrence.  I  soon  found,  however,  that  I  was 
pursuing  a  phantom  which  constantly  eluded  my 
grasp,  and  that,  even  when  I  understood  something 
of  the  general  principles  which  were  guiding  the 
action  of  the  Government,  the  vacillation  shown 
in  the  execution  of  the  detail  was  simply  heart- 
breaking. I  could  not  blind  myself  to  facts  to 
please  JNIr.  Gladstone,  and  directly  I  stated  the 
facts  and  pointed  out  the  inevitable  conclusions  to 


CH.XLV  THE  NORTHBROOK  MISSION  369 


be  drawn  from  them,  I  found  that,  however  clear 
they  might  be,  they  were  ignored.  To  cite  another 
instance,  General  Gordon  was  sent  to  the  Soudan, 
not  to  act,  but  to  report.  General  Gordon  had 
failed  to  recosjnise  the  real  facts  in  connection  with 
the  Soudan  when  he  undertook  his  mission.  After 
his  arrival  at  Khartoum,  he  recognised  them,  but 
he  could  not  enforce  their  recognition  on  Mr. 
Gladstone ;  the  latter's  blindness  to  facts,  which 
were  patent  to  all  the  world,  eventually  resulted  in 
the  death  of  General  Gordon,  of  Colonel  Stewart, 
and  of  many  other  brave  men.  Every  one  knows 
the  reluctance  which  many  men  feel  about  making 
a  will.  Inability  to  recognise  that  death  is  the 
common  lot  of  all  has  from  time  immemorial  formed 
the  text  alike  of  the  divine  and  the  satirist.  Mr. 
Gladstone  appears  to  have  lain  under  a  similar  dis- 
ability in  dealing  with  Egyptian  affairs.  He  ignored 
all  unpleasant  facts.  Lord  Northbrook's  fate  was 
to  be  that  of  his  predecessors.  He  was  asked  to 
"report  and  advise."  It  was  almost  certain,  before 
he  began  his  work,  that  his  report  would  pass 
unheeded  and  that  Mr.  Gladstone  would  turn  a 
deaf  ear  to  his  advice,  unless,  which  was  improbable, 
it  happened  to  be  such  as  he  had  wished  to  receive 
at  the  time  when,  ex  hypothesi,  the  Government 
were  in  partial  ignorance  of  the  facts. 

Lord  Northbrook  arrived  in  Egypt  on  September 
9,  1884.  He  remahied  in  the  country  about  six 
weeks,  during  which  time  he  laboured  strenuously 
to  master  all  the  complicated  facts  connected  with 
the  situation.  Before  he  left  Cairo  he  prepared 
the  draft  of  his  report,  but,  inasmuch  as  when  he 
arrived  in  London,  it  appeared  that  his  views  weie 
distasteful  to  Mr.  Gladstone,  his  proposals  were 
modified  before  they  assumed  their  final  shape. 
Eventually,  he  sent  in  two  reports,  both  dated 
November  20, 1884.    One  of  these  dealt  exclusively 

VOL.  II  2  b 


370 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  V 


with  the  financial  situation.  The  other  was  of  a 
more  general  nature. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  at  length  on  Lord 
Nortlibrook's  financial  proposals.  It  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  say  that  they  involved :  (1)  adequate 
provision  being  made  for  the  improvement  and 
extension  of  the  system  of  irrigation  ;  (2)  a  prospect 
of  the  abolition  of  the  corvee ;  (3)  the  acquisition 
by  the  Egyptian  Government  of  greater  freedom 
in  the  matter  of  imposing  taxes  on  foreigners ; 
(4)  the  abolition  of  the  dual  administration  of  the 
Daira,  Domains,  and  Railways  ;  (5)  a  reduction  of 
the  land-tax,  and  of  the  taxes  on  the  export  and 
transit  of  produce ;  and  (6)  the  issue  of  a  loan  for 
about  £9,000,000,  the  interest  of  which  was  to  be 
guaranteed  by  the  British  Government. 

"  The  effect  of  the  proposals  which  I  have 
made,"  Lord  Northbrook  said  in  concluding  his 
report,  "will  undoubtedly  be  to  substitute  the 
financial  control  of  England  for  the  international 
control  which  was  proposed  by  the  Conference ; 
but  the  alteration  seems  to  me  to  be  an  advantage 
both  to  the  Egyptian  and  to  the  English  Govern- 
ments. Nor  do  I  see  what  objections  the  other 
Powers  of  Europe  can  entertain  to  this  control 
being  exercised  by  Great  Britain  after  the  sacrifices 
whicii  have  been  made  in  maintaining  the  peace 
and  safety  of  Egypt,  and  the  financial  liability 
which  has  now  to  be  undertaken." 

In  his  general  report,  after  dwelling  on  the 
reforms  which  had  already  been  accomplished, 
Lord  Northbrook  added  :  "  The  progress,  in  order 
to  be  solid,  must  necessarily  be  gradual  in  a  country 
where  the  people  have  had  to  be  taught  to  compre- 
hend the  first  elements  of  decent  government.  .  .  . 

"  I  cannot  recommend  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  fix  any  date  at  which  the  British  troops 
serving  in  Egypt  shall  be  withdrawn.     In  my 


CH.XLV  THE  NORTHBROOK  MISSION  371 


report,  I  have  stated  my  reasons  for  anticipating 
that  their  strength  may  be  reduced  before  long  to 
about  4000  men,  but  it  is  my  duty  to  express  my 
decided  opinion  tiiat  it  would  not  be  safe  or  wise 
to  fix  any  definite  time  for  their  entire  withdrawal, 
because  the  safety  of  such  a  step  must  depend  on 
the  internal  state  of  the  country,  and  upon  the 
political  position  of  Egypt,  which  has  been  left  in 
uncertainty  in  consequence  of  the  failure  of  the 
Conference  of  London." 

It  will  be  seen  that  Lord  Northbrook  did  not 
attempt  to  solve  the  Egyptian  question  in  so  far  as 
its  solution  depended  on  the  continuance  of  the 
British  occupation.  He  expressed  a  strong  opinion 
that  the  garrison  could  not  be  at  once  withdrawn 
from  Egypt,  and  there  he  left  the  matter.  But  he 
made  some  excellent  proposals  in  respect  to  the 
finances  of  the  country.  Had  these  proposals  been 
accepted  by  the  Cabinet  and  carried  into  execution, 
internationalism,  which  has  been  the  bane  of 
Egypt,  would  have  received  a  heavy  blow,  and  the 
paramount  power  of  Great  Britain,  as  the  guide  and 
protector  of  Egypt,  would  have  been  asserted. 

Lord  Northbrook's  views  were,  however,  too 
thoroughgoing  for  Mr.  Gladstone,  who  was  not 
prepared  to  guarantee  the  interest  on  an  Egyptian 
loan.  The  proposals  also  did  not  receive  the 
support  which  they  deserved  from  the  English 
press.  The  result  was  that  nothing  was  done 
in  the  direction  of  carrying  Lord  Northbrook's 
policy  into  execution.    His  mission  was  a  failure. 

Mr.  Gladstone's  Government,  which  fell  in  June 
1885,  made  no  subsequent  attempt  to  settle  the 
Egyptian  question  in  its  larger  aspects.  It  is  now 
necessary  to  deal  with  an  endeavour  to  arrive  at 
a  solution  which  was  made  under  the  auspices  of 
Mr.  Gladstone's  successor,  Lord  Salisbury. 


CHAPTER  XLVI 


THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION" 
August  1885-October  1887 

Sir  Henry  WolfF  appointed  Special  Commissioner — Convention  of 
October  24,  1885— Moukhtar  Pasha— Convention  of  May  22,  1887 
— Comparison  of  the  two  Conventions — Frontier  affairs — The 
army — Civil  reforms — Evacuation — France  and  Russia  oppose  the 
Convention — Tlie  Sultan  refuses  to  ratify  it — Moukhtar  Pasha 
permanently  located  in  Egypt — Results  of  the  Wolflf  mission. 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  a  sufficient 
number  of  Special  Commissioners,  diplomatists, 
and  others  had  already  reported  on  the  affairs  of 
Egypt.  Such,  however,  was  not  the  view  of  the 
British  Government.  Lord  Salisbury  determined 
to  take  a  leaf  out  of  the  book  of  his  predecessors. 
It  was  decided  to  send  Sir  Henry  WolfF,  who  had 
been  a  prominent  member  of  what  was  then  known 
as  the  Fourth  Party,  and  who  had  lost  his  seat  in 
Parliament  at  the  General  Election  which  had 
recently  taken  place,  on  a  mission  to  Constantinople 
and  Cairo.  He  was  given  a  sort  of  general  com- 
mission to  examine  into  Egyptian  affairs.  He  was 
to  invite  the  co-operation  of  the  Sultan  in  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Egyptian  question  ;  more  especially  it 
was  thought  that  it  was  "  in  His  Majesty's  power 
to  contribute  materially  to  the  establishment 
of  settled  order  and  good  government "  in  the 
Soudan. 

Sir  Henry  WolfF  arrived  in  Constantinople  on 

372 


CH.XLVI    THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION  373 


August  22,  1885.  On  October  24,  he  signed  a 
Convention  with  the  Turkish  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  All  that  this  first  Convention  settled  was 
the  nature  of  the  subjects  which  were  to  be  discussed. 
It  provided  that  the  British  and  Turkish  Govern- 
ments were  each  to  send  a  Special  Commissioner 
to  Egypt,  where  the  Ottoman  Commissioner  was 
to  consult  with  the  Khedive  "  upon  the  best  means 
of  tranquillising  the  Soudan  by  pacific  means." 
The  two  Commissioners,  in  concert  with  the 
Khedive,  were  to  reorganise  the  Egyptian  army, 
and  also  to  "examine  all  the  branches  of  the 
Egyptian  administration,  and  introduce  into  them 
the  modifications  which  they  considered  necessary, 
within  the  limits  of  the  Imperial  Firmans."  The 
sixth  and  most  important  article  of  the  Convention 
was  couched  in  the  following  terms  :  "  So  soon  as 
the  two  High  Commissioners  shall  have  established 
that  the  security  <jf  the  frontiers  and  the  good 
working  and  stability  of  the  Egyptian  Government 
are  assured,  they  shall  present  a  Report  to  their 
respective  Governments,  who  will  consult  as  to 
the  conclusion  of  a  Convention  regulating  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from  Egypt  in  a 
convenient  period." 

In  a  despatch,  dated  October  24,  Sir  Henry 
Wolff  pointed  out  the  advantages  which,  he 
thought,  had  accrued,  or  were  likely  to  accrue, 
from  the  signature  of  this  Convention.  "  The 
conclusion  of  an  arrangement,"  he  said,  "of  any 
kind  has  done  much  to  allay  the  irritation  that  has 
existed  for  some  time  in  the  minds  of  the  Turks 
towards  England.  .  .  .  The  experience  of  the 
Sultan's  Commissioner,  if  wisely  chosen,  will  be 
useful  in  the  elaboration  of  institutions  which  must 
combine  both  Eastern  and  Western  elements.  The 
same  reason  will  liold  good  with  respect  to  the 
regulations  in  the  Soudan.     It  must,  doubtless, 


374  MODERN  EGYPT 


have  been  very  difficult  for  English  gentlemen, 
however  able  and  conciliatory,  to  come  to  terms 
with  races  who  had  suffered  so  severely  at  our 
hands.  Tlie  regulations  which  are  to  be  under- 
taken, with  our  assent  and  countenance,  but 
between  the  Khalif  and  those  who  recognise  his 
authority,  are  more  likely  to  lead  to  a  rapid  and 
satisfactory  result." 

Sir  Henry  Wolff  arrived  in  Cairo  on  October  29. 
The  departure  from  Constantinople  of  Ghazi 
JMoukhtar  Pasha,  a  distinguished  soldier,  who  was 
named  Turkish  Commissioner,  was  delayed;  he  did 
not  arrive  in  Cairo  till  December  27. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  the  lengthy  negotia- 
tions which  ensued.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say 
that,  after  eighteen  months  of  discussion,  a  further 
Convention  was  signed  at  Constantinople,  on  May 
22,  1887,  between  Sir  Henry  Wolff  and  two 
Turkish  Plenipotentiaries  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
Sultan. 

The  two  Conventions  may  now  be  compared 
■with  a  view  to  ascertaining  how  far  the  latter 
accomplished  the  objects  proposed  by  the  former. 

As  regards  the  tranquillisation  of  the  Soudan, 
Sir  Henry  Wolff's  efforts  were  foredoomed  to 
failure  from  the  commencement.  He  spoke  of 
negotiations  being  undertaken  "between  the 
Khalif  and  those  who  recognised  his  authority. ' 
Moukhtar  Pasha  and  other  Turks  were  naturally 
slow  to  believe  that  any  JNIohammedans  refused  to 
recognise  the  authority  of  the  Sultan  as  Khalif. 
But  every  one  in  Egypt  knew  that  the  JNIahdi  con- 
founded Christians  and  Turks  alike  in  one  common 
anathema,  and  that  the  idea  of  conjuring  with  the 
Sultan's  name  in  the  Soudan  was  a  delusion. 

On  this  particular  point,  therefore,  the  negotia- 
tions conducted  by  Sir  Henry  Wolff  and  Moukhtar 
Pasha  ended  in  failure.     It  was  reserved  for  Sir 


CH.XLVI    THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION  375 


Francis  Grenfell  and  Colonel  Wodehouse  to  arrive 
at  some  settlement  of  the  frontier  question  by 
methods  Avhich  were  efficacious  because  they  were 
based  on  the  true  facts  of  the  case,  and  not  on  the 
imaginary  facts  evolved  from  the  brains  of  Turkish 
diplomatists.  The  defeats  which  the  Dervishes  sus- 
tained at  Arguin  and  Toski  in  the  summer  of  1889, 
gave  peace  to  the  frontier.  Powder  and  shot  proved 
more  effective  agents  than  the  "authority  of  the 
Khalif" 

Much  discussion  took  place  about  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  the  Egyptian  army.  At  one  time,  a 
proposal  was  put  forward  to  recruit  troops  in 
Turkey,  an  idea  which  did  not  find  favour  with  the 
Sultan.  At  another  time,  the  notion  of  importing 
a  number  of  Turkish  officers  into  Egypt  was 
started.  Eventually,  however,  nothing  was  done. 
The  British  officers  were  fortunately  left  to  re- 
organise the  Egyptian  army  after  their  own 
fashion.  On  this  point  also,  therefore,  the  Con- 
vention of  October  24,  1885,  was  unproductive  of 
result. 

Much  the  same  may  be  said  as  regards  admin- 
istrative reforms.  A  Protocol  annexed  to  the 
Convention  of  May  22,  1887,  provided  that  the 
British  and  Ottoman  Governments  should  jointly 
address  the  Powers  with  a  view  to  modifying  the 
Capitulations  in  the  sense  of  bringing  all  residents 
of  Egypt  "  under  a  local  and  uniform  jurisdiction 
and  legislation."  A  second  Protocol  provided  that 
joint  representations  should  be  made  to  the  Powers 
with  a  view  to  reforming  the  administrations  of 
the  Domains,  Daira,  and  Railways,  defining  the 
powers  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt,  and 
enacting  laws  relative  to  the  press  and  to  quarantine. 
But  beyond  making  an  enumeration  of  the  points 
which  required  the  attention  of  the  reformer, 
nothing  was  done. 


876  MODERN  EGYPT 


There  remains  to  be  considered  the  sixth  and 
most  important  article  of  the  Convention  of 
October  24,  1885,  namely,  that  which  provided 
that  the  Commissioners  should  discuss  the  ques- 
tion of  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  garrison  from 
Egypt.  It  was  perhaps  rather  a  bold  flight  of  the 
official  imagination  to  indulge  in  the  hope  that  any 
possible  steps  taken  by  the  two  Commissioners 
would  assure  "the  good  working  and  stability  of 
the  Egyptian  Government."  The  good  working 
and  stability  of  that  Government  are  still  assured 
by  the  presence  of  the  garrison  whose  speedy 
withdrawal  from  Egypt  formed  the  main  subject 
of  the  discussions  which  took  place  in  1885-87. 
Too  much  attention  should  not,  however,  be 
attached  to  the  wording  of  the  Convention  of 
October  1885.  Diplomatic  instruments  of  this 
sort  usually  abound  in  euphemisms  and  picturesque 
conventionalities.  In  plain  English,  the  first  Con- 
vention signed  by  Sir  Henry  Wolff  meant  that 
England  and  Turkey  were  to  endeavour  to  come 
to  terms  over  the  Egyptian  question,  and,  although 
nothing  practical  came  of  the  endeavour,  some 
cautious  and  intelligent  steps  were  taken  in  the 
direction  intended. 

Article  V.  of  the  Convention  of  May  22,  1887, 
laid  down  that  "at  the  expiration  of  three  years 
from  the  date  of  the  present  Convention,  Her 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government  will  withdraw  its 
troops  from  Egypt."  This  clause  seemed  ex])licit 
enough,  but  it  was  followed  by  another  clause, 
under  the  provisions  of  which  the  British  troops 
were  not  to  withdraw  at  the  end  of  three  years 
if  there  was  any  "appearance  of  danger  in  the 
interior  or  from  without."  It  was  not  specifically 
stated  who  was  to  judge  whether  the  internal  or 
external  danger  was  sufficient  to  justify  the  reten- 
tion of  the  British  garrison  in  Egypt,  but  in  the 


CH.XLVI    THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION  377 

absence  of  any  specific  arrangement  on  this  point, 
it  was  obvious  that  the  decision  rested  with  the 
British  Government.  One  important  definition 
was,  however,  given  to  the  words  "  danger  from 
without."  Article  VI.  of  the  Convention  laid  down 
that,  after  the  ratification  by  England  and  Turkey, 
the  Powers,  who  were  parties  to  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin,  should  be  invited  to  adhere  to  it.  The 
ultimate  execution  of  the  Convention  depended,  in 
fact,  on  its  acceptance  by  the  Powers.  In  a  letter 
attached  to  the  Convention,  which  was  addressed 
by  Sir  Henry  Wolff  to  the  Turkish  Plenipoten- 
tiaries, he  said  :  "  If,  at  the  expiration  of  the  three 
years  stipulated  in  the  Convention  of  this  day  for  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from  Egypt,  one 
of  the  Great  Mediterranean  Powers  shall  not  have 
accepted  it,  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government 
would  consider  this  refusal  as  the  appearance  of  a 
danger  from  without,  provided  against  by  Article 
V.  of  the  Convention,  and  the  means  of  executing 
the  aforesaid  Convention  shall  be  again  discussed 
and  settled  between  the  Imperial  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment and  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government." 

More  than  this.  Article  V,  provided  that  if,  at 
any  time  subsequent  to  the  evacuation,  "  order  and 
security  in  the  interior  were  disturbed,  or  if  the 
Khedivate  of  Egypt  refused  to  execute  its  duties 
towards  the  Sovereign  Court,  or  its  international 
obligations,"  both  the  Ottoman  and  British  Govern- 
ments would  have  the  right  to  occupy  the  country 
with  troops,  and,  moreover,  that  if,  "  by  reason  of 
hindrances, '  the  Sultan  did  not  avail  himself  of 
his  right  of  occupation,  the  British  Government 
could  none  the  less  take  military  action  on  their 
own  account,  and  that,  in  that  case,  the  Sultan 
would  "send  a  Commissioner  to  remain  during  the 
period  of  the  sojourn  of  the  British  troops  with  their 
Commander." 


878  MODERN  EGYPT 


So  long  as  the  negotiations  which  were  pre- 
liminary to  the  signature  of  the  Convention  were 
going  on,  the  embers  of  diplomatic  opposition 
smouldered.  Directly  it  was  signed,  they  burst 
into  a  flame.  M.  de  NelidofF,  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople,  at  once  "sent  to  the 
Palace  his  remonstrances,  and  reproached  the 
Grand  Vizier  with  having  gratuitously  sacrificed 
the  rights  of  the  Sultan  to  England."  "  Similar 
language,"  Sir  Henry  Wolff  reported  on  May  27, 
"  had  been  used  to  the  Turkish  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  by  M.  de  Giers,  who  said  that  Russia 
would  probably  refuse  her  adhesion,  and  thus  act 
in  the  interests  of  the  Sultan." 

The  French  Government  also  took  strong  excep- 
tion to  the  right  of  re-entry  into  Egypt,  which  the 
Convention  conferred  on  England.  On  June  7, 
the  Count  de  Montebello,  who  represented  France 
at  Constantinople,  addressed  a  minatory  letter  to 
the  Sultan  in  which  he  stated  that  the  "  French 
Government  had  definitely  decided  not  to  accept 
the  situation  which  would  result  from  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  Egyptian  Convention." 

The  Sultan  was  perplexed.  On  July  9,  the 
Turkish  Plenipotentiaries  called  on  Sir  Henry 
Wolff.  "They  said  that  the  recent  language  of 
the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors,  both  at  the 
Palace  and  the  Porte,  had  much  disturbed  the 
Sultan.  His  Majesty  had  been  told  that  if  he 
ratified  the  Convention,  France  and  Russia  would 
thereby  be  given  the  right  to  occupy  provinces  of 
the  Empire,  and  to  leave  only  after  a  similar  Con- 
vention had  been  concluded.  France  might  do  so 
in  Syria,  and  Russia  in  Armenia.  Religious  feel- 
ing had  also  been  excited  in  the  same  direction." 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  asked,  could 
not  Sir  Henry  Wolff  "  advise  as  to  some  formula 
by  which  these  difficulties  might  be  met?"  Sir 


CH.XLVI    THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION  379 


Henry  could  not  advise  the  distracted  Plenipo- 
tentiaries as  to  any  formula.  He  "  had  exhausted 
his  powers  of  reference  "  to  Lord  Salisbury.  What 
was  an  unfortunate  ruler  who  was  torn  hither  and 
thither  by  rival  diplomatists  to  do  ?  He  could  at 
all  events  fall  back  upon  his  favourite  device  and 
try  to  gain  time.  Under  Article  VII.  of  the 
Convention  the  ratifications  w^ere  to  be  exchanged 
within  one  month  of  the  date  on  which  the  Con- 
vention was  signed.  The  British  Government  were 
implored  to  prolong  this  period.  On  June  26,  that 
is  to  say  four  days  after  the  prescribed  period  of 
a  month  had  expired,  the  Turkish  Ambassador 
represented  to  Lord  Salisbury  that  "the  Sultan 
was  much  fatigued  after  Bairam,"  and  wanted  time 
to  consider  the  whole  question.  A  short  delay 
was  granted,  but  the  Sultan  was  still  unable  to 
make  up  his  mind  as  to  whether  he  would  or 
would  not  ratify  the  Convention.  Sir  Henry 
Wolff  then  announced  his  intention  of  leaving 
Constantinople.  He  at  once  received  a  letter 
from  the  Sultan's  Grand  INIaster  of  the  Cere- 
monies which  was  to  the  following  effect :  "  His 
Majesty  is  at  this  moment  occupied  with  questions 
of  the  greatest  importance  for  his  Empire.  In 
view  of  these  occupations,  which  will  last  all  next 
week,  he  is  anxious  that  you  should  remain  at 
Constantinople  until  Friday,  July  15."  Sir  Henry 
Wolff's  departure  was  accordingly  fixed  for  July 
15.  At  8.30  P.M.  of  that  day  he  telegraphed  to 
Lord  Salisbury :  "  Just  as  I  am  leaving,  Artin 
Efifendi  has  come  with  a  personal  message  from  the 
Sultan  urgently  pressing  me  to  stay.  I  have  told 
him  that  this  is  quite  impossible."  At  midnight 
on  July  15,  Sir  Henry  Wolff  left  Constantinople. 

Shortly  after  he  left,  the  Sultan,  through  his 
Ambassador  in  London,  made  an  ,  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  renew  the  negotiations  with  the  British 


380  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  v 

Government  He  was  informed  by  Lord  Salis- 
bury "that  so  long  as  the  Sultan  was  so  much 
under  the  influence  of  other  advisers  as  to  repudi- 
ate an  agreement  which  he  had  himself  so  recently 
sanctioned,  any  fresh  agreement  would  obviously 
be  liable  to  meet  with  the  same  fate  as  the  late 
Convention." 

It  should  be  added  that  one  practical  conse- 
quence of  an  unfortunate  nature  resulted  from  the 
W olff  mission.  Before  that  time,  the  Egyptian 
administrative  machine  was  sufficiently  compli- 
cated. Henceforth,  an  additional  complication 
was  added.  A  Turkish  Commissioner  was  left 
in  Egypt.  When  once  the  negotiations  had  broken 
down,  there  was  no  plausible  excuse  for  the  con- 
tinued presence  in  Egypt  of  a  high  Turkish  official, 
whose  functions  could  not  be  defined,  whose  presence 
would  naturally  be  resented  by  the  Khedive,  and 
who  at  any  moment  might  become  the  centre  of 
intrigue,  Moukhtar  Pasha  was,  however,  allowed 
to  remain.  In  spite  of  his  high  personal  character, 
the  presence  of  a  Turkish  Commissioner  in  Egypt 
has  served  no  useful  purpose,  and  has  at  times 
caused  some  trouble. 

Although  the  negotiations  conducted  by  Sir 
Henry  AVolff  failed  to  effect  their  object,  the 
Britisli  Government  were  in  a  better  diplomatic 
position  at  their  close  than  they  had  been  at  their 
commencement.  They  could  henceforth  point  to 
the  fact  that  they  had  made  an  endeavour  to  come 
to  terms  with  the  Sultan  on  the  Egyptian  ques- 
tion ;  that  they  had,  moreover,  succeeded  in  their 
endeavour ;  and  that  it  was  no  fault  of  theirs  if 
the  Sultan,  under  the  pressure  of  France  and 
Russia,  had  refused  to  ratify  an  arrangement  to 
which  at  one  time  he  had  agreed.  Strong  in  this 
argument,  the  British  Government  could  feel  that 
the  Wolff  negotiations,  although  for  the  time  being 


CH.XLVI    THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION  381 


unproductive  of  result,  had  fortified  their  posi- 
tion as  against  both  Mohammedan  and  European 
critics. 

The  neutralisation  of  the  Suez  Canal,  to  which 
allusion  was  made  in  Article  III.  of  the  Convention 
of  May  22,  1887,  formed  the  subject  of  further 
discussion,  with  results  which  will  now  be 
described. 


CHAPTER  XLVII 


THE  NEUTRALISATION  OF  THE  SUEZ  CANAL* 

Neutralisation  of  Egypt  —  Neutralisation  of  the  Canal  —  The  word 
neutrality — Circular  of  January  3,  1883 — The  Suez  Canal  Com- 
mission of  1885  —  The  Commission  dissolved — The  VV^olff  Con- 
vention— Signature  of  the  Caual  Convention — Its  application. 

At  one  time,  politicians  in  search  of  an  idea 
flattered  themselves  with  the  belief  that  the 
solution  of  the  Egyptian  question  was  to  be  found 
in  neutralising  Egypt.  Why,  it  was  sometimes 
asked,  should  not  Egypt  become  an  "Oriental 
Belgium "  ?  A  point  is  already  gained  by  the 
advocates  of  any  political  idea  when  they  can  label 
their  pet  theory  with  an  epigrammatic  ticket  of 
this  sort.  The  mere  appellation  gives  their  pro- 
posal the  appearance  of  involving  some  sound 
and  statesmanlike  principle.  Catchpenny  phrases 
exercise  a  good  deal  of  influence  in  the  government 
of  the  world.  In  the  Sturm  und  Drang  of  public 
life  in  this  busy  century,  large  numbers  of  people 
who  are  engaged  in  politics  are  often  too  much 
occupied  with  ^other  matters  to  inquire  carefully 
whether  the  particular  phrase  in  question  embodies, 
as  may  at  first  sight  appear,  the  elements  of  a 
sound  policy  based  on  the  true  facts  of  the  situation, 
or  whether,  as  is  not  unfrequently  the  case,  it  is  a 
mere  tinsel  covering  beneath  which  some  glaring 
fallacy  may  lurk. 

^  See  further  remarks  on  this  subject  on  p.  66& 
382 


CH.  xLvu  SUEZ  CANAL 


383 


The  proposal  to  neutralise  Egypt  belongs  to 
the  latter  of  these  two  categories.  Its  tinsel 
covering  consists  of  an  argument,  which  may 
conveniently  be  stated  in  the  form  of  a  syllogism 
thus  :  The  most  serious  aspect  of  the  Egyptian 
question  is  that  it  may,  under  contingencies  which 
are  easily  conceivable,  bring  about  a  rupture 
between  France  and  England.  The  principal 
element  of  danger  consists  in  the  two  facts  that 
England  would  resent  a  French  occupation,  whilst 
France  resents  a  British  occupation  of  the  country. 
Therefore,  the  danger  will  be  removed  and  all  risk  of 
a  rupture  will  disappear  if  both  France  and  England 
agree  that  neither  of  them  shall  occupy  Egypt. 

This  appears  at  first  sight  a  compact  and 
plausible  chain  of  argument.  Unfortunately,  it  is 
fallacious,  for  the  main  question  to  be  decided  is 
not  whether  both  England  and  France  shall 
abstain  from  occupying  the  country,  but  whether, 
inasmuch  as  some  foreign  occupation  is  necessary, 
the  occupiers  shall  be  French  or  British.  The 
analogy  between  Belgium  and  Egypt  breaks  down 
on  this  essential  point,  that  whereas  Belgium  is 
inhabited  by  a  highly  civilised  population  capable 
of  self-government,  the  population  of  Egypt  is 
for  the  present  incapable  of  governing  itself 
on  principles  which  would  commend  themselves 
to  the  civilised  world.  This  bald  fact,  namely, 
that  a  foreign  occupation  was,  and  still  is  neces- 
sary in  order  to  prevent  anarchy  in  Egypt,  and, 
therefore,  in  order  to  obviate  the  resuscitation  of 
an  Egyptian  question  which  would  be  a  source  of 
constant  trouble  to  Europe,  has  been  frequently 
forgotten  by  those  who  have  from  time  to  time 
discussed  Egyptian  affairs.  Nevertheless,  I  am 
convinced  that  it  is  true,  and,  moreover,  that  it  is 
of  a  nature  to  quash  all  ideas  of  neutralisation. 
Oriental  Belgiums,  and  similar  phantasies. 


884 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  V 


Most  responsible  and  impartial  authorities  who 
have  studied  the  Egyptian  question  appear  so  far 
to  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  stated  above.  It 
is  true  that  Article  V.  of  the  Convention  of 
May  22,  1887,  provided  that  the  Great  Powers 
were  to  be  "  invited  to  sign  an  Act  recoffnisincr 
and  guaranteeing  the  inviolability  of  Egyptian 
territory  " ;  but  this  was  immediately  followed  by 
a  provision  which  enabled  Turkey  and  England  to 
occupy  the  country  in  case  any  foreign  occupation 
should  become  necessary.  For  all  practical  purposes, 
it  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  idea  of  neutral- 
ising Egypt,  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  has  never 
got  beyond  the  stage  of  academic  discussion. 

It  has  been  otherwise  with  the  question  of 
neutralising  the  Suez  Canal.  This  subject  attracted 
the  attention  of  the  Powers  of  Europe  in  1882, 
notice  having  been  more  particularly  drawn  to  it 
by  the  fact  that,  during  the  period  which  preceded 
the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  Lord  Wolseley  used  the 
Canal  as  his  base  of  operations.  Before  proceeding 
to  state  what  was  done  in  this  matter,  it  may  be  as 
well  to  describe  what,  in  this  particular  instance, 
was  meant  by  the  word  neutrality. 

In  the  words  of  Lord  Pauncefote,  an  excellent 
authority  on  this  subject,  the  word  as  applied  to 
the  proposals  made  in  connection  with  the  Suez 
Canal,  "  had  reference  only  to  the  neutrahty  which 
attaches  by  international  law  to  the  territorial 
waters  of  a  neutral  state,  in  which  a  right  of 
innocent  passage  for  belligerent  vessels  exists,  but 
no  right  to  commit  any  act  of  hostility." 

The  definition  of  the  term  is  important.  Lord 
Granville  was  evidently  apprehensive  lest  the  mere 
use  of  the  word  "  neutrality "  should  carry  him 
farther  than  he  intended.  With  conrmaendable 
prudence,  therefore,  he  directed  that,  in  dealing 
with  this  subject,  its  use  should  be  avoided  and 


CH.  xLvii  SUEZ  CANAL 


385 


that  the  words  "freedom"  or  "free  navigation" 
should  be  substituted  in  its  place. 

Some  three  months  after  the  battle  of  Tel- 
el -Kebir,  Lord  Granville  addressed  a  Circular  to 
the  Powers  in  order  to  give  them  "  full  information 
on  all  matters,  which  were  immediately  connected 
with  the  peace,  security,  and  social  order  of  Egypt, 
and  on  which,  accordingly,  they  {i.e.  the  British 
Government)  had  thought  it  their  duty  to  advise 
the  Khedive  as  to  the  best  mode  of  exercising  his 
governing  power." 

In  this  Circular,  a  prominent  place  was  given  to 
the  arrangements  which  it  was  proposed  should  for 
the  future  be  adopted  in  connection  with  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

The  question  was  then  allowed  to  sleep  till 
early  in  1885,  when,  at  the  instance  of  the  French 
Government,  it  was  decided  to  assemble  a  Com- 
mission in  Paris  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
Great  Powers,  as  well  as  of  Spain  and  Holland,  in 
order  to  discuss  the  question  of  neutralising  the 
Canal.  The  British  Government  would  have 
preferred  "that  all  the  Maritime  Powers  who 
applied  should  be  permitted  to  send  delegates," 
but  to  this  proposal  the  French  objected.  The 
purpose  for  which  the  Commission  was  convoked 
was  to  "  establish  by  a  conventional  act  a  definite 
system  for  guaranteeing  at  all  times  and  to  all 
Powers  the  free  use  of  the  Suez  Canal." 

The  first  meeting  was  held  on  March  80,  1885, 
the  proceedings  being  opened  by  M.  Jules  Ferry, 
the  French  Prime  Minister. 

M.  Billot,  the  Director -General  of  the  French 
Foreign  Office,  then  assumed  the  presidency  of  the 
Commission,  but  the  real  work  was  delegated  to 
a  Sub- Commission,  over  which  M.  Barr^re,  the 
second  French  representative,  presided. 

It  is  needless  to  describe  the  proceedings  of  the 

VOL.  II  2  c 


386  MODERN  EGYPT 


Commission  in  detail.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say 
that  the  object  of  the  majority  of  the  Powers  was 
to  internationalise  rather  than  to  neutralise  the 
Canal,  and  that  the  British  Government  were 
opposed  to  the  adoption  of  this  course. 

The  British  delegates  were  obliged  to  fight  the 
ground  inch  by  inch.  Although  they  made  some 
concessions,  they  were  unable  to  come  to  terms 
with  their  adversaries.  Eventually,  after  some  ten 
weeks  of  wearisome  discussion,  a  draft  Treaty 
was  drawn  up  representing  the  views  of  the 
majority.  It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  in  detail 
on  the  points  at  issue  between  France  and  her 
allies  on  the  one  side,  and  England,  supported  to 
a  certain  extent  by  Italy,  on  the  other.  It  will 
be  sufficient  to  say  that  they  were  of  a  nature  to 
exclude,  for  the  time  bemg,  the  possibility  of  any 
common  understanding. 

On  June  13,  the  Commission  held  its  last  sitting. 
A  few  days  later,  Mr.  Gladstone's  Ministry  fell.  The 
question  of  neutralising  the  Canal  was  again  allowed 
to  sleep  for  a  while.  Shortly  afterwards.  Sir  Henry 
Wolff  started  on  his  mission.  The  question  of  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Canal  formed  the  subject  of 
negotiation  at  Constantinople,  with  the  result  that 
an  Article  (III.)  on  this  point  was  inserted  in  the 
Convention  of  May  22,  1887.  Briefly  it  may  be 
said  that  this  Article  embodied  the  views  which 
had  been  maintained  by  the  British  delegates  in 
Paris  in  June  1 885. 

Although  the  Convention  of  May  22,  1887,  was 
not  ratified  by  the  Sultan,  the  idea  of  neutralising 
the  Canal  was  not  allowed  to  drop.  It  was  one 
to  which  the  French  attached  great  importance. 
Eventually,  after  some  lengthy  negotiations,  which 
need  not  be  described  in  detail,  a  Convention,  the 
text  of  which  is  to  be  found  in  Egypt,  No.  2  of 
1889,  was  signed  on  April  29,  1888.    The  British 


CH.  XLVn 


SUEZ  CANAL 


387 


Government  stipulated  that  the  Convention  was 
not  to  come  into  force  so  long  as  the  British 
occupation  of  Egypt  lasted. 

Nothing  further  was  done  in  this  matter  until 
1904.  Under  the  Anglo-French  Agreement,  signed 
on  April  8  of  that  year,  the  British  Government 
agreed  to  put  the  Suez  Canal  Convention,  of  April 
29,  1888,  into  force,  with  the  exception  of  those 
portions  which  provided  that  a  Local  International 
Board  should  be  created  at  Cairo  to  watch  over 
the  execution  of  the  Convention. 

Thus,  another  important  step  was  taken  in  the 
direction  of  settling  the  Egyptian  question. 

The  actual  working  of  the  Canal  Convention 
was  put  to  the  test  during  the  Russo-Japanese 
War.  On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  it  worked 
well,  but,  as  usually  happens  in  such  cases,  a  number 
of  questions  of  detail  arose  in  respect  to  which  the 
wording  of  the  Convention  was  wanting  in  precision. 
It  would  be  desirable  that  an  opportunity  should 
be  taken  to  revise  the  Convention  by  the  light  of 
the  experience  which  has  now  been  gained. 


CHAPTER  XL VIII 


THE  ANGLO-FRENCH  AGREEMENT  OF  1904 

Apparent  insolubility  of  the  Egyptian  question — Gradual  change  in 
public  opinion — Statement  of  Lord  EUenborough — The  business  of 
diplomacy — The  main  facts  of  the  problem — The  events  of  1904 — 
Morocco— Signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement — Remarks  on 
the  Agreement. 

For  some  years  subsequent  to  the  Wolff  nego- 
tiations, no  attempt  was  made  to  deal  with  the 
larger  aspects  of  the  Egyptian  Question.  When- 
ever the  British  Government  were  reproached  by 
the  French,  or  by  British  partisans  of  evacuation, 
with  not  having  fulfilled  their  pledge  to  evacuate, 
the  reply  persistently  given,  by  both  Conservative 
and  Liberal  statesmen,  was  that  England's  work  in 
Egypt  was  not  yet  completed.  This  reply,  though 
regarded  by  some  as  a  mere  subterfuge,  was 
perfectly  true ;  yet  it  did  not  convey  the  whole 
truth.  It  encouraged  the  inference  that  England's 
work  would  be  completed  at  some  period,  which 
would  not  be  very  remote,  whereas  not  one  of  the 
British  statesmen  who  gave  the  reply  had  any 
precise  idea  as  to  whether  the  period  would  be 
remote  or  proximate.  The  better  was  his  acquaint- 
ance with  the  facts,  the  stronger  would  his 
conviction  be  that  the  period  would  be  remote, 
even  to  the  extent  of  giving  a  distinctly  permanent 
character  to  the  occupation,  which  was  originally 
intended  to  be  temporary. 

383 


caxLvm      AGREEMENT  OF  1904  389 


For  more  than  twenty  years,  therefore,  poli- 
ticians, whether  professional  or  amateur,  French 
or  English,  wandered  aimlessly  in  a  labyrinth  to 
which  there  was  no  clue.  They  sought  for  the 
solution  of  a  question  which  was  in  reality 
insoluble  on  any  basis  which  had,  during  that 
period,  been  formulated.  Eventually,  Englishmen 
relaxed  their  attempts  to  make  a  pyramid  stand  on 
its  apex ;  whilst  Frenchmen  gradually  recognised 
two  facts.  One  was  that  the  British  occupation 
of  Egypt  was  beneficial  rather  than  hurtful  to  the 
material  interests  of  France,  whilst  general  French 
political  interests  suffered  from  the  prolonged 
estrangement  of  the  two  countries,  which  was 
caused  by  the  Egyptian  Question.  The  other 
was  that,  unless  the  evacuation  of  Egypt  was 
to  be  made  a  casus  belli  with  England,  the  British 
view  of  the  facts  had  to  be  accepted. 

An  English  politician,  writing  in  1844,  had  said  : 
"  It  is  impossible  for  any  statesman  who  carries  his 
views  forward  a  few  years  not  to  see  that  there 
must  be  eventually  a  contest  among  European 
Powers  for  the  possession  of  Egypt."  ^ 

That  contest,  if  it  ever  came,  could  only  be 
between  England  and  France.  It  was  the  business 
of  diplomacy  to  be  on  the  watch  for  any  opportunity 
to  settle  the  question,  and  thus  avoid  any  such 
calamity  as  that  predicted  by  Lord  Ellenborough. 

The  main  facts  connected  with  the  Egyptian 
Question  were  in  reality  very  simple. 

It  was  certain  that,  in  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation,  the  British  Government  stated  publicly 
their  desire  to  withdraw  the  British  garrison,  so 
soon  as  circumstances  admitted  of  the  adoption  of 
such  a  course. 

It  was  equally  certain  to  all  who  considered  the 
subject  impartially,  and  with  a  full  knowledge  of 

^  Letter  from  Lord  Ellenborough,  Sir  Robert  Peel,  vol.  iii.  p.  269. 


390  MODERN  EGYPT 


the  circumstances,  that  the  British  Government 
could  not,  with  a  due  regard  to  all  the  interests 
involved,  carry  out  their  declared  intention. 

Gradually,  the  truth  of  this  latter  statement 
came  to  be  generally  recognised,  and  when  once  it 
was  recognised,  all  that  was  required  to  set  diplo- 
matic action  in  movement  was  an  opportunity  for 
negotiating  with  a  fair  prospect  of  success. 

Such  an  opportunity  occurred  in  1904.  The 
visits  of  King  Edward  VII.  to  Paris,  and  of  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic  to  London, 
prepared  the  public  opinion  of  both  countries  for 
a  general  settlement  of  all  outstanding  differences. 
Moreover,  at  this  moment  the  affairs  of  Morocco 
acquired  some  prominence. 

That  State  had  been  for  some  while  past  travers- 
ing the  various  stages  on  the  road  to  ruin,  which 
would  appear  to  be  normal  in  the  case  of  Oriental 
countries.  The  final  stage  had  nearly  been  reached. 
The  exercise  of  unbridled  personal  power  by  the 
ruler  of  the  State  led  to  misgovernment,  culminating 
in  revolution.  European  intervention  had  become 
inevitable.  The  only  practical  question  at  issue 
was  to  decide  on  the  nationality  of  the  Europeans 
who  were  to  intervene. 

The  choice  practically  lay  between  three  nations, 
Spain,  England,  and  France. 

Spain,  still  staggering  under  the  effects  of  a 
disastrous  war  with  America,  was  manifestly  in- 
capable of  assuming  the  task  of  regenerator. 

England  was  unwilling  to  add  to  her  already 
heavy  burthen  of  world-wide  responsibilities. 

The  duty  of  dealing  with  Morocco  devolved, 
therefore,  naturally  on  France.^    But,  in  order  that 

'  The  difficulties  which  subsequently  occurred  between  France  and 
Germauy,  as  also  the  proceedingfs  of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  lie 
obviously  outside  the  scope  of  this  work.  Moreover,  those  difficulties 
did  not  arise  until  a  period  subsequent  to  the  signature  of  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement  of  April  8,  1904. 


CH.XLVIII     AGREEMENT  OF  1904  391 


the  task  should  be  taken  in  hand  with  a  fair 
prospect  of  success,  the  goodwill  of  England  was 
necessary.  What,  therefore,  could  be  more  natural 
than  to  barter  British  support  in  Morocco  for 
French  support  in  Egypt  ? 

Negotiations  on  this  basis  were  commenced  in 
the  summer  of  1903,  with  the  result  that,  on 
April  8,  1904,  three  Conventions  were  signed  by 
Lord  Lansdowne,  who  then  presided  over  the 
British  Foreign  Office,  and  by  M,  Cambon,  the 
French  Ambassador  in  London. 

Two  of  these  Conventions  dealt  with  the  affairs 
of  Newfoundland,  Nigeria,  Siam,  INIadagascar,  and 
the  New  Hebrides.  The  consideration  of  these 
questions  lies  outside  the  scope  of  the  present  work. 

As  regards  Egypt,  it  has  been  already  explained 
that  the  Egyptian  Government  acquired  financial 
liberty,  and  also  that  the  British  Government 
recognised  the  Suez  Canal  Convention  of  1888. 
Further,  a  "Declaration"  made  on  April  8,  1904, 
contained  the  following  very  important  provision  : — 

"  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  declare 
that  they  have  no  intention  of  altering  the  political 
status  of  Egypt. 

"  The  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  for 
their  part,  declare  that  they  will  not  obstruct  the 
action  of  Great  Britain  in  that  country  by  asking 
that  a  limit  of  time  be  fixed  for  the  British  Occupa- 
tion or  in  any  other  manner." 

In  other  words,  the  occupation  was  recognised, 
and  the  British  Government  were  left  a  far  freer 
hand  than  formerly  to  deal  with  Egyptian  affairs. 

The  Governments  of  Germany,  Austria,  and 
Italy  subsequently  adhered  to  this  declaration. 

Thus,  the  "  Egyptian  Question,"  in  the  sense  in 
which  that  phrase  had  heretofore  been  used,  was 
partially  settled.  It  is  rare  that  an  arrangement 
of  this  kind  is  of  a  nature  to  give  satisfaction  to 


892  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.v 


all  those  who  are  directly  or  indirectly  concerned. 
Such,  however,  was  the  case  as  regards  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement. 

As  to  the  advantages  which  are  likely  to  accrue 
to  the  residents  in  Egypt,  both  European  and 
Egyptian,  there  cannot  be  a  shadow  of  doubt. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  financial  restrictions, 
which  by  a  change  of  circumstances  had  become 
obsolete  and  unnecessary,  have  been  removed,  it  is 
to  be  observed  that  Egyptian  progress  will  now,  it 
may  be  hoped,  continue  to  advance  without  being 
hampered  by  that  somewhat  acute  stage  of  inter- 
national rivalry  which  has  been  productive  of  so 
much  harm  in  the  past. 

Both  England  and  France  gained  in  the  removal 
of  a  difference  of  opinion  which  had  for  long 
embittered  the  relations  of  two  nations  whose 
common  interest  it  is  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of 
close  friendship. 

England  gained  by  obtaining  a  practically  valid 
sanction  to  a  position  which  was  previously,  to 
some  extent,  irregular.  I  had  for  long  been 
convinced  that  the  early  withdrawal  of  the  British 
garrison  from  Egypt  was  quite  impossible,  but 
I  never  regarded  lightly  the  non-fulfilment  of  the 
engagement  to  withdraw.  Neither  did  I  ever 
think  that  a  good  deal  of  provocation  in  local 
matters  constituted  a  sufficient  plea  to  justify  the 
annulment  of  that  engagement.  It  is  a  distinct 
advantage  for  a  nation,  which  is  bound  to  a 
scrupulous  respect  of  international  obligations  by 
every  consideration  of  public  morality  and  self- 
interest,  that  it  can  no  longer  be  accused  of  any 
apparent  disregard  of  those  obligations. 

France  also  gained.  The  large  French  interests 
at  stake  in  Egypt  are  secured  by  specific  engage- 
ments, and  are  still  more  amply  secured  by  the 
traditional   character   of    British  predominance. 


CH.XLVIII     AGREEMENT  OF  1904  393 


wherever  it  has  been  acquired.  On  the  other 
hand,  any  apparent  loss  of  French  political 
influence  in  Egypt  received  compensation  else- 
where. 

Lastly,  the  civilised  world — whose  principal 
interest  I  conceive  to  be  the  maintenance  of  peace 
— gained  by  the  re-establishment  of  very  friendly 
relations  between  two  of  the  most  important 
members  of  the  European  family. 

Such,  therefore,  is  the  view  I  venture  to  submit 
of  this  very  important  and  auspicious  transaction. 
I  began  my  connection  with  Egypt  twenty-eight 
years  previous  to  the  signature  of  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement,  when  England  and  France  moved 
hand  in  hand  together  in  that  country.  I  rejoice 
that  my  connection  lasted  long  enough  to  enable 
me  to  see  the  friendly  relations  of  the  past 
re-established  after  an  interlude  of  misunder- 
standing which  was  detrimental  alike  to  British, 
French,  and  Egyptian  interests. 

A  further  Egyptian  Question  remains  behind. 
It  consists  in  gradually  adapting  the  institutions 
of  the  country  to  the  growing  needs  of  the  popu- 
lation. Possibly,  time  will  also  solve  that  problem, 
but,  unless  disaster  is  to  ensue,  it  must  be  a  long 
time. 


PART  VI 


THE  KEFORMS 


In  the  East,  we  are  attempting  to  put  new  wime  into  old 
bottles,  to  pour  what  we  can  of  a  civilisation  whose  spirit  is 
prog7-ess  into  the  form,  of  a  civilisation  whose  spirit  is  fixity ; 
and  whether  we  succeed  or  not  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting' 
question  in  an  age  abounding  almost  beyond  example  m 
questions  of  political  interest. 

Bagehot,  Physics  cmd  Politics. 


S9S 


CHAPTER  XLIX 


THE  COURBASH 

Universal  use  of  the  courbash — Lord  Dufferin's  Circular — It  wag 
partially  inoperative — Final  abolition  of  the  courbash. 

Reforms  in  all  countries,  which  are  in  a  backward 
state  of  civilisation,  can  be  divided  into  two 
categories,  namely,  first,  those  which  are  manifestly 
possible  if  the  reformer  is  provided  with  the  money 
and  the  administrative  agency  necessary  to  their 
execution ;  secondly,  those  dealing  with  long- 
standing abuses  or  faulty  habits  of  thought,  which 
are  ingrained  to  such  an  extent  into  the  minds  of 
the  population  as  to  require  a  social  almost  as 
much  as  an  administrative  revolution  in  order  to 
ensure  their  eradication. 

The  present  and  the  two  succeeding  chapters 
will  deal  with  the  most  prominent  instances  of 
Egyptian  reforms  belonging  to  the  second  of  these 
categories.  These  are  the  three  C's — the  Courbash, 
the  Corvee,  and  Corruption. 

It  was  formerly  the  custom  of  the  governing 
classes  in  Egypt  to  practise  many  cruel  forms  of 
torture  on  the  population.  One  case  which  came 
under  my  personal  notice  may  be  mentioned  as  an 
example  of  the  perverse  ingenuity  which  was 
occasionally  exhibited  in  discovering  recondite 
means  for  the  infliction  of  bodily  pain.  A  Moudir 
was  in  the  habit  of  causing  a  burning  rag  steeped  in 
spirits  of  wine  to  be  held  close  to  the  mouth  of  any 

397 


398  MODERN  EGYPT 


recalcitrant  taxpayer,  who  then  received  a  blow  on 
the  chest,  the  consequence  of  which  was  that,  the 
air  being  expelled  from  his  lungs,  he  was  obliged 
to  take  a  deep  breath  to  refill  them.  The  flame 
was  thus  drawn  into  his  mouth.  The  official  who 
was  guilty  of  this  particular  act  of  barbarity  was 
by  no  means  a  bad  specimen  of  his  class.  He 
simply  followed  certain  caste  traditions,  which  led 
him  to  be  callous  to  the  pain  inflicted  on  a  fellow- 
creature.  It  was  with  the  aid  of  administrative 
material  such  as  this  Moudir  that  the  English  had, 
in  the  first  instance,  to  create  the  New  Egypt. 

Refined  forms  of  torture  were,  however,  com- 
paratively rare.  On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of  the 
courbash,  a  strip  of  hippopotamus  hide  tapering  at 
the  end,  was  universal.  When  such  a  simple  and 
effective  form  of  torture  as  flogging  with  this  imple- 
ment could  readily  be  applied,  there  was,  indeed, 
no  need  for  refinements  in  cruelty.  The  courbash 
was  employed  on  every  occasion  when  coercion  or 
punishment  was  required,  but  notably  for  the  col- 
lection of  taxes  and  for  extracting  either  the 
evidence  of  witnesses  or  the  confession  of  persons 
accused  of  crime. 

Confession  forms  an  important  part  of  the 
Mohammedan  law  of  evidence.  If,  the  Moham- 
medan lawgiver  argued,  a  man  confesses  his  crime, 
he  must  surely  be  guilty.  What,  then,  added  the 
Turco- Egyptian  Pasha  with  mediaeval  logic  and 
assurance,  can  be  more  just  and  natural  than  that 
when  I  see  that  he  will  not  inculpate  himself,  and 
when  I  know  that  either  he  or  some  one  else  must 
be  guilty,  I  should  flog  him  to  see  if  he  will  con- 
fess ?  It  is  true  that  he  may  afterwards  retract  his 
confession,  but  no  importance  can  be  attached  to 
his  retractation ;  for,  if  he  is  not  guilty,  why  did  he, 
in  the  first  instance,  confess  his  crime  ?  Moreover, 
if  some  glimmering  of  doubt  entered  into  the  mind 


CH.XLIX  THE  COURBASH  399 


of  the  old-fashioned  Pasha  as  to  the  soundness  of  this 
process  of  reasoning,  he  would  change  his  tactics.  He 
would  bid  avaunt  to  the  argumentative  subtleties 
of  the  Frank,  and  would  triumphantly  point  out 
that,  even  supposing  the  confession  to  have  been 
made  in  order  to  obtain  relief  from  bodily  pain, 
no  injustice  was  committed,  for,  ere  one  stroke  of 
the  courbash  had  been  administered,  he,  the 
Pasha,  knew  that  the  man  was  guilty,  and  that 
the  flogging  was,  therefore,  a  mere  formality  in 
order  to  obtain  the  confession  necessary  to  give 
legal  sanction  to  the  punishment,  which  the  criminal 
had  richly  deserved.  The  Pasha,  having  complied 
with  the  text  of  the  law,  to  which,  oblivious  of  its 
spirit,  he  attached  the  utmost  importance,  no  valid 
complaint  could  be  made ;  nor,  indeed,  was  it 
necessary  to  ask  any  useless  questions  as  regards 
the  method  adopted  to  ensure  compliance.^ 

When  Lord  Dufferin  came  to  Cairo,  one  of  his 
first  resolves  was  of  a  negative  nature.  It  was  not 
at  that  time  clear  how  Egypt  was  to  be  governed 
for  the  future,  but  Lord  Dufferin  determined  that 
in  any  case  the  country  should  not,  if  he  could 
prevent  it,  be  ruled  by  an  indiscriminate  use  of 
the  whip.  Under  his  auspices,  a  Circular  was 
issued  forbidding  the  use  of  the  courbash.  It  was 
signed  by  Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub,  who  was  then 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  is  a  curious  and  very 
characteristic  document.  Like  many  Oriental 
state -papers,  it  assumed  a  condition  of  things 
which  was  wholly  at  variance  with  the  reality. 
Any  one  unacquainted  with  the  ways  of  the  East 
might,  on  reading  it,  suppose  that  the  rulers  of 
Egypt  had  on  frequent  occasions  used  their  utmost 

*  I  wish  to  explain  that  here,  and  elsewhere,  I  am  speaking  of  the 
"old-fashioned  Pasha,"  that  is  to  say,  the  Pasha  who  existed  some 
twenty-five  years  ago.  This  type  has  now  almost  entirely  disappeared. 
The  modern  Pasha  may  have  his  defects,  but  he  is  generally  au 
educated  and  enlightened  gentleman. 


400 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


endeavours  to  suppress  the  use  of  the  courbash, 
and  that  they  were  scandalised  to  learn  that,  in 
spite  of  all  their  humane  efforts,  that  implement 
was  still  very  generally  employed.  Any  such  con- 
clusion would  have  been  wholly  erroneous.  No 
real  effort  had  ever  been  made  by  the  Egyptian 
portion  of  the  administration  to  abolish  torture. 

It  is,  however,  proverbially  unnecessary  to  look 
a  gift  horse  in  the  mouth.  If  the  thistles  of 
Pashadom  could,  under  pressure,  be  made  to  pro- 
duce figs,  the  business  of  the  British  statesman  was 
to  make  the  most  of  the  figs,  and  not  to  dwell  on 
the  circumstances  by  which  the  change  of  produc- 
tion had  been  effected.  Whatever  Ismail  Pasha 
Eyoub  and  his  coadjutors  may  have  thought  on  the 
subject  of  government  by  torture,  their  sentiments, 
as  expressed  in  the  Circular,  were  unimpeacliably 
orthodox  when  judged  by  the  standard  of  modern 
civilisation.  It  was  stated,  in  terms  of  indignant 
remonstrance,  that,  in  spite  of  reiterated  Circulars 
in  past  days,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  had  heard, 
to  his  unspeakable  regret,  that  recourse  was  still 
had  by  some  perverse  officials  to  the  "repre- 
hensible use  of  the  bastinado."  This  practice 
was  denounced  as  "  horrible  and  infamous."  It 
"  degraded  humanity,  and  violated  in  the  gravest 
manner  the  principles  of  social  rights."  Further,  it 
was  "absolutely  useless  and  without  justification," 
for  the  Minister,  who  here  indulged  to  a  certain 
extent  in  a  flight  of  his  imagination,  pointed  out 
that  the  Government  had  instituted  law-courts, 
whose  business  it  was  to  deal  with  all  litiijious 
affairs,  both  civil  and  criminal.  As  to  the  collec- 
tion of  the  taxes,  what  need  could  there  be  of  the 
whip  when  the  series  of  Decrees  issued  by  the 
Government  laid  down  with  commendable  precision 
the  nature  of  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  ensure 
their  payment  ?    The  various  officials  were,  there- 


THE  COURBASH  401 


fore,  solemnly  warned  that  "the  only  object  of 
their  mission  was  to  secure,  as  much  as  possible, 
the  welfare  of  the  people,  their  prosperity,  and 
their  moral  and  material  development,  by  dispensing 
to  individuals  equality  of  justice  whilst  defending 
them  against  all  aggression  and  protecting  their 
interests  and  their  rights."  They  were  all,  down 
to  the  lowest  village  Sheikh,  who  was  sometimes 
courbashed  and  sometimes  courbashed  others,  ad- 
jured in  language  which,  to  those  acquainted  with 
the  peculiar  ways  of  the  Pashadom  of  the  time,  is 
almost  comic  in  its  deceptive  pathos,  to  abstain 
in  the  future  from  the  abominable  and  barbarous 
practice  of  flogging. 

Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub  probably  stated  the  truth 
when  he  said  that  on  previous  occasions  orders  had 
been  issued  prohibiting  the  use  of  the  courbash. 
It  is  needless  to  inquire  into  this  point,  for,  if  any 
such  orders  were  issued,  no  adequate  steps  were 
taken  to  enforce  obedience  to  them.  But  when 
the  Circular  of  Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub  was  published, 
the  population  of  Egypt,  and  more  especially  that 
portion  of  it  which  was  in  the  habit  of  being  flogged, 
woke  up  to  the  fact  that  they  no  longer  had  to  deal 
with  a  few  meaningless  platitudes  intended  to  throw 
dust  in  the  eyes  of  humanitarians.  It  was  felt  that, 
although  the  signature  to  the  Circular  might  be 
that  of  an  official  who  had  little  real  sympathy 
with  its  spirit,  the  contents  of  that  document  had 
been  dictated  by  the  British  Envoy,  who  meant 
what  he  said,  and  who,  moreover,  possessed  both 
the  will  and  the  power  to  enforce  his  behests. 
One  instance  will  suffice  to  show  the  spirit  which 
the  new  order  evoked.  A  British  officer  was 
present,  shortly  after  the  issue  of  the  order,  when  a 
man  who  was  accused  of  some  crime  was  brought 
before  the  Moudir  of  the  province.  The  man 
declined  to  answer  the  questions  which  were  put 

VOL.  II  2d 


402  MODERN  EGYPT 


to  him.  The  Moudir  directed  that  he  should  be 
flogged.  All  the  steps  which  were  usually  pre- 
liminary to  the  infliction  of  flogging  were  taken. 
The  man,  however,  was  in  no  way  impressed. 
"The  English  are  here,"  he  said  to  the  Moudir; 
"you  know  that  you  cannot  flog  me."  And 
accordingly,  he  was  not  flogged.  It  may  well  have 
been  that  the  unwonted  audacity  displayed  in  this 
case  was  due  to  the  presence  of  an  Englishman. 
Nevertheless,  the  mere  fact  that  an  Egyptian  fellah 
should  have  dared  to  assert  his  right  not  to  be 
flogged  was  a  striking  innovation.  A  reflective 
Pasha  would  have  noted  that  a  new  spirit  was 
abroad. 

Lord  Duflerin's  Circular  constitutes  a  land- 
mark in  the  administrative  history  of  Egypt  To 
him  belongs  the  credit  of  having  dealt  the  first 
decisive  blow  to  the  system  of  government  by 
flogging.  He  has,  however,  often  been  criticised 
for  his  action  in  this  matter.  The  people  of  Egypt, 
it  has  been  said,  had  from  time  immemorial  been 
governed  by  the  whip.  Was  it  safe  to  abolish  this 
system  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen,  without  substituting 
anything  in  its  place  ?  The  reign  of  law,  which 
Lord  Duflerin  held  should  take  the  place  of  the 
courbash,  would  necessarily  be  a  work  of  slow 
creation.  A  month  after  the  issue  of  the  Circular 
he  himself  wrote :  "  At  this  moment,  there  is  no 
real  justice  in  this  country.  What  passes  under 
that  name  is  a  mockery."  Would  it  not  have  been 
wiser  to  have  accepted  the  facts  of  the  situation,  to 
have  aimed  at  the  gradual  abolition  of  the  courbash, 
and  to  have  postponed  its  total  suppression  until 
some  progress  had  been  made  in  the  direction  of 
establishing  properly  constituted  law-courts  ? 

These  criticisms  are  perhaps,  to  some  extent, 
justified.  There  need  have  been  no  hesitation  in 
abolishmg  at  once  the  system  of  flogging  in  so  far 


THE  COURBASH  403 


as  the  collection  of  taxes  was  concerned.  That 
system  had  been  shaken  by  the  reforms  introduced 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Dual  Control.  The 
burthen  of  taxation,  though  still  heavy,  had  been 
alleviated,  and  the  legal  process  for  the  recovery 
of  taxes,  being  a  matter  in  which  the  governing 
body  was  directly  interested,  was  in  sufficiently 
good  order  to  ensure  the  Treasury  against  serious 
loss.  It  was,  however,  otherwise  in  respect  to  the 
procedure  of  the  law-courts.  The  principle  on 
which  the  Government  had  heretofore  acted  was 
to  mete  out  punishment  without  entering  into 
any  fine  discrimination  as  to  whether  those  who 
incurred  the  punishment  were  guilty  or  innocent 
of  the  crimes  laid  to  their  charge.  The  confessions 
extracted  under  torture,  though  often  false,  were 
sometimes  true.  The  idea  that  any  witness  would 
voluntarily  appear  to  give  evidence  was  foreign  to 
the  habits  of  the  Egyptian  people.  Justice,  such 
as  it  was,  was  almost  as  much  a  terror  to  the 
innocent  witness  as  to  the  accused  person  against 
whom  testimony  was  borne.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, there  was,  without  doubt,  a  risk  that  as  a 
result  of  the  sudden  and  complete  abolition  of  the 
courbash,  crime  and  lawlessness  would  be  inade- 
quately checked,  and  that  Egyptian  society  in 
general  would  be  in  danger  of  dissolution. 

It  is  probable,  indeed,  that  when  Lord  Dufferin 
decided  that  the  use  of  the  courbash  in  Egypt 
should  suddenly  cease,  he  did  not  fully  realise  the 
importance  of  the  step  which  he  was  taking.  This 
view  is  confirmed  by  a  perusal  of  the  despatch 
which  he  wrote  to  Lord  Granville  forwarding  the 
Circular.  It  was  very  brief.  It  did  not  contain 
anything  from  which  it  can  be  inferred  that  Lord 
Dufferin  realised  that  he  had  initiated  a  social  and 
administrative  revolution.  "  The  new  JNIinister  of 
the  Interior,  Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub,"  Lord  Dufferin 


404  MODERN  EGYPT 


wrote,  "has  signalised  his  entry  into  office  by 
peremptorily  forbidding  the  application  of  this 
instrument  of  chastisement  (i.e.  the  courbash). 
I  cannot  but  regard  such  an  act  as  significant 
of  the  introduction  of  a  more  humane  and  civil- 
ised spirit  into  the  civil  administration  of  the 
country." 

In  other  vv^ords,  when  Lord  Dufferin  came  to 
Egypt  he  found  that  the  poorer  classes  of  the  popu- 
lation were  habitually  flogged  by  the  agents  of  the 
Government.  He  naturally  thought  that  they 
ought  not  to  be  flogged.  What,  therefore,  could 
be  simpler  than  to  issue  an  order  that  flogging 
should  cease,  and  to  insist  on  the  execution  of  the 
order  ?  There  is  a  "  scorn  of  consequence  "  and  a 
breezy  lightheartedness  in  the  conduct  of  the 
courageous  Irishman  which  excites  alike  admira- 
tion and  amusement.  It  is  probable,  however, 
that,  after  all  that  can  be  said,  he  was  quite 
right.  The  action  of  any  one  who  knew  Egypt 
well  would  perhaps  have  been  more  cautious,  but 
it  might  not  improbably  have  been  less  effective. 
Lord  Dufferin  threw  the  Egyptian  administrator 
into  the  water  and  called  out  to  him  from  the 
bank  that  he  must  learn  to  swim  as  well  as  he  could 
without  the  help  of  his  time-honoured  support. 

Did  the  Egyptian  administrator  at  once  learn 
to  swim  ?  He  did  not.  In  fact,  the  main  reason 
why  no  dissolution  of  provincial  society  took  place 
in  consequence  of  the  Circular  was  that  it  was 
partially  inoperative.  Lord  Dufferin  dealt  a 
staggering  blow  to  the  use  of  the  courbash ; 
nevertheless,  that  implement  was  plentifully  used 
for  some  years  after  the  issue  of  his  epoch-making 
Circular.  In  the  early  days  of  the  British  occupa- 
tion, crime  increased  to  such  an  extent  that  Nubar 
Pasha  thought  it  necessary  to  create  the  Com- 
missions of  Brigandage  to  which  allusion  has  been 


THE  COURBASH  405 


already  made.^  These  Commissions  virtually  took 
the  place  of  the  ordinary  Tribunals.  Recourse  was 
had  to  the  old  system  of  torture.  To  quote  one 
out  of  many  passages  which  occur  in  a  report  pre- 
pared by  M.  Le  Grelle,  the  Procureur-G^neral  of 
the  Native  Courts,  dated  April  6,  1889 : — 

"  En  Septembre,  1888,  un  acte  de  brigandage  se 
commit  a  Manchite  Gouzour  (Menoufieh).  Une 
eiiquete  amena  I'arrestation  d'une  s^rie  de  prdvenus. 
Quatre  firent  des  aveux.  Sur  les  ordres  r^it^r^s 
d'un  Mouavin  du  Minist^re  de  I'lnt^rieur  venu  a 
Chibin-el-Kom,  la  torture  fut  employee  pendant 
six  jours  de  suite,  en  pleine  stance  de  la  Commis- 
sion Criminelle,  devant  le  Moudir,  le  Juge,  et  le 
Substitut  du  Parquet.  Les  malheureux  ^taient 
frapp^s  jusqu'au  moment  ou  ils  avouaient  ou 
satisfaisaient  par  leurs  r^ponses  les  enqueteurs. 
Parmi  les  tortures,  figurait  une  femme  appel^e 
Fatmah." 

Eventually,  the  Commissions  were  abolished  and, 
at  the  same  time,  Sir  John  Scott  was  named 
Judicial  Adviser  to  the  Egyptian  Government. 
Then  the  work,  which  Lord  Dufferin  commenced, 
was  completed.    Torture  ceased. 

I  Vide  ante,  p.  289. 


CHAPTER  L 


THE  CORVEE 

Connection  between  the  courbash  and  tbe  corvee — Merits  and  demerits 

of  the  corvee  system — Tlie  corvee  law— Dredging  the  canals — 
Proposed  reduction  of  the  land-tax  —  Proposal  to  abolish  the 
corvee  instead  of  reducing  the  land-tax — The  Powers  object — 
Action  of  the  British  Government — The  corvee  is  not  called  out — 
A  Decree  is  issued  partially  abolishing  the  corvee — Final  settle- 
ment of  the  question  in  1892. 

The  gods,  we  know,  are  just,  and  of  our  vices, 
pleasant  or  otherwise,  make  instruments  to  scourge 
us.  The  Egyptian  Government,  not  only  that  of 
the  Pashas  who  ruled  the  country  in  these  latter 
days  of  which  this  history  treats,  but  that  of  their 
predecessors  from  the  days  of  the  Pharaohs  onwards, 
was  vicious  in  this  respect,  that  it  had  held  that  the 
only  way  to  govern  the  Egyptians  was  perpetually 
to  flog  them.^  This  special  form  of  administrative 
vice  was  suddenly  arrested.  A  superior  authority 
decreed  that  flogging  was  to  cease.  Then  the 
scourge  of  the  gods,  whose  time  for  avenging  past 
misdeeds  had  come,  was  at  once  applied  m  the 
following  practical  shape.  The  people  of  Egypt 
could  not  live  unless  they  were  supplied  with 
water  to  irrigate  their  fields.  The  water  could 
not  be  placed  on  the  fields  unless  the  mud,  which 

*  The  employment  of  the  corvee  dates  from  very  ancient  times. 
See,  for  instance,  the  description  of  Solomon's  bond -service "  in 
1  Kings  ix.  16-22. 

It  is  said  that  100,000  men  were  made  to  work  three  months  in  the 
year  for  eighteen  years  to  build  the  great  Pyramid. 

406 


CH.  L 


THE  CORVEE 


407 


the  rise  of  the  Nile  leaves  at  the  bottom  of  the 
canals,  was  annually  removed.  It  was  in  the 
interests  of  the  people  themselves  that  the  nmd 
should  be  removed  in  due  time  and  season.  But 
the  majority  of  the  people  were  blind  to  their  own 
interests.  They  had  always  been  accustomed  to 
coercion.  For  centuries  past,  the  practice  had 
been  to  call  on  them  to  work  in  order  to  remove 
the  mud,  and,  in  case  of  need,  to  flog  them  unless 
they  responded  to  the  call.  They  now  learnt  that 
they  were  not,  under  any  circumstances,  to  be 
flogged.  In  that  case,  they  said,  we  need  not, 
and  we  will  not  remove  the  mud,  "The  Ministry 
of  Public  Works,"  Sir  Colin  Scott-Moncriefl'  wrote 
on  January  14,  1885,  "finds  by  certain  indications 
that  the  corvee  system,  which  was  enforced  by 
the  courbash,  is  becoming  no  longer  possible 
under  a  milder  regime.  The  peasantry  refuse  to 
go  to  the  works  at  the  bidding  of  the  Moudirs,  and 
they  can  no  longer  be  compelled.  The  result  is 
that  the  clearance  of  the  canals  is  imperfectly 
performed." 

Clearly,  some  means  other  than  flogging  had 
to  be  found  in  order  to  get  the  mud  removed. 
That  was  one  of  the  first  problems  which  had 
to  be  solved  by  the  British  administrators  of 
Egypt,  and  a  very  difficult  problem  it  was.  How 
was  a  torpid,  semi-civilised  Government  to  get  on 
when,  being  suddenly  overtaken  by  the  rush  of 
an  imperious  civilisation,  it  was  deprived  of  the 
use  of  the  only  implement  by  which  the  people 
had  heretofore  been  governed  ?  The  dilemma  was 
one  which  might  well  have  puzzled  more  capable 
men  than  these  bewildered  Egyptian  Ministers 
who,  by  no  fault  of  their  own,  were  the  last 
inheritors  of  the  administrative  vices  bequeathed 
to  them  by  their  political  ancestors.  Indeed,  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  the  British  Envoy,  when 


408  MODERN  EGYPT 


he  dictated  the  order  that  flogging  was  to  cease, 
reaUsed  the  fact  that  it  might  become  necessary 
to  flog  the  Egyptian  people  in  order  to  prevent 
them  from  starving.  Yet  it  is  a  fact  that  humani- 
tarian diplomacy  nearly  received  a  severe  check 
owing  to  the  difficulty  of  getting  a  certain  quantity 
of  mud  lifted  from  the  bottom  of  a  number  of 
ditches  and  deposited  on  their  banks. 

It  is  in  some  respects  unfortunate  that  the 
word  "  corvee "  has  been  incorporated  into  the 
English  language.  The  Arabic  word  is  somewhat 
euphemistic ;  it  is  "  Aouna,"  signifying  "  assist- 
ance which  is  compulsorily  rendered."  The  word 
corvee  conjures  up  ideas  based  on  the  condition  of 
the  French  peasantry,  who  were  "  corveable,  tail- 
lable  et  tuable  k  volonte  "  in  the  pre-revolutionary 
days.  It  is,  indeed,  difficult  to  get  Englishmen 
to  believe  that  anvthing  can  be  said  in  favour  of 
a  system  with  which  such  pitiful  tales  of  suffering 
are  associated. 

From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  however,  the 
system  of  forced  labour  is  capable  of  defence  as 
one,  amongst  several  forms  of  taxation.  More- 
over, from  a  practical  point  of  view,  it  admits  in 
some  cases  of  justification.  It  may  be  that  a 
country  is  so  exceptionally  situated  that  the 
interests  of  the  community  oblige  the  governing 
body  to  force  a  certain  number  of  its  citizens  to 
fulfU  their  duties  of  citizenship  by  giving  manual 
labour  rather  than  money  payments  to  the  State. 
The  existence  of  Holland  depends  on  the  dykes 
being  kept  in  proper  order.  So  also,  the  material 
prosperity  of  Egypt  may  be  said  to  depend  on  the 
clearing  of  the  canals  in  due  season  and  on  adequate 
steps  being  taken  to  guard  against  inundation.^ 

*  In  the  seventeenth  century,  the  corvee  existed  in  England. 
Macaulay  says  :  "  Every  parish  was  bound  to  repair  the  highways 
which  passed  through  it  The  peasantry  were  forced  to  give  their 
gratuitous  labour  six  days  in  the  year"  {Worki,  voL  L  p.  293),  A 


CH.  L 


THE  CORVEE 


409 


Although,  however,  recourse  may  justifiably  be 
had  to  the  corvee  under  certain  exceptional  circum- 
stances, the  system  of  exacting  taxes  in  the  form 
of  manual  labour  is  a  bad  one  in  this  respect,  that 
it  is  singularly  liable  to  abuse. 

The  abuses  to  which  it  gave  rise  in  Egypt  were 
very  similar  to  those  which  existed  in  France  at 
the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century.^  When  Sir 
Colin  Scott-MoncriefF  first  examined  this  question, 
he  found  that  the  annual  clearing  of  the  canals 
required  the  work  of  one-eighth  of  the  popula- 
tion during  ninety  days.  "  This  number,"  he  wrote 
on  January  14,  1885,  "would  be  amply  sufficient, 
but  owing  to  the  fact  that  a  large  proportion  of 
the  agricultural  population  sends  not  a  man  to 
the  corvee,  the  burden  falls  on  the  remainder 
with  extreme  severity.  Instead  of  one-eighth  of 
the  whole  population  working  for  ninety  days,  a 
much  larger  proportion  from  certain  poor  districts 
is  employed  for  180  days."  For  instance,  in  the 
province  of  Gharbieh,  "  the  Wakfs,  which  own 
19,024  acres  with  a  population  of  4000  men,  and 
the  large  proprietors,  who  own  83,200  acres  with 
17,000  men,  send  no  men  to  the  corvee,  and  pay 
no  ransom  money." 

A  well-intentioned  but  unsuccessful  effort  was 
made  under  the  auspices  of  the  Dual  Control  to 
deal  with  the  corvee  question.  A  Decree  was 
issued  on  January  25,  1881,  under  which  every 
inhabitant  of  Egypt,  with  a  few  perfectly  legiti- 
mate exceptions,  was  rendered  liable  to  be  called 
out  for  corvee  work.  In  certain  cases,  a  money 
payment  was  accepted  in  lieu  of  personal  service. 
This  law  was  evaded  by  the  rich,  and  rigorously 
enforced  on  the  poor. 

Scotch  law  to  a  similar  effect  was  passed  in  1719  (Social  Life  in  Scotland, 
Graham,  i.  167).  To  this  day,  the  corvee  ia  used  for  the  maintenance 
of  rural  roads  in  France. 

*  Arthur  Young's  Travels  in  France,  1787-89,  p.  45. 


410 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


During  the  first  two  years  of  the  British 
occupation,  great  difficulty  was  encountered  in 
getting  the  canals  cleared  out.  It  was,  however, 
found  that  scientific  knowledge  could,  in  some 
degree,  serve  as  a  substitute  for  labour.  By 
skilful  treatment,  a  portion  of  the  alluvial  deposit 
of  the  Nile  was  floated  on  to  the  fields  and 
prevented  from  settling  at  the  bottom  of  the 
canals.  "  By  a  little  manoeuvring  of  the  water 
during  the  flood,"  Sir  Colin  Scott- Moncrieff 
wrote  on  January  31,  1885,  "Mr.  (afterwards  Sir 
William)  Willcocks  has  got  a  depth  of  '80  metres 
to  take  out  of  a  canal  this  year,  where  last  year 
more  than  two  metres  had  to  be  cleared.  In 
Major  Ross's  hands  this  year,  the  clearance  of 
the  Ismailieh  Canal  (done  by  dredging,  not  by 
corvee)  will  cost  not  more,  I  hope,  than  £3000. 
Last  year,  it  cost  about  £15,000.  By  the  use  of 
the  '  Barrage '  we  raise  the  water  surface  in  the 
canals,  and  they  will  not  require  to  be  cleared  so 
deep." 

It  was,  however,  obviously  impossible  to  substi- 
tute free  for  forced  labour  unless  money  was  forth- 
coming to  pay  the  labourers.  A  sum  of  about 
£400,000  annually  would,  it  was  estimated,  be 
required  in  order  to  ensure  the  total  abolition  of 
the  corvee  in  so  far  as  removing  the  deposit  from 
the  bottom  of  the  canals  was  concerned.  It  Avas 
not  until  the  summer  of  1885,  that  there  appeared 
any  prospect  of  being  able  to  obtain  even  a  moiety 
of  this  sum.  Lord  Northbrook,  in  November  1884, 
recommended  that  the  land-tax  should  be  reduced 
by  £450,000  a  year.  A  budget  framed  on  this 
basis  was  communicated  to  the  Powers  by  the 
British  Government  on  December  6,  1884.  After 
some  diplomatic  wrangling,  a  Khedivial  Decree,  to 
which  the  Powers  had  assented,  was  eventually 
signed  on  July  27,  1885.    This  Decree  indirectly 


CH.  L 


THE  CORVfiE 


411 


involved  sanction  to  the  proposed  relief  from 
taxation. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that,  dealing  with 
Egyptian  affairs,  appearances  are  often  deceptive. 
I  have  now  to  explain  a  remarkable  instance  of 
financial  and  political  mirage.  Under  the  arrange- 
ment made  with  the  Powers,  it  appeared  that  a 
relief  of  taxation  to  the  extent  of  £450,000  a 
year  would  be  afforded  to  the  Egyptian  taxpayers. 
When,  however,  the  question  of  carrying  out  the 
provisions  of  the  Decree  of  July  27,  1885,  arose,  it 
was  found  that  the  boon,  which  in  appearance  was 
conferred  on  the  people  of  Egypt,  was  to  a 
great  extent  illusory.  The  figures  had  been  so 
manipulated  that  a  large  portion  of  the  money, 
which  the  Powers  appeared  to  give  with  one  hand, 
was  taken  away  with  the  other.  On  October  1, 
1885,  Sir  Edgar  Vincent  pointed  out  that  the 
deficit  of  the  Domains  had  been  underestimated 
by  £100,000,  that  certain  taxes  on  Europeans,  to 
which  the  Powers  had  agreed  in  principle  and 
which  were  calculated  to  yield  £100,000  a  year, 
had  not  yet  been  imposed,  and  that  a  further 
margin  of  £100,000  should  be  left  to  allow  for 
unpaid  land-tax,  for  which  credit  had  been  taken 
in  the  estimates,  but  which  it  would  not  be 
possible  to  collect.  He  estimated  the  sum  avail- 
able for  the  relief  of  taxation,  not  at  £450,000, 
but  at  £150,000. 

Apart  from  the  question  of  the  amount  of 
money  really  available,  another  question  now  arose, 
namely,  in  what  form  should  relief  be  afforded  to 
the  taxpayers  ?  The  Powers  had  contemplated  a 
reduction  of  the  land-tax.  Nubar  Pasha,  supported 
by  his  British  advisers,  now  urged  that,  instead  of 
this  reduction,  relief  should  be  afforded  by  devoting 
the  available  money  to  the  partial  abolition  of  the 
corvee.    The  proposal  was,  in  fact,  most  reasonable. 


412  MODERN  EGYPT 


The  abolition  of  the  corvee  had  become  almost  a 
practical  necessity,  and  the  only  possible  method  of 
abolishing  it  was  to  throw  the  charge  of  providing 
free  labour  on  the  land.  It  would  have  been 
absurd  to  reduce  the  land-tax,  and,  almost  in  the 
same  breath,  to  reimpose  a  fresh  tax  in  order  to 
enable  the  corvde  to  be  abolished.  The  Egyptian 
Government,  therefore,  issued  a  Circular  to  the 
Powers  in  which  it  was  requested  that,  instead  of 
applying  the  whole  of  the  £450,000 — to  the 
nebulous  existence  of  which  no  allusion  was  made 
— to  the  reduction  of  the  land-tax,  a  sum  of 
£250,000  should  be  applied  to  the  partial  abolition 
of  the  corvde,  and  the  balance  used  in  reducing  the 
land-tax.  This  proposal  was  supported  by  the 
British  Government,  who  "  could  not  conceive  that 
there  was  any  doubt  as  to  its  acceptance  by  the 
Powers."    It  was,  however,  not  accepted. 

The  next  six  months  were  spent  in  international 
burrowings  of  various  sorts.  The  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt  were  eventually  consulted,  and  on 
July  6,  1886,  a  Decree  was  submitted  to  the  Powers 
under  the  provisions  of  which  permission  was  given 
to  add  £250,000,  which  was  to  be  applied  to  the 
partial  abolition  of  the  corvde,  to  the  limit  of 
the  recognised  administrative  expenditure  of  the 
Egyptian  Government. 

In  the  meanwhile,  Sir  Colin  Scott-Moncrieff 
and  his  coadjutors  had  been  abolishing  the  corvee 
without  awaiting  the  decision  of  the  Powers.  In 
July  1886,  Sir  Colin  Scott-Moncrieff  reported  that 
the  £250,000  devoted  to  the  reduction  of  the  corvee 
had  enabled  the  number  of  men  called  out  to  work 
for  100  days  to  be  reduced  from  234,153  (the 
average  of  the  previous  three  years)  to  102,507,  a 
reduction  of  56  per  cent.  It  appeared,  therefore, 
that  whilst  the  diplomatic  agents  had  been  discuss- 
ing whether  the  £250,000  should  be  spent,  the 


CH.  L 


THE  CORVEE 


413 


practical  Scotchman  had  to  a  great  extent  solved 
the  question  by  spending  the  money.  The  result, 
I  remarked  in  writing  to  Lord  Rosebery,  was 
"  most  gratifying,"  and  an  echo  of  satisfaction  was 
at  once  wafted  back  from  the  Foreign  Office. 

Here,  then,  was  a  solid  fact.  It  was  felt  that, 
if  once  the  fellah  was  relieved  from  the  obligation 
of  scooping  up  mud  with  his  fingers  from  the 
bottom  of  a  clay  drain,  under  penalty  of  being 
flogged  if  he  refused  to  scoop,  it  would  be  difficult 
for  the  united  Powers  of  Europe  to  make  him 
resume  his  former  task. 

In  the  meanwhile,  regardless  of  facts,  the  inter- 
national mill  was  grinding  slowly  on.  It  might 
have  been  thought  that,  as  the  Powers  had  made 
consultation  with  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt 
a  condition  of  their  acceptance  of  the  corvee 
Decree,  and  as  the  Commissioners  had  agreed  to 
the  Decree,  the  goal  was  not  far  distant.  In  reality, 
it  was  as  yet  scarcely  in  sight. 

A  pause  then  ensued.  At  one  moment,  it 
looked  as  if  one  of  two  courses  was  unavoidable — 
either  to  call  out  the  corvee  and  thus  plunge  Egypt 
back  again  into  the  slough  of  the  old  administrative 
processes  from  which  the  country  was  just  begin- 
ning to  emerge,  or  to  go  on  employing  free  labour 
and  incur  a  serious  risk  that  bankruptcy  would 
ensue.  It  was  questionable  which  was  the  worst 
of  these  two  evils.  There  was,  however,  this  much 
to  be  said  in  favour  of  the  adoption  of  the  first 
course,  that  a  public  declaration  to  the  effect  that 
the  corvee  was  to  be  called  out  might  perhaps 
shame  the  opposition  into  agreement,  and,  further, 
that  it  might  stimulate  the  British  Government  to 
afford  assistance.  It  was,  therefore,  decided  to  call 
out  the  corvde.  A  public  notice  to  that  effect  was 
issued.  The  result  was  that  public  opinion,  both 
in  Englapd  and  Egypt,  was  moved.    A  fortnight 


414  MODERN  EGYPT 


later  (February  15),  the  French  Government 
intimated  their  acceptance  of  the  corvee  Decree  on 
condition  that  a  clause  should  be  inserted  which 
virtually  placed  the  whole  of  the  Public  Works 
expenditure  under  the  control  of  the  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt.  The  Britisli  Government  were  con- 
sulted by  telegraph,  and  declined  to  accept  the 
French  proposal. 

The  situation  was,  at  this  moment,  very  embar- 
rassing. Besides  the  corvee  difficulty,  the  British 
Treasury  was  pressing  for  large  military  payments 
due  by  the  Egyptian  Government.  Sir  Colin 
Scott- Moncrieff,  maddened  by  the  opposition  he 
encountered  at  every  turn,  resigned  his  post, 
but  subsequently  withdrew  his  resignation.  Little 
confidence  could  be  placed  in  the  co-operation  of 
the  Egyptians,  in  whose  interests  the  British 
Government  and  the  British  officials  in  Egypt 
were  working.  Nubar  Pasha  saw  the  interest 
Egypt  had  in  avoiding  the  appointment  of  an  Inter- 
national Commission  to  deal  Avith  the  financial  situa- 
tion, but  the  Khedive  and  other  leading  Egyptians 
were  indifferent  on  the  subject.  Some  would  even 
have  preferred  a  Commission  in  order  to  break  the 
exclusive  influence  of  England,  and  others,  for  small 
local  reasons,  would  not  make  any  serious  efforts 
to  avoid  one.  It  would,  however,  have  been  a  stain 
on  the  reputation  of  England  if  the  corvee  system 
had  been  re-established.  A  strong  plea  for  British 
assistance  was,  therefore,  telegraphed  to  London. 
In  reply,  I  received  the  following  communication 
from  Lord  Salisbury  : — 

"  If  you  will  indicate  in  what  way  Her  Majesty's 
Government  can  assist  in  extricating  the  Egyptian 
Government  from  the  embarrassments  now  caused, 
they  are  willing  to  consider  your  suggestions  in  the 
most  friendly  spirit. 

"  The  suspension  of  the  measures  for  the  aboli- 


CH.  L 


THE  CORVEE 


415 


tion  of  the  corvee  would  be  so  disastrous  to  the 
well-being  of  the  fellaheen  and  the  general  pros- 
perity of  the  country  that  it  must  if  possible  be 
avoided,  and  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  give 
their  best  attention  to  any  proposals  that  may  be  sub- 
mitted to  them  for  tiding  over  the  present  difficulties, 
by  any  temporary  measure,  or  by  other  means." 

After  some  further  communications  had  passed, 
it  was  agreed  that,  in  case  of  need,  the  payment  of 
the  money  due  to  the  British  Government  on 
account  of  interest  on  the  Suez  Canal  shares  should 
be  postponed  in  order  to  provide  the  funds  neces- 
sary for  dispensing  with  corvee  labour.  The 
following  public  notification  was  then  issued  : — 

"  L'adhesion  de  certaines  Puissances  au  projet 
de  Ddcret  sur  la  corvee  ayant  ete  subordonnee  k 
des  modifications  considerees  comme  inadmissibles, 
le  Gouvernement  Egyptien  s'est  vu  dans  la  n^ces- 
sit^  d'abandonner  ce  projet.  Mais  le  Gouverne- 
ment de  Son  Altesse,  consid^rant  la  suppression  de 
la  corvee  comme  une  mesure  a  laquelle  sont  attaches 
le  bien-etre  et  la  prosp^rite  du  pays,  a  consults  le 
Gouvernement  Britannique,  qui  partage  entiere- 
ment  I'opinion  du  Gouvernement  Egyptien  a  ce 
sujet. 

"  A  la  suite  de  cet  ^change  de  vues,  des  arrange- 
ments ont  ^t^  pris  qui  permettent  I'emploi  du 
travail  remunerd  La  decision  du  Conseil  des 
Ministres  contenue  dans  'I'Officiel'  du  5  de  ce 
mois  a  ^t^,  par  consequent,  rapportde  ^  et  le  Ministre 
des  Travaux  Publics  a  ^te  invito  a  sanctionner  les 
contrats  d'entreprises  qui  avaient  ete  suspendus." 

There  are  a  few  important  landmarks  in  the 
history  of  Egyptian  administration,  and  this  is  one 
of  them.  As  the  Circular  issued  under  Lord 
Dufferin's  auspices  gave  a  death-blow  to  the  use 
of  the  courbash,  so  the  notification  quoted  above 

1  This  decision  was  the  uotification  calling  out  the  corvee. 


416  MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


sealed  the  doom  of  the  corvee  system.  Although 
the  battle  was  not  yet  over,  there  could  hence- 
forward be  no  doubt  as  to  the  side  which  would 
ultimately  gain  the  victory.  The  fellaheen  were  no 
longer  to  be  flogged  unless  they  scooped  up  mud 
with  their  fingers  from  the  bottom  of  a  deep  ditch. 
The  British  Government  had  practically  pledged 
their  word  that  this  particular  Egyptian  abomi- 
nation should  cease.  Retractation  was  no  longer 
possible.  Nubar  Pasha  understood  the  importance 
of  the  step,  and  in  words  suitable  to  the  occasion 
expressed  the  feelings  of  the  Egyptian  people. 

"L'abolition  de  la  corvee,  vous  le  savez,  M. 
le  Ministre,"  he  wrote,  "a  et^  un  but  que  le 
Gouvernement  de  Son  Altesse  a  vise  depuis  long- 
temps,  et  vers  lequel  ont  constamment  tendu  tons 
ses  voeux  ;  aussi,  me  fais-je  un  devoir  de  vous  prier 
de  transmettre  au  Gouvernement  Britannique 
I'expression  de  la  reconnaissance  de  toute  I'Egypte 
pour  le  concours  quelle  a  trouv^  aupres  du 
Gouvernement  Britannique  dans  la  realisation 
partielle  d'une  mesure  a  laquelle  sont  attaches  le 
bien-etre  et  la  prosperite  du  pays." 

Egyptian  gratitude  is  perhaps  not  always  very 
heartfelt  or  very  long-lived,  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  debt  of  gratitude  was  really  due. 
Moreover,  thanks — "  Ever  more  thanks,  the  ex- 
chequer of  the  poor" — was  all  the  Egyptians  had 
to  give. 

Amongst  the  many  achievements  which  England 
has  accomplished  in  the  cause  of  suffering  humanity, 
not  the  least  praiseworthy  is  this  act,  that  in  the 
teeth  of  strong  opposition,  the  Anglo-Saxon  race 
insisted  that  the  Egyptian  labourer  should  be  paid 
for  his  work,  and  that  he  should  not  be  flogged  if 
he  did  not  wish  to  work. 

As  yet,  however,  the  victory  was  not  complete. 
It  has  been  already  stated  that  an  annual  sum  of 


CH.  L 


THE  CORVfiE 


417 


about  £400,000  was  required  to  abolish  the  corvee 
system  in  so  far  as  the  clearing  out  of  the  canals 
was  concerned.  With  infinite  trouble,  £250,000  a 
year  had  been  obtained.  This  enabled  the  system 
of  forced  labour  to  be  partially  abolished.  In 
1883,  the  number  of  men  called  out  for  100  days 
was  202,650.  In  1886,  the  number  fell  to  95,093. 
In  1887,  only  87,120  men  were  called  out.  The 
corvee  system  having  been  virtually  doomed,  the 
question  naturally  arose  of  how  to  dispense  with 
the  enforced  services  of  the  remaining  87,000  men. 
To  complete  the  reform,  a  further  expenditure  of 
£150,000  a  year  was  required.  The  Egyptian 
Government  wished  that  this  sum  should  be  added 
to  the  amount  of  the  administrative  expenditure 
authorised  by  the  Powers.  This  proposal  was 
not,  in  the  first  instance,  accepted. 

It  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  narrate  in 
detail  the  history  of  the  tedious  and,  at  times, 
somewhat  angry  negotiations  which  then  ensued. 
They  may  well  be  buried  in  oblivion.  It  will  be 
sufficient  to  say  that,  as  time  went  on  and  the 
financial  position  improved,  an  immediate  settle- 
ment became  a  matter  of  less  urgency.  Eventually, 
the  death  of  Tewfik  Pasha,  in  January  1892, 
afforded  an  unexpected  opportunity  for  settling 
the  question.  The  Egyptian  Government,  insti- 
gated by  their  British  advisers,  wished  to  signalise 
the  accession  of  the  young  Khedive  by  the  adop- 
tion of  some  measures  which  would  be  of  general 
benefit  to  the  population.  They  proposed  to 
devote  a  portion  of  the  economies  resulting  from 
the  recent  conversion  of  the  Preference  debt  from 
a  5  per  cent  to  a  3^  per  cent  stock,  to  the  abolition 
of  the  corvee,  and  at  the  same  time  to  reduce  the 
salt  tax  by  40  per  cent  The  French  Government 
would  not  agree  to  any  proposals  which  involved 
touching  the  economies.    On  the  other  hand,  they 

vol,.  II  2  E 


418 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  VI 


were  unwilling  to  stand  in  the  way  of  a  reduction 
of  the  salt  tax.  But  they  coupled  a  condition 
with  their  acceptance  of  the  Egyptian  proposal. 

The  London  Conference  of  1884  had  agreed  in 
principle  that  Europeans  in  Egypt  should  pay  the 
professional  tax,  which  had  heretofore  been  only 
paid  by  Egyptians.  After  some  tedious  negotia- 
tions, a  law  applicable  to  all  residents  in  Egypt, 
whether  European  or  Egyptian,  had  been  accepted 
by  the  Powers.  At  the  time  of  Tewfik  Pasha's 
death,  the  tax  was,  for  the  first  time,  about  to  be 
levied  on  Europeans,  amongst  whom  it  was  naturally 
very  unpopular.  The  French  Government  decided 
to  make  their  assent  to  the  Egyptian  proposal 
relative  to  the  reduction  of  the  salt  tax  and  the 
abolition  of  the  corvee  conditional  on  the  abolition 
of  the  professional  tax.  Ultimately,  it  was  arranged 
that  the  salt  tax  should  be  reduced ;  that  the  pro- 
fessional tax  should  be  abolished  both  in  respect  to 
Europeans  and  Egyptians  ;  and  that  the  recognised 
limit  of  the  administrative  expenditure  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  should  be  increased  by 
£150,000  a  year,  thus  enabling  money  to  be  found 
to  pay  for  the  free  labour  which  had  taken  tlie 
place  of  the  corvee. 

Thus,  after  a  struggle  which  lasted  for  eight  years, 
this  great  reform  was  eventually  accomplished. 
Begun  when  Egypt  was  in  the  throes  of  national 
bankruptcy,  it  was  continued  through  a  long  period 
of  diplomatic  bickerings,  which  sometimes  assumed 
an  acute  form  and  at  other  times  lapsed  into  a 
chronic  state  of  acerbity,  and  was  at  last  concluded 
by  the  fortuitous  circumstance  that  it  became 
possible  to  drive  a  bargain  over  the  grave  of  the 
dead  Khedive.  To  Tewfik  Pasha  may  be  accorded 
the  posthumous  merit  of  having  by  his  death 
overcome  to  some  slight  and  temporary  extent  the 
demon  of  international  jealousy,  and  of  having 


CH.  L 


THE  CORVEE 


419 


thus  given  a  final  blow  to  the  hateful  system  of 
forced  labour  which  had  existed  in  the  country 
over  which  he  ruled  since  the  days  of  his  Pharaonic 
predecessors. 

So  far  allusion  has  only  been  made  to  the  forced 
labour  which  used  to  be  employed  in  the  work 
of  clearing  out  the  canals  during  the  period  of 
low  Nile.  The  corvee  has,  however,  from  time 
immemorial  been  employed  in  Egypt  to  attain 
another  object,  namely,  to  guard  the  banks  of  the 
river  during  the  period  of  high  Nile  and  thus 
obviate  any  risk  of  inundation.  It  is  essential  to 
the  well-being  and  safety  of  the  country  that  this 
work  should  be  performed.  It  has  not  as  yet 
been  found  possible  to  abolish  completely  this 
description  of  corvde,  but  the  number  of  men 
employed  every  year  is  small,  and  is  steadily 
diminishing. 


CHAPTER  LI 


CORRUPTION 

Universality  of  corruption — Steps  taken  to  arrest  it — Example  of 
British  officials — Diniiuutiou  of  corrupt  practices. 

In  no  country  probably  has  corruption — the  canker 
which  eats  away  the  heart  of  most  Eastern  govern- 
ments— been  more  universal  than  it  was  in  Egypt 
during  the  reign  of  Ismail  Pasha.  Ismail  had 
inherited  from  his  predecessors  an  administrative 
system  steeped  in  corruption.  By  his  own  action, 
he  made  this  system  doubly  corrupt.  He  believed 
in  bribery,  if  not  as  the  only,  at  all  events  as  the 
most  effective  system  of  government.  Every  man, 
he  thought,  had  his  price.  He  put  into  practice 
the  principles  of  which  Byron,  in  one  of  his  cynical 
moods,  has  given  us  a  description  : — 

'Tis  pleasant  purchasing  our  fellow-creatures, 
And  all  are  to  be  sold,  if  you  consider 
Their  passions,  and  are  dext'rous  ;  some  by  features 
Are  bought  up,  others  by  a  warlike  leader ; 
Some  by  a  place,  as  tend  their  years  or  natures ; 
The  most  by  ready  cash — but  all  have  prices, 
From  crowns  to  kicks,  according  to  their  vices. 

Ismail  Pasha's  subjects  followed  humbly  in  the 
footsteps  of  their  master.  They  took  and  they 
paid  bribes.  From  the  half- naked  donkey -boy, 
who  in  shrill  tones  demanded  "  bakhshish  "  to  the 
extent  of  a  piastre  or  two  from  the  winter  tourist, 

420 


CH.  LI 


CORRUPTION 


421 


to  the  highly-placed  Pasha,  whose  assistance  could 
only  be  obtained  by  the  payment  of  more  sub- 
stantial sums,  all,  or  nearly  all,  were  venal.  The 
contractor  bribed  the  Minister  to  obtain  a  contract 
on  terms  unduly  advantageous  to  himself,  and 
would  then  bribe  the  Clerk  of  the  Works  in  order 
that  he  should  not  inquire  too  carefully  as  to 
whether  the  terms  of  the  contract  had  or  had  not 
been  strictly  executed.  The  subordinate  official 
bribed  his  superior  in  order  to  get  promotion. 
The  landowner  bribed  the  engineer  in  order  that 
he  should  obtain  more  water  for  his  fields  than  was 
his  due.  The  Kadis  were  paid  by  both  the  plaintiff 
and  the  defendant  to  any  suit,  the  decision  being 
usually  given  in  favour  of  the  highest  bidder.  The 
Government  surveyors  were  bribed  to  make  false 
measurements  of  land.  The  village  Sheikhs  were 
bribed  to  accord  exemption  from  the  corvee  and 
from  military  service.  The  Police  were  bribed  by 
everybody  who  had  the  misfortune  to  be  brought 
in  contact  with  them.  The  passenger  by  railway 
found  it  cheaper  to  give  "  bakhshish  "  to  the  guard 
or  to  the  ticket-collector  than  to  pay  for  a  ticket. 
As  a  preliminary  to  bribing  a  Moudir  to  inquire 
into  any  alleged  grievance,  it  was  necessary  for  the 
petitioner  to  bribe  the  hungry  satellites,  who  hang 
about  the  office  of  the  Moudirieh,  before  the  great 
man  could  be  personally  informed  that  any  petition 
had  been  presented.  The  ramifications  of  the 
system  were,  in  fact,  endless.  Egyptian  official 
and  social  life  was  saturated  with  the  idea  that  in 
Egypt  personal  claims  and  interests,  however  just 
on  their  own  merits,  could  never  be  advanced 
without  the  payment  of  "bakhshish." 

It  was  from  the  first  manifest  that  the  adoption 
of  more  healthy  ideas  by  an  administrative  service 
and  by  a  society  so  thoroughly  diseased  as  that 
described  above,  would  be  a  work  of  time.    One  of 


422  MODERN  EGYPT 


the  main  safeguards  against  corruption  in  civilised 
countries  is  that  society  condemns  venality.  The 
act  of  offering  or  of  taking  a  bribe  is  considered 
dishonourable.  The  offender,  if  discovered,  is 
visited  by  a  social  punishment  often  more  severe 
than  any  which  the  law  can  inflict  on  him  In 
Egypt,  no  restraining  public  opinion  existed,  even 
if  it  now  exists,  on  this  subject.  Bribery  was  con- 
sidered a  venial  offence.  Habits  of  thought  of 
this  kind  cannot  be  changed  of  a  sudden.  They 
are  but  little  affected  by  the  passing  of  laws  and 
regulations.  Nevertheless,  it  was  possible  to 
adopt  certain  administrative  measures  calculated 
to  diminish  the  temptation  to  accept  bribes,  and 
thus  both  render  it  less  probable  that  bribery  would 
obtain  the  objects  for  which  money  had  heretofore 
been  paid,  and  also  facilitate  the  discovery  of  the 
guilty  parties.  Measures  of  this  sort  were  initiated 
in  Egypt  during  the  period  of  the  Dual  Control, 
and  were  subsequently  perfected  during  that  of 
the  British  occupation. 

In  the  first  place,  the  inauguration  of  a  proper 
system  of  accounts  and  of  audit  did  a  good  deal 
towards  putting  a  check  on  the  malversation  of  funds 
belonging  to  the  State.  Vouchers  were  required 
for  all  expenditure.  Officials  were  called  upon  to 
render  strict  account  of  all  monies  which  had  passed 
through  their  hands.  It  was  no  longer  possible  for 
public  money  to  disappear  as  if  by  enchantment. 

This  reform  was  excellent  in  its  wav.  It  is, 
however,  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  accountant 
or  the  auditor  can  alone  put  a  stop  to  the  corrupt 
dealings  of  dishonest  officials.  A  hundred  ways 
exist  for  eluding  their  vigilance.  To  quote  a  single 
instance,  a  high  Egyptian  official  was,  on  one 
occasion,  charged  with  the  sale  of  certain  lands 
belonging  to  the  Government.  Adjoining  these 
lands,  were  others,  which  were  his  private  property. 


CH.  LI 


CORRUPTION 


423 


He  sold  the  two  lots  together  to  the  same 
purchaser.  They  were  of  precisely  the  same  quality, 
but  the  price  obtained  for  the  Government  was 
very  low,  whilst  that  obtained  by  the  official  acting 
in  his  private  capacity  was  very  high.  Thus, 
a  considerable  part  of  the  money,  which  should 
have  been  paid  into  the  Treasury,  found  its  way 
into  the  pockets  of  the  official  who  was  specially 
charged  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the  Govern- 
ment. No  system  of  audit  would  have  succeeded 
in  preventing  a  fraud  of  this  description.  It 
could  only  have  been  discovered  by  some  one  who 
happened  to  know  that  the  market  value  of  the 
land  sold  by  the  Government  was  in  excess  of  the 
sum  which  the  Government  received. 

In  the  second  place,  the  regular  payment  of  the 
salaries  due  to  Government  officials  has  done  much 
to  free  them  from  the  temptation  to  take  bribes. 
Also,  in  many  cases  the  salaries  of  the  lowest 
classes  have  been  raised.  So  long  as  the  Govern- 
ment allowed  inadequate  salaries  to  their  servants, 
or,  as  in  the  days  of  Ismail  Pasha,  often  left  them 
for  months  without  paying  them  at  all,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  temptation  of  the  latter  to  increase  their 
incomes  by  illicit  means  must  have  been  strong.^ 

In  the  third  place,  the  system  of  inviting  tenders 
for  most  public  works  and  for  the  supply  of  Govern- 
ment stores,  struck  a  blow  in  that  quarter  where 
corruption  on  a  large  scale  was  heretofore  most 
prevalent. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  creation  of  an  improved 
judicature,  the  careful  choice  of  judges,  and  the 
more  vigilant  control  which  has  been  exercised  over 
their  conduct,  have  purified  the  law-courts. 

In  the  fifth  place,  with  the  abolition  of  the 

»  It  was  by  raising  the  salaries  of  oflBcials  that  Lord  Cornwallis  put 
a  stop  to  the  corruption  which  existed  in  India  towards  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth  century. 


424  MODERN  EGYPT 


greater  part  of  the  corvee,  and  the  regulation  of 
whatever  remains  of  the  system  of  forced  labour, 
the  necessity  for  paying  the  village  Sheikhs  in  order 
to  be  exempted  from  the  obhgation  to  labour  dis- 
appeared. 

In  the  sixth  place,  the  organisation  of  a  proper 
recruiting  service  swept  away  a  whole  nest  of 
corrupt  practices. 

Lastly,  the  employment  of  a  number  of  honour- 
able and  capable  British  officials  has  probably  done 
more  than  anything  else  to  check  corruption. 
Their  mere  example  has  counted  for  much.  The 
Egyptians  pay  an  unconscious  compliment  to 
English  integrity  by  very  rarely  offering  bribes  to 
British  officials.^ 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  these  measures  have 
been  effective  in  checking  corruption.  Broadly 
speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  most  branches  of  the 
central  administration  of  the  Egyptian  Government 
and  the  law-courts  are  now  little,  if  at  all,  tainted 
with  venality.  It  is  not,  however,  on  this  account 
to  be  supposed  that  the  "  bakhshish  "  system  is  de- 
funct. It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  state  with  any 
degree  of  confidence  to  what  extent  it  still  exists,  for 
the  people,  in  spite  of  every  encouragement  given  to 
them  by  the  superior  officials  of  the  Go\  ernment, 
are  generally  reluctant  to  complain  of  illegal  exac- 
tions, whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  the  corrupt  Egyptian 
official  displays  such  a  singular  degree  of  perverted 
ingenuity  in  the  perpetration  of  fraud  as  to  baffle  the 
efforts  of  those  whose  wish  it  is  to  track  him  down. 
On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  although  cor- 
ruption is  no  longer  practised  on  any  large  scale, 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  in  the  provincial  admin- 
istrations, as  also,  I  fear,  in  some  branches  of  the 

^  As  a  general  rule,  the  integrity  of  the  British  officials  in  Egypt 
has  been  absolutely  unimpeachable.  There  have,  however,  1  regret  to 
say,  been  a  very  few  cases  of  corruption  and  dishonesty  amongst  the 
subordinates. 


CH.  LI 


CORRUPTION 


425 


Public  Works  Department,  there  is  still  a  good 
deal  of  bribery.  It  will  be  long  before  all  this 
disappears,  more  especially  in  view  of  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  obtaining  evidence  against  corrupt 
officials.^  In  the  meanwhile,  it  can  be  stated 
with  confidence  that  at  no  previous  period  in 
Egyptian  history  has  so  little  "bakhshish"  been 
paid  or  received  as  at  present. 

These,  therefore,  were  the  first-fruits  of  British 
interference  in  the  country.  Torture  and  the  use 
of  the  courbash  ceased.  The  corvee  system  was 
practically  abolished.  Administrative  corruption 
was  greatly  diminished. 

How  was  it  that,  in  these  three  cases,  the 
efforts  of  the  British  officials  in  the  service  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  were  crowned  with  such 
signal  success  ?  It  was  because  they  were  either 
free  to  act,  or  because,  as  in  the  matter  of  the 
corvee,  they  were  able,  after  a  sharp  struggle,  to 
throw  off  the  international  shackles  by  which  they 
were  bound.  The  more  the  history  of  Egyptian 
reform  is  examined,  the  more  will  it  be  seen  that 
in  most  cases  success  was  in  direct  proportion  to 
the  freedom  of  action  of  the  Egyptian  Government, 
acting  under  British  control  and  advice.  Where 
no  such  freedom  exists,  the  result  has  usually  been 
either  failure,  or,  at  best,  a  modified  success. 

^  It  cannot  be  too  clearly  understood  that  fear  of  each  other  has,  in 
the  minds  of  the  mass  of  the  Egyptian  population,  largely  taken  the 
place  of  the  fear  of  the  Government,  wliich  formerly  existed.  This  is 
a  very  important  feature  in  the  administration  of  the  country.  The 
latter  of  these  two  sentiments  tended,  at  all  events,  towards  the 
maintenance  of  public  tranquillity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fear  that 
vengeance  will,  in  some  form  or  another,  be  wreaked  by  any  one  of 
whose  conduct  a  complaint  is  made,  or  against  whom  evidence  is 
tendered  in  a  law-court,  manifestly  operates  in  an  exactly  opposite 
direction.  Mr.  Machell,  the  present  Adviser  of  the  Interior,  has,  in 
his  Annual  Reports,  given  frequent  and  very  striking  illustrations  in 
support  of  this  view.  As  regards  the  jealousy  often  entertained 
amongst  the  fellaheen  for  each  other,  see  Egypt,  No.  1,  1905,  p.  46. 


CHAPTER  LII 


EUROPEAN  PBIVILEGE 

Origin  of  tbe  Capitulations — Difference  between  Turkey  and  Egypt — 

Abuse  of  the  Capitulations — liaison  d'etre  of  European  privilege — 
Anomaly  of  the  British  position — Impossibility  of  arriving  at  any 
general  solution — Minor  changes — The  right  to  enact  by-laws — 
'ITie  House  Tax — The  Professional  Tax — Proposal  to  create  a  local 
legislature — Internationalism. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  enter  into  any  technical  dis- 
cussion on  the  rights  conferred  by  virtue  of  the 
Capitulations  upon  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt. 
The  subject  is  complicated,  more  especially  as  some 
of  those  rights  rest  on  the  text  of  international 
instruments,  whilst  the  precise  nature  of  others, 
which  have  been  acquired  by  custom,  is  still  a 
constant  source  of  dispute.  Historically  speaking, 
it  is,  indeed,  incorrect  in  this  connection  to  employ 
the  term  "rights."  The  Capitulations  were  origin- 
ally "letters  of  privilege,  or,  according  to  the 
Oriental  expression,  imperial  diplomas  containing 
sworn  promises,"^  which  were  delivered  by  the 
Sultans  of  Turkey,  as  also  by  their  Byzantine  pre- 
decessors, to  Europeans  who  wished  to  reside  and  to 
acquire  real  property  in  their  dominions.  A  legal 
fiction  had  to  be  created  in  order  to  afford  a  justifica- 
tion to  strict  Moslems,  who  were  guided  solely  by 
Koranic  principles,  for  dealing  with  Christians  on 
a  basis  of  equality.  Christians  were  theoretically 
deemed  perpetual  enemies  and,  as  such,  unworthy 
of  peace  unless  they  either  embraced  Islam  or  paid 

1  Van  Dyck^  Ottoman  CapUukUiong,  p.  12. 
426 


cH  ui       EUROPEAN  PRIVIIvEGE 


427 


tribute  to  their  Moslem  conquerors.  With  un- 
believers, "treaties"  were  impossible,  and  indeed 
impious,  but  it  was  conceivable  that  the  Com- 
mander of  the  Faithful  might,  of  his  grace,  con- 
descend to  grant  them  "  privileges."  The  Moslem, 
unaware  that  his  inelastic  faith  contained  within 
itself  the  seeds  of  his  own  political  decadence,  may 
well  have  thought  that  the  bestowal  of  these 
"  privileges "  would  not  undermine  his  system  of 
government.  In  this,  he  was  mistaken.  As  the 
power  of  the  Crescent  waned  before  that  of  the 
Cross,  the  Frank  was  gradually  transformed  from 
being  a  humble  receiver  of  "  privileges "  into  an 
imperious  possessor  of  "rights."  These  rights 
were  to  form  a  potent  instrument  for  good  and 
also  for  evil,  both  to  their  possessors  and  to  those 
by  whom  they  were  originally  conferred.  They 
were  notably  to  contribute,  as  they  are  still  con- 
tributing, to  shatter  the  political  and  social  systems 
of  those  who  hold  to  the  faith  of  Islam. 

The  rights  which  have  been  conferred  by,  or 
which  have  grown  out  of  the  Capitulations  are  not 
the  same  in  Egypt  and  in  other  parts  of  the  Otto- 
man dominions.  The  Turkish  Government  have 
been  watchful  of  European  encroachment,  and 
have,  relatively  speaking,  been  powerful  to  resist 
it.  The  Khedives  of  Egypt,  on  the  other  hand, 
being  wantmg  in  vigilance,  allowed  a  plentiful  crop 
of  European  privileges,  which  are  not  sanctioned 
by  treaty,  to  be  drifted  on  the  wave  of  custom  into 
the  position  of  acquired  rights,  and  if,  as  at  times 
occurred,  they  tardily  awoke  to  the  consequences 
of  their  own  heedlessness,  they  were  either  too 
weak  to  offer  resistance,  or  the  impecuniosity, 
which  was  the  result  of  reckless  extravagance, 
rendered  them  willing  to  barter  a  portion  of  their 
political  birthright  for  the  sake  of  some  temporary 
concession.  Thus  it  came  about  that  the  European, 


428  MODERN  EGYPT 


who  is  privileged  in  Turkey,  is  ultra-privileged  in 
Egypt.  Abuse  of  privilege  follows  in  the  train 
of  privilege  itself.  It  happened,  therefore,  that  in 
that  part  of  the  Ottoman  dominions  which,  more 
than  any  other,  has  of  late  years  been  subject  to 
the  direct  control  of  a  European  Power,  and  in 
which,  consequently,  the  concession  of  privilege 
has  been  least  of  all  necessary  and  its  abuse  most 
of  all  baneful  to  the  cause  of  progress,  the  degree 
of  privilege  granted  has  been  greater,  and  its  abuse 
more  pronounced,  than  in  any  other  portion  of  the 
territories  of  the  Sultan. 

Although,  however,  nothing  can  be  said  in  favour 
of  the  abuse,  many  valid  arguments  may  be  advanced 
in  defence  of  the  use  of  the  Capitulations.  At  first 
sight,  it  appears  monstrous  that  the  smuggler  should 
carry  on  his  illicit  trade  under  the  eyes  of  the 
Custom-house  authorities  because  treaty  engage- 
ments forbid  any  prompt  and  effective  action  being 
taken  against  him.  Those  engagements  have  also 
been  turned  to  such  base  uses  that  they  have 
protected  the  keeper  of  the  gambling  hell,  the 
vendor  of  adulterated  drinks,  the  receiver  of  stolen 
goods,  and  the  careless  apothecary  who  supplies  his 
customer  with  poison  in  the  place  of  some  healing 
drug.  But  when  all  this,  and  a  great  deal  more 
of  the  same  description  of  argument  has  been 
stated,  there  still  remains  the  unquestionable 
fact  that  the  smuggler,  the  keeper  of  a  gambling- 
hell,  the  receiver  of  stolen  goods,  and  the  retailer 
of  adulterated  spirits,  represent  certain  prin- 
ciples. They,  and  their  contemptible  brethren, 
notably  represent  these  principles,  that  so  long  as 
they  have  not  been  proved  to  commit  an  offence 
at  law  ^  they  have  a  right  to  continue  without  hin- 

'  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that,  before  any  European  can  be 
adequately  punished,  he  must  be  proved  to  have  committed  an  offence 
not  against  Egyptian  law,  but  against  the  law  of  his  country  of  origin. 


CH.  m       EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  429 


drance  in  the  exercise  of  their  caUings,  and  that 
before  they  undergo  punishment  or  molestation  of 
any  kind,  it  must  be  shown  to  the  satisfaction 
of  some  properly  constituted  and  trustworthy 
authority  that  they  have  transgressed  the  law. 
One  of  the  great  battles  in  the  history  of  English 
constitutional  liberty  was  fought  over  the  person 
of  the  disreputable  Wilkes.  Lord  Palmerston's 
treatment  of  the  Don  Pacifico  case  is  another 
instance  in  point.  So  likewise,  paradoxical  as  it  may 
appear,  the  cause  of  European  civilisation  in  Egypt 
is  to  some  extent  unavoidably  identified  with  the 
treatment  of  European  ruffians.  For,  in  fact,  it 
is  often  difficult  to  do  anything  towards  sweeping 
away  the  abuse  of  privilege  without  incurring  a 
considerable  risk  that  other  equally  objectionable 
abuses  may  be  created  in  the  process  of  reform. 
It  is  reasonable  that  the  Egyptian  custom-house 
official  should  search  the  ship  of  the  smuggler  for 
tobacco  or  hashish,  but  what  guarantee  is  there 
that  the  same  official  will  not,  in  disregard  of  the 
spirit  if  not  of  the  text  of  the  law,  subject  the 
captain  of  a  vessel  engaged  in  legitimate  trade 
to  endless  vexations  ?  Inviolability  of  domicile  is 
one  of  the  corner-stones  of  European  privilege 
in  the  East.  It  is  well  that  the  Police  should 
be  able  to  penetrate  into  a  gambling-hell  and  stop 
an  infamous  trade,  but  what  guarantee  is  there 
that,  under  the  orders  of  an  official  incapable  of 
any  fine  discrimination  of  character  or  of  circum- 
stances, these  same  Police  will  not  invade  the  house 
of  some  individual  who  never  in  the  course  of  his 
life  held  a  playing-card  or  a  dice-box  in  his  hand  ? 
The  careless  apothecary  should,  in  the  interests 
of  the  public,  be  prevented  from  poisoning  his 
customers,  but  his  more  careful  rival  in  trade 
naturally  requires  some  valid  assurance  that  he 
will  not  be  subjected  to  unnecessary  annoyances 


430  MODERN  EGYPT 


in  the  exercise  of  his  profession.  Endless  illustra- 
tions of  the  same  sort  might  be  adduced.  When- 
ever the  question  of  modifying  the  Capitulations 
has  been  broached,  the  contending  parties  have 
always  used  the  same  arguments.  On  the  one 
side,  stood  the  reformer  rightly  clamouring  against 
the  abuse  of  privilege  which  impeded  his  progress. 
On  the  other  side,  stood  the  European  who,  if 
he  was  politically  unbiassed,  expressed  his  willing- 
ness to  aid  in  checking  the  abuse  and  in  furthering 
the  progress  of  reform,  but  who,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  profound  and,  to  some  extent,  justifiable 
mistrust  of  Oriental  legal  and  administrative 
processes,  demanded  guarantees  against  an  abuse 
of  power  before  he  would  agree  to  curtail  the  privi- 
leges of  his  countrymen.  The  guarantees  which 
were  demanded  were  often  excessive,  and  more- 
over, they  generally  took  a  form  which  involved 
an  extension  of  the  international  system  of  govern- 
ment. The  Egyptian  Government  either  would 
not  or  could  not  grant  them.  Hence,  not  unfre- 
quently  arose  a  deadlock. 

When  the  British  occupation  took  place,  the 
question  of  the  rights  conferred  on  Europeans  by 
the  Capitulations  entered  into  a  new  and  singular 
phase.  The  English  took  Egyptian  reform  in  hand. 
They  found  themselves  hampered  at  every  turn  by 
the  privileges  which  they,  in  common  with  other 
foreign  nations,  enjoyed.  The  English  reformer  was 
able  to  plead  that,  under  his  civilised  auspices,  there 
would  be  no  longer  any  danger  of  an  abuse  of 
power,  and  that,  therefore,  greater  freedom  of 
action  could  properly  be  accorded  to  an  Anglo- 
Egyptian  than  to  a  purely  Egyptian  Government. 
In  the  early  days  of  the  occupation,  this  argument 
availed  him  but  little  either  with  his  friends  or 
with  his  foes.  His  foes  scoffed  at  it.  It  is  true, 
they  said,  that  you  are  here,  but  you  have  no  right 


CH.LII      EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  431 


to  stay.  Even  supposing  the  paramount  influence 
of  England  to  constitute  a  valid  guarantee  against 
abuse,  which  we  doubt,  what  is  to  become  of  the 
guarantee  when  you  leave  the  country,  as  you  have 
promised  to  do?  More  than  this,  are  we  to  abandon 
our  rights  merely  to  facilitate  the  work  of  our 
rivals,  who  have  outwitted  us  ?  Heaven  forbid. 
We  will  not  even  make  those  concessions  to  an 
Anglo -Egyptian  Government  which  we  might 
perhaps  have  made  to  an  Egyptian  Government, 
pure  and  simple. 

The  friends  of  the  English  reformer  came  to 
much  the  same  conclusion  as  his  foes,  but  by  a 
different  process  of  reasoning.  If,  they  said,  you 
would  declare  your  intention  to  remain  permanently 
in  Egypt  and  to  undertake  the  administration  of 
the  country,  we  should  not  be  unwilling  to  concede 
our  privileges,  for  we  should  then  have  some  solid 
guarantee  against  an  abuse  of  power.  But  as 
you  are  constantly  asseverating  that  you  are  but 
sojourners  in  the  land,  and  that  your  occupation  is 
only  temporary,  we  fail  to  see  what  guarantees 
against  abuse  will  exist  when  you  carry  out  your 
declared  intentions.  There  could  be  no  question  as 
to  the  validity  of  this  argument.  Moreover,  it  was 
one  which  the  British  Government  were  themselves 
obliged  to  recognise  and  adopt.  Hence,  the  British 
nation  had  characteristically  placed  itself  in  this 
illogical  position — that  whilst  its  official  repre- 
sentative was  obliged  at  times  to  maintain  privilege 
in  British  interests  for  fear  of  eventual  abuse  by 
the  Egyptians,  he  was  also  called  upon  by  the 
British  reformer  to  aid  in  the  abolition  of  privilege 
in  order  to  further  that  work  of  reform  in  which 
the  Government  and  people  of  England  were 
deeply  interested.  The  creation  of  this  singular 
position  may  be  regarded  as  a  triumph  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  inconsistency.     "England,"  jNIontalembert 


432  MODERN  EGYPT 


once  said,  "  fortunately  for  herself,  is  not  the 
pedantic  slave  of  logic."  Fully  as  I  recognise  the 
value  of  this  encomium,  I  have  sometimes,  as  a 
humble  agent  charged  with  the  execution  of 
British  policy,  wished  that  that  policy  was  a  little 
more  logical. 

Under  all  these  circumstances,  only  one  solution 
was  for  many  years  possible.  It  was  that,  in  so 
far  as  the  main  issues  were  concerned,  there  should 
be  no  solution  at  all.  Unless  the  British  Govern- 
ment were  prepared  to  assume  permanently  the 
responsibility  of  governing  Egypt,  it  was  neither 
possible  nor  desirable  to  assimilate  the  legal  status 
of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  It  was, 
indeed,  painful  enough  to  see  the  parasitic  and 
ignoble  growths  which  clung  round  European 
civilisation,  but  as  Egypt  was  to  be  civilised  on  a 
European  model  without  being  formally  placed 
under  a  European  Government,  it  was  inevitable 
that,  together  with  many  blessings,  some  of  the 
curses  of  civilisation  should  devolve  on  the  country. 
Apart  from  the  practical  and  political  difficulties 
wiiich  stood  in  the  way  of  radical  reform,  it  was  to 
be  observed  that,  looking  at  the  matter  broadly, 
the  blessings  greatly  predominated  over  the  curses. 
The  material  prosperity  of  Egypt  depended  in  no 
small  degree  on  the  presence  of  a  numerous 
European  colony,  and  on  the  attractions  for  the 
investment  of  European  capital.  The  European 
would  not  reside  in  Egypt  unless  he  could  make 
money  by  doing  so,  and  he  could  not  make  money 
unless  his  life  and  property  were  guaranteed  against 
the  arbitrary  proceedings  of  a  Government  which 
but  recently  was  very  bad,  and  which,  as  he  rightly 
thought,  would  probably  relapse  into  its  former 
condition  if  the  controlling  hand  of  England  were 
withdrawn. 

Broadly  speaking,  therefore,  the  question  of 


CH.LII      EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  433 


European  privilege  stood,  up  to  1904,  in  much  the 
same  position  as  it  did  in  1882.  Nevertheless,  if 
we  descend  from  general  principles  to  detail,  it  will 
be  found  that  a  few  minor  reforms  were  undertaken 
of  a  nature  to  mitigate  some  of  the  worst  abuses  of 
the  system  which  the  English  found  in  existence 
when  they  took  Egyptian  affairs  seriously  in  hand. 

The  main  blot  in  the  system  under  which  Egypt 
was,  and,  unfortunately,  still  is  governed,  is  the 
absence  of  any  legislative  machinery  capable  of 
passing  laws  binding  on  all  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country.  As  the  absence  of  any  properly  con- 
stituted Tribunals  created,  to  use  Nubar  Pasha's 
expressive  phrase,  a  "judicial  Babel,"  so  the 
absence  of  any  supreme  legislature  creates  a 
"legislative  Babel."  History  affords  abundant 
examples  of  countries  whose  systems  of  legislation 
have  been  bad.  Egypt  affords  a  unique  example 
of  a  country  well  advanced  on  the  road  to  civilisa- 
tion which,  for  all  practical  purposes,  may  be  said 
to  possess  no  general  legislative  system  whatsoever. 

Although,  however,  the  system  of  legislation  by 
diplomacy,  in  so  far  as  its  main  features  are  con- 
cerned, still  holds  the  field,  and  although  it  is  true 
that  the  continuance  of  this  system  involves  an 
almost  complete  legislative  deadlock,  nevertheless, 
after  vast  travail,  the  diplomatic  mountain  did  at 
last  bring  forth  a  small  but  not  altogether  ridiculous 
mouse,  which  in  some  degree  mitigated  the  evils 
necessarily  attendant  on  legislative  impotence. 
Nubar  Pasha,  to  whom  must  be  attributed  the 
merit  of  the  innovation  about  to  be  described, 
pointed  out  that,  apart  from  questions  of  the  first 
importance,  such  as  criminal  jurisdiction  and  the 
right  of  taxing  Europeans,  there  remained  a 
considerable  field  of  petty  but  not  unimportant 
legislation  on  matters  relating  to  what  he  termed 
"la  vie  journaliere  de  la  population."  Questions 

VOL.  II  2  F 


434  MODERN  EGYPT 


were  frequently  arising  as  to  the  extent  to  which 
Europeans  were  subject  to  regulations  edicted  by 
the  Egyptian  Government  on  such  matters  as  the 
maintenance  of  dykes  and  canals,  the  establishment 
of  drinking-shops  and  places  of  amusement,  the 
right  to  carry  arms,  and  a  host  of  other  minor 
subjects,  which  in  Europe  are  often  treated  by 
by-laws  framed  by  some  subordinate  legislative 
authority,  to  whom  power  has  been  delegated  by 
the  supreme  legislature.  After  some  discussion, 
the  Powers  agreed  to  confer  legislative  rights  on 
the  Egyptian  Government  in  respect  to  these 
matters,  subject  to  the  condition  that  the  Egyptian 
proposals,  before  acquiring  the  force  of  law,  should 
receive  the  approval  of  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  Mixed  Tribunals.  It  was  provided  that  no 
greater  punishment  than  a  fine  of  £l  or  seven  days' 
imprisonment  could  be  incurred  for  infringing  these 
by-laws.^  The  Decree  introducing  these  changes, 
which  is  dated  January  31,  1889,  is  a  document  of 
some  importance  in  so  far  as  it  represents  the  first 
faltering  steps  taken  in  the  direction  of  a  real 
Egyptian  legislative  autonomy. 

The  arrangement  is  obviously  open  to  some 
objections  in  principle.  It  is  unusual  that  judges 
should  frame  the  laws,  which  they  have  to 
administer.  But  the  necessities  of  the  case  were 
such  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  attach  much 
weight  to  objections  based  on  the  undesirability  of 
amalgamating  legislative  and  judicial  functions. 
In  Egypt,  legislators  have  to  be  caught  wherever 
they  can  be  found.  As  a  legislative  machinery 
composed   of  judges   was  ready  to  hand,  that 

*  In  very  numerous  cases,  the  penalty  for  infringing  the  law  is 
altogether  insufficient  to  ensure  general  respect  being  paid  to  its  provi- 
sions. Moreover,  the  procedure  of  tlie  law-courts  is  often  complicated 
and  unduly  slow  in  action.  These  defects  have  become  notably 
apparent  in  dealing  with  the  illicit  sale  of  Hashish,  the  use  of  which  ia 
a  fertile  source  of  lunacy  in  Egypt    See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  p.  64. 


CH.  Lu      EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  435 


machinery  had  to  be  utilised  in  default  of  anything 
better. 

The  fundamental  idea  of  the  Decree  of  January 
31,  1889,  was,  therefore,  to  transfer  a  certain 
portion  of  the  legislative  functions,  heretofore 
exercised  collectively  by  the  Powers,  to  the  judges 
of  the  Mixed  Tribunals.  Some  beneficent  measures 
have  been  enacted  under  its  provisions.  To  quote  a 
single  instance,  the  Egyptian  Government  have  been 
enabled  to  control  the  sale  of  liquor  in  the  agri- 
cultural districts,  and  have  thus  placed  some  sort  of 
check  on  the  demoralisation  which  the  foreign  pur- 
veyor of  alcoholic  and  often  adulterated  drinks 
spreads  around  him.^ 

Passing  to  another  reform,  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  when  the  British  occupation  took  place, 
certain  direct  taxes  were  paid  by  Egyptians,  but 
not  by  Europeans.  These  were  the  house  tax  and 
the  professional  tax.  No  valid  arguments  could 
be  adduced  in  favour  of  exempting  Europeans 
from  the  payment  of  these  taxes.  The  reason  why 
they  did  not  pay  them  was  because  they  did  not 
like  paying  them.  Secure  in  the  support  of  their 
diplomatic  representatives,  they  had  succeeded  in 
maintaining  their  fiscal  privileges  intact.  The 
injustice  was  so  glaring  that  the  Powers  were 
forced  into  applying  a  remedy.  On  March  17, 
1885,  they  went  so  far,  at  the  instance  of  the 
British  Government,  as  to  sign  a  Declaration  stating 
that  they  "recognised  the  justice  of  making  their 
subjects  in  Egypt  liable  to  the  same  taxes  as  the 
natives."  They  agreed  in  principle  to  a  Decree 
under  the  terms  of  which  Europeans  were  rendered 
liable  to  the  payment  of  the  house  tax ;  they 
"equally  declared  that  they  accepted  the  appli- 
cation to  their  subjects,  in  the  same  manner  as  to 

^  For  further  remarks  on  this  very  important  subject,  see,  inter  alia, 
Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  73-7G. 


436  MODERN  EGYPT 


the  natives,  of  the  stamp  tax  and  hcence  tax  ;  and 
they  engaged  to  undertake  immediately,  in  concert 
with  the  Egyptian  Government,  the  study  of  the 
draft  laws  establishing  these  two  taxes." 

Both  before  and  after  the  signing  of  this  Declara- 
tion, the  usual  unedifying  and  wearisome  wrangling 
took  place.  It  was  not  till  April  15,  1886,  that  a 
Decree  was  at  last  issued  which  rendered  Europeans 
liable  to  the  payment  of  the  house  tax. 

Although  the  Powers  undertook,  on  March  17, 
1885,  to  study  "immediately"  the  draft  laws 
necessary  for  the  imposition  of  the  licence  or 
professional  tax  on  Europeans,  it  is  to  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  word  "  immediate  "  is,  in  diplomatic 
phraseology,  a  relative  term.  Six  years  elapsed 
before,  on  March  8,  1891,  a  Decree  was  issued, 
under  which  Europeans  were  rendered  liable  to 
the  payment  of  the  professional  tax.  The  law  had 
not,  however,  been  put  in  operation  when,  in 
connection  with  the  corvee  negotiations,^  the 
French  Government  pressed  for  its  repeal.  There 
Avas  a  good  deal  to  be  said  in  favour  of  abolishing 
the  tax.  In  spite  of  the  prolonged  study  which 
preceded  the  issue  of  the  Decree,  many  of  its  details 
were  faulty.  Moreover,  in  an  Oriental  country,  a 
direct  tax  is  always  liable  to  abuse  by  reason  of 
the  untrustworthy  nature  of  the  agency  employed 
in  its  assessment  and  collection.  The  Egyptian 
Government  and  their  British  advisers,  therefore, 
decided  to  rest  content  with  the  victory  which  had 
been  already  gained.  By  dint  of  strenuous  per- 
severance, they  had  remedied  an  injustice  ;  they 
had  asserted  the  principle  that  in  fiscal  matters 
Europeans  and  Egyptians  were  to  be  treated  on  a 
footing  of  equality  ;  there  could  be  no  objection  to 
a  relief  of  taxation  which  would  be  applied  to 
Europeans  and  Egyptians  alike.    The  professional 

1  Vide  ante,  p.  418. 


CM.  Lii       EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  437 


tax  was,  therefore,  abolished  by  a  Decree  issued  on 
January  28,  1892. 

To  sum  up.  The  results  of  British  intervention 
in  Egypt,  in  so  far  as  European  privilege  is  con- 
cerned, have  up  to  the  present  time  been  as 
follows  : — 

1.  A  slight  advance  has  been  made  in  the 
direction  of  Egyptian  legislative  autonomy. 

2.  Europeans  and  Egyptians  have  been  placed  on 
a  basis  of  equality  in  so  far  as  taxation  is  concerned. 

With  the  signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Con- 
vention in  1904,  the  question  of  dealing  with  the 
Capitulations  entered  into  a  new  phase.  The 
prospects  of  reform  brightened.  It  became  possible 
to  discuss  the  subject  on  its  own  merits  without 
the  introduction  of  irrelevant  issues. 

I  have  already  stated  that  the  main  object  of 
this  work  is  to  narrate  the  history  of  the  past, 
rather  than  to  discuss  questions  which  now  occupy 
public  attention.  Acting  on  this  principle,  I 
abstain  from  entering  fully  into  a  discussion  of  the 
method  under  which  the  existing  regime  of  the 
Capitulations  might  advantageously  be  modified. 
In  my  Annual  Report  for  the  year  1905  ^  I  dwelt  on 
this  subject,  and  in  my  Report  for  the  following 
year,^  I  sketched  out  the  broad  features  of  a  plan, 
having  for  its  object  the  creation  in  Egypt  of 
a  Council  invested  with  powers  to  enact  laws 
binding  on  all  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt.  I 
concluded  with  the  following  remarks : — 

"  I  am  well  aware  of  the  danger  of  making 
Constitutions  which  may  look  well  on  paper,  but 
which  will  not  work  in  practice.  It  is  one  against 
which  Lord  DufFerin  very  wisely  uttered  a  note 
of  warning  when  he  was  framing  proposals  for  the 
creation  of  an  Egyptian  Legislative  Assembly.  I 

1  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  pp.  1-8. 
2  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  10-26. 


438  MODERN  EGYPT 


have  endeavoured,  to  the  best  of  my  abihty,  to 
avoid  this  danger.  My  wish  has  been  to  create  an 
institution  which,  albeit  it  will  not  be  free  from 
anomalies,  and  may  possess  many  theoretical 
imperfections,  will,  on  the  whole,  be  suited  to  the 
present  practical  requirements  of  Egyptian  political 
and  administrative  Ufe.  I  have  more  particularly 
endeavoured  to  utilise  such  elements  as  are  avail- 
able, in  order  to  guard,  so  far  as  is  possible,  against 
that  danger  to  which,  possibly,  Eg)'pt  is  somewhat 
specially  exposed — I  mean  the  danger  of  making 
what  Burke  once  called  '  a  stock -jobbing  Con- 
stitution.' I  am  far  from  saying  that  I  have 
altogether  succeeded,  but  I  trust  that  what  I  have 
proposed  may  form  the  basis  for  further  discussion, 
with  the  result  that  any  defects  which  may  be 
discovered  in  the  scheme  set  forth  in  this  Report 
may  be  remedied. 

"Much  will  depend  upon  the  views  taken  by 
the  natural  leaders  of  public  opinion  in  Egj^t. 
To  the  Egyptians,  I  would  say  that  some  plan 
based  on  the  broad  features  of  that  which  I  have 
sketched  out  is,  I  am  convinced,  the  only  method 
by  which  they  can,  within  any  period  which  it  is 
now  possible  to  foresee,  be  relieved  of  those 
portions  of  the  Capitulations  which  retard  the 
progress  of  their  country,  and  of  which  they  so 
frequently,  and,  I  should  add,  so  legitimately, 
complain.  To  the  Europeans  who  have  made 
Egypt  their  home,  I  would  say  that,  in  my  desire 
to  guard  against  any  reappearance  of  the  arbitrary 
methods  of  government  against  which  the  Capitu- 
lations were  intended  to  protect  them,  I  am  no 
less  European  than  they  ;  that  though  the  rights 
and  privileges  which  they  very  naturally  prize  are 
taken  away  in  one  form,  they  are  simultaneously 
granted  in  another  form  of  equal  and  far  less 
objectionable  efficacy ;  and  that,  in  addition,  the 


CH.  Lii      EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  439 


inestimable  privilege  will  be  granted  to  them  of 
making  their  own  laws,  instead  of  being  dependent 
on  the  vicissitudes  of  European  politics  and  on  the 
views  taken  in  fifteen  different  capitals  of  the 
world  by  others,  who,  however  much  they  may 
be  animated  by  good  intentions,  must  necessarily 
be  ignorant  of  local  requirements.  It  is  only  in 
the  '  Land  of  Paradox '  that  the  bestowal  on  a 
whole  community  of  the  right  to  manage  its  own 
affairs  could  be  regarded  as  the  destruction  of  a 
privilege. 

"  Before  moving  any  further  in  the  matter,  I 
ask  the  leading  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt 
whether  they  wish  to  support  an  archaic  system 
of  government  which  has  outlived  its  time,  and 
which  acts  as  a  clog  to  all  real  progress,  or  whether 
they  would  not  rather  prefer  to  assist  in  reforming 
that  system  in  order  to  meet  the  altered  conditions 
of  the  country,  and  thus  lay  the  foundation-stone 
of  an  Egyptian  nationality  in  the  best  and  only 
practicable  sense  of  that  much-abused  term." 

I  have  now  only  to  express  an  earnest  hope 
that  this  question  will  not  be  allowed  to  drop.  By 
far  the  most  important  reform  now  required  in 
Egypt  is  to  devise  some  plan  which  will  enable 
laws  binding  on  Europeans  resident  in  the  country 
to  be  enacted.  Until  this  is  done,  progress  in 
many  directions,  where  reform  is  urgently  required, 
will  be  barred.  I  would  add  that  the  mere  transfer 
of  criminal  jurisdiction  over  Europeans  from  the 
Consular  to  the  Mixed  Courts — a  project  which 
tmds  support  in  some  quarters — altogether  fails  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  the  situation.  The  main 
reform  required  is  legislative,  not  judicial.^ 

The  abolition  of  indefensible  privileges  is  part 
and  parcel  of  the  work  of  modern  progress.  In 

*  Some  further  remarks  on  this  subject  will  be  found  on  p.  668. 


440  MODERN  EGYPT 


the  West,  the  work  of  destroying  privilege  is  well- 
nigh  complete,  and  the  next  generation  will 
probably  see  democracy  pass  from  the  destructive, 
and  enter  upon  the  constructive  phase  of  its 
existence,  with  what  result  we  cannot  now  foretell. 
The  backward  East  is  still  in  the  stage  in  which 
a  privilege  destroyed,  whether  it  be  of  a  Western 
or  of  an  Eastern  type,  may  be  regarded  as  a  battle 
won.  The  constructive  period  of  Eastern  political 
existence  is  as  yet  afar,  neither  can  any  one  of  the 
present  generation  hope  to  see  what  will  eventually 
happen  to  the  curious  amalgam  of  fanaticism  and 
agnosticism,  of  old-world  despotism  and  latter-day 
republicanism,  which  in  Egypt,  as  in  other  Oriental 
countries,  is  now  laid  on  the  anvil,  and  which 
receives  blows  from  all  quarters  of  such  diverse 
strength  as  to  render  it  a  matter  of  haphazard 
conjecture  to  foretell  what  will  be  the  shape 
which  it  will  ultimately  assume.  In  the  mean- 
while, assuming  the  abolition  of  such  privileges 
as  those  enjoyed  by  Europeans  in  Egypt  to  be 
an  advantage,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Egyptian 
Government,  under  British  auspices,  made  one 
considerable  step  forward.  They  placed  all  the 
residents  in  Egypt,  whether  European  or  Egyptian, 
on  a  footing  of  fiscal  equality.  But  they  have  so  far 
been  unable  seriously  to  attack  the  Capitulations, 
which  constitute  the  main  citadel  of  privilege. 
These,  as  in  the  days  prior  to  the  British  occupation, 
remain  for  the  present  inviolate.  Why  was  this  ? 
It  was  because  the  international  system  of  govern- 
ment barred  the  way  to  advance. 

This  work  has  been  written  to  little  purpose 
if  it  has  not  shown  the  radical  defects  of  inter- 
nationalism, considered  as  a  machinery  for  adminis- 
tration and  legislation.  In  making  this  remark, 
however,  I  must  carefully  guard  against  being 
misunderstood.     In  condemning  executive  action 


CH.UI      EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  441 


through  international  agency,  I  do  not  in  any 
degree  wish  to  deprecate  the  employment  of 
officials  of  various  nationalities  in  certain  executive 
functions.  The  system  which  I  wish  to  condemn 
is  that  under  which  executive  officials  are  practically 
nominated  by  foreign  Governments  and  become,  as 
experience  in  Egypt  has  abundantly  proved,  the 
political  agents  of  their  countries  of  origin.  Not 
only  is  there  no  objection  to  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment being  free  to  choose  their  European  officials 
from  any  country  in  Europe,  but  great  advantage 
is  to  be  derived  from  the  adoption  of  this  system. 
Some  sohd  guarantee  is  thus  affijrded  that  the 
individuals  nominated  will  be  chosen  solely  by 
reason  of  their  professional  merits,  and  that  they 
will  not  be  moved  by  political  considerations  to 
overstep  the  limit  of  the  functions  assigned  to 
them.  The  same  remark  applies,  even  to  a  greater 
extent,  to  the  case  of  those  in  judicial  employment. 
European  judges  for  the  Egyptian  law-courts 
should  continue,  as  at  present,  to  be  chosen  from 
various  nationalities. 

The  case  of  legislative  internationaUsm  is  some- 
what different.  Egypt  is  essentially  a  cosmopolitan 
country.  It  follows,  therefore,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  if  any  local  legislature  is  created,  it 
must,  if  it  is  to  be  truly  representative,  be  cosmo- 
politan in  character. 

The  internationalism  which  I  wish  to  condemn 
is,  therefore,  confined  to  what  may  be  termed 
political  internationalism,  that  is  to  say,  the  system 
which  admits  of  the  employment  of  political 
agents,  who,  acting  under  whatever  instructions 
they  may  receive  from  their  several  Foreign  Offices, 
are  prone  to  introduce  into  the  discussion  of 
some  purely  local  question,  considerations  based 
on  the  friendliness  or  hostility,  in  other  parts  of 
the  world,  of  their  countries  of  origin.  Political 


442 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


passions  are — or,  at  any  moment  may  become — too 
strong  to  allow  of  an  international  system  of  this 
latter  type  working  smoothly.  "The  principles 
of  true  politics,"  Burke  once  said,  "are  those  of 
morality  enlarged,  and  I  neither  now  do,  nor 
ever  will,  admit  of  any  other."  An  influential 
school  of  English  politicians  have  been  zealous 
in  supporting  the  principle  of  action  thus  advocated 
by  Burke.  "  I  would  not,"  Mr.  Bright  said  in 
1877,  "dissociate  what  is  true  in  morals  from  what 
is  true  in  statesmanship."  Few  persons  would 
wish  to  speak  in  disparaging  terms  of  these  noble 
principles.  They  certainly  command  my  full 
assent,  and,  I  may  add,  that  during  a  long 
diplomatic  career,  I  have  persistently  acted  upon 
them  to  the  best  of  my  ability.  But,  whilst  our 
principles  may  be  elevated,  our  application  of 
them  must  be  subordinated  to  the  facts  with  which 
we  have  to  deal.  Do  not  let  us  imagine  that 
nations  and  Governments  in  general  are  prepared 
altogether  to  assimilate  public  and  private  morality. 
Mr.  Lecky  says  with  truth :  "  Nothing  is  more 
calamitous  than  the  divorce  of  politics  from  morals, 
but  in  practical  politics  public  and  private  morals  will 
never  absolutely  correspond."^  Internationalism, 
in  spite  of  its  fair  exterior,  which  proclaims  equality 
of  governing  power  and  equitable  treatment 
towards  subject  races,  means  but  too  often  in 
practice  political  egotism,  a  disregard  of  the  rights 
of  subject  races,  and,  in  the  case  now  under 
discussion,  a  decadence  in  the  authority  of  that 
European  Power  on  the  maintenance  of  whose 
paramount  influence  the  advance  of  true  civilisation 
in  Egypt  depends.    That  Power  is  Great  Britain. 

>  Map  of  Life,  p.  18L 


CHAPTER  LIII 


FINANCE 

The  first  bankruptcy  of  Egypt — Risk  of  a  second  bankruptcy — The 
Race  against  Bankruptcy — The  era  of  reform — Fiscal  relief — 
Reduction  of  taxation  —  Increase  of  revenue  —  Expenditure — 
Aggregate  surplus  since  1888 — The  indebtedness  of  the  fellaheen 
— Distribution  of  land — Importance  of  the  financial  question. 

"Great,"  says  Carlyle,  "is  Bankruptcy.  .  .  . 
Honour  to  Bankruptcy  ;  ever  righteous  on  the  great 
scale,  though  in  detail  it  is  so  cruel.  Under  all 
falsehoods  it  works  unweariedly  mining.  No  false- 
hood, did  it  rise  heaven  high  and  cover  the  world, 
but  Bankruptcy,  one  day,  will  sweep  it  down  and 
make  us  free  of  it."  ^ 

In  Egypt,  bankruptcy,  of  a  truth,  destroyed 
many  false  gods  and  pricked  many  bubbles. 
Notably,  it  dashed  down  Ismail  Pasha,  the  great 
high -priest  of  Sham,  from  that  false  eminence 
which  he  had  attained,  and  allowed  him  to  be 
pulverised  by  the  adventurers  who  were  his  former 
worshippers.  More  than  this,  bankruptcy,  riding 
roughshod  over  all  who  would  not  recognise  the 
irresistible  nature  of  its  action,  brought  home  to 
the  minds  of  a  reluctant  Egyptian  Ministry  that 
they  must  needs  abandon  the  Soudan,  at  all  events 
for  a  time,  because  they  could  not  afford  to  stay 
there.  These  and  many  other  benefits  did  bank- 
ruptcy, in  its  ruthlessness,  confer  on  a  land  whose 

^  French  Revolution,  Book  iii.  c.  i. 
443 


444  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 


government  had  for  many  years  been  one  gigantic 
falsehood. 

When  the  British  troops  occupied  Egypt  in 
1882,  one  act  of  bankruptcy  had  already  been 
committed.  In  1879,  the  Government  of  Egypt 
declared  themselves  insolvent.  In  1880,  a  composi- 
tion with  their  creditors  was  effected.  Nevertheless, 
under  the  combined  influences  of  the  Arabi  re- 
bellion and  the  cataclysm  in  the  Soudan,  the 
Treasury  was  again  on  the  high  road  to  another 
act  of  bankruptcy.  There  was,  however,  this 
difference  between  the  financial  chaos  of  1878-79 
and  that  of  1882-83.  During  the  earlier  of  these 
two  periods,  the  hopes  of  every  well-wisher  to 
Egypt  were  based  on  a  declaration  of  bank- 
ruptcy. It  was  impossible  to  apply  a  remedy  until 
the  true  facts  of  the  case  were  recognised.  In 
1882-83,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  in  the  true 
interest  of  every  Egyptian,  and  of  every  sympathiser 
with  Egypt,  to  stave  off  bankruptcy,  for  the  remedy 
which  would  certainly  have  been  applied,  had  a 
condition  of  bankruptcy  been  declared,  was  almost 
as  bad  as  the  disease.  That  remedy  was  inter- 
national government  in  eoccehis.  Hence,  the 
Egyptian  Government  had  to  enter  upon  what 
Lord  Milner  has  aptly  termed  "  The  Race  against 
Bankruptcy." 

Tlie  struggle  was  long  and  arduous.  For  some 
while,  the  issue  seemed  doubtful.  The  final  result 
was  a  complete  triumph.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
period  of  doubt  lasted  till  1888.  By  that  time,  the 
race  had  been  virtually  won. 

So  long  as  the  Egyptian  Government  and  their 
British  advisers  were  in  constant  danger  of  being 
throttled  by  bankruptcy,  it  was  hopeless  to  think 
seriously  of  fiscal  reform.  More  than  this,  any 
improvement  in  the  administrative  system  which 
mvolved  an  increase  of  expenditure — and  it  may 


CH.  Lin 


FINANCE 


445 


be  said  that  practically  every  improvement  required 
money — had  to  be  set  aside.  Attention  was  con- 
centrated on  one  object,  and  that  was  how  to  make 
both  ends  meet.  But  when  financial  equilibrium 
was  assured,  the  aspect  of  affairs  changed. 

When  it  became  known  that  the  Egyptian 
Treasury  was  in  possession  of  a  surplus,  all  the 
various  interests  concerned  clamoured  for  the 
redress  of  long-standing  and  often  very  legitimate 
grievances.  The  inhabitant  of  the  country  pleaded 
that  his  land-tax  was  too  high,  and  pointed  with 
justice  to  the  fall  in  the  price  of  agricultural  pro- 
duce as  a  reason  for  affording  him  relief.  The 
inhabitant  of  the  town  complained  of  the  oppres- 
sive nature  of  the  octroi  duty.  The  population  in 
general  urged  that  the  price  of  salt  was  excessive. 
The  possessor  of  live  stock  asked  why  he  should 
pay  a  tax  for  every  sheep  or  goat  on  his  farm.  The 
seller  of  produce  at  every  market  or  fair  dwelt  on 
the  fact  that  his  goods  had  to  be  weighed  by  a 
Government  official  who  charged  a  fee  for  the 
Treasury  and  another  fee  for  himself.  Why,  again, 
it  was  urged,  should  railway,  postal,  and  telegraph 
rates  be  higher  in  Egypt  than  elsewhere  ?  Why 
should  a  boat  passing  under  a  bridge  pay  a  toll,  whilst 
a  passenger  going  over  the  bridge  paid  nothing  ? 
These,  and  a  hundred  other  arguments  and  proposals, 
were  put  forward  by  the  advocates  of  fiscal  reform. 

On  the  other  hand,  each  zealous  official,  anxious 
to  improve  the  administration  of  his  own  Depart- 
ment, hurled  in  demands  for  money  on  a  poverty- 
stricken  Treasury.  The  soldier  wanted  more 
troops,  and  painted  in  gloomy  colours  the  dangers 
to  which  the  frontier  was  exposed  by  reason  of  the 
proximity  of  the  Dervishes.  The  Police  officer 
wanted  more  policemen  to  assist  in  the  capture  of 
brigands.  The  jurist  urged  that,  without  well-paid 
judges,  it  was  impossible  to  establish  a  pure  system 


446 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


of  justice.  The  educationalist  pointed  out  with 
great  truth  that,  unless  the  sums  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  Department  of  Public  Instruction 
were  greatly  increased,  the  execution  of  the  policy 
of  employing  Egyptian  rather  than  European 
agency  in  the  administration  of  the  country  would 
have  to  be  indefinitely  postponed.  The  soldier, 
the  policeman,  the  jurist,  the  director  of  prisons, 
and  the  schoolmaster  all  joined  in  asking  for  the 
construction  of  expensive  buildings.  The  medical 
authorities  clamoured  for  hospitals,  and  pointed 
out  that,  without  improved  sanitation,  which  was 
a  bottomless  financial  abyss,  there  could  be  no 
guarantee  against  epidemic  disease.  The  engineer 
showed  that  it  was  false  economy  not  to  extend  the 
system  of  irrigation,  to  drain  the  fields,  to  make 
roads,  and  to  develop  railway  communication. 
Following  on  the  larger  demands,  came  every  species 
of  minor  proposal.  Would  it  not  be  an  attraction 
to  the  tourists,  who  spent  so  much  money  in  Egypt, 
if  a  theatrical  company  visited  Cairo  in  the  winter  ? 
How  could  this  be  managed  unless  the  Government 
gave  a  subvention  to  the  theatre  ?  Was  it  not  a 
scandal,  now  that  a  civilised  Power  was  virtually 
governing  Egypt,  that  more  was  not  done  to  pro- 
tect the  ancient  monuments  of  the  country  from 
injury  ?  What  report  would  the  winter  visitors  to 
Egypt  make  when  they  returned  to  Europe,  if,  in 
driving  to  the  Pyramids,  they  were  bumped  over 
a  road  which  had  not  been  repaired  since  the 
Empress  Eugenie  drove  over  it  some  twenty  years 
previously  ?  These,  and  scores  of  other  questions, 
were  asked,  in  tones  of  more  or  less  indignant 
remonstrance,  by  individuals  who  realised  the 
desirability  of  paying  attention  to  some  one  or 
other  subject  in  which  they  were  interested,  but 
who  had  no  clear  perception  of  the  financial 
situation  considered  as  a  whole. 


CH.  LIII 


FINANCE 


447 


Under  all  these  circumstances,  it  behoved  those 
who  were  responsible  for  the  financial  guidance  of 
the  Egyptian  Government  to  act  with  great  caution. 
It  was  clear  that,  as  a  wave  of  European  civilisa- 
tion was  to  sweep  over  the  land,  all  the  parapher- 
nalia of  civilisation— that  is  to  say,  its  judges  and 
law-courts,  its  hospitals,  its  schools,  its  reforma- 
tories for  juvenile  offenders,  and  so  on — would, 
sooner  or  later,  have  to  be  introduced ;  but  the 
main  point  to  be  borne  in  mind  was  this :  that,  in 
introducing  all  these  reforms,  Egypt  should  not  be 
allowed  to  shp  back  into  the  slough  of  bankruptcy 
from  which  it  had  been  so  hardly  and  so  recently 
rescued.  The  principal  difficulty  was  to  decide 
which  were  the  most  pressing  amongst  the  many 
points  requiring  attention.  It  was  thought  that, 
before  the  sick  man  was  provided  with  a  comfort- 
able hospital,  before  the  criminal  was  lodged  in  a 
prison  built  on  improved  penological  principles, 
before  schools  were  provided,  and  even  before  rival 
litigants  could  be  provided  with  an  adequate 
number  of  honest  and  capable  judges,  or  before 
the  judges  could  be  located  in  suitable  buildings, 
it  was  essential  to  alleviate  the  burthens  which 
weighed  on  the  mass  of  the  population.  Fiscal 
relief  had  a  prior  claim  to  administrative  reform. 
It  was,  therefore,  decided  that,  whilst  penuri- 
ously  doling  out  grants  to  the  spending  Depart- 
ments, the  principal  efforts  of  the  Government 
should  be  devoted  to  devising  means  for  the  relief 
of  taxation. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  I  should  give  in  detail 
the  fiscal  history  of  Egypt  since  the  British 
occupation.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that 
direct  taxation  has  been  reduced  by  little  less  than 
£2,000,000  a  year.  In  the  domain  of  indirect 
taxation,  the  Salt  Tax,  the  collection  of  which  was 
attended  with  great  hardship  to  the  poorest  classes 


448 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


of  the  population,^  the  octroi  duties,  the  bridge 
and  lock  dues  on  the  Nile,^  and  the  tax  both  on 
river  boats  and  on  sea  fishing-boats  have  been 
wholly  abolished.  The  Registration  dues  on  the  sale 
of  land  have  been  reduced  from  5  to  2  per  cent.  The 
Light  dues  have  been  greatly  diminished  in  amount. 
So  also  has  the  tax  on  ferries.  The  Customs  duties 
on  coal,  liquid  fuel,  charcoal,  firewood,  timber  for 
building  purposes,  petroleum,  live  stock,  and  dead 
meat  have  been  reduced  from  8  to  4  per  cent. 
The  inland  fishery  industry  has  been  relieved 
from  the  vexatious  and  onerous  restrictions  which 
were  formerly  imposed  on  it.  The  Postal,  Tele- 
graph, and  Railway  rates  have  been  largely  reduced. 
The  only  increase  in  taxation  has  been  in  the 
tobacco  duty,  which  has  been  raised  from  P.T.  14 
to  P.T.  20  per  kilogramme.  There  cannot  be  a 
doubt  that  the  whole  Egyptian  population  is  now 
very  lightly  taxed.  The  taxation  is,  however,  still 
unequally  distributed.  The  urban  population  do 
not  bear  their  fair  share  of  the  public  burdens.  In 
this,  as  in  so  many  other  matters,  the  Capitulations 
bar  the  way  to  reform. 

In  spite  of  these  large  reductions  of  taxation, 
the  revenue  has  grown  from  £E.8,935,000  in  1883 
to  £E.15,337,000  in  1906— an  increase  of  no  less 
than  £E.6, 402,000. 

The  expenditure  has,  of  course,  increased  with 
the  growing  revenue,  but  it  has  been  carefully 
controlled.  In  1883,  it  amounted  to  £E.8,o54,000, 
and  in  1906  to  £E.  12,393,000  an  increase  of 
£E.3,839,000. 

1  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1905,  p.  33,  and  No.  1  of  1906,  p.  191. 

*  The  development  of  Nile  traffic  has  been  very  remarkable.  I  give 
a  single  instance.  The  number  of  boats  passing  the  Atfeh  lock,  which 
connects  the  Mahmoudieh  Canal  and  the  Nile,  in  1900  —  the  year 
before  the  abolition  of  the  toll— was  only  4564.  In  1905,  nearly  22',000 
passed. 

3  These  figures  are  exclusive  of  £E.  1,238,000  debited  to  Special 
Funds  in  1883,  and  of  £E.  769,000  similarly  debited  in  1906. 


CH.  LIII 


FINANCE 


449 


The  following  three  facts  will  perhaps  bring 
clearly  home  to  the  mind  of  the  reader  the  general 
nature  of  the  results  obtained  by  the  financial 
administration  of  Egypt  since  the  British  occu- 
pation in  1882. 

In  the  first  place,  I  have  to  record  that,  up  to 
1888,  either  a  deficit  was  annually  incurred,  or  else 
financial  equilibrium  was  preserved  with  the  utmost 
difficulty.  Then  the  tide  turned.  During  the 
eighteen  years  from  1889  to  1906,  both  inclusive, 
the  aggregate  surplus  realised  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury  amounted  to  more  than  27^  millions 
sterling. 

The  second  fact  which  I  have  to  record  is  no 
less  striking.  During  the  twenty  years  preceding 
December  31,  1906,  extraordinary  expenditure  to 
the  extent  of  £E.  19,303,000  was  incurred  on  rail- 
ways, canals,  and  public  buildings.  Of  this  large 
sum,  only  £E.3,610,000  was  borrowed.  The 
remainder  was  provided  out  of  revenue.  More- 
over, on  December  30,  1906,  a  Reserve  Fund  of 
£E.3,050,000  stood  to  the  credit  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Debt.  The  Reserve  Fund  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  amounted  on  the  same  date 
to  £E.11,055,000,  of  which  only  £E.2,353,000  had 
at  that  date  been  engaged  for  capital  expenditure. 
Both  of  these  Funds,  amounting  in  the  aggregate 
to  £E.14,105,000,  were  provided  out  of  revenue. 

In  the  third  place,  I  wish  to  draw  attention  to 
the  facts  and  figures  relating  to  the  indebtedness 
of  Egypt.  In  1883,  the  capital  of  the  Debt,  which 
was  then  held  exclusively  by  the  public,  amounted 
to  £96,457,000,  and  the  charge  on  account  of 
interest  and  sinking  fund  to  £4,268,000.  Since 
then,  the  Guaranteed  Loan,  which  amounted  to 
£9,424,000,  has  been  issued  ;  £4,882,000  has  been 
borrowed  for  the  execution  of  public  works,  and  for 
the  commutation  of  pensions  and  of  allocations  to 

VOL.  II  2  G 


450  MODERN  EGYPT 


the  Khedivial  family.  The  conversion  operation 
of  1890  added  £3,904,000  to  the  nominal  capital  of 
the  Debt.  In  all,  £18,210,000  has  been  added  to 
the  capital  of  the  Debt.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Daira  Loan,  which  in  1883  amounted  to  £9,009,000, 
has  been  entirely  paid  off.  The  Domains  Loan, 
which  in  1883  amounted  to  £8,255,000,  has  been 
reduced  to  £1,316,000.  The  Guaranteed  Loan 
has  been  reduced  to  £7,765,000,  a  reduction 
of  £1,659,000  from  the  original  amount.  On 
December  28,  1906,  the  outstanding  capital  of 
the  Debt  in  the  hands  of  the  public  amounted  to 
£87,416,000.^  The  charge  on  account  of  interest 
and  sinking  fund  borne  by  the  taxpayers  was 
£3,368,000.  There  has,  therefore,  in  twenty-three 
years  been  a  reduction  of  £9,041,000  in  the  capital 
of  the  Debt,  and  of  £900,000  in  the  charge  on 
account  of  interest  and  sinking  fund. 

These  facts  and  figures  speak  for  themselves. 
Considerations  of  space  preclude  me  from  de- 
scribing in  detail  the  beneficial  results  which  have 
accrued  to  the  population  of  Egypt  in  every 
direction  from  the  substitution  of  a  sound  fiscal 
policy  for  the  oppressive  and  ruinous  system  of 
government  to  which  they  were  formerly  subjected. 
I  may,  however,  allude  to  one  point  of  special 
importance. 

Lord  Dufferin,  writing  in  1883,  alluded  to  "the 
encumbered  condition  of  a  considerable  proportion 
of  the  fellaheen  lands "  as  "  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tressing subjects  connected  with  the  present  social 
condition  of  the  country."  There  was  a  tendency, 
he  added,  "  for  the  land  to  pass  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  present  owners  into  those  of  foreign  creditors." 

1  In  addition  to  this,  stock  to  the  amount  of  £8,760,000  was  held  by 
the  Eg-yptian  Treasury  and  the  ('ommissioners  of  the  Debt.  This 
stock  will  be  gradually  sold,  aud  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  expended  on 
remunerative  public  works.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  interest  is,  of  course, 
credited  to  the  Egyptian  Government. 


CH.  LUI 


FINANCE 


451 


There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  very  great  im- 
portance of  the  question  to  which  Lord  DufFerin 
drew  attention.  In  the  first  place,  as  Lord 
Dufferin  very  truly  remarked,  a  transfer  on  a 
huge  scale  of  the  landed  property  of  the  country 
to  foreign  creditors  "  could  scarcely  take  place 
without  producing  an  agrarian  crisis  (Lord  Dufferin 
might  also  have  added,  a  political  crisis)  which 
would  prove  equally  disastrous  to  the  creditors, 
the  debtors,  and  the  Government."  Then,  again, 
the  arguments  in  favour  of  small  holdings  apply 
with  somewhat  special  force  in  Egypt.  Owing  to 
the  fact  that  there  is  not  generally  any  serious 
congestion  of  the  population,  competition  rents 
have  not  as  yet  resulted  in  any  grave  strife  between 
landlords  and  tenants.  Nevertheless,  as  the  popula- 
tion increases,  and  the  area  of  cultivable  but 
uncultivated  land  diminishes,  there  will  be,  to  say 
the  least,  a  risk  that  issues  will  eventually  arise 
between  landlords  and  tenants,  somewhat  similar 
to  those  which  have  caused  so  much  trouble  in 
other  countries — notably  in  India  and  in  Ireland. 
The  best  way  to  postpone  this  strife,  as  also  to 
mitigate  its  intensity  should  it  eventually  prove 
to  be  inevitable,  will  be  to  avoid  the  adoption  of 
any  measures  which  will  tend  towards  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  small  proprietors. 

The  political  arguments  in  favour  of  this  policy 
are  no  less  strong  than  those  of  a  purely  economic 
character.  I  know  of  no  measure  more  calculated 
to  destroy  any  hopes  that  the  Egyptians  will 
eventually  become  really  autonomous,  and  that 
they  will  exercise  whatever  self-governing  powers 
they  may  some  day  acquire  in  the  interests  of  the 
whole  community,  than  the  displacement  of  the 
small  proprietors,  more  especially  if  the  large 
landowners,  who  would  take  their  places,  were, 
to  any  excessive  degree,  of  European  nationality. 


452  MODERN  EGYPT 


The  policy  which  has  been  persistently  pursued 
by  the  Egyptian  Government  of  recent  years  has, 
therefore,  been  to  endeavour,  by  a  variety  of 
indirect  but  perfectly  legitimate  means,  to  main- 
tain the  small  proprietors  in  the  possession  of 
their  holdings,  and,  whilst  affording  all  reasonable 
facilities  for  the  employment  of  European  capital 
in  land  development,  to  do  nothing  which  would 
tend  towards  ousting  Egyptian  proprietors  and 
substituting  Europeans  in  their  places. 

Of  these  means,  the  improvement  in  the  system 
of  irrigation  has  perhaps  been  the  most  important 
and  the  most  productive  of  result.  The  establish- 
ment of  an  Agricultural  Bank,  which  has  ad- 
vanced sums  amounting  in  the  aggregate  to  about 
£9,000,000  in  small  sums  to  the  fellaheen,  and  of 
Agricultural  and  Horticultural  Societies,  which 
have  been  the  means  of  spreading  a  knowledge  of 
scientific  agriculture  and  horticulture,  and  have 
also  facilitated  the  purchase  by  the  cultivators  of 
good  seed  and  of  manure,  have  also  been  potent 
influences  acting  in  the  same  direction.^ 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  these  efforts  have 
been  crowned  with  success.  On  January  1,  1907, 
only  665,226  acres  were  held  by  6021  foreign 
landowners,^  as  against  4,765,546  acres  held  by 
1,224,560  Egyptian  proprietors.  Of  the  latter, 
the  holdings  of  1,081,348  proprietors  were  of  less 
than  5  acres  in  extent;  the  holdings  of  132,198 
varied  from  5  to  50  acres,  thus  leaving  11,054 

*  Full  descriptions  of  the  creation  and  working  both  of  the  Agri- 
cultural Bank  and  of  the  Agricultural  and  Horticultural  Societies 
are  given  in  the  Annual  Reports  which  have  been  laid  before 
Parliament. 

*  For  further  details  up  to  December  31,  1905  see  Egypt,  No.  1  of 
1907,  p.  60.  A  great  deaf  of  the  land  now  held  by  foreigners  belongs 
to  Land  Companies.  It  will  eventually  be  sold.  One  of  the  highest 
authorities  on  this  subject  in  Egypt  (the  late  M.  Felix  Suares)  assured 
me  that  he  was  convinced  that,  before  many  years  had  passed,  almost 
the  whole  of  the  land  in  Egypt  would  be  in  the  hands  of  Egyptians. 


CH.  Lm 


FINANCE 


453 


proprietors  of  more  than  50  acres.  It  may,  I  think, 
be  confidently  stated  that  the  danger,  which  Lord 
Dufferin  apprehended,  has  been  averted. 

Finance  is  often  considered  a  repellent  subject, 
and,  because  it  is  repellent,  it  has  gained  a  reputa- 
tion for  being  more  difficult  to  understand  than  is 
really  the  case.  There  are,  indeed,  some  few 
economic  and  currency  questions  which  are  abstruse, 
but  the  difficulty  of  understanding  even  these  has 
been  in  no  small  degree  increased  by  the  cloud  of 
words  with  which  writers  on  subjects  of  this  sort 
often  surround  issues  in  themselves  simple.  One 
merit  of  the  Egyptian  financial  situation  was  this, 
that  no  semi  -  insoluble  economic  problem  lurked 
between  the  leaves  of  the  Budget.  The  Finance 
Minister  had  not,  as  in  India,  to  deal  with  a 
congested  population,  of  whom  a  large  percentage 
were  in  normal  times  living  on  the  verge  of  starva- 
tion. He  never  had  to  refer  to  the  pages  of 
Malthus  or  Mill,  of  Ricardo  or  Bastiat.  The 
complications  arising  from  a  bewildering  political 
situation  had  done  a  good  deal  to  obscure  the 
problems  which  he  had  to  solve,  and  to  hinder  their 
solution.  But,  in  truth,  all  that  was  required  in 
Egypt,  in  order  to  understand  the  situation,  was  a 
knowledge  of  arithmetic,  patience  to  unravel  the 
cumbersome  system  of  accounts  which  was  the 
offspring  of  internationalism,  and  a  sturdy  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  neither  an  individual  nor  a 
State  can  with  impunity  go  on  Uving  for  an  indefinite 
period  above  his  or  its  income. 

The  main  facts  relating  to  Egyptian  finance, 
when  once  the  thread  of  the  international  labyrinth 
had  ^  been  found,  were,  in  fact,  very  simple ;  when 

1  I  use  the  past  tense  because,  with  the  practical  abolition  of  the 
Caisse  de  la  Dette,  the  financial  situation,  and  notably  the  system  of 
accounts,  has  been  very  greatly  simplified. 


454 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  VI 


they  were  understood,  they  were  not  uninteresting. 
"Nothing,"  as  Lord  INlihier  truly  says,  "in  this 
strange  land  is  commonplace."  The  subject  cannot 
surely  be  devoid  of  interest  when  it  is  remembered 
that  the  difference  between  the  magic  words  surplus 
and  deficit  meant  whether  the  Egyptian  cultivator 
was,  or  was  not,  to  be  allowed  to  reap  the  fruits  of 
his  labour ;  whether,  after  supplying  the  wants  of 
the  State,  he  was  to  be  left  with  barelv  enough  to 
keep  body  and  soul  together,  or  whether  he  was  to 
enjoy  some  degree  of  rustic  ease  ;  whether  he  was 
to  be  eternally  condemned  to  live  in  a  wretched 
mud  hut,  or  whether  he  might  have  an  opportunity 
given  to  him  of  improving  his  dwelling-house; 
whether  he  should  or  should  not  have  water 
supplied  to  his  fields  in  due  season  ;  whether  his 
disputes  with  his  neighbours  should  be  settled  by  a 
judge  who  decided  them  on  principles  of  law,  or 
whether  he  should  be  left  to  the  callous  caprice  of 
some  individual  ignorant  of  law  and  cognisant  only 
of  bakhshish ;  whether,  if  he  were  ill,  he  should  be 
able  to  go  to  a  well-kept  hospital,  or  whether  he 
should  be  unable  to  obtain  any  better  medical 
assistance  than  that  which  could  be  given  to  his 
watch-dog  or  his  donkey;  whether  a  school,  in 
which  something  useful  could  be  learnt,  should  be 
provided  for  his  children,  or  whether  they  should  be 
left  in  the  hands  of  teachers  whose  highest  know- 
ledge consisted  in  being  able  to  intone  a  few  texts, 
which  they  themselves  only  half  understood,  from 
the  Koran ;  whether,  if  he  suffered  from  mental  aber- 
ration, he  should  be  properly  treated  in  a  well-kept 
Lunatic  Asylum,  or  whether  he  should  be  chained 
to  a  post  and  undergo  the  treatment  of  a  wild 
beast ;  whether  he  could  travel  from  one  part  of 
the  country  to  another,  or  communicate  with  his 
friends  by  post  or  telegraph,  at  a  reasonable  or  only 
at  a  prohibitive  cost ;  in  fact,  whether  he,  and  the 


CH.  Lin 


FINANCE 


455 


ten  millions  of  Egyptians  who  were  like  him,  were 
or  were  not  to  have  a  chance  afforded  to  them  of 
taking  a  few  steps  upwards  on  the  ladder  of  moral 
and  material  improvement. 

This,  and  much  more,  is  implied  when  it  is  stated 
that  the  British  and  Egyptian  financiers  arrested 
bankruptcy,  turned  a  deficit  into  a  surplus,  relieved 
taxation,  increased  the  revenue,  controlled  the  ex- 
penditure, and  raised  Egyptian  credit  to  a  level  only 
second  to  that  of  France  and  England.  All  tiie 
other  reforms  which  were  effected  flow  from  this  one 
fact,  that  the  financial  administration  of  Egypt  has 
been  honest,  and  that  the  country,  being  by  nature 
endowed  with  great  recuperative  power,  and  being 
inhabited  by  an  industrious  population,  responded 
to  the  honesty  of  its  rulers.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  in  any  other  country  such  a  remarkable 
transformation  has  been  made  in  so  short  a  time. 


CHAPTER  LIV 


IRRIGATION 

Nature's  bounty  to  Egypt  —  The  work  of  the  Pharaohs — Turkish 
neglect — Progress  under  British  guidance — Programme  of  the 
future  —  Causes  of  the  progress  —  Qualifications  of  the  officers 
selected — Absence  of  international  obstruction — Loan  of  £1,800,000 
— Support  of  the  public — Importance  of  the  work. 

"  If  you  dispute  Providence  and  Destiny,"  says  an 
ancient  author,  "you  can  find  many  things  in 
human  affairs  and  nature  that  you  would  suppose 
might  be  much  better  performed  in  this  or  that 
way;  as,  for  instance,  that  Egypt  should  have 
plenty  of  rain  of  its  own  without  being  irrigated 
from  the  land  of  Ethiopia."  ^  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  nowadays  any  one  would  be  inclined  to 
dispute  Providence  and  Destiny  on  this  ground. 
Indeed,  the  extraordinary  fertility  for  which  Egypt 
has  from  time  immemorial  been  famous,  which 
made  Homer  apply  to  it  the  epithet  of  ^etSwpo?,  and 
which  led  Juvenal  to  sing  of  the  divitis  ostia  NIU^ 
is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  its  fields  are  not 
irrigated  by  the  rain  which  falls  within  its  own 
confines,  but  by  the  vast  stores  of  water  which 
sweep  down  the  Nile  from  the  centre  of  Africa. 
In  no  other  country  in  the  world  may  the  agri- 
culturist be  so  surely  guaranteed  against  the 
accidents  and  vicissitudes  of  the  seasons.  It  is 
true  that  if  the  Nile  is  unusually  high  or  low,  the 

*  Strabo,  Book  iv.  c.  L 
456 


IRRIGATION 


457 


cultivator  is  or,  at  all  events,  was  exposed,  in  the 
one  case,  to  the  evils  of  inundation,  and  in  the  other 
case,  to  those  of  drought.  But  there  is  this  notable 
difference  between  risks  of  this  nature  and  those 
incidental  to  the  cultivation  of  the  fields  in  countries 
which  depend  for  their  water-supply  on  their  own 
rainfall,  namely,  that  whereas  no  human  effort  can 
increase  or  diminish  the  quantity  of  rain  which  falls 
from  the  clouds,  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  within  the 
resources  of  human  skill  to  so  regulate  the  water 
of  the  Nile  flood  as  to  mitigate,  if  not  altogether 
to  obviate,  any  dangers  arising  from  an  insufficient 
or  an  excessive  supply  of  water.  In  this  highly 
favoured  country,  Nature  seems  to  have  said  to 
Man  :  I  grant  you  the  most  favourable  conditions 
possible  under  which  to  till  the  soil, — a  genial 
climate,  an  assured  supply  of  water,  and  a  natural 
fertilising  element,  which,  with  scarcely  an  effort 
of  your  own,  will  every  year  recuperate  the  pro- 
ductive powers  of  the  soil ;  it  is  for  you  to  turn  to 
advantage  the  gifts  which  I  have  lavished  on  you. 

How  did  Man  utilise  his  advantages  ?  In  the 
early  days  of  Egyptian  civilisation,  he  made  great 
and  creditable  efforts  to  turn  them  to  account. 
*'  It  is  certain,"  says  Colonel  Ross,  "  that  in  old 
days,  there  must  have  been  native  engineering 
talent  of  the  very  highest  order,  and  when  we 
read  of  such  and  such  a  King  restoring  public 
works  in  a  long  and  glorious  reign,  there  must 
have  existed  a  continuous  supply  of  good  engineer- 
ing talent  which  had  carte  blanche  from  the  ruler 
of  the  day."  ^ 

The  Pharaohs,  it  would  thus  appear,  used  their 
talent  according  to  the  best  of  their  lights.  The 
Turks,  who  ultimately  succeeded  them,  hid  theirs 
in  a  napkin,  with  the  result  that  Nature,  indignant 
at  the  treatment  accorded  to  her,  minimised  the 


*  Colonel  Ross's  Introduction  to  Willcocks'  Egyptian  Irrigation,  p.  vi. 


458  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 


value  of  her  gifts  and  exacted  penalties  for  the 
neglect  of  her  laws.  In  later  Mohammedan  times, 
no  serious  efforts  were  made  to  avert  drought  or 
inundation.  The  general  condition  of  Egyptian 
irrigation  at  the  time  when  England  took  the 
affairs  of  the  country  in  hand,  was  thus  described 
by  Colonel  Ross  : — 

"  There  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt  that,  up 
to  1882,  Egyptian  irrigation  was  going  downhill. 
Every  year,  some  false  step  was  taken  in  spite  of 
the  engineer.  Every  year,  the  corvee  lost  ground 
in  its  out-turn  of  work,  drains  were  abandoned  or 
became  useless,  and  canals  became  less  of  artificial 
and  more  of  natural  channels  wholly  influenced  by 
the  natural  rise  and  fall  of  the  Nile.  .  .  .  Owing 
to  many  causes,  the  native  talent  has  sunk  so  low 
that,  without  modern  scientific  aid,  the  Egyptians 
could  not  work  their  own  canals.  They  have  sunk 
into  a  dead  conservatism.  .  .  .  The  absence  of 
repairs,  so  common  to  all  JMohammedan  countries, 
and  the  existence  of  the  corvee,  or  forced  labour, 
have  also  largely  contributed  to  the  lowering  of  the 
standard  of  Egyptian  engineers'  design  and  method." 

Here  was  a  grand  opportunity  for  the  English- 
man, and  nobly  did  he  avail  himself  of  it  Con- 
sidering the  importance  of  the  subject,  and  the 
pride  which  every  Englishman  must  feel  at  the 
splendid  results  obtained  by  those  of  his  countrymen 
whom  Lord  Milner  rightly  terms  "the  saviours  of 
Egyptian  irrigation,"  a  sore  temptation  exists  to 
deal  with  this  matter  in  some  detail.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  desirable  to  abridge  this  work ; 
moreover,  the  subject  has  been  already  treated  by 
a  highly  qualified  writer.  The  lassitude  which 
pervades  both  man  and  beast  in  Egypt  during  the 
hot  months,  when  the  land  is  baked  by  the  fiery 
African  sun  and  windswept  by  the  scorching 
khamsin  ;  the  general  relief  experienced  when  the 


IRRIGATION 


459 


Nile  begins  to  rise ;  the  anxiety  to  know  whether 
the  water  will  pass  the  level  of  those  "  low  cubits  " 
which,  it  is  said,  were  designated  by  the  Arabs 
"  the  angels  of  death  "  ;  ^  the  fear  lest  Nature  should 
be  too  prodigal  of  her  gifts  and  destroy  by  excess 
what,  it  was  hoped,  she  would  have  bestowed  by 
moderation  ;  the  revival  of  the  whole  country  when 
the  waters  retire  and  the  earth  begins  to  yield  forth 
her  increase  ;  all  these  things  have  been  admirably 
related  by  Lord  Milner  in  a  chapter  of  his  work, 
entitled  The  Struggle  for  Water.  He  has  also 
described  the  care,  the  watchfulness,  and  the  un- 
tiring energy  displayed  by  the  British  engineers 
in  their  endeavours  to  direct  and  bridle  the  forces 
of  Nature.  At  one  time,  water  had  to  be  economised 
and  hydraulic  skill  exercised  to  make  the  most  of 
a  scanty  supply.  Again,  at  other  times,  constant 
vigilance  was  required  to  guard  against  inundation. 
During  the  season  of  low  Nile,  a  system  of  rotations 
was  adopted,  under  which  the  limited  supply  of 
water  was  turned  to  the  best  advantage  in  the 
interests  of  the  entire  population.  The  privileged 
classes  learnt  to  their  dismay  that  the  rights  of 
their  humble  neighbours  must  be  respected.  The 
Barrage  —  a  work  which  owed  its  origin  to  the 
genius  of  a  French  engineer  —  was,  in  spite  of 
strong  opposition,  repaired  and  rendered  capable 
of  doing  excellent  service.^     New  canals  were 

1  "  With  good  reason  the  Arabs  designate  the  low  cubits  by  the 
name  of  the  "  angels  of  death,"  for,  if  the  river  does  not  reach  its  full 
height,  famine  and  destruction  come  upon  the  whole  land  of  Egypt." 
— Mommsen's  Promnces  of  the  Roman  Empire,  vol.  ii.  p.  252. 

2  When  the  works  at  the  Barrage  were  in  course  of  construction, 
I  visited  them  in  company  with  Ali  Pasha  Moubarek.  He  was  at  that 
time  Minister  of  Public  Works,  and  had  passed  many  years  of  his  life 
in  the  service  of  that  Department.  He  strongly  opposed  Sir  Colin  Scott- 
MoncrieflF's  plan  for  repairing  the  Barrage,  and  was  in  favour  of  the 
costly  and  wasteful  alternative  of  erecting  huge  pumps.  He  remarked 
to  me  casually  on  his  way  down  the  river  that  he  had  not  visited  the 
Barrage  for  twenty-seven  years.  He  was  quite  unconscious  of  the 
criticism  on  his  own  conduct  which  this  admission  involved. 


460 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  VI 


dug.  A  variety  of  useful  works  were  executed 
in  Upper  Egypt  to  guard  against  the  effects  of  a 
low  Nile.  Drainage  went  hand  in  hand  with 
irrigation.  Before  the  British  engineers  had  been 
at  work  ten  years,  the  cotton  crop  was  trebled,  the 
sugar  crop  more  than  trebled,  and  the  country  was 
being  gradually  covered  with  a  network  of  light 
railways  and  agricultural  roads  in  order  to  enable 
the  produce  to  be  brought  to  market. 

Much,  however,  as  the  British  engineer  has  done 
for  Egypt,  his  work  is  not  yet  complete.  The 
whole  of  the  cultivable  lands  in  Egypt  are  not  as 
yet  brought  under  cultivation.^  In  order  to  attain 
this  object,  it  is  estimated  that  it  will  be  necessary 
to  store  about  four  million  cubic  metres  of  water. 
The  magnificent  dam  constructed  at  Assouan, 
which  has  already  rendered  invaluable  service  to 
the  country,^  is  capable  of  storing  one  million  cubic 
metres.  Works  are  now  in  course  of  execution 
which  will  increase  its  storage  capacity  to  about 
2^  millions  of  cubic  metres.  It  is  not  as  yet  decided 
how  any  further  supply  will  be  obtained,  but  a 
general  sketch  of  the  projects  which  are  worthy 
of  consideration  has  been  given  in  Sir  William 
Garstin's  masterly  report  of  March  1904.^  Prob- 
ably, I  shall  not  be  far  from  the  mark  if  I  say 
that,  in  the  course  of  the  next  fifteen  or  twentv 
years,  some  twenty  millions  sterling  may  profit- 
ably be  spent  in  improving  the  Egyptian  and 
Soudanese  systems  of  irrigation. 

1  The  question  of  the  extent  to  which  the  area  of  cotton-bearing  land 
is  capable  of  increase  was  examined  in  some  detail  in  my  Report  for  the 
year  1906.    See  Egt/pt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  45-47. 

^  To  give  one  example,  it  is  estimated  that  the  conversion,  which  is 
now  nearly  complete,  of  404,470  acres  of  land  in  Middle  Egypt  from 
a  system  of  basin  to  one  of  perennial  irrigation  will  increase  the  rental 
value  of  those  lands  by  no  less  than  £E.  2,022,350,  and  the  sale  value 
by  £E. 28,312,900. —^nnwa/  Report  of  the  Irrigation  Department,  1906, 
p.  178. 

3  See  Egypt,  No.  2  of  1904. 


IRRIGATION 


461 


When,  eventually,  the  waters  of  the  Nile,  from 
the  Lakes  to  the  sea,  are  brought  fully  under 
control,  it  will  be  possible  to  boast  that  Man — in 
this  case,  the  Englishman — has  turned  the  gifts  of 
Nature  to  the  best  possible  advantage. 

The  operations  of  the  Irrigation  Department 
have,  in  fact,  been  singularly  successful,  perhaps 
more  so  than  those  of  any  other  Department  of  the 
Government.  To  what  causes  may  this  success  be 
attributed  ? 

It  has,  in  the  first  place,  been  due  to  the  high 
character  and  marked  capacity  of  the  British 
engineers,  who  were  chosen  with  the  utmost  care. 
The  superior  officials  of  the  Irrigation  Department 
came  from  India,  a  country  which  affords  an 
excellent  training  for  the  hydraulic  engineer. 
Armed  with  the  previous  knowledge  which  they 
had  acquired,  they  studied  the  various  problems 
which  Egyptian  irrigation  presented  for  solution, 
and  proposed  nothing  until  they  had  obtained  a 
thorough  mastery  of  the  facts  with  which  they  had 
to  deal.  So  far  as  I  know,  they  have  never  yet 
made  a  serious  mistake. 

But  the  qualifications  of  the  individuals,  high 
though  they  were,  would  have  availed  but  little 
had  not  their  labours  been  exerted  in  a  sphere 
where  adventitious  circumstances  were  favourable 
to  success. 

The  first  of  these  circumstances  was  that,  rela- 
tively to  some  other  branches  of  the  Egyptian 
service,  the  Public  Works  Department  was  from 
the  first  freed  from  the  incubus  of  internationalism. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  actions  of  the 
British  engineers  were  not  in  some  degree  hampered 
by  the  meshes  which  an  obstructive  diplomacy 
had,  with  perverse  ingenuity,  flung  over  the  whole 
governmental  machine  of  Egypt.  Any  such 
supposition  would  be  erroneous.    Ubiquitous  inter- 


462  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

nationalism,  by  imposing  a  fantastic  financial 
system  on  the  country,  and  by  secreting  for  many 
years  the  economies  resulting  from  the  partial  con- 
version of  the  Debt,  limited  the  funds  which  it 
was  possible  to  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  British 
engineers,  and  thus  diminished  their  power  of 
doing  good.  JNIore  than  this,  that  duality,  which 
was  the  bane  of  the  Egyptian  administrative 
system,  existed  at  one  time  in  the  heart  of  the 
Pubhc  Works  Department,  but  fortunately  in  a 
relatively  innocuous  form.  This  duality  was,  how- 
ever, abolished  at  an  early  period  of  the  occupation. 
It  was  felt  that,  in  view  of  the  importance  of  the 
Irrigation  Department,  it  should  be  exclusively  in 
British  hands.  "  It  is  evident,'"  Lord  Dufferin 
wrote  in  1883,  "that  the  present  irrigation  service 
of  Egypt  is  wanting  in  intelligent  direction  and 
honest  and  efficient  inspection.  .  .  .  Egypt  is  so 
similar  to  many  of  the  irrigated  districts  in  India 
that  it  is  only  natural  to  turn  to  that  country  for 
advice." 

Thus,  the  British  engineers  were  left  free  to  desicm 
and  to  execute  their  own  plans  for  the  canalisation 
of  the  country.  They  were  spared  the  calamity 
of  having:  to  deal  with  an  International  Board. 
They  could  decide  on  the  construction  of  a  canal 
without  having  to  consider  whether  the  policy  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  Pacific  or  Indian  Oceans  was 
viewed  with  favour  at  Berlin  or  Paris.  This  was 
a  great  negative  advantage.  The  comparative 
freedom  of  action  accorded  to  the  British  enghieers 
contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  the  success  which 
attended  their  operations. 

In  one  other  respect,  the  British  engineers  were 
fortunate.  However  remarkable  may  have  been 
their  professional  skill,  and  however  sound  their 
plans,  it  is  obvious  that  they  could  have  done 
nothing  without  money.    Funds  were  fortunately 


IRRIGATION 


463 


provided  for  them.  When  the  London  Confer- 
ence on  the  financial  affairs  of  Egypt  took  place 
in  1884,  it  was  proposed  to  borrow  £1,000,000,  to 
be  applied  to  the  improvement  of  the  irrigation 
system  of  the  country.  The  proposal  met  with 
a  good  deal  of  opposition.  Doubts  were  at  the 
time  expressed  by  competent  British  authorities 
as  to  the  wisdom  of  adopting  this  course.  Those 
doubts  were  based  on  reasonable  grounds.  Exces- 
sive borrowing  had  brought  Egypt  to  the  verge  of 
ruin,  and  it  was  pointed  out  that  to  increase  the 
debt  of  a  State  which  was  then  in  a  well-nigh 
bankrupt  condition  was,  at  best,  a  hazardous 
experiment.  Others,  who  had  more  confidence  in 
the  future  of  Egypt  and  in  the  elasticity  of  its 
resources,  were  in  favour  of  a  bolder  policy.  They 
supported  the  view  which,  it  must  be  admitted, 
at  the  time  appeared  somewhat  paradoxical,  that 
the  best  way  to  relieve  the  country  from  the 
burthen  of  a  crushing  debt  resulting  from  loans, 
the  proceeds  of  which  had  been  to  a  large 
extent  squandered,  would  be  to  contract  a  further 
loan,  and  to  apply  the  money  thus  obtained  to 
developing  the  resources  of  the  country.  After  a 
sharp  struggle,  this  latter  view  prevailed.  A  sum 
of  £1,000,000  for  irrigation  purposes  was  included 
in  the  loan  contracted  for  the  payment  of  the 
Alexandria  indemnities  and  other  purposes.  In 
1890,  an  additional  sum  of  £800,000  was  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Public  Works  Department  for 
irrigation  and  drainage  works. 

In  my  Report  for  1891,  after  describing  the  ex- 
tent to  which  the  productive  powers  of  the  country 
had  been  increased  by  irrigation,  I  added  : — 

"  The  policy  of  increasing  the  debt  of  Egypt, 
which  was  adopted  seven  years  ago,  has  been 
amply  justified.  I  should  be  the  last  to  wish  that 
the  facts  which  I  have  narrated  above  should  be 


464  MODERN  EGYPT 


used  as  a  justification  for  reckless  borrowing,  but 
they  certainly  do  show  that  cases  may  arise  in 
which  a  quasi- bankrupt  State,  if  it  be  possessed  of 
great  natural  resources,  may  be  placed  in  a  position 
of  solvency  by  adding  to  its  debt,  provided  always 
that  the  money  borrowed  be  judiciously  applied. 
In  cases  of  this  sort,  the  main  difficulty  generally 
is  to  ensure  the  execution  of  the  proviso.  So  far 
as  Egypt  is  concerned,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  say- 
ing that  the  expenditure  of  this  £1,800,000  on 
irrigation  and  drainage  has  contributed  probably 
more  than  any  one  cause  to  the  comparative  pros- 
perity that  the  country  now  enjoys.  It  ensured 
the  solvency  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury,  and  until 
this  was  done,  no  very  serious  effort  was  possible 
in  the  direction  of  moral  and  material  progress." 

Lastly,  when  once  his  value  had  been  recognised 
— that  is  to  say,  in  a  very  short  space  of  time — the 
British  engineer  secured  the  support  of  Egyptian 
public  opinion.  The  facts  were,  indeed,  so  strong 
as  to  bring  conviction  to  the  minds  of  the  most 
prejudiced  and  sceptical.  The  fellah  might  fail 
to  realise  the  utility  and  insignificance  of  some 
of  the  reforms  instituted  under  British  tutelage, 
but  he  knew  the  value  of  water  to  an  extent  which 
can  perliaps  scarcely  be  appreciated  by  inhabitants 
of  northern  countries.  No  amount  of  misrepre- 
sentation could  persuade  him  that  the  man  who 
brought  to  his  fields,  in  a  measure  surpassing 
his  wildest  expectations,  the  element  for  which  he 
thirsted,  was  not  his  benefactor. 

Till  taught  by  pain, 
Men  really  know  not  what  good  water's  worth.^ 

The  British  engineer,  in  fact,  unconsciously 
accomplished  a  feat  which,  in  the  eyes  of  a 
politician,  is  perhaps  even  more  remarkable  than 

'  Don  Juan,  ii.  84. 


CH.  uv  IRRIGATION 


465 


that  of  controlling  the  refractory  waters  of  the 
Nile.  He  justified  Western  methods  to  Eastern 
minds.  He  inculcated,  in  a  manner  which  arrested 
and  captivated  even  the  blurred  intellect  and  way- 
ward imagination  of  the  poor,  ignorant  Egyptian 
fellah,  the  lesson  that  the  usurer  and  the  retailer 
of  adulterated  drinks  are  not  the  sole  products  of 
European  civilisation  ;  and,  inasmuch  as  he  achieved 
this  object,  he  deserves  the  gratitude  not  only  of 
all  intelligent  Asiatics,  but  also  of  all  Europeans — 
of  the  rulers  of  Algiers  and  of  Tunis  as  well  as 
those  of  India. 


VOL.  II 


CHAPTER  LV 


THE  ARMY* 

Disbandment  of  the  army  in  1882 — History  of  the  army — Mehemet 
Ali's  Syrian  campaigns — Ismail  Pasha — The  Abyssinian  campaig-u 
— Tel-el-Kebir — It  is  decided  to  form  a  fellaheen  army  officered 
by  Englishmen — The  black  battalions — Will  the  army  fight? — 
Reasons  why  the  reorganisation  has  been  successfully  conducted. 

In  leaving  the  work  of  the  civilian  for  that  of  the 
soldier,  we  at  once  seem  to  pass  from  the  involved 
and  cautious  language  of  diplomacy  to  the  out- 
spoken behests  of  the  barrack-yard.  One  of  the 
first  points  which  had  to  be  considered  after  the 
battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir  had  been  fought  and  won 
was  what  should  be  done  with  the  Egyptian  army. 
The  soldier  advisers  of  the  British  and  Egyptian 
Governments  answered  this  question  with  military 
frankness.  The  Egyptian  army,  as  then  consti- 
tuted, was  worse  than  useless.  It  had  proved 
itself  a  danger  to  the  State.  It  could  mutiny,  but  it 
could  not,  or  would  not  fight.  The  logical  conclu- 
sion to  be  drawn  from  this  statement  of  facts  was 
that  the  existing  army  should  be  disbanded,  and 
another  army  created  in  its  place.  Accordingly, 
on  September  19,  1882,  that  is  to  say,  six  days 
after  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir  had  been  fouglit, 
the  following  laconic  Decree  appeared  in  the  Official 
Journal : — 

1  In  the  preparation  of  this  chapter,  I  have  been  materially  aided  by 
Sir  Reginald  Wingate. 

466 


CH,  LV 


THE  ARMY 


467 


"  Nous,  Khedive  d'Egypte,  consid^rant  la  rebellion 
militaire, 

D^CR^TONS 

Art.  1. 

L'arm^e  Egyptienne  est  dissoute. 

(Signe)       Mehemet  Tewfik.* 

Out  of  what  material  was  a  new  army  to 
be  formed  ?  Could  the  fellaheen,  who  had  but 
recently  shown  themselves  so  destitute  of  military 
qualities,  be  made  into  good  soldiers  ?  It  was  im- 
possible at  the  time  to  answer  this  latter  question 
confidently  in  the  affii'mative.  Nevertheless,  the 
past  history  of  Egypt  was  there  to  show  that  the 
behaviour  of  the  troops  at  Tel-el-Kebir  did  not 
constitute  a  sufficient  proof  that  the  answer  should 
be  a  decided  negative.  For  centuries  past,  Egypt 
had  been  ruled  by  foreign  conquerors,  who  intro- 
duced their  own  or  mercenary  troops  in  order  to 
maintain  their  authority.  The  Egyptian  fellah 
had  inherited  no  warlike  attributes ;  rather  was  he 
the  outcome  of  a  system  of  serfdom  and  slavery 
well  calculated  to  stifle  all  military  instincts. 

It  has  been  the  custom  to  give  Mehemet  Ali 
the  credit  of  having  been  the  first  to  realise  that 
Egypt  had  ready  to  hand  in  the  fellaheen  the  raw 
material  out  of  which  a  national  army  could  be 
formed.  The  defeats  which  he  inflicted  on  the 
Turkish  armies  in  Syria  are  adduced  in  proof  of 
the  success  of  his  military  policy.  To  a  certain 
extent,  the  praise  bestowed  on  Mehemet  Ali  in 
this  connection  is  justified.  What  he  did  was 
briefly  this.  His  early  campaigns  against  the 
Wahabis  (1811-18),  and  his  campaigns  in  Nubia 
and  Sennar  (1820-22)  were  conducted  with  mer- 
cenary troops.  Subsequently,  that  is  to  say,  in 
1822-24,  being  carried  away  by  the  regnandi  dira 


468  MODERN  EGYPT 


cupido,  he  required  a  larger  army.  It  was  not 
possible  to  obtain  an  adequate  supply  of  Albanians 
or  Circassians.  An  attempt  made  to  utilise 
the  blacks  of  the  Soudan  resulted  in  failure,  by 
reason  of  the  mortality  which  prevailed  amongst 
them  when  they  were  transported  from  tropical 
Africa  to  the  relatively  cold  climate  of  Egypt. 
Mehemet  Ali  had,  therefore,  to  fall  back  on  the 
Egyptian  peasantry. 

The  experiment  was  crowned  with  some  measure 
of  success.  The  fellah  is  hardy  and  robust.  He 
soon  proved  himself  to  be  a  docile  soldier.  In 
1824,  a  battalion  of  Egyptians  was  sent  to  Arabia, 
another  to  Sennar,  and  four  battalions  were  de- 
spatched to  the  Morea,  under  the  celebrated 
Ibrahim  Pasha.  Then  came  the  first  Syrian  war, 
when  the  veteran  ranks  were  swelled  by  crowds  of 
fellaheen  raised  under  the  most  tyrannous  of  con- 
scriptions.^ Yet  this  force  carried  all  before  it. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that,  had  not  European 
diplomacy  intervened,  Ibrahim  Pasha  might,  after 
the  battle  of  Konia,  have  marched  to  Constantinople 
with  little  or  no  opposition.  It  was  this  success, 
followed  by  the  victory  at  Nezib  over  the  Turkish 
troops  in  the  second  Syrian  war  of  1839,  which  had 
the  effect  of  raising  the  Egyptian  soldiery  to  a 
position  of  some  celebrity  as  a  force  of  acknow- 
ledged value. 

Prior  to  the  battle  of  Konia,  the  strength  of  the 
Egyptian  army  and  navy,  the  former  of  which  had 
been  organised  by  French  officers,  consisted,  accord- 
ing to  Clot  Bey,'  of  277,000  men,  of  whom  130,000 
were  regular  troops.  Of  the  regular  troops,  the 
bulk  of  the  infantry  was  nominally  composed  of 

1  "  Women  were  hung  up  by  the  hair  of  the  head  and  whipped 
till  they  disclosed  their  sons'  hidiug-places.  Those  that  were  taken 
were  never  seen  again.  Once  a  soldier  always  a  soldier,  in  Hirahim 
Pasha's  army." — lAfe  and  Letters  of  Lady  Hester  Stanhope,  p.  263. 

*  AperfU  sur  tEgypte,  vol.  iL  p.  235. 


CH.  LV 


THE  ARMY 


469 


fellaheen,  but  the  system  under  which  they  were 
recruited  leaves  little  doubt  that  there  was  a  con- 
siderable foreign  element  in  the  ranks.  Not  only 
the  officers,  but  also  a  large  proportion  of  the  non- 
commissioned officers  were  Turks,  Albanians,  etc. 
It  is  said  that,  as  the  result  of  Ibrahim  Pasha's 
experience  in  Arabia,  it  was  decided  never  to  pro- 
mote an  Egyptian  above  the  rank  of  sergeant.  As 
regards  the  composition  of  the  other  arms,  it  is  not 
possible  to  obtain  accurate  statistics,  but  during 
the  early  years  of  the  British  occupation  there  were 
still  many  living  who  could  remember  that  a  large 
proportion  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  cavalry  were 
Turks  and  Circassians,  whilst  in  the  artillery  the 
proportion  of  the  latter  was  still  greater.  It  is  to 
be  remembered  that  when,  in  1826,  Sultan  Mah- 
moLid  ordered  the  massacre  of  the  Janissaries,  a 
large  number  of  the  survivors  fled  to  Egypt,  where 
they  accepted  service  in  the  newly  organised  army. 
Again,  during  Ibrahim  Pasha's  campaign  in  Syria, 
he  increased  his  strength  by  recruiting  locally  from 
the  mountain  tribes  and  Bedouins.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  the  army  with  which  Ibrahim  Pasha 
won  his  victories  was  not,  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term,  a  purely  national  army.  A  strong  foreign 
element  existed,  not  only  amongst  the  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers,  but  also  amongst  the 
rank  and  file. 

Moreover,  in  judging  of  the  importance  to  be 
attached  to  the  military  prowess  of  the  Egyptian 
troops  in  the  days  of  Mehemet  Ali,  account  has  to 
be  taken  of  the  state  of  the  Turkish  army.  Prior 
to  1826,  the  armed  forces  of  Turkey  consisted  of 
the  Janissaries.  After  their  destruction  and  dis- 
bandment,  there  was,  in  point  of  fact,  no  disciplined 
Turkish  military  force  left.  The  disaster  of 
Navarino,  followed  by  the  Russo- Turkish  war 
of  1828-29,  left  Sultan  Mahmoud  in  the  position 


470  MODERN  EGYPT 


of  having  to  send  against  Ibrahim  "disaffected 
armies  of  raw  recruits,  badly  officered  and  worse 
generalled."  ^  In  comparison  with  these  raw  levies, 
the  Egyptian  army  represented  a  well-organised  and 
well -disciplined  force,  trained  by  able  foreign 
officers  on  European  principles,  and,  moreover, 
leavened  with  a  considerable  proportion  of  veteran 
troops  who  had  had  experience  of  actual  war  in 
the  Morea,  Arabia,  and  elsewhere.  More  than  this, 
they  had  in  Ibrahim  Pasha  a  leader  possessed  of 
undoubted  military  genius,  whose  actions  bore  the 
stamp  of  energy,  foresight,  and  skill. 

Ibrahim  Pasha's  successes  in  Syria  afford, 
therefore,  ample  proof  that  a  well -disciplined  and 
well-led  force  will  almost  invariably  defeat  badly 
disciplined  and  untrained  levies,  however  superior 
be  the  numbers  of  the  latter.  But  to  say  more 
than  this  would  exceed  the  limits  of  justifiable 
deduction.  To  make  the  result  of  the  Syrian 
battles  the  standard  by  which  to  gauge  the  per- 
manent fighting  value  of  the  Egyptians  would 
involve  a  generalisation  of  too  hasty  and  too 
sweeping  a  character.  Mr.  William  Dye,  an 
American  officer  formerly  in  the  Egyptian  service, 
after  reviewing  the  military  history  of  Egypt,  says  : 
"  Ibrahim's  successes  at  Konia  and  elsewhere  were 
due  to  his  generalship,  certainly  not  to  any  peculiar 
qualities  that  the  fellah  may  have  possessed  as 
a  soldier."  The  fact  that  under  Abbas  I.  the 
Egyptians  were  driven  from  Nejd,  and  that  the 
Wahabite  State  regained  its  independence,  con- 
firms the  correctness  of  this  opmion. 

Said  Pasha,  the  successor  of  Abbas  I.,  at  first 
played  with  his  soldiers,  and  then  disbanded  the 
greater  part  of  the  army.  In  1863,  it  consisted  of 
only  3000  men.  The  personnel  was  disorganised 
and  the  material  defective. 

*  Creasy's  History  of  the  Ottoman  Turks,  voL  ii.  p.  437. 


CH.  LV 


THE  ARMY 


471 


On  Ismail's  accession,  his  first  care  was  to 
increase  the  military  power  of  the  State.  He 
believed,  or,  at  all  events,  he  acted  as  if  he  believed 
in  the  fighting  qualities  of  the  fellaheen.  Said 
Pasha  had  been  the  first  to  employ  men  of  fellah 
extraction  as  officers,  but  he  did  not  allow  them  to 
be  promoted  above  the  rank  of  captain.  Ismail 
Pasha  made  an  important  and  hazardous  innovation. 
He  allowed  Egyptians  to  be  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  colonel. 

The  first  opportunity  of  testing  the  value  of 
Ismail  Pasha's  army  occurred  in  1874,  when  a 
rebellion  broke  out  in  Darfour.  It  was  suppressed 
by  General  Gordon,  who  discarded  his  Egyptian 
soldiers  and  mainly  employed  troops  raised  on  the 
S])ot.  "  The  officers  and  men,"  he  wrote,  "  are  a 
cowardly  set.  They  are  good  marchers,  and  bear 
privation  well,  but  that  is  all  I  can  say  in  their 
favour.  ...  I  have  not  the  least  confidence  in  iny 
officers  and  men.  ...  I  cannot  bear  these  Egyptian 
officers.  They  have  no  good  quality.  I  like  the 
blacks ;  now,  these  black  soldiers  are  the  only 
troops  in  the  Egyptian  service  worth  anything."^ 

Then  came  the  disastrous  Abyssinian  campaign 
of  1876,  when  the  Egyptians  were,  on  several 
occasions,  routed  with  heavy  loss.  Mr.  Dye,  in 
criticising  these  operations,  says :  "  There  was  no 
vuiity  of  command,  there  was  no  cohesion  among 
the  parts  of  the  army.  This  was  due  to  the  want 
of  individual  interest  among  the  men  in  the 
campaign,  a  general  need  of  good  officers  and  a 
lack  of  discipline,  and  of  any  equitable  system  of 
rewards  and  punishments." 

That  the  Egyptian  army  did  not  suffer  any 
further  reverses  during  Ismail  Pasha's  reign  is 
probably  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  not  again 
seriously  involved  in  warlike  operations.  Ismail 

*  General  Gordon  in  Central  Africa,  p.  151. 


472 


MODERN  EGYPT 


was  assuredly  more  successful,  during  the  latter 
years  of  his  reign,  in  disorganising,  than  he  had 
been,  during  his  earlier  years,  in  organising  an 
army.  It  has  been  shown  in  the  course  of  this 
narrative  how  the  son  reaped,  in  the  shape  of  overt 
mutiny,  the  whirlwind  which  the  father  had  sown. 

It  is  impossible  for  an  army  to  mutiny  without 
its  value  as  a  fighting- machine  being  impaired. 
We  are,  indeed,  so  accustomed  to  connect  military 
efficiency  with  military  subordination  that  it  is 
well-nigh  impossible  to  dissociate  the  two  ideas. 
Nevertheless,  the  greater  or  less  degree  of  harm 
inflicted  on  military  efficiency  by  any  mutiny 
must  depend  in  some  measure  on  the  causes  and 
circumstances  of  the  mutiny  itself.  If,  as  happened 
in  India  in  1857,  the  rank  and  file  rebel  against 
their  officers,  the  mutineers  must  of  necessity  take 
the  field  under  circumstances  of  great  disadvantage 
to  themselves.  The  men  are  suddenly  deprived  of 
the  leaders  to  whom  they  have  been  accustomed  to 
yield  implicit  obedience.  The  case  of  Arabi's  armv 
was  diffisrent.  The  men  did  not  mutiny  against 
their  officers ;  it  was  the  officers  who  mutinied 
against  the  Khedive,  and  who  carried  the  rank  and 
file  with  them.  It  may  be  said  that  practically 
the  army  rebelled  en  bloc.  It  is  true  that  a  few 
Turkish  and  Circassian  officers  disappeared,  the 
Arabi  movement  having  been  primarily  directed 
against  them.  But  their  numbers  were  not 
sufficient  to  dislocate  the  military  machine.  More- 
over, their  disappearance  only  enhanced  the  lesson, 
which  was  rudely  inculcated  by  Lord  Wolseley, 
as  to  the  fighting  value  of  an  Egyptian  army 
led  by  Egyptian  officers.  Arabi's  soldiers  had,  in 
fact,  every  inducement  to  fight,  and  every  oppor- 
tunity of  showing  what  they  could  do  in  the  way 
of  fighting.  They  represented,  or,  at  all  events, 
they  purported  to  represent,  the  forces  of  indignant 


CH.  LV 


THE  ARMY 


473 


patriotism  calling  on  the  sons  of  the  soil  to  repel 
a  foreign  foe.  Their  cause  was  that  of  the  Moslem 
against  the  Christian,  of  the  native  Egyptian 
against  the  upholders  of  Turkish  tyranny.  They 
fought  under  local  conditions  of  great  advantage. 
Arabi  occupied  at  Tel-el-Kebir  an  entrenched 
position  of  great  strength.  The  attacking  force, 
which  had  to  advance  up  a  "  glacis-like  slope,"  was 
numerically  only  one-half  as  strong  as  the  defenders. 
Yet  within  twenty  minutes  of  the  first  shot  being 
fired,  the  Egyptian  force  was  in  full  retreat  with  a 
loss  of  upwards  of  2000  killed,  whilst  the  British 
force,  which  delivered  a  frontal  attack,  only  lost 
459  men  killed  and  wounded.  Manifestly,  Arabi's 
force  was,  in  Dry  den's  oft-quoted  words,  nothing 
but  a  rude  militia. 

In  peace  a  charge,  in  war  a  weak  defence. 

Europe  was  astonished,  and  some  hostile  critics, 
being  unable  to  show  that  Arabi  had  in  reality  been 
a  victor  in  the  fray,  found  consolation  in  the  fiction 
that  the  battle  had  been  won  by  British  gold. 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  Soudan  confirmed 
the  lesson  which  was  to  be  derived  from  the  experi- 
ence of  Tel-el-Kebir.  Everywhere  the  Dervishes 
drove  the  fellaheen  soldiers  before  them. 

Such  were  the  historical  facts  with  which  Lord 
DufFerin  and  his  military  advisers  had  to  deal  in 
1882,  They  all  pointed  to  one  inevitable  con- 
clusion. It  was  that  an  Egyptian  army  officered 
by  native  Egyptians  was  worse  than  useless.  The 
question  of  employing  mercenary  soldiers  was  dis- 
cussed. Lord  Dufferin  wisely  decided  to  put 
aside  all  idea  of  enrolling  Albanians,  Circassians,  or 
other  waifs  and  strays  of  the  Mediterranean.  He 
laid  it  down  as  a  principle  that  the  army  "  should 
be  essentially  composed  of  native  Egyptians.  .  .  . 
Egypt  has  had  enough  of  Mamelukes  and  their 


474  MODERN  EGYPT 


congeners."  The  officers  were  to  be  supplied  from 
England.  An  experiment  was  to  be  made  with  a 
view  to  ascertaining  whether  what  Lord  DufFerin 
termed  "  the  metamorphic  spirit  of  the  age " — 
aided  by  a  certain  number  of  British  officers  and 
drill-sergeants — could  achieve  the  remarkable  feat 
of  turning  the  fellah  into  an  efficient  soldier. 

Sir  Evelyn  Wood — who  was  subsequently 
succeeded,  first,  by  Lord  Grenfell,  and,  later,  by 
Lord  Kitchener  and  Sir  Reginald  Wingate — was 
appointed  to  command  the  army.  The  cadres  of 
battalions  were  formed  by  carefully  selecting  from 
the  debris  of  Arabi's  army  the  requisite  number  of 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  The  rank 
and  file  were  taken  straight  from  the  plough. 

The  British  officers  had  an  arduous  task  to 
perform.  Not  only  had  every  branch  of  the 
military  administrative  machine  to  be  created 
afresh ;  not  only  had  the  oppressive  recruiting 
system,  which  formerly  existed,  to  be  swept 
away  and  an  improved  system  put  in  its  place ; 
not  only  had  the  Englishman  to  wage  unremit- 
ting war  against  corruption  and  against  the  other 
chronic  diseases  of  Egyptian  administration  and 
society ;  but,  in  reversing  the  old,  and  entering 
upon  the  new  order  of  things,  it  was  necessary 
to  implant  in  the  minds  of  the  fellaheen  the 
fact  that  discipline  could  be  strict  without  being 
oppressive ;  that  the  period  of  service  for  which 
they  had  been  enrolled  would  not  be  prolonged 
beyond  that  prescribed  by  law ;  that  they  would 
receive  their  pay  and  their  food  regularly ;  that 
the  former  would  never  be  stopped  except  for 
misconduct;  that  they  would  no  longer  be 
subjected  to  brutal  treatment  at  the  hands  of  their 
officers ;  that  any  complaints  which  they  might  make 
would  be  impartially  investigated,  and  that,  if  they 
committed  any  crime,  they  would  be  fairly  tried  and 


CH.  LV 


THE  ARMY 


475 


would  only  receive  punishment  in  proportion  to  the 
gravity  of  the  offence.  All  these  difficulties  were 
overcome.  Professional  skill  was  brought  to  bear 
on  all  administrative  questions.  High  character 
and  integrity  graduaUy  weaned  the  fellaheen  soldiers 
from  the  idea  that  the  exercise  of  authority  was 
synonymous  with  the  committal  of  injustice. 
Indeed,  the  moral  reforms  which  the  British 
officers  achieved  rank  even  higher  than  their 
administrative  successes,  albeit  these  latter  were 
also  remarkable.  Looking  to  the  past  history 
and  actual  condition  of  Egypt  in  1882,  it  might 
well  have  been  thought  that  confidence  in  those 
placed  in  authority  over  him  would  be  a  plant 
of  very  slow  growth  in  the  mind  of  the  Egyptian 
fellah.  Yet,  the  British  officers  of  the  Egyptian 
army  speedily  accomplished  the  remarkable  feat 
of  obtaining  the  complete  confidence  of  their 
men.  Not  only,  moreover,  does  this  spirit  of 
confidence  now  pervade  all  ranks  of  the  army, 
but  it  extends  to  every  family  in  the  country.  The 
relations  of  the  soldiers  understand  the  altered  con- 
ditions under  which  conscription  is  conducted,  and 
the  regulations  of  the  army  enforced.  "  The  re- 
appearance of  the  fellah  soldier,"  Lord  Milner 
says,  "in  his  native  village  after  an  absence  of  a 
year  in  the  barracks — not  crawling  back  mutilated, 
or  smitten  by  some  foul  disease,  but  simply  walk- 
ing in  as  a  visitor,  healthy,  well-dressed,  and  with 
some  money  in  his  pocket — was  like  the  vision  of 
a  man  risen  from  the  dead."^ 

Thus,  the  reconstituted  army  consisted,  in  the 
first  instance,  only  of  fellaheen.  About  6000  men 
were  raised.  These  were  formed  into  two  brigades, 
one  of  which  was  commanded  by  British  and  the 
other  by  Egyptian  officers.  It  was  intended  that 
this  force  should  mainly  be  used  as  an  aid  to 

*  England  in  Egypt,  p.  176. 


476  MODERN  EGYPT 


the  constabulary  in  the  maintenance  of  internal 
tranquillity.  The  soldiers  were  to  "prevent  the 
Bedouins  from  causing  trouble  along  the  desert 
border."  They  were  to  suppress  "  small  local 
insurrections."^  It  was  not  contemplated  at  the 
time  that  they  would  ever  be  employed  in  the 
Soudan.  As,  however,  events  in  the  Soudan  de- 
veloped and  tlie  power  of  the  Mahdi  grew,  it  became 
evident  that  the  southern  frontier  of  Egypt  would 
either  have  to  be  permanently  defended  by  British 
troops,  or  that  the  Egyptian  army  would  have 
to  be  increased  and  improved  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  render  it  possible  to  dispense  with  British 
aid.  To  have  relied  wholly  on  fellaheen  troops 
would  manifestly  have  been  dangerous.  The 
necessity  of  stiffening  what  Lord  Dufferin  called 
"the  invertebrate  ranks  of  the  fellaheen  soldiery" 
had  arisen.  An  unsuccessful  attempt  was  made 
to  raise  a  brigade  of  Turks.  The  nucleus  of 
a  battalion  of  Albanians  was  formed.  They 
mutinied,  and  were  disbanded  in  a  few  weeks. 
It  was  then  decided  to  fall  back  on  the  blacks 
of  the  Soudan.  Thus,  Lord  Dufferin's  fellaheen 
army  was  eventually  converted  into  a  combined 
force  of  fellaheen  and  blacks. 

The  blacks,  who  join  as  volunteers,  belong  for 
the  most  part  to  the  tribes  who  are  found  on 
the  Upper  Nile  from  near  Kodok  to  the  Equatorial 
Province ;  others  come  from  the  west  beyond 
Kordofan,  and  even  from  as  far  as  Wadai  and 
Bornou.  Many  of  them  are  little  better  than 
savages.  They  are  difficult  to  control,  and  are 
as  thoughtless,  capricious,  and  wanting  in  fore- 
sight as  children.  They  are  not  quick  at  drill, 
nor  are  they  fond  of  it,  affording  in  this  respect 

*  Some  authorities  went  so  far  in  1882-83  as  to  hold  that  no 
Egyptian  army  was  required.  Lord  Dufferin  wisely  rejected  this 
extreme  view. 


CH.  LV 


THE  ARMY 


477 


a  contrast  to  the  fellah,  who,  true  to  his  national 
characteristics,  is  an  admirable  automaton.  The 
blacks  are  very  excitable.  On  the  other  hand, 
their  initiative,  dash,  and  instincts  of  self-defence 
make  them  invaluable  as  fighting  troops. 

Before  the  British  officers  had  been  long  at 
work,  it  was  clear  that  they  had  created  a  small 
army  superior  in  quality  to  anything  which  Egypt 
had  heretofore  possessed.  That  army  was  endowed 
with  all  those  outward  and  visible  signs  of  efficiency 
of  which  note  can  be  taken  in  time  of  peace. 
Would  it,  however,  fight  ?  That  was  a  question 
which  for  some  while  remained  doubtful.  But 
all  doubts  have  now  been  removed.  The  history 
of  the  Soudan,  which  has  been  narrated  in  this 
work,  enables  the  question  to  be  confidently 
answered  in  the  affirmative. 

The  reasons  why  the  endeavours  to  form  an 
efficient  military  force  in  Egypt  have  been  crowned 
with  success  are  clear.  The  British  officer  has 
been  allowed  a  free  hand ;  he  has  had  even  greater 
liberty  of  action  than  the  British  engineer.  Even 
a  devotee  of  cosmopolitan  principles  would  hesitate 
to  subject  the  command  of  an  armed  force  to  the 
disintegrating  process  of  internationalism.  In  spite, 
however,  of  the  success  which  has  so  far  attended 
the  efforts  of  military  reformers  in  Egypt,  it 
should  never  be  forgotten  that  an  army  composed 
of  Moslems  and  officered  to  a  considerable  extent 
by  Christians  is  a  singularly  delicate  machine,  which 
requires  most  careful  handling. 


CHAPTER  LVl 


THE  INTERIOR 

Uncertainty  of  British  policy — Difficulties  of  administrative  reform — 
Lord  Dufferin's  Police  proposals — Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd — Changes 
made  in  the  Police  organisation — Nubar  Pasha's  conflict  with 
Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd — The  latter  resigns — Friction  in  the  Interior — 
Appointment  of  an  Adviser — And  of  Inspectors — Difficulties  of  the 
present  moment. 

Cases  have  so  far  been  discussed  in  which  the 
reformer  was,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  crippled 
by  internationalism,  or  hampered  by  the  anomalous 
nature  of  an  official  position  in  which  he  was 
expected  to  fulfil  many  of  the  functions  of  a 
INIinister  without  possessing  ministerial  rank  or 
authority.  It  is  now  necessary  to  deal  with  a 
case  in  which  the  evils  arising  from  the  uncer- 
tainty, which  for  many  years  hung  over  the 
future  of  British  policy  in  Egypt,  come  into 
special  prominence.  Whether  the  British  occupa- 
tion was  to  be  temporary  or  permanent,  there 
could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  desirability  of  relieving 
taxation,  digging  canals,  and  creating  a  well- 
disciplined  army  which  would  be  able  to  repel 
Dervish  invasion.  The  financier,  the  engineer,  and 
the  soldier  might,  indeed,  think  that  the  edifice 
which  each  had  reared  would  either  collapse  at 
once,  should  British  influence  cease  to  be  para- 
mount, or  gradually  decay  when  exposed  to  the 
dry-rot  of  unchecked  Pashadom.  But  however 
that  might  be,  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the 

478 


THE  INTERIOR 


479 


kind  of  edifice  which  had  to  be  constructed ;  its 
nature  was,  indeed,  indicated  by  certain  well- 
recognised  professional  canons. 

The  case  of  internal  administrative  reform  was 
different.  It  might  have  been  thought  that  the 
work  of  organising  the  Department  of  the  Interior 
would,  relatively  to  other  Departments,  have 
presented  but  little  difficulty  to  the  Englishman, 
with  his  law  -  abiding  tendencies,  his  practical 
common  sense,  and  his  freedom  from  bureaucratic 
formalism.  The  main  thing  was  to  organise  a 
Police  force,  to  appoint  a  few  Police  Magistrates, 
and  to  lay  down  a  few  simple  rules  for  the  relations 
which  were  to  exist  between  the  judicial  and 
executive  authorities.  Work  of  this  sort  could 
not  surely  present  any  insuperable  difficulties  to  a 
nation  whose  dominion  was  world-wide,  and  who 
had  shown  a  special  genius  for  the  government  of 
subject  races. 

Conclusions  drawn  from  general  arguments  of 
this  nature  are  often  liable  to  error  from  forgetful- 
ness  of  the  fact  that  certain  combinations  will  not 
bring  about  certain  anticipated  results  unless  it  be 
ascertained  that  no  link  is  wanting  in  the  chain  of 
circumstances  necessary  to  fulfil  the  conditions  of 
the  required  combination.  Even  Euclid  had  to 
assume  the  truth  of  his  postulates.  There  can 
be  little  doubt  that  if  the  conditions  under  which 
the  work  of  Egyptian  administrative  reform  was 
undertaken  had  been  favourable,  a  success  equal 
to  that  of  which  the  British  administrative  reformer 
may  boast  in  India  and  elsewhere  would  speedUy 
have  been  achieved.  But  the  conditions  were  not 
only  less  favourable  than  in  other  countries,  they 
were  unfavourable  even  when  judged  by  the 
standard  of  Egyptian  intricacy.  It  was  not  only 
that  the  British  reformer  was  deprived  of  liberty 
of  action  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be  unable  to 


180  MODERN  EGYPT 


execute  his  own  plans.  It  was  not  only  that  he 
had  to  pose  as  a  subordinate  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  act  in  a  great  measure  as  a  superior. 
Difficulties  even  more  formidable  than  these 
had  to  be  encountered.  He  was  in  the  position 
of  an  architect  who  was  told  to  design  a  house 
without  any  indication  as  to  whether  the  build- 
ing was  to  be  a  king's  palace  or  the  cottage  of  a 
peasant.  No  one  could  tell  him  precisely  what 
was  required  of  him.  Was  he  to  allow  the 
abominable  Police  system  which  he  found  in 
existence  to  remain  in  force  with  merely  some 
slight  modifications  ?  Certainly  not.  He  was 
expected  to  reform,  and  he  was  well  aware  that  he 
could  not  make  a  silk  purse  out  of  a  sow's  ear.  Was 
he  to  take  the  matter  vigorously  in  hand,  employ 
agents  on  whom  he  could  thoroughly  rely,  and  intro- 
duce a  rational  system  based  partly  on  the  experience 
gained  in  other  countries,  and  partly  on  the  special 
requirements  of  Egypt  ?  From  many  points  of 
view  this  would  unquestionably  have  been  the  best 
course  to  pursue,  but  he  had  to  remember — and 
here  the  most  important  link  in  the  chain  of 
circumstances  necessary  to  ensure  success  snapped 
in  twain — that  the  British  occupation  was  only 
temporary,  that  the  authority  of  the  native  rulers 
must  not  be  impaired,  and  that  it  was  useless  to 
begin  the  construction  of  a  system  which  could 
not  be  completed  in  the  limited  time  at  his 
disposal,  and  which  would  of  a  surety  fall  to 
pieces  directly  the  Englishman  turned  his  back. 
For,  indeed,  a  severe  relapse  could,  in  this  instance, 
be  predicted  with  absolute  certainty.  There 
might  be  some  faint  hope  that,  if  the  occupa- 
tion ceased,  self-interest  would  lead  the  rulers 
of  Egypt  to  employ  British  engineers  to  supervise 
the  supply  and  distribution  of  water.  It  was  con- 
ceivable, though  improbable,  that  the  first  outcome 


THE  INTERIOR 


481 


of  the  withdrawal  of  effective  British  control  would 
not  be  the  reproduction  of  financial  chaos.  But  it 
was  altogether  inconceivable  that  the  cause  of  in- 
ternal administrative  reform  should  prosper  in  the 
hands  of  the  Egyptian  governing  classes,  if  they 
were  left  entirely  to  their  own  devices.  For,  in  fact, 
the  centre  of  gravity  of  Egyptian  misgovernmeiit  lay 
in  the  Department  of  the  Interior.  That  Depart- 
ment was  the  very  citadel  of  corruption,  the 
headquarters  of  nepotism,  the  cynosure  of  all 
that  numerous  class  who  hoped  to  gain  an  easy,  if 
illicit,  livelihood  by  robbing  either  the  Treasury  or 
the  taxpayers,  or,  if  both  these  courses  were 
impossible,  by  obtaining  some  well-paid  sinecure. 
Every  vested  interest  in  the  country  was  sure  to 
be  against  the  reformer,  who  at  each  step  would 
find  that  his  views  clashed  with  long-standing 
abuses,  perverted  morals,  and  habits  of  thought 
with  which  he  was  unfamiliar.  Neither  could  he 
hope  to  gain  that  degree  of  support  from  local 
public  opinion  which  was,  however  grudgingly, 
accorded  to  the  engineer.  He  would  be  unable 
to  produce  material  proofs,  which  could  be  visible 
to  the  eye  or  palpable  to  the  touch,  of  the  good 
work  he  was  doing.  In  order  to  succeed,  he 
would  have  to  be  a  moral,  even  more  than  an 
administrative  reformer.  He  would  have  to  be 
engaged  in  a  succession  of  conflicts  on  matters  of 
detail,  the  mass  of  which,  taken  collectively,  were 
indeed  of  great  importance,  but  which,  taken 
separately,  were  little  calculated  to  arouse  en- 
thusiasm or  sympathy  on  his  behalf. 

Moreover,  besides  these  general  causes,  other 
special  hindrances  stood  in  the  way  of  the  internal 
reformer.  It  was  no  easy  matter  to  sweep  away 
the  abuses  of  the  ancient  village  system  of  govern- 
ment, without  wrecking  the  system  itself.  Still 
less  easy  was  it  to  estabUsh  a  modus  vivendi  between 

VOL.  II  2  I 


482 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Ff.  VI 


British  ideas  of  Police  duties  and  Franco-Egyptian 
ideas  of  judicial  functions.  The  regime  of  the 
Capitulations  also  barred  the  way  to  many  useful 
reforms. 

The  work  of  internal  reform  presented,  therefore, 
difficulties  of  a  very  peculiar  character.  They  were 
the  result  partly  of  the  actual  circumstances  with 
which  the  reformer  had  to  deal,  but  still  more  of  the 
want  of  reality  which  attended  the  whole  system  of 
government  by  reason  of  the  uncertainty  of  British 
policy  in  connection  with  Egypt. 

The  question  of  the  organisation  of  the  Police 
force  naturally  attracted  the  attention  of  Lord 
DufFerin.  He  dwelt  on  the  necessity  of  forming 
"  an  intelligent,  active,  and  ubiquitous  provincial 
constabulary,"  which  was  to  partake  of  a  civil 
rather  than  of  a  military  character.  The  force  of 
provincial  and  urban  constabulary,  including  two 
reserve  battalions  of  500  men  each,  was  to  consist 
of  6500  men.  They  were  to  be  under  a  European 
Inspet  tor  -  General,  who  was  to  act  under  the 
control  of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  General 
A^alentine  Baker  was  appointed  to  this  post ;  a  few 
European  officers  were  nominated  to  act  as  his 
subordinates. 

When  I  arrived  in  Egypt  in  September  1883,  I 
found  that  Mr.  CUfFord  Lloyd  was  in  Cairo.  He 
had  come  on  a  vague  roving  commission  to 
"  superintend  internal  reforms."  Even  in  Egypt, 
the  chosen  home  of  lax  official  nomenclature,  it 
was  found  that  this  definition  of  Mr.  Clifford 
Lloyd's  functions  was  wanting  in  precision.  In 
January  1884,  he  was,  therefore,  appointed  Under- 
Secretary  to  the  Department  of  the  Interior. 

I  have  rarely  come  across  any  man  who,  on  first 
acquaintance,  created  such  a  favourable  impression 
as  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd.  His  appearance  and  de- 
meanour, his  singularly  sympathetic  features  and 


THE  INTERIOR 


483 


clear  blue  eyes,  his  courteous  manner,  and  the  rare 
mixture  of  decision  and  moderation  with  which  he 
was  wont  to  expound  his  opinions,  all  bespoke  a 
man  of  strong  will,  who  could  assert  his  authority 
without  bluster,  and  who  could  be  firm  without 
being  unconciliatory.  Neither  was  this  first  im- 
pression erroneous.  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  possessed 
many  remarkable  qualities.  In  spite  of  some 
obvious  defects  of  character,  this  straightforward, 
honourable,  courageous  English  gentleman  was 
always  to  me  a  very  attractive  figure.  In  a  dis- 
turbed district  of  India  or  Ireland,  he  would  have 
been  an  ideal  Government  official.  But  he  had 
not  the  versatility  and  tact  necessary  for  the 
work  he  had  in  hand  in  Egypt.  He  was  unable 
to  adapt  himself  to  local  circumstances.  More- 
over, he  wished  not  only  to  do  the  work,  but  to 
let  all  the  world  know  that  he  was  doing  it.  To 
quote  a  single  instance  of  how  little  careful  he 
was  to  avoid  wounding  native  susceptibilities,  he 
would  not  adopt  the  ordinary  Egyptian  custom 
of  stamping  his  letters  with  a  seal  on  which  his 
signature  in  Arabic  was  engraved.  He  insisted  on 
signing  his  name  in  English  to  all  the  letters  he 
wrote  to  Egyptian  officials.  Moreover,  he  had 
never  been  behind  the  scenes  of  a  central  adminis- 
tration, with  the  result  that  he  had  no  experience 
of  how  work  at  the  headquarters  of  government 
is  really  carried  on.  These  defects  were  sufficient 
to  mar  his  finer  qualities,  and  to  detract  from  his 
usefulness  as  a  Government  official. 

One  of  the  first  results  of  his  appointment  was 
the  issue  of  a  Decree,  on  December  31, 1883,  laying 
down  the  nature  of  the  relations  which  were  to 
exist  between  the  Police  and  the  Moudirs.  Egypt 
was,  for  Police  purposes,  divided  into  three  circles, 
to  each  of  which  a  European  Inspector,  who  was 
to  be  the  delegate  of  the  Inspector-General,  was 


484 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


appointed.  European  Inspectors  were  also  to  be 
employed  in  the  principal  towns.  The  Inspector 
was  to  be  the  intermediary  between  the  Police  and 
the  Moudir.  The  investigation  of  crime  was  to 
be  conducted  by  the  Police,  independently  of  the 
Parquet. 

The  adoption  of  these  measures  gave  rise  to  a 
feud  which  lasted  somewhat  longer  than  the  siege 
of  Troy. 

On  the  one  side  it  was  urged,  more  especially 
by  Nubar  Pasha,  who  succeeded  to  office  immedi- 
ately after  the  issue  of  the  Decree  of  December  31, 
1883,  that  whenever  a  European  was  placed  under 
an  Egyptian,  the  former  would  usurp  the  functions 
of  the  latter.  There  can,  in  fact,  be  little  doubt 
that  the  European  Inspectors  looked  more  to  the 
orders  of  the  Inspector-General  than  to  those  of  the 
Moudirs,  although  the  latter  were  nominally  their 
official  superiors.  No  one,  therefore,  knew  who  was 
really  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  public 
tranquillity.  Nubar  Pasha  was  never  tired  of 
complaining  of  what  he  called  "  la  duality  dans  les 
provinces."  The  authority  of  the  Moudirs  had, 
in  fact,  been  impaired,  and  nothing  sufficiently 
definite  had  been  substituted  in  its  place.  They 
were  not  allowed  to  rule  according  to  their  own 
rude  lights.  On  the  other  hand,  they  could  not, 
or  would  not  assist  in  ruling  according  to  the  new 
methods  which  found  favour  with  their  English 
coadjutors.  Under  these  circumstances,  although 
they  were  powerless  to  prevent  the  change  of 
system,  they  were  sufficiently  strong  to  counteract 
any  beneficial  results  which  might  have  accrued 
from  its  adoption.  They  fell  back  on  the  arm  in 
the  use  of  which  the  Oriental  excels.  They 
adopted  a  system  of  passive  obstruction. 

On  the  other  side,  it  was  urged,  with  much 
force,  that  unless  the  Moudirs  were  placed  under 


CH.LVI  THE  INTERIOR 


485 


some  European  control,  all  the  abuses  of  the  past 
would  reappear.  When  complahits  were  made 
that  the  people  no  longer  respected  the  Moudirs, 
it  was  replied — in  the  words  of  Sir  Benson 
Maxwell,  who  was  then  Procureur- General — that 
the  old  respect  "was  merely  the  offspring  of 
the  terror  felt  by  the  helpless  inhabitants  in  the 
presence  of  the  officer  who  was  armed  with  the 
courbash  and  the  keys  of  the  gaol.  If  the  restora- 
tion of  the  power  was  not  accompanied  by  fresh 
abuses,  the  respect  would  not  revive,  since  the  fear 
on  which  it  rested  would  not." 

If  Nubar  Pasha  had  been  prepared  to  accept  a 
certain  limited  amount  of  European  co-operation 
and  inspection,  both  at  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior 
and  in  the  provinces,  a  compromise  might  have 
been  effiscted.  But,  although  at  first  inclined  to 
entertain  proposals  of  this  nature,  he  subsequently 
rejected  them. 

Apart,  however,  from  the  merits  or  demerits  of 
the  new  Police  system,  it  soon  became  clear  that 
two  men  so  dissimilar  in  character  as  Nubar  Pasha 
and  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  could  not  work  together 
for  long.  Early  in  April  1884,  the  first  of  a  suc- 
cession of  petty  crises  arose.  The  points  at  issue 
were  laid  before  Lord  Granville.  "The  real 
question,"  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  said,  "is  whether 
Her  Majesty's  Government  will  now  face  the 
inevitable  and  appoint  an  English  President  of  the 
Council,  or  by  withdrawing  me  deal  a  death-blow 
to  reformation  in  this  country." 

Now,  if  there  was  one  thing  in  the  world  which 
Lord  Granville  disliked,  it  was  "facing  the  in- 
evitable." He  was  constitutionally  averse  to  any 
line  of  policy  which,  in  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd's  words, 
was  intended  to  "  clear  the  way  for  all  that  had  to 
be  done,  once  and  for  all."  Moreover,  in  this  particu- 
lar instance,  he  could  give  some  very  valid  reasons 


486 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  VI 


for  declining  to  act  on  the  advice  of  his  masterful 
subordinate.  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  had  been  sent  to 
Egypt,  not  to  initiate  a  new  Egyptian  policy,  but 
to  do  the  best  he  could  under  the  difficult  and 
abnormal  circumstances  of  the  situation.  Of 
course,  if  an  English  President  of  the  Council  had 
been  appointed — in  other  words,  if  England  had 
assumed  the  direct  government  of  Egypt — all 
administrative  difficulties  would  have  been  solved. 
Any  one,  as  has  truly  been  said,  can  govern  in  a 
state  of  siege.  But  INIr.  Cliffi3rd  Lloyd  had  not  been 
asked  to  govern,  neither  had  he  been  commissioned 
to  introduce  such  radical  changes  as  would  neces- 
sarily involve  a  complete  change  of  governors.  His 
task  was,  partly  by  persuasion,  and  partly  by  a 
moderate  amount  of  diplomatic  support,  to  intro- 
duce such  partial  reforms  in  the  existing  system  of 
administration  as  were  possible  without  shattering 
the  flimsy  political  fabric  with  which  he  had  to 
deal.  He  was  constitutionally  unsuited  for  the 
performance  of  this  delicate  task.  He  could  not 
understand  half  measures.  Aj7  actum  credem,  dum 
quid  svperesset  agendum,  was  his  motto.  Never, 
probably,  did  he  show  his  want  of  discernment 
more  conspicuously  than  when  he  exhorted  a 
Minister,  who  was  pre-eminently  opportunist,  to 
resort  to  heroic  measures.  Lord  Granville  was 
equal  to  the  occasion.  He  could  elude  the 
point  of  the  rapier  even  when  the  hilt  was 
held  by  a  skilled  diplomatist  and  dialectician ; 
how  much  more,  therefore,  could  he  escape  from 
the  sledge-hammer  blows  and  wild  thrusts  of  this 
blunt,  outspoken  tyro  in  official  life.  Acting  under 
I^ord  Granville's  instructions,  I  patched  up  a  truce 
between  Nubar  Pasha  and  ]Mr.  Cliffiard  Lloyd,  but 
tlie  feud  soon  broke  out  again.  Eventually,  towards 
the  end  of  May  1884,  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  resigned 
his  appointment  and  left  Egypt. 


THE  INTERIOR 


487 


It  was  a  misfortune  that  his  mission  did  not 
prove  successful.  Had  he  managed  to  acquire 
a  commanding  influence  over  the  affairs  of  the 
Interior,  not  only  would  much  good  have  accrued 
to  Egypt,  but  a  great  deal  of  friction,  which  sub- 
sequently ensued,  would  have  been  avoided. 

I  have  often  asked  myself  whether,  had  I 
supported  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  more  strongly,  a 
more  favourable  result  might  have  been  obtained. 
If  the  circumstances  of  the  time  had  been  different, 
and  if  I  had  been  able  to  devote  myself  more  ex- 
clusively to  the  solution  of  this  particular  diffi- 
culty, it  is  possible  that  the  conflict  between 
Nubar  Pasha  and  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  might  not 
have  become  so  acute  as  was  actually  the  case. 
But  the  circumstances  of  the  time  were  ab- 
normal. General  Gordon  was  inundating  me 
with  violent  and  contradictory  telegrams  from 
Khartoum.  Whatever  time  could  be  spared  from 
Soudan  affairs,  had  mainly  to  be  devoted  to  finance, 
which  was  then  the  burning  question  of  the  day. 
The  representatives  of  almost  every  Power  in 
Europe  were  banded  together  in  opposition  to 
England,  and  to  every  proposal  emanating  from 
a  British  source.  On  the  other  hand,  Nubar  Pasha 
jauntily  threw  off  all  responsibility  for  Soudanese 
or  financial  affairs,  and  concentrated  all  the  efforts 
of  his  astute  mind  on  an  endeavour  to  upset  the 
Clifford  Lloyd  combination,  and  to  free  the  Egyptian 
Government  from  all  European  control  in  so  far  as 
the  affairs  of  the  Interior  were  concerned.  Under 
circumstances  such  as  these,  the  result  of  the 
struggle  was  almost  a  foregone  conclusion. 

Even,  however,  without  the  special  circum- 
stances existing  at  the  moment,  I  do  not  think  that 
Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  could  have  remained  for  long 
in  Egypt.  Despite  his  high  character  and  un- 
questionable ability,  he  was  not  the  right  man  in 


488 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  VI 


the  right  place.  He  was  not  fitted  for  the  dehcate 
work  of  Egyptian  administration.  As  well  might 
it  be  expected  that  a  brawny  navvy  should  be  able 
to  mend  a  Geneva  watch  with  a  pickaxe. 

It  would,  of  course,  have  been  possible  to  have 
appointed  an  English  successor  to  Mr.  Clifford 
Lloyd,  but  at  that  time  the  difficulties  of  the 
situation  were  so  great,  and  the  work  was  so 
heavy,  that  it  was  desirable  to  throw  a  certain 
amount  of  cargo  overboard  in  order  to  lighten 
the  ship.  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd's  place  was,  there- 
fore, filled  by  an  Egyptian. 

It  is  needless  to  describe  the  minor  changes 
which  the  Police  organisation  underwent  durinor 
the  next  ten  years.  It  will  suffice  to  say  that  the 
system  did  not  work  smoothly.  The  old  cause  of 
complaint  always  existed,  namely,  that  the  presence 
of  European  Police  officers  in  the  provinces  dimin- 
ished the  authority  of  the  INIoudirs.  One  Egyp- 
tian Minister  succeeded  another,  but  all  adopted 
an  attitude  of  hostility  to,  or  at  best  of  surly 
acquiescence  with  the  new  system. 

At  last,  as  generally  happens  in  such  cases,  an 
opportunity  came  of  settling  the  question.  When 
Nubar  Pasha  assumed  office  in  the  summer  of  1894, 
he  at  once  took  up  the  matter.  A  plan,  having  for 
its  object  the  decentralisation  of  the  Police,  which 
was  to  be  left  in  Egyptian  hands,  coupled  with  the 
establisiiment  of  an  efficient  European  control  at 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  was  elaborated  and 
eventually  accepted.  An  English  "  Adviser  "  was 
appointed,  whose  functions  were  to  co-operate 
with  the  Minister  in  charge  of  the  Department. 
Subsequently,  a  very  few  young  Englishmen,  who 
had  been  specially  trained  for  Egyptian  service, 
were  appointed  to  be  Inspectors. 

Since  the  change  in  1894,  a  great  improvement 
has  unquestionably  taken  place  in  the  Administra- 


THE  INTERIOR 


489 


tion  of  the  Interior.  Nevertheless,  the  old  difficulty 
still  remains.  The  presence  of  British  Inspectors 
in  the  Provinces  tends  to  weaken  the  authority 
and  to  diminish  the  sense  of  responsibility  of  the 
Moudirs.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  certain  that 
the  total  withdrawal  of  the  Inspectors  from  the 
provinces  would  be  attended  with  a  serious  risk 
that  many  of  the  abuses  of  the  past  would  re- 
appear, and,  generally,  that  great  administrative 
confusion  would  arise.  It  is,  in  fact,  impossible  to 
avoid  altogether  the  disadvantages  of  over -inter- 
ference, without  incurring  the  evils  which  would 
result  from  total  non-interference.  The  most  that 
can  be  done  is  to  effect  the  best  compromise  of 
which  the  circumstances  admit.  But,  in  working 
a  system  where  so  much  depends  upon  the 
characters  and  idiosyncrasies  of  the  individuals 
concerned,  it  is  inconceivable  that  complete 
success  can  be  attained. 

A  heroic  remedy,  which  has  occasionally  been 
suggested,  would  be  to  appoint  British  Moudirs. 
I  greatly  deprecate  the  adoption  of  this  measure. 
It  would  be  a  very  distinct  step  backwards  in  the 
direction  of  dissociating  the  Egyptians  from  the 
government  of  their  own  country.  Moreover, 
although  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  all  the  In- 
spectors are  equally  tactful  and  efficient,  or  that 
all  the  Moudirs  possess  every  qualification  which 
could  be  wished,  I  am  convinced  that  the  former 
are  steadily  gaining  knowledge  and  experience  of 
the  country,  and  that  the  latter  are  generally  far 
more  efficient  than  their  predecessors  of  a  few 
years  ago.  If  this  be  so,  and  if,  as  I  hold,  a 
policy  of  complete  non  -  interference  is  not  only 
open  to  great  objections,  but  would  also  be  very 
unpopular  with  the  mass  of  the  population,  there 
is  nothing  for  it  but  to  continue  to  work  on  the 
broad  lines  of  the  present  system,  with  all  its 


490  MODERN  EGYPT 


recognised  defects.  All  that  can  be  done  is  to 
watch  its  operation,  to  choose  the  Moudirs  with  the 
utmost  care,  to  constantly  impress  on  the  European 
Inspectors  the  necessity  of  dealing  in  a  spirit  of 
friendliness  and  sympathy  with  the  Egyptian 
authorities,  and  to  move — whenever  this  can 
prudently  be  done — in  the  direction  of  diminishing 
rather  than  of  enhancing  the  degree  of  British 
interference  in  the  details  of  the  administration.^ 

1  I  must  refer  those  who  wish  for  more  detailed  information  as 
regards  the  work  of  the  Interior,  in  connection  with  village  orgaaisa- 
tion  and  other  matters,  to  my  Annual  Reports. 


CHAPTER  LVII 


SUB-DEPARTMENTS  OF  THE  INTERIOR 

1.  Prisons — State  of  the  prisons  in  1882 — Reform — 2.  Slavery — The 
Slave  Trade  and  slavery — The  Convention  of  1877— The  Slave 
Home — Change  of  opinion  in  Egypt — Success  of  the  Convention — 
3.  Medical  and  Sanitary  Administration — Egyptian  superstitions 
— Clot  Bey — State  of  things  in  1883 — Improvements  effected — 
Sanitary  reform  —  Impediments  to  progress  —  Treatment  of 
epidemics. 

1.  Prisons. 

Those  who  have  only  a  shght  acquaintance  with 
the  ways  of  Eastern  Governments  may  perhaps 
be  astonished  to  learn  of  the  existence  of  a  Turkish 
Habeas  Corpus  Act.  In  reality,  however,  this  is 
no  cause  for  surprise.  Contact  with  Europe  has 
led  to  the  adoption  of  the  forms  and  the  incorpora- 
tion of  much  of  the  jargon  of  Western  civilisation, 
but  has  been  powerless  to  make  the  East  imbibe 
its  spirit.  Oriental  rulers  have,  indeed,  discovered 
a  plan,  by  the  adoption  of  which,  as  they  think, 
they  can  satisfy  European  reformers  without  in- 
curring all  the  consequences  which  would  result 
from  the  execution  of  a  reforming  policy.  Broadly 
speaking,  this  plan  consists  in  passing  a  law,  and 
then  acting  as  if  the  law  had  never  been  passed.^ 

^  "  No  reform  is  clamoured  for  which  does  not  already  figure  in  the 
statute-book ;  no  complaint  is  made  which  cannot  be  disproved  by 
statistics.  .  .  .  Eastern  peoples,  not  only  in  Turkey  but  in  many 
other  countries,  form  a  solid  national  conspiracy  against  foreign  and 
Christian  influences.    They  know  when  their  Government  is  forced  to 

491 


492 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


According  to  Ottoman  law,  an  accused  person 
must  be  examined  within  twenty-four  hours  of  his 
arrest  by  competent  officials  ;  when  the  charge 
against  him  is  formulated,  the  conditions  under 
which  he  may  be  admitted  to  bail  are  clearly  laid 
down. 

So  much  for  the  theory.  The  practice  is 
different.  Sir  Herbert  Chermside  and  Mr. 
Beaman,  who  were  deputed  by  Lord  Dufferin 
to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the  Egyptian  prisons 
in  1882,  wrote :  "  It  is  impossible,  in  the  face  of 
the  deluge  of  complaints  as  to  no  examination  or 
trial  during  months  and  years  of  confinement, 
which  has  met  us,  to  avoid  concluding  that  the 
present  system  of  arrest  and  sending  to  trial  is, 
in  practice,  a  flagrant  injustice,  and  aggravated  by 
venality,  tyranny,  and  personal  vindictiveness." 

Two  causes  were  at  work  during  the  pre- 
occupation days,  one  of  which  tended  unduly  to 
deplete,  and  the  other  unduly  to  crowd  the  prisons. 
On  the  one  hand,  a  number  of  offences  were 
committed  for  which  no  one  was  ever  punished. 
This  immunity  from  punishment  tended  to  keep 
the  prisons  empty.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
the  authorities  took  cognisance  of  an  offence,  it 
was  their  practice  to  arrest  not  only  every  one  who 
might  possibly  have  been  implicated  in  it,  but  also 
a  number  of  their  relations,  as  well  as  all  the 
witnesses,  whether  they  were  on  the  side  of  the 
prosecution  or  of  the  defence.  The  result  of  this 
twofold  injustice  was  that,  whilst  a  number  of 
persons  were  free  who  should  have  been  in  prison, 
at  the  same  time  a  number  of  persons  were  in 

give  way  against  its  will ;  they  know  when  orders  are  meant  to  be 
obeyed,  and  answer  the  rein  in  a  moment ;  they  also  know  wlien  they 
are  not  meant  to  be  obeyed,  but  are  what  are  called  '  watery  commands,' 
and  then  they  do  not  obey  them.  ...  In  the  end,  this  national  con- 
spiracy, this  '  invincible  inertia,'  nearly  always  wins  the  day." — Turkey 
in  Europe,  p.  138. 


THE  INTERIOR 


493 


prison  who  should  have  been  free ;  ^  and,  once  in 
prison,  no  distinction  was  made  between  those  who 
had  been  convicted,  those  who  were  awaiting  trial, 
and  others,  such  as  witnesses,  who  were  detained, 
not  for  any  offence,  but  because  it  was  more  con- 
venient to  keep  them  in  prison,  in  case  they  were 
wanted,  than  to  set  them  at  liberty.  "  In  the 
East,"  Sir  Herbert  Chermside  wrote,  "  every  man 
is  treated  as  if  guilty  of  the  offence  of  which  he  is 
accused  until  he  has  established  his  innocence." 

The  condition  of  the  prisons  was  horrible  in  the 
extreme.  "  No  report,"  Mr.  Beaman  said,  "  can 
convey  the  feeblest  impression  of  the  helpless 
misery  of  the  prisoners,  who  live  for  months,  like 
wild  beasts,  without  change  of  clothing,  half- 
starved,  ignorant  of  the  fate  of  their  families  and 
bewailing  their  own.  They  only  look  forward  to 
the  day  of  their  trial  as  synonymous  with  the 
day  of  their  release,  but  the  prospect  of  its 
advent  is  too  uncertain  to  lend  much  hope  to  their 
wretchedness.  From  the  moment  of  entering  the 
prison,  even  on  the  most  trifling  charge,  they 
consider  themselves  lost.  It  is  impossible  for  them 
to  guess  at  the  time  when  a  new  official  may  begin 
to  clear  off  the  cases  in  his  district,  or  when  the 
slow  march  of  the  administration  may  reach  them. 
It  may  be  weeks,  it  may  be  months,  and  it  may  be 
years  ;  many  of  them  have  long  since  ceased  to  care 
which." 

In  those  days,  the  only  hope  of  the  Egyptian 
prisoner  lay  in  the  possession  of  money.  A 
moderate  bribe  to  the  gaoler  would  insure  relatively 
good  treatment  in  prison.  A  further  sum  to  the 
judge  might  hasten  the  trial.  The  tariff  for  an 
acquittal  was  naturally  somewhat  higher. 

'  "It  is  esteemed  an  act  of  Imperial  clemency  when  the  Sultan 
orders  the  release  from  prison  of '  all  persons  against  whom  there  is  no 
charge.'  " — Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  140. 


494 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


There  is,  however,  nothing  surprising  in  all  this. 
The  state  of  the  Egyptian  prisons  in  1882  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  much  worse  than  that  of 
the  prisons  in  England  before  those  reforms  were 
undertaken  which  have  made  the  name  of  John 
Howard  for  ever  famous. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  in  detail  the  series 
of  reforms  in  this  Department  which  have  been 
effected  since  1882.  It  will  suffice  to  say  that, 
here  as  elsewhere,  order  and  justice  have  taken 
the  place  of  confusion  and  tyranny.  The  old 
prisons  have  been  improved  and  placed  in  a  sanitary 
condition.  Large  sums  have  been  spent  in  the  con- 
struction of  new  prisons.  Special  prisons  have  been 
constructed  for  women.  Reformatories  for  juvenile 
offenders  have  been  instituted.  The  prisoners 
have  been  provided  with  proper  food  and  clothing. 
Many  of  them  are  taught  trades.  These  reforms 
took  time.  Even  now  (1907)  the  prison  accom- 
modation can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  adequate  to 
meet  aU  the  requirements  of  the  country. 

The  only  criticism  now  directed  against  the 
Prison  Administration  is — to  quote  the  words  of 
Coles  Pasha,  to  whom  the  credit  of  reforming  this 
branch  of  the  Public  Service  is  mainly  due — that, 
in  the  eyes  of  many  "  prison  life  is  not  sufficiently 
deterrent,  and  that  the  swing  of  the  pendulum  has 
carried  the  Administration  too  far  in  the  direction 
of  humanity,  if  not  of  luxury."  There  may 
possibly  be  some  truth  in  this  criticism,  but  there 
can,  of  course,  be  no  question  of  reverting  to  the 
brutal  methods  of  the  past  in  order  to  make  punish- 
ment more  deterrent.  In  Egypt,  as  elsewhere,  the 
tendency  of  the  best  qualified  penological  experts 
is  to  move  in  the  direction  of  reforming  rather  than 
in  that  of  administering  very  severe  punishment  to 
criminals. 


THE  INTERIOR 


495 


2.  Slavery. 

There  is  an  obvious  distinction  between  the 
Slave  Trade  and  Slavery.  Both  are  bad ;  but, 
whereas  nothing  can  be  said  in  defence  of  the  Slave 
Trade,  some  mitigating  pleas  may  be  advanced  as 
regards  domestic  slavery,  which,  although  they  in 
no  degree  justify  the  existence  of  the  institution, 
are  of  a  nature  to  temper  the  zeal  of  the  reformer 
who  aspires  towards  its  immediate  abolition. 

Most  Englishmen  have  been  made  familiar  with 
the  horrors  of  the  Slave  Trade.  They  have  been 
told  how  peaceable  villages  in  Central  Africa  have 
been  invaded  by  parties  of  ruffianly  Arab  raiders  ; 
how  the  older  inhabitants,  male  and  female,  have 
been  shot  down  without  mercy  ;  how  the  girls  and 
boys — the  latter  after  undergoing  the  most  cruel 
process  of  mutilation  to  which  any  man  can  be 
subjected  ^  —  have  been  marched  long  distances 
down  to  the  coast;  how  numbers  died  of  exhaustion 
on  the  way ;  and  how  eventually  the  survivors 
were  sold  to  be  the  household  servants  of  the 
Turkish  and  Egyptian  Pashas.^  Some  arguments, 
more  or  less  specious,  can  generally  be  found  to 
defend  most  of  the  worst  abuses  which  exist,  or  at 
times  have  existed  in  the  world.  The  Slave  Trade 
stands  alone  as  an  abomination  which  is  incapable 
of  any  defence  whatsoever,  unless  it  be  the  vicious 
plea  that  Pashas  require  servants,  and  that  they  are 
unable  to  obtain  them  in  sufficient  numbers,  or  at 

^  The  high  price  paid  for  these  unfortunate  boys  is  due  to  the  feet 
that  a  large  proportion  of  them  die  under  the  process  of  mutilation. 
The  operation  is  performed  in  the  most  ruthless  and  barbarous  manner 
by  persons  devoid  of  any  surgical  skill. 

2  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  black  girls  from  Central  Africa 
always  become  the  concubines  of  their  masters.  It  would  be  an  exagger- 
ation to  say  that  cases  of  this  sort  never  occur,  but  they  are  rare.  The 
wives  and  concubines  of  the  Pashas  come  almost  exclusively  from 
Circassia  and  Abyssinia.  The  blacks  are  almost  always  bought  with 
the  object  of  being  employed  as  household  servants. 


496  MODERN  EGYPT 


a  sufficiently  low  price,  by  any  other  means  than 
those  to  which  allusion  is  made  above. 

The  case  of  domestic  slavery,  considered  inde- 
pendently of  the  Slave  Trade,  is  different.  A  slave 
in  the  Ottoman  dominions  lies  under  certain  civil 
disabilities  which  shock  the  European's  sense  of 
justice;  nevertheless,  in  practice,  the  disabilities 
in  question  lie  lightly  on  the  slaves  themselves. 
Moreover,  under  unreformed  Ottoman  law,  the 
slave  is  not  free  to  carry  his  labour  to  any  market 
which  he  chooses.  This  is  unjust.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  a  general  rule,  slaves  are  well  treated ;  ^ 
they  lead  an  easy  life  and  are  not  overworked. 
On  the  whole,  save  that  the  stigma  of  slavery  is 
attached  to  them— a  consideration  which  is  all-im- 
portant from  the  European,  but  relatively  unim- 
portant from  the  Eastern  point  of  view  ^ — it  may 
be  doubted  whether  in  the  majority  of  cases  the 
lot  of  slaves  in  Egypt  is,  in  its  material  aspects, 
harder  than,  or  even  as  hard  as  that  of  many 
domestic  servants  in  Europe.  Indeed,  from  one 
point  of  view,  the  Eastern  slave  is  in  a  better  posi- 
tion than  the  Western  servant.  The  latter  can  be 
thrown  out  of  employment  at  any  moment.  In 
Egypt,  on  the  other  hand,  although  under  the 
existing  law,  which  is  the  outcome  of  contact  with 

1  There  are,  however,  exceptions.  I  remember  a  case  which 
occurred  early  in  1885.  It  was  brought  to  my  notice  that  a  white 
slave  girl  in  the  harem  of  a  lady  of  high  social  position  in  Cairo  was 
very  badly  treated,  and  that  she  wished  to  escape.  M'ith  some  diffi- 
culty, I  obtained  an  interview  with  her  at  my  house.  She  declared  to 
me  most  positively  that  she  was  very  well  treated,  and  that  she  wished 
to  return  to  the  harem.  I  had  no  alternative  but  to  comply  with  her 
request.  Shortly  afterwards,  I  went  to  England.  On  my  return,  the 
girl  had  disappeared.  There  were  good  reasons  for  believing  that  the 
statement  she  made  to  me  was  untrue,  that  she  had  been  promised  a 
large  sum  of  money  if  she  made  it,  that  she  was  never  paid  the  money, 
and  that,  on  my  departure  from  Egypt,  she  was  beaten  to  death.  But 
in  cases  of  this  sort  it  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  obtain  positive  proof. 

^  Many  Egyptians  of  the  highest  social  classes  are  the  sons  of  slave 
mothers,  who  are  often  married  to  their  masters  after  having  borne  a 
child. 


THE  INTERIOR 


497 


the  West,  the  slave  can,  if  he  chooses,  free  himself 
from  his  master,  no  provision  is  made  for  the  con- 
verse case  of  a  master  who  wishes  to  get  rid  of  a 
slave.  Custom,  based  on  religious  law,  obliges  him 
to  support  his  slave.  Cases  are  frequent  of  masters 
who  would  be  glad  to  get  rid  of  their  slaves,  but 
who  are  unable  to  do  so  because  the  latter  will  not 
accept  the  gift  of  liberty.  A  moral  obligation, 
which  is  universally  recognised,  rests  on  all  masters 
to  support  aged  and  infirm  slaves  till  they  die ; 
this  obligation  is  often  onerous  in  the  case  of  those 
who  have  inherited  slaves  from  their  parents  or 
other  relatives. 

On  these  grounds,  therefore,  some  distinction 
must  be  drawn  between  the  Slave  Trade  and 
Slavery.  It  is,  however,  none  the  less  true  that 
the  one  is  intimately  connected  with  the  other. 
Where  there  is  a  demand,  a  supply  will  follow.  If 
the  institution  of  slavery  did  not  exist,  the  Slave 
Trade  would  perish.  In  order  to  check  the  Slave 
Trade,  if  for  no  other  reason,  it  is  necessary  to  do 
all  that  is  possible  to  discourage  slavery.  The 
object  of  the  English  reformer  has,  therefore,  been 
twofold.  In  the  first  place,  he  has  endeavoured  to 
prevent  slaves  from  being  brought  into  the  country, 
and  has  thus  to  some  extent  cut  off  the  supply. 
In  the  second  place,  he  has  endeavoured  to  wean 
the  slave-owning  classes  from  their  ancient  habits, 
and  has  thus  done  much  to  diminish  the  demand. 

Whether  Ismail  Pasha  was  moved  by  a  sincere 
desire  to  abolish  an  infamous  traffic,  or  whether  he 
merely  wished  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  humani- 
tarian Europe,  it  is  certain  that  to  him  belongs  the 
credit  of  having  given  the  first  blow  to  the  institu- 
tion of  slavery  in  Egypt.  In  August  1877,  a 
Convention  was  signed  between  the  Egyptian 
Government  and  Lord  Vivian,  acting  on  behalf  of 
the  British  Government.    Under  the  terms  of  this 

VOL.  II  2  k 


498 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  VI 


Convention  and  the  annexes  attached  to  it,  the 
Slave  Trade  was  formally  forbidden  on  Egyptian 
territory.  Slave  dealers  were  to  be  tried  by  court 
martial,  and  were  rendered  liable  to  severe  penalties. 
The  sale  of  slaves  from  family  to  family  was  to 
be  tolerated  until  August  1884,  after  which  time 
it  was  declared  illegal.  Any  slave  who  chose  to 
claim  his  or  her  liberty  could  obtain  it  on  applica- 
tion to  certain  Bureaux  of  Manumission  which 
were  specially  created. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  explain  a  point  in  con- 
nection with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  Egypt, 
the  importance  of  which  is  often  insufficiently  re- 
cognised by  those  who  are  specially  interested  in 
this  subject.  On  February  6,  1883,  Lord  Dufferin 
wrote  : — 

"  Slavery  might  be  abolished  by  Khedivial  Decree, 
but  a  Convention  is  so  much  more  formal  and 
binding  that  it  would  seem  preferable.  I  would, 
therefore,  propose  that  a  new  Convention  be  entered 
into  between  Great  Britain  and  Egypt,  by  which 
slavery  would  entirely  cease  in  Egypt  and  its 
Dependencies  seven  years  after  the  date  of  signa- 
ture." 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  Lord  Dufferin 
fully  realised  the  obstacles  which  must  have  been 
encountered  had  any  endeavour  been  made  to  give 
effect  to  his  proposal.  In  1883,  those  obstacles 
were  practically  insurmountable.  Slavery  in  the 
East  does  not  exist  by  virtue  of  any  special  Decree 
or  law  emanating  either  from  the  executive  govern- 
ments or  from  the  legislatures  under  which  Eastern 
countries  are  governed.  It  exists  because  its 
existence  is  authorised  by  the  Sacred  Law  of  Islam, 
which  is  as  immutable  as  were  the  laws  of  the 
Medes  and  Persians.  That  law  cannot  be  abro- 
gated by  any  Khedivial  Decree,  and  still  less  by 
any  Convention  signed  with  a  Christian  Power. 


THE  INTERIOR 


499 


Kadis,  Muftis,  and  Ulema  would  regard  Decrees 
and  Conventions,  which  infringed  the  fundamental 
reUgious  law  of  Islam,  much  as  devout  French 
Catholics  must  have  regarded  the  attempts  of 
Anacharsis  Clootz  and  other  maniacs  of  the  French 
revolution  to  effect  the  legal  abolition  of  the 
Christian  religion.  They  would  altogether  decline 
to  recognise  the  validity  of  a  law  which,  inasmuch 
as  it  altered  the  Sheriat,  would  in  their  eyes  be 
considered  as  an  attempt  to  justify  sacrilege. 

It  is  true  that,  some  fifty  years  ago,  the  rulers 
of  India  ignored  the  Mohammedan  religious  law. 
In  1843,  an  Act  was  passed  by  the  Indian  legislature, 
which  provided  that  the  status  of  slavery  should 
not  be  recognised  by  any  law-tourt  in  the  country, 
criminal  or  civil.  But,  although  in  the  abstract,  the 
Sheriat  may  be  as  inviolable  at  Calcutta  as  it  is  at 
Cairo,  the  question  of  the  total  and  immediate 
abolition  of  slavery  presented  itself,  from  a  practical 
poi?it  of  view,  in  a  very  different  aspect  in  Egypt 
under  Lord  DufFerin  from  that  which  obtained  under 
Lord  EUenborough  in  India.  In  1843,  the  English 
had  been  for  half  a  century  in  India.  They  were 
the  absolute  rulers  of  the  country.  The  law-courts, 
which  they  had  established,  inspired  confidence. 
Moreover,  they  had  to  deal,  not  with  one  compact 
body  of  Mohammedans,  but  with  a  Mohammedan 
population  which,  though  numerous,  possessed 
little  or  no  cohesion,  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  was 
merged  amongst  the  members  of  a  more  numerous 
and  more  tolerant  creed.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, a  radical  reform,  such  as  that  effected  in 
1843,  becomes  possible.  Under  the  political  con- 
ditions which  prevailed  in  Egypt  in  1883,  it  would 
have  been  impossible,  or  at  all  events  in  the  highest 
degree  imprudent,  to  have  attempted  to  follow  the 
Indian  precedent. 

Under  the  Sheriat,  a  slave  cannot  marry  or 


500  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 


inherit  property  without  the  consent  of  his  master. 
When,  therefore,  it  is  said  that,  under  the  Con- 
vention of  1877,  any  slave  was  able  to  obtain  his 
or  her  liberty  on  application  to  a  Manumission 
Bureau,  it  is  to  be  understood  that  the  term 
"liberty"  is  used  in  a  restricted  sense.  The 
Convention  gave  to  the  slave  the  right  to  go 
Avherever  he  pleased,  and  to  work  or  remain  idle 
as  he  pleased.  But  it  did  not  allow  him  to  marry 
or  to  inherit  property  without  the  consent  of  his 
master.  To  this  extent,  in  spite  of  nineteenth- 
century  intervention,  Islam  of  the  seventh  century 
still  held  the  manumitted  slave  in  its  grip. 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  British  occupation 
should  give  a  fresh  stimulus  to  the  work  of 
emancipation  which  was  begun  in  1877.  One 
important  consideration,  however,  tempered  the 
zeal  of  the  reformer.  Almost  all  the  slaves  in 
Egypt  were  women.  When  they  left  the  harems, 
having  no  means  of  support,  they  either  starved 
or  fell  into  a  life  of  vice.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, those  who  were  desirous  of  hastening  the 
work  of  emancipation  hesitated  to  act  for  fear 
of  producing  evils  as  bad  as,  if  not  worse  than 
slavery.  To  remedy  this  defect,  money  was 
subscribed  in  England  with  the  help  of  the  Anti- 
Slavery  Society,  who,  in  this  connection,  did  some 
excellent  work.  With  the  money  thus  obtained, 
which  was  supplemented  by  a  grant  from  the  Egyp- 
tian Treasury,  a  Home  for  Freed  Female  Slaves 
was  established  at  Cairo.  The  manumitted  slaves 
are  now  housed  and  fed  in  this  Home  until  employ- 
ment can  be  obtained  for  them.^  This  system  has 
worked  well.  Respectable  IVIohammedans  con- 
stantly apply  to  the  Home  for  domestic  servants. 

*  So  few  slaves  now  apply  to  the  Manumission  Bureaux  that  it  will 
probably  soon  become  a  question  whether  the  Home  for  Freed  Slaves 
need  be  any  longer  maintained. 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR 


501 


It  would  be  probably  an  exaggeration  to  say 
that  any  public  opinion  adverse  to  slavery  has  been 
evoked  in  Egypt.  The  purchase  and  employment 
of  slaves  is  not  generally  regarded  with  any  moral 
reprobation,  neither,  under  all  the  circumstances 
which  exist,  would  it  be  reasonable  to  expect  any 
such  reprobation.  In  1894,  no  less  a  person  than 
the  President  of  the  Legislative  Council,  who  was 
a  Turco-Egyptian,  was  arraigned  before  a  Court- 
martial  for  purchasing  slaves,  and  only  escaped 
imprisonment  on  account  of  his  bad  health  and 
advanced  years.  Nevertheless,  the  slavery  reforms 
instituted  under  British  auspices  have  produced  a 
notable  change  in  the  behaviour,  if  not  in  the 
opinions,  of  the  slave-owning  classes  in  Egypt. 
There  are  no  longer  any  slave -markets.  The 
purchase  of  a  slave  is  a  criminal  offence  attended 
with  danger  both  to  the  buyer  and  to  the  seller. 
The  slave  routes  are  carefully  watched.  It  is 
only  with  great  difficulty  that  a  few  slaves  are 
occasionally  smuggled  into  the  country.  The 
result  of  these  measures  has  been,  not  only  that 
it  has  become  year  by  year  more  difficult  to  obtain 
slaves,  but  that  also,  when  any  clandestine  purchase 
is  effected,  a  price  considerably  higher  than  that 
which  formerly  ruled  has  to  be  paid.  The  slave- 
owner is,  therefore,  beginning  to  ask  himself 
whether  slave  labour  is  not,  after  all,  more  ex- 
pensive as  well  as  more  troublesome  than  free 
labour,  and  whether  it  is  worth  while,  besides  com- 
mitting a  criminal  act  for  which  he  may  be  severely 
punished,  to  pay  a  considerable  sum  for  a  slave  girl 
who  can,  on  the  morrow  of  her  purchase,  walk  out 
of  the  harem  and  obtain,  not  only  her  freedom, 
but  also  the  strong  support  of  the  British  repre- 
sentative if  any  attempt  is  made  to  tamper  with  her 
liberty  of  action. 

Thousands  of  slaves  have,  during  the  last  few 


502  MODERN  EGYPT 


years,  been  granted  their  certificates  of  freedom. 
Those  who  remain  in  the  harems  know  that  they 
can  obtain  their  liberty  if  they  choose  to  ask  for  it. 
In  the  meanwhile,  as  very  few  fresh  slaves  are 
imported,  and  as  the  numbers  born  in  slavery 
must  certainly  be  inconsiderable  in  proportion  to 
the  number  of  those  who  have  been  manumitted, 
the  supply  of  slaves  is  gradually  falling  short  of 
the  demand.  Very  few  eunuchs  are  now  to  be 
found  in  Egypt.  The  objections  to  their  employ- 
ment from  the  Egyptian  point  of  view  are  that 
a  very  high  price  has  to  be  paid  for  them  ;  that, 
on  account  of  their  bad  physique,  they  are  use- 
less as  servants  ;  and  that  they  are  liable  to  die 
of  consumption.  It  may  safely  be  asserted  that 
slavery  in  Egypt,  although  it  will  take  a  long 
time  to  die  out  completely,  is  moribund.  It 
may  be  asserted  with  an  almost  equal  degree  of 
confidence  that  both  the  Slave  Trade  and  slavery 
would  revive  if  vigilance  were  relaxed. 

From  one  point  of  view,  the  particular  reform 
of  the  Egyptian  social  and  administrative  system 
now  under  discussion  is  remarkable.  In  view  of 
the  state  of  the  Mohammedan  law,  of  the  fact  that 
slavery,  although  discouraged  by  the  founder  of 
the  Mohammedan  religion,  has,  by  a  perverted  view 
of  his  original  preaching,  become  associated  with 
the  distinctive  features  of  the  Mohammedan  faith  ; 
and  of  the  further  fact  that  material  interests  of 
some  importance  were  involved  in  the  abolition  of 
slavery — it  might  well  have  been  thought  that  the 
introduction  of  Western  ideas  in  connection  with 
this  subject  would  have  encountered  opposition  of 
a  somewhat  specially  strong  description.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  opposition  has  been  mild,  and 
has  been  easily  overcome.  A  great  change  has 
been  going  on  insensibly.  It  has,  indeed,  been 
almost  imperceptible  to  those  who,  it  might  be 


CH.LVII  THE  INTERIOR 


503 


thought,  were  most  interested  in  the  maintenance 
of  the  existing  abuse.  No  heroic  measures  have 
been  adopted.  Nothing  has  been  done  to  clash 
with  Mohammedan  opinions  and  prejudices.  Never- 
theless, a  considerable  measure  of  success  has  been 
attained.  This  result  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Convention  of  1877  was  admirably  adapted  to 
achieve,  in  a  prudent  and  unostentatious  manner, 
the  object  for  which  it  was  intended.  The  late 
Lord  Vivian's  name  is  rarely,  if  ever,  mentioned  as 
one  of  the  chief  initiators  of  Egyptian  reform. 
Yet  it  is  due  to  the  wise  moderation  of  the 
Convention  which  he  negotiated  that  slavery  has 
been  gradually  disappearing  from  Egypt.  At  the 
commencement  of  this  work,  some  words  of  Bacon 
were  quoted  as  an  example  of  the  general  principles 
which  should  guide  the  reformer  in  an  Eastern 
country  :  "It  were  good  that  men  in  their 
innovations  would  follow  the  example  of  Time 
itself,  which,  indeed,  innovateth  greatly,  but 
quietly  and  by  degrees  scarce  to  be  perceived." 
That  is  the  principle  which  has  been  adopted  in 
connection  with  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Egypt. 
Lord  Vivian's  action  in  this  matter  was  based  on 
strictly  Baconian  principles. 

In  1895,  a  fresh  Slavery  Convention  was  signed 
between  the  British  and  Egyptian  Governments. 
It  gave  precision  to  the  existing  law,  and  in  some 
respects  altered  the  procedure.  Moreover,  it  pro- 
vided that  it  was  a  criminal  offence  to  interfere 
in  any  way  with  the  full  liberty  of  action  of  an 
enfranchised  slave.  This  change  is  important.  It 
practically  effects  by  a  side  wind  all  that  was  done 
by  the  Indian  Act  of  1843.  Any  one  in  Egypt 
who  prevents  a  freed  slave  from  marrying  or  from 
inheriting  property  is  now  liable  to  imprisonment 

A  scholarly  writer,  who  has  paid  special  atten- 
tion to  this  subject,  calls  slavery  the  "  Nemesis  of 


504  MODERN  EGYPT 


Nations."  "Civilisation,"  he  says,  "begins  with 
the  crack  of  the  slave  whip."  ^  It  may  be  placed 
to  the  credit  of  latter-day  civilisation  that  the 
crack  of  that  whip  can  no  longer  be  heard  in 
Egypt. 

3.  Medical  and  Sanitary  Administration. 

Whatever  may  be  the  case  at  present,  it  is 
certain  that  but  a  few  years  ago  the  lowest  classes 
in  Egypt  rarely  sought  for  medical  aid  until  the 
patient  was  well-nigh  moribund.  The  recipes  of 
village  barbers  and  of  the  old  women,  who  were 
sometimes  called  in  to  attend  the  sick,  as  often 
as  not  aggravated  the  condition  of  the  patient.^ 
Great  faith  was  entertained  in  the  healing  properties 
of  written  charms.  These  generally  consisted  of 
passages  of  the  Koran  for  Mohammedans,  or  from 
the  Psalms  and  Gospels  for  Copts,  which  were  inter- 
mingled with  numerical  combinations,  diagrams, 
and  symbols.  Persons  of  all  creeds,  being  possessed 
of  evil  spirits,  were  said  to  be  cured  at  certain  Coptic 
convents,  notably  at  the  convent  of  St.  Damianus  ^ 
near  Mansourah,  and  at  that  of  St.  Michael  near 
Birket-el-Sab. 

An  operation  which  was  "warranted  to  cure  all 
diseases  which  were  not  fatal,"  could  be  performed 
if  the  sick  person  was  fortunate  enough  to  become 

*  Paterson's  Nemesis  of  Nations,  p.  53. 

*  The  instances  of  superstition  in  this  chapter  are  mainly  taken  from 
a  pamphlet  entitled  Medical  Matters  in  Egypt,  written  by  Dr.  F.  W. 
Sandwith  in  August  1884.  Dr.  Sandwith's  researches  revealed  a  stage 
of  medical  knowledge  amongst  the  poorer  classes  not  materially  in 
advance  of  that  reached  iu  Pharaonic  times.  M.  Maspero  (Causeries 
d! ^gypte,  p.  313)  says  that  an  ancient  Egyptian  medical  practitioner 
was  obliged  to  be  "aussi  expert  en  exorcismes  qu'en  formules  de 
pharmacie." 

^  St.  Damianus  and  his  brother  St.  Cosmos  were  both  doctors. 
They  underwent  martyrdom  during  the  persecution  of  Diorletiau, 
about  A.D.  303.  Pope  Felix  IV.  built  a  Basilica  in  their  honour  at 
Rome. 


CH.LVH  THE  INTERIOR 


505 


possessed  of  a  brass  bowl,  made  in  a  peculiar  fashion, 
and  to  the  rim  of  which  forty-one  oblong  strips  of 
brass  were  attached.  On  each  of  these  strips  the 
words  "In  the  name  of  the  most  merciful  God." 
were  inscribed.  This  bowl  had  to  be  filled  on  a 
Friday  night  with  Nile  water,  into  which  some 
drugs  and  nuts  were  thrown.  The  sick  person 
was  instructed  to  stand  in  a  basin  of  water  before 
sunrise  on  the  following  morning,  to  drink  out  of 
the  bowl,  and  to  eat  the  nuts,  throwing  the  shells 
behind  his  back.  This  operation  had  to  be  repeated 
on  three  consecutive  Fridays. 

It  was,  and  perhaps  still  is  a  common  practice 
amongst  both  Copts  and  Mohammedans  to  wear 
about  their  persons  a  bone  taken  from  the  body 
of  a  polytheist  or  of  a  Jew.  This  was  supposed 
to  afford  immunity  from  all  sorts  of  fevers.  A 
bone  taken  from  any  ancient  Egyptian  mummy 
was  often  worn. 

The  remedy  for  sterility  was  for  the  woman  who 
wished  to  become  a  mother  to  step  over  the  corpse 
of  an  executed  criminal,  or  into  a  basin  of  water 
which  had  been  used  to  wash  his  corpse,  or  to  tread 
on  a  human  skull,  or  walk  between  the  tombs  of 
a  cemetery,  or  step  over  some  antique  resemblance 
of  a  cat  or  other  relic  of  old  Egypt. 

The  cure  for  a  stye  in  the  eye  was  to  eat  bread 
obtained  from  seven  different  women,  each  called 
Fatma,  the  name  of  the  Prophet's  daughter. 

Headache  was  cured  by  driving  a  nail  into  one 
of  the  gates  of  Cairo,  called  the  Bab-el-Zueilah. 
For  toothache,  it  was  considered  necessary  to  extract 
the  tooth,  and  deposit  it  in  a  crevice  of  the  same 
gate.  The  latter  part  of  this  operation  was  supposed 
to  prevent  other  teeth  from  aching. 

One  of  the  most  frequent  antidotes  for  poison 
was  to  write  certain  texts  of  the  Koran  on  slips 
of  paper,  which  were  then  thrown  into  a  dish  of 


506  MODERN  EGYPT 


water.  The  water  was  stirred  and  the  solution 
drunk. 

Innumerable  remedies  existed,  and  probably  still 
exist,  to  counteract  the  dreaded  effects  of  the  Evil 
Eye,  belief  in  which  has  existed  from  time  im- 
memorial in  Egypt.^  The  most  efficacious  is  to 
steal  a  piece  of  the  dress  of  the  supposed  envier,  bum 
it,  and  fumigate  the  envied  person  with  it  Another 
common  practice  is  to  heat  some  alum,  and  to 
prick  one  of  the  water  bubbles,  saying  at  the  same 
time  :  "  I  prick  the  eye  of  the  envier."  Cornelian 
and  charcoal  are  worn  on  the  forehead  by  Moslem 
children  for  the  same  purpose.  Parents  also  some- 
times keep  a  monkey  or  a  gazelle  in  the  house  in 
order  to  avert  the  Evil  Eye. 

I  may  here  mention  a  curious  case  of  super- 
stition which  came  under  my  personal  notice.  Some 
years  ago,  my  eldest  son  was  dangerously  ill  with 
typhoid  fever  at  Cairo.  A  short  time  before  his 
illness,  he  had  been  given  a  black  dog,  which  used 
to  live  in  the  house.  The  pattering  of  the  dog's 
footsteps  on  the  floor  of  the  room  disturbed  the 
patient's  rest.  The  dog  was,  therefore,  sent  out  of 
the  house.  I  afterwards  learnt  that  my  Egyptian 
servants  looked  on  the  dog  as  an  "  Afrit "  (devil), 
that  they  considered  the  case  hopeless  so  long  as 
the  dog  remained  in  the  house,  but  entertained  no 
doubt  of  ultimate  recovery  directly  the  animal  was 
removed.  In  this  particular  instance,  as  my  son 
recovered,  their  belief  in  the  power  of  "Afrits" 
must  have  been  strengthened. 

In  the  instances  so  far  given,  the  fantastic 
remedies  applied  in  cases  of  sickness  have  their 

^  "Abundant  testimony  exists  in  the  oldest  monuments  in  the 
world  that  among-  the  ancient  Eg-yptians  belief  in  and  dread  of  the  E\al 
Eye  were  ever  present ;  their  efforts  to  avert  or  to  baffle  it,  both  as 
regarded  the  living  and  the  dead,  who  they  knew  would  live  again, 
were  perhaps  the  most  constant  and  elaborate  of  any,  of  which  we  caa 
now  decipher  the  traces." — Elworthy's  The  Evil  Eye,  p.  6. 


THE  INTERIOR 


507 


origin  in  superstition.  Instances  of  prescribed  cures 
based  on  complete  ignorance  of  medical  science 
and  dissociated  from  any  religious  belief,  however 
perverted,  might  readily  be  added.  Thus,  Dr. 
Sandwith  tells  of  a  Coptic  bone-setter  of  celebrity, 
who  was  called  in  to  attend  a  woman  with  a  dis- 
located hip.  He  "gave  instructions  that  the 
woman's  hip  should  be  tightly  bound  to  a  half- 
starved  cow,  and  that  the  cow  should  then  be  fed 
until  the  rapid  swelling  of  the  animal  had  caused 
the  reduction  of  the  dislocation."  ^ 

The  credit  of  having  first  brought  true  know- 
ledge to  bear  on  all  this  mass  of  ignorance  and 
credulity  belongs  to  an  eminent  Frenchman.  Dr. 
Clot  Bey,  who  was  the  father  of  Egyptian  medical 
reform,  was  summoned  to  Egypt  by  Mehemet  Ali. 
Under  his  auspices,  a  School  of  Medicine  and 
Pharmacy,  as  well  as  a  Maternity  Hospital  for  the 
instruction  of  midwives,  were  created ;  a  sanitary 
service  for  the  interior  of  the  country  was  also 
organised.  A  European  doctor  and  apothecary, 
who  were  aided  by  Egyptian  medical  men  and 
women,  were  appointed  to  every  province  in  Lower 
Egypt.  Under  the  intelligent  stimulus  thus  afforded, 
considerable  progress  was  made  in  the  direction  of 
medical  and  sanitary  reform.  All  the  superior 
officers  possessed  a  European  diploma. 

At  a  later  period,  Egyptians,  possessing  only 

^  The  state  of  things  described  above  was  but  little,  if  at  all,  worse  than 
that  which  existed  in  England  and  Scotland  so  late  as  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. During  the  first  half  of  that  century  "  medicines  in  common  use 
contained  brains  of  hares  and  foxes,  snails  burnt  in  the  shell,  powder  of 
human  skull  and  Egyptian  mummy,  burnt  hoofs  of  horses,  calcined 
cockle-shells,  pigeon's  blood,  ashes  of  little  frogs — like  to  the  diabolical 
contents  of  the  witches'  cauldron  in  Macbeth  "  (Graham's  Social  Life  in 
Scotland  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  i.  p.  51).  The  Poor  Man's 
Physician,  written  by  the  "  famous  John  Moucrieff  of  Tippermalloch," 
prescribes  the  following  as  a  cure  for  whitlow  :  "Stop  the  finger  with 
a  cat's  ear,  and  it  will  be  whole  in  half  an  hour.  '  In  1744,  Mrs. 
Delany  sent  to  her  nephew,  as  an  infallible  cure  for  ague,  "  a  spider 
put  into  a  goosequill,  well  sealed  and  secured,  and  hung  about  the 
child's  neck." — Mrs.  Delany  s  Memoirs,  p.  138. 


508 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


certificates  issued  locally,  were  nominated  to  high 
posts.  European  control  was  relaxed.  The  re- 
forms, which  had  begun  to  blossom,  withered  under 
the  misrule  of  Ismail.  The  shadow  of  approach- 
ing bankruptcy  fell  upon  the  land.  Useful 
expenditure  was  everywhere  cut  down  with  an 
unsparing  hand  in  order  to  compensate  for  the 
financial  vagaries  of  a  spendthrift  Khedive.  "At 
the  end  of  1878,"  Dr.  Sandwith  says,  "  all  sanitary, 
quarantine,  and  hospital  buildings  had  fallen  into 
ruin  for  want  of  funds,  and  the  provincial  hospitals 
naturally  suffered  to  a  greater  degree  than  others." 

By  the  time  the  British  occupied  the  country 
in  1882,  three-fourths  of  the  good  effects  of  Clot 
Bey's  reforms  had  been  obliterated.  The  School 
of  Medicine  still  existed,  but  the  instruction 
afforded  to  the  students  was  very  defective.  The 
greater  number  of  the  medical  officers  serving  under 
the  Egyptian  Government  were  ignorant  and  in- 
competent. They  were  also  underpaid,  with  the 
natural  result  that  they  used  the  numerous  oppor- 
tunities afforded  to  them  in  the  exercise  of  their 
official  functions  to  increase  their  incomes  by  illicit 
means. ^  The  state  of  the  hospitals  was  deplorable. 
Nothing  could  be  worse  than  the  general  adminis- 
tration of  the  Medical  Department.  Sir  Guyer 
Hunter,  who  was  sent  to  Egypt  in  1883  to  report 
on  the  cholera  epidemic  which  then  prevailed, 
wrote : 

"  The  hospitals,  as  a  rule,  are  in  a  more  or  less 
tumble  -  down,  dirty  condition,  impregnated  with 

'  "A  dishonest  man  may  occasionally  threaten  to  cause  some 
sweeping  reform  to  be  carried  out  in  a  village,  unless  a  sum  of  money 
is  immediately  collected  for  him  by  the  headman,  or  money  may  be 
obtained  from  a  private  individual  by  threatening  to  perform  an 
autopsy  on  the  dead  body  of  his  relative,  on  the  plea  that  there  is 
some  suspicion  of  foul  play.  To  the  uneducated  Musulman,  who 
believes  that  the  dead  can  feel  and  should  be  treated  with  a  respect 
similar  to  the  living,  this  idea  is  naturally  repugnant" — Sandwith, 
Medical  Matters  in  Egypt,  p.  7- 


CH.  Lvn 


THE  INTERIOR 


509 


foul  odours,  and  containing  beds  filthy  in  the  ex- 
treme ;  they  are,  in  fact,  noisome  places,  utterly 
unfit  for  the  reception  of  human  beings.  .  .  .  The 
medical  administration  is  simply  deplorable.  I 
took  the  opportunity  of  examining  the  hospital 
registers.  Here,  as  in  everything  else  which  met 
my  observation  under  this  administration,  matters 
were  as  bad  as  bad  could  be." 

As  to  the  Lunatic  Asylum  in  Cairo,  an  English 
doctor,  who  visited  this  institution  in  1877,  wrote  : 

"  The  whole  place  is  so  utterly  beyond  the  ken 
of  civilisation  that  it  remains  as  hideous  a  blot  on 
the  earth's  surface  as  is  to  be  found  even  in  the 
Dark  Continent." 

The  veterinary  art  is  of  special  importance  in 
Egypt  owing  to  the  ravages  which  have  at  times 
been  made  by  the  cattle  disease.  The  veterinary 
surgeons,  however,  Dr.  Sandwith,  speaking  of  the 
early  days  of  the  occupation,  said,  "  may  be  fairly 
passed  over  with  the  remark  that  they  are  more 
ignorant,  and  not  more  honest,  than  their  medical 
brethren." 

It  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work,  and 
moreover,  would  be  of  little  interest  to  the  general 
reader,  were  an  attempt  made  to  give  the  details 
connected  with  the  work  of  reform  accomplished 
as  regards  the  subject  now  under  discussion.  The 
results  may,  however,  be  briefly  summarised. 

Modern  medicine  and  surgery  are  essentially 
European  sciences.  The  superiority  of  Western  over 
Eastern  therapeutic  methods;  thecosmopolitan  char- 
acter of  the  work  performed  by  the  physician  and 
the  surgeon  ;  the  dissociation  which  exists,  or  which 
at  all  events  should  exist  between  the  art  of  healingr 
the  sick  and  political,  racial,  or  religious  rivalry  ; 
and  the  manifest  benefits  which  the  Egyptian 
people,  whether  as  doctors  or  patients,  are  capable 
of  receiving  from  European  guidance  and  tuition — 


510 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


are  all  so  clear  that  it  might  well  have  been  thought 
that,  in  this  instance  at  all  events,  the  beneficent 
co-operation  of  the  Englishman  would  not  only 
have  been  accepted  without  demur,  but  would  even 
have  been  invited  and  welcomed.  Such,  however, 
was  unfortunately  not  the  case.  The  best,  and, 
indeed,  the  only  method  of  providing  for  the 
medical  wants  of  Egypt  without  flooding  the 
country  with  European  doctors,  was  to  take  in 
hand  the  work  of  medical  education.  It  was  from 
the  first  evident  that  a  few  qualified  Englishmen 
at  the  School  of  Medicine  would,  through  the 
influence  of  teaching,  be  able  in  a  few  years  to 
spread  the  light  of  Western  science  throughout  the 
country.  A  cruel  fate,  however,  ordained  that,  by 
a  fortuitous  and  most  unfortunate  combination 
of  circumstances,  which  are  not  worth  relating  in 
detail,  the  School  of  Medicine  was  for  some  while 
a  hotbed  of  ultra-Mohammedan  and  anti-European 
feeling.  This  obstacle,  though  sufficient  to  retard, 
was  powerless  to  arrest  the  progress  of  medical 
instruction.  With  characteristic  Anglo-Saxon 
energy,  the  Englishman  set  to  work  to  make 
the  Egyptian  "  un  mddecin  malgr^  luL"  His  per- 
severance was  rewarded.  The  School  of  Medicine 
at  Cairo  was  eventually,  in  spite  of  much  opposi- 
tion, put  on  a  sound  footing.  A  capable  staff"  of 
Egyptian  doctors,  some  of  whom  have  European 
diplomas,  is  being  gradually  created. 

The  hospitals,  the  number  of  which  has  been 
largely  increased,  are  now  clean,  properly  equipped 
with  beds,  bedding,  and  clothing,  and  supplied  with 
medicines,  appliances,  and  instruments.  The  pre- 
judice, which  formerly  existed,  against  being  treated 
in  a  hospital,  is  gradually  disappearing.  About 
31,000  in-patients  and  118,000  out-patients  were 
treated  in  the  Government  Hospitals  during  1906. 
The  number  both  of  in-  and  out-patients  is  steadily 


CH.  Lvn 


THE  INTERIOR 


511 


increasing  every  year.  A  staff  of  trained  English 
nurses  has  been  attached  to  the  principal  hospital 
in  Cairo,  to  the  great  benefit  of  the  Egyptian 
nurses  and  pupils,  whom  they  train  and  educate 
by  precept  and  example.  Dispensaries,  where  the 
poor  can  obtain  gratuitous  treatment,  have  been 
opened  in  several  towns. 

Vaccination  has  been  carried  out  on  a  large 
scale  amongst  the  Egyptian  population,  though 
the  Capitulations  hinder  its  extension  amongst 
Europeans.^ 

A  vigorous  campaign,  initiated  in  the  first 
instance  by  the  munificence  of  Sir  Ernest  Cassel, 
has  been  commenced  against  ophthalmia,  which 
was  formerly  the  curse  of  Egypt.^ 

A  Foundling  Hospital  has  been  erected  by  private 
subscription  in  memory  of  a  European  lady  who 
had  endeared  herself  to  the  whole  population. 

The  Lunatic  Asylum  at  Cairo,  which  has  been 
placed  in  charge  of  an  English  specialist,  is  now 
in  perfect  order.  Another  large  Asylum  is  in 
course  of  construction. 

Considerable  progress  has  also  been  made  in  the 
Veterinary  Department  since  1886,  when  it  was 
put  under  the  control  of  an  English  veterinary 
surgeon.    The  butchers'  shops,  dairies,  slaughter- 

^  "  Half  the  cases  of  small-pox  notified  occurred  among'  Europeans, 
a  proportion  which  is  extremely  heavy  when  we  consider  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  natives  in  Cairo,  and  was,  no  doubt,  due  to  non- 
vaccination,  many  of  the  lower-class  Europeans  neglecting  to  have  their 
children  vaccinated.  Though  vaccination  is  compulsory  on  all  persons 
residing  in  Egypt,  the  law  is  evaded  by  some  of  the  Europeans  from 
the  fact  that  the  births  among  this  class  of  the  population  are  not 
notified  at  the  Public  Health  Office,  but  at  the  respective  Consulates, 
and  the  Consuls  in  many  cases  do  not  send  in  the  notifications  to  this 
Department,  and  the  Government  are  unable  to  enforce  the  law  on  the 
parents." — Report  of  the  Public  Health  Department  for  1905. 

2  Not  very  long  ago  Mrs.  Ross,  the  daughter  of  Lady  Duff  Gordon, 
visited  Egypt.  Forty  years  previously,  she  had  had  peculiar  facilities 
for  observing  the  condition  of  the  people.  I  asked  her  what  was  the 
change  which  struck  her  most.  I  was  pleased,  and  also  surprised  at  her 
reply.    She  said,  "The  marked  decrease  in  ophthalmia." 


512  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 


houses,  cattle-sheds,  etc.,  have  been  regularly- 
inspected  and  controlled,  their  owners  being  in- 
duced or  compelled  to  maintain  them  in  a  satis- 
factory sanitary  condition.  Several  outbreaks  of 
pleuro-pneumonia  and  other  epizootic  diseases  have 
been  stamped  out.  A  Veterinary  College,  as  also 
an  Anti-Rabic  Institute,  have  been  established. 

On  the  whole,  although  of  course  much  remains 
to  be  done,  it  may  be  said  that,  in  so  far  as  medical 
instruction  and  organisation,  veterinary  administra- 
tion, and  the  proper  maintenance  of  hospitals,  dis- 
pensaries, and  lunatic  asylums  are  concerned,  an 
amount  of  progress  has  been  realised  which  is  as 
great  as  could  reasonably  be  expected.  The  very 
capable  Englishmen  who  have  devoted  their 
energies  to  the  work  of  this  Department,  and 
who,  like  all  other  British  officials  in  Egypt,  have 
had  great  obstacles  to  encounter,  have  at  all  events 
succeeded  in  introducing  the  first  commonplace 
elements  of  Western  order  and  civilisation  into  the 
country. 

Sanitary  reform  has,  of  course,  progressed  less 
rapidly  than  improvements  in  the  medical  ser^-ice. 
In  the  former  case,  the  conservative  instincts  of 
the  people,  and  their  indifference  to  sanitation, 
constitute  an  almost  insuperable  barrier  to  rapid 
progress.  At  the  same  time,  much  has  already 
been  done.  The  water-supply  of  the  principal 
towns  has  been  taken  in  hand.  The  Mosque 
latrines  are  no  longer  drained  into  the  Nile  or 
the  canals,  and  in  most  of  the  towns  the  Mosques 
themselves  have  been  put  in  a  satisfactory  sanitary 
condition.  Authority  has  been  obtained  to  remove 
cemeteries  pronounced  to  be  a  danger  to  pubhc 
health.  A  commencement  has  been  made  in 
filling  up  the  highly  insanitary  pools  which  are 
to  be  found  in  close  proximity  to  most  Egyptian 
villages.    As  funds  become  available,  it  cannot  be 


CH.  LVII 


THE  INTERIOR 


513 


doubted  that  sanitary  reform  will,  year  by  year, 
occupy  a  more  prominent  place  in  the  Government 
programme. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  my  subject,  some 
brief  allusion  must  be  made  to  the  eminent  services 
rendered  by  the  Sanitary  Department  in  arresting 
the  progress  of  the  various  epidemics  which  have 
visited  Egypt  of  late  years.  In  the  cholera  epi- 
demic of  1883,  58,369  deaths  from  this  disease  were 
registered,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  real  number 
was  far  in  excess  of  this  figure.  In  1896,  another 
severe  epidemic  of  cholera  visited  the  country. 
The  number  of  deaths  was  limited  to  18,105.  It 
cannot  be  doubted  that  the  reduced  mortality  was, 
in  a  great  measure,  due  to  the  improved  efficiency  of 
the  Sanitary  Department,  under  the  auspices  of 
Sir  John  Rogers  and  Sir  Horace  Pinching.  This 
Department  also  dealt  successfully  with  the  cholera 
epidemic  of  1902,  and,  moreover,  gained  well- 
deserved  laurels  in  its  treatment  of  the  epidemic 
of  plague  in  1898  and  subsequent  years. 

Some  interesting  statistics  have  been  drawn  up, 
showing  the  relative  number  of  deaths  in  Alex- 
andria from  the  plague  epidemic  which  lasted  from 
1834  to  1843,  as  compared  with  those  for  the  years 
1899  to  1905.  The  number  of  deaths  in  the  former 
period  of  ten  years  was  12,380.  The  number  in 
the  latter  period  of  seven  years  was  647.  The 
statistics  of  the  earlier  period  are  probably  very 
imperfect.  At  the  same  time,  they  are  sufficient 
to  show  the  effect  produced  by  the  more  stringent 
measures  recently  taken  to  check  the  disease,  as 
compared  with  the  results  obtained  by  the  methods 
adopted  during  the  earlier  of  the  two  epidemics. 


VOL.  II 


CHAPTER  LVIII 


JUSTICE 

Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — The  Mixed  and  Consular  Courts — The 
Kadis'  Courts — The  Native  Tribunals — Justice  prior  to  1883 — The 
French  system  taken  as  a  model  —  The  judicial  macliinery — 
Reforms  instituted  by  Sir  John  Scott  and  Sir  Malcolm  Mcllwraith 
— Opposition  to  these  reforms — The  personnel  of  the  Courts — 
Result  of  the  reforms. 

When  Sir  Edward  Malet  left  Egypt  in  1883,  he 
declared  that  the  first  requirement  of  the  Egyp- 
tian population  was  justice.  In  the  present  chapter, 
an  endeavour  will  be  made  to  state  very  briefly 
how  far  this  requirement  has  been  met 

It  has  been  already  explained  ^  that  the  ISIixed 
Tribunals  deal  with  all  civil  cases,  in  which  Euro- 
peans are  concerned,  and  the  Consular  Courts  with 
all  criminal  cases  in  which  Europeans  are  the 
accused  parties.  The  latter  Courts  apply  their 
national  laws.  Of  these  institutions,  no  more  need 
be  said.  Up  to  the  present  time  (1907)  tlie  juris- 
diction of  the  Consular  Courts  remains  unchanged. 
The  law  administered  by  the  Mixed  Tribunals  has 
merely  undergone  some  minor  modifications.  In 
each  of  these  cases,  the  reasons  for  this  long 
immunity  from  change  have,  broadly  speaking, 
been  twofold.  The  first  is  that  neither  the  Mixed 
nor  the  Consular  Courts  stood  nearly  so  much  in 
need  of  reform  as  the  Egyptian  portions  of  the 

1  See  Chapter  XUI. 
514 


CH.  LVIII 


JUSTICE 


515 


judicial  system.  The  second  is  that,  hedged  behind 
the  ahnost  impenetrable  barrier  of  internationalism, 
both  of  these  jurisdictions  have  so  far  been  able  to 
defy  the  efforts  of  the  reformer. 

Neither  need  much  be  said  about  the  Kadis' 
Courts.  These  Courts  deal  with  all  questions 
affecting  the  personal  status  of  Moslems.  If  they 
are  ever  to  be  improved,  the  movement  in  favour 
of  reform  must  come  from  within.  It  must  be 
initiated  by  the  Egyptians  themselves.  Any  serious 
attempt  to  impose  reforms  by  pressure  from  without 
would  be  extremely  impolitic,  and,  moreover,  would 
probably  result  in  failure.  The  British  reformer, 
therefore,  being  partly  convinced  of  the  uselessness 
of  attack  and  partly  impelled  by  political  neces- 
sity, turned  aside  from  Mohammedan  law-reform. 
Although  he  made  some  faltering  steps  in  the 
direction  of  improving  the  Kadis'  Courts,  his 
energies  were  mainly  applied  in  other  directions, 
where  better  results  were  to  be  obtained. 

There  remain  the  Native  Tribunals  instituted 
in  1883.  These  deal  with  all  civil  cases  in  which 
both  parties  are  Ottoman  subjects,  and  with  all 
criminal  cases  in  which  an  Ottoman  subject  is  the 
accused  party.  It  can  scarcely  be  said  that  these 
Courts  took  the  place  of  any  existing  institutions. 
They  were  new  creations.  The  judges  were  the 
instruments  who  gave  expression  to  a  phase  of 
thought  which  had  been  hitherto  unfamiliar  to 
the  Egyptian  mind.  Prior  to  1883,  a  system  of 
punishment  existed,  or  it  would  be  perhaps  more 
correct  to  say  that  a  method  was  in  force  by  which 
occasionally  somebody  was  punished  for  an  offence 
which  as  often  as  not  he  had  never  committed, 
whilst  not  unfrequently  others  were  punished 
without  any  offence  at  law  having  been  committed 
at  all.  Moreover,  the  existence  of  some  rude  code 
of  Civil  Law  was  so  far  recognised  as  to  enable  the 


516 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


worst  illegalities  to  be  hallowed  by  legal  sanction. 
For  instance,  when  Ismail  Pasha  confiscated  the 
vineyard  of  some  Naboth  among  his  subjects,  the 
transfer  was  always  effected  in  accordance  with 
strictly  legal  forms.  But  any  system  of  justice,  pro- 
perly so  called,  was  unknown  in  the  country.  The 
divorce  between  law,  such  as  it  was,  and  justice 
was  absolute.  It  has  been  already  explained  ^  how, 
in  1883,  the  Department  of  Justice  was,  to  some 
extent,  placed  under  British  management ;  how, 
during  the  storm  and  stress  of  the  years  1884-85, 
when  the  Anglo-Egyptian  bark  was  being  tossed 
hither  and  thither  by  the  waves  of  Soudanese 
troubles,  bankruptcy,  and  international  rivalry,  this 
Department,  as  well  as  that  of  the  Interior,  were 
confided  to  Egyptian  hands ;  how  the  experiment, 
which  was  then  tried,  resulted  in  complete  failure  ; 
and  how  eventually,  with  the  nomination  of  Sir 
John  Scott  to  the  post  of  Judicial  Adviser,  an  era 
of  real  reform  commenced. 

It  is  true  that,  prior  to  1883,  no  system  of 
justice  existed  hi  Egypt.  It  is  not,  however,  on 
that  account  to  be  supposed  that  the  English  were 
free  to  introduce  into  the  country  any  system  which 
they  preferred.  Such  was  far  from  being  the  case. 
French  law  and  procedure  had  already  taken  root 
in  Egypt.  The  codes  administered  by  the  Mixed 
Tribunals  were  French.  All  the  young  Egyptians 
who  had  received  any  legal  training  had  been 
educated  in  France.  It  was,  therefore,  inevit- 
able that  the  new  Tribunals  should  be  based  on 
a  French  rather  than  on  an  English  model. 
The  necessity  was  regrettable,  for  a  simple  code 
of  law  and  procedure,  somewhat  similar  to 
that  which  was  subsequently  introduced  into 
the  Soudan,  would — more  especially  in  criminal 
matters — have  probably  been  more  suited  to  the 

»  Vide  ante,  pp.  288-90.  •  ' 


CH.  LVIII 


JUSTICE 


517 


requirements  of  the  country  than  that  which  was 
actually  adopted.^ 

Proposals  have  frequently  been  made  to  sweep 
away  the  system  of  criminal  justice  inaugurated 
shortly  after  the  British  occupation  took  place,  and 
to  substitute  something  else  in  its  place.  Apart 
from  other  and  very  valid  objections  to  the  adoption 
of  this  course,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  those  who 
have  urged  this  radical  treatment  of  the  question 
have  not,  perhaps,  sufficiently  realised  that,  although 
the  system  is,  indeed,  by  no  means  perfect,  the 
main  difficulties  which  have  to  be  encountered  in 
introducing  any  improvements  are  inherent  in  the 
situation,  and  cannot  be  removed  by  any  mere  change 
of  system.  They  arise  from  the  character  of  the 
people,  from  the  impossibility  of  creating  rapidly  a 
competent  judiciary  calculated  to  inspire  confidence 
and  respect,  and,  generally,  from  the  circumstances 
which  are  the  necessary  accompaniment  of  a  tran- 
sitionary  period  from  arbitrary  government  to  a 
reign  of  law.  It  was,  therefore,  decided  to  make 
no  radical  changes,  but  to  remedy  the  defects  which 
existed  by  gradually  introducing  such  minor  reforms 
as  experience  showed  were  calculated  to  adapt  the 
system  more  fully  to  the  requirements  of  the 
country. 

It  is  unnecessary  that  I  should  describe  in  detail 
the  nature  of  the  changes  which,  from  time  to 
time,  have  been  carried  out  under  the  auspices  of 

^  The  danger  of  making  too  faithful  a  copy  of  European  judicial 
institutions  is  fully  recognised  by  the  best  French  authorities  on  colonial 
affairs.  In  an  interesting  article,  written  by  M.  de  Lavigne  Saiute- 
Suzanne,  and  entitled  "  La  Justice  Indigene  aux  Colonies,"  which 
appeared  in  the  Revue  Diplomatique,  the  following  passage  occurs  ; — • 

"  C'cst  surtout  dans  I'organisation  de  la  justice  indigene  que  re- 
trouve  son  application  cette  formule  qui  devrait  servir  de  base  a  tout 
le  programme  du  droit  colonial  :  pas  d'assimilatioii.  S'il  est  absiirde 
de  transporter  chez  des  peuples  encore  primitifs  tous  les  rouages 
administratifs  en  usage  dans  la  vieille  Europe,  il  devient  dangereux  et 
inique  d'imposer  aux  indigenes  notre  le'gislation  et  notre  organisation 
judiciaire." 


518  MODERN  EGYPT 


successive  Egyptian  Ministers  of  Justice  aided  by 
Sir  John  Scott,  and  iiis  successor,  Sir  Malcolm 
Mcllwraith.  The  most  important  of  these  have 
been  the  establishment  of  a  Committee  of  Surveil- 
lance who,  without  possessing  any  power  to  upset 
or  revise  judgments  already  delivered,  watch  over 
the  proceedings  of  the  Courts  of  First  Instance ; 
the  partial  decentralisation,  first  of  Civil,  and 
subsequently  of  Criminal  justice  ;  the  revision  of 
the  Criminal  Codes  with  the  object  of  freeing  them 
from  useless  formalism ;  and  the  establishment  of 
Assize  Courts  whose  judgments,  save  on  points  of 
law,  are  final. 

These  reforms  followed  what  may  be  considered 
the  normal  course  of  all  administrative  chans^e  in 
Egypt.  When  any  new  measure  is  proposed,  a 
certain  amount  of  opposition  is  sure  to  be 
encountered.  This  opposition  will  sometimes  be 
based  on  the  conservative  tendencies  of  the  more 
old-fashioned  class  of  Egyptians,  who  look  askance 
at  any  one  who  aspires  to  moliri  res  novas ;  or,  it 
may  be  based  on  the  mental  inelasticity  of  the 
Egyptian  reformer,  who,  albeit  somewhat  prone  to 
radical  change,  finds  it  difficult  to  get  out  of  the 
special  groove  into  which,  by  the  accident  of  educa- 
tion and  association,  his  intellectual  forces  have 
been  directed.  When  the  reform  is  eventually 
accomplished,  it  is  discovered  that  the  fears  of  the 
opposition  were  groundless,  and  that  the  measure, 
so  far  from  having  done  harm,  has  done  much  good. 
This  experience  will  in  no  degi-ee  act  as  a  pre- 
ventive to  a  repetition  of  similar  tactics  on  some 
future  occasion ;  but  it  is  a  point  which  the 
European  reformer  should  bear  in  mind  that,  pro- 
vided always  that  his  proposals  be  reasonable,  they 
will  generally,  after  a  certain  amount  of  murmur- 
ing, be  accepted.  All  Easterns  carry  fatalism  into 
the  practical  affairs  of  life  ;  they  readily  bow  before 


CH.  LVIII 


JUSTICE 


519 


an  accomplished  fact.  In  the  particular  cases 
described  above,  the  somewhat  fictitious  opposition, 
which  was  at  one  time  excited  against  Sir  John 
Scott's  and  Sir  Malcolm  Mcllwraith's  proposals,  died 
an  unusually  speedy  death.  The  benefits  derived 
from  the  reforms  were,  in  fact,  too  manifest  to 
admit  of  doubt.  Experience  soon  pricked  the 
theoretical  bubbles  of  which  the  opponents  of 
practical  reforms  in  Egypt  are  at  times  prodigal.^ 

So  far,  the  main  features  of  the  judicial  system 
which  were  introduced  have  been  described.  The 
chief  difficulty  in  this,  as  in  so  many  other  cases, 
has,  however,  been  not  to  devise  a  system,  but  to 
find  men  capable  of  working  it.  Sir  John  Scott, 
writing  in  the  early  part  of  1894,  said  : 

*"Tant  valent  les  juges,  tant  valent  les  lois,' 
is  a  principle  which  had  been  overlooked  before 
1890  ;  and  judges  had  been  named  in  Appeal,  as 
well  as  in  First  Instance,  who  were  far  from 
possessing  the  necessary  qualifications." 

In  point  of  fact,  when  the  Tribunals  were  first 
instituted  in  1883,  few  Egyptians  were  to  be  found 
who  were  capable  of  exercising  judicial  functions. 
Moreover,  amongst  those  few,  the  best  men  were 
frequently  not  selected.  The  appointments  were 
jobbed.  Gradually,  the  least  capable  men  have 
been  weeded  out.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
standard  of  efficiency  in  the  law-courts  is  steadily 
improving.    I  should  add  that  the  personnel  of  tlie 

*  Perhaps  the  most  striking'  instance  of  the  collapse  of  opposition 
was  in  the  case  of  the  Assize  Courts.  Few  measures  have  been  more 
violently  or  more  universally  condemned.  Yet,  very  shortly  after  the 
change  of  system  had  been  effected,  one  of  the  most  competent  of  the 
Egyptian  judicial  officials  was  able  to  write :  "  Nothing  shows  more 
clearly  the  efficiency  and  excellency  of  the  new  system  than  the  absence 
of  all  criticisms  upon  the  results  obtained  by  its  adoption,  especially 
when  it  is  remembered  that,  when  the  project  was  under  consideration, 
it  gave  rise  to  much  difference  of  opinion,  and  to  fears  as  to  the  con- 
sequence which  would  be  entailed  from  the  point  of  view  of  justice." 
The  establishment  of  these  Courts  has,  inter  alia,  rendered  justice  much 
more  expeditious  than  formerly. 


520  MODERN  EGYPT 


Judicial  Department  is  almost  wholly  Egyptian. 
Out  of  a  total  staff  of  1600,  only  36  are  Europeans. 

Have  the  changes,  whose  main  features  have 
thus  been  briefly  described,  given  to  the  population 
of  Egypt  a  sound  system  of  justice,  on  the  neces- 
sity of  which  Sir  Edward  ^lalet  insisted  in  1883  ? 

In  a  sense,  this  question  may  unhesitatingly  be 
answered  in  the  affirmative.  The  system,  which 
I  do  not  doubt  Sir  Edward  Malet  wished  to  advo- 
cate, was  one  under  which  law-courts  should  be 
placed  in  a  position  to  protect  the  most  humble 
individual  of  the  community  against  the  caprices 
of  his  ruler  and  of  the  Government  agents,  of 
whose  malpractices  Sir  Edward  Malet  had  been  a 
scandalised  witness.  Law-courts  possessing  both 
the  power  and  the  will  to  attain  this  object  have 
been  created.  Not  only  are  the  judges  indepen- 
dent of  the  Government,  but  they  are  in  the 
highest  degree  sensitive  of  any  words  or  deeds 
calculated  to  call  their  independence  in  question. 
Justice  is  no  longer  bought  and  sold.  It  may  be 
dilatory,  and,  as  in  other  countries,  it  may  occasion- 
ally err.  It  may  perhaps  be  that,  where  racial  or 
religious  feelings  are  evoked,  some — probably  un- 
conscious— bias  may  be  discerned.  But  no  more 
grave  accusation  than  this  can  be  brought  against 
the  Egyptian  law  courts.  So  early  as  iNIarch  9, 
1893,  I  was  able  to  write  to  Lord  Rosebery  :  "  It 
can  now  be  said  that  justice  in  Egypt  is  adminis- 
tered on  fixed  princi})les  and,  with  occasional 
exceptions,  the  decisions  are  just."  The  fact  that 
no  more  than  ten  years  after  the  British  occupa- 
tion commenced  a  statement  of  this  sort  could  be 
recorded  reflects  great  credit,  not  only  on  the 
Ministers  and  their  Judicial  Advisers,  who  have 
guided  the  work  of  reform  in  this  Department, 
but  also  on  the  Euro])can  and  Egyptian  judges 
and  other  officials  who  iiave  co-operated  with  them. 


CH.  LVIII 


JUSTICE 


521 


The  Anglo-Saxon  race  have  broad  shoulders.  They 
may  well  pardon  a  little  pedantry,  as  well  as  the 
Anglophobia  which  the  Egyptian  judges  have  at 
times  displayed,  and  which  is  to  a  great  extent  the 
result  of  ignorance  and  misguidance,  if,  in  dealing 
with  the  litigious  affairs  of  their  own  countrymen, 
their  "  decisions  are  just." 

The  protection  of  the  weak  against  the  strong 
is,  however,  not  the  sole  function  of  justice.  It 
should  also  be  able  to  protect  society  against  evil- 
doers. That  this  protection  has,  of  late  years, 
been  inadequate  in  Egypt,  can  scarcely  be  doubted. 
It  is  easy  to  indicate  the  main  reason  for  this 
state  of  things.  On  the  one  hand,  civilisation 
insists  on  the  cardinal  principle  that  no  man  is  to 
be  punished  for  any  offence  unless  he  is  clearly 
proved  to  have  committed  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  peculiar  conditions  of  Egyptian  society  render 
it  often  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty  to  obtain 
evidence  of  guilt  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction. 
In  the  last  report  which  I  wrote  from  Egypt 
before  tendering  the  resignation  of  my  appoint- 
ment, I  made  the  following  remarks,  to  which  I 
have  nothing  to  add  : — 

"  I  have  no  hesitation  in  stating  that  the  increase 
of  crime,  to  which  I  have  frequently  alluded  in 
former  Reports,  is  the  most  unsatisfactory  feature 
in  the  whole  Egyptian  situation.  The  Govern- 
ment are  frequently  being  pressed  to  examine  into 
the  causes  which  have  led  to  the  increase,  and  to 
look  to  the  removal  of  those  causes,  rather  than 
to  the  punishment  of  the  offenders,  as  the  true 
remedy  for  the  existing  state  of  affairs.  As  a 
matter  of  general  principle,  I  entirely  agree  that 
when,  in  any  country,  it  is  found  that  the  number 
of  crimes  is  increasing,  it  is  most  necessary  to 
inquire  into  the  cause,  but  the  possibility  of  apply- 
ing any  remedy  other  than  that  of  punishment 


522  MODERN  EGYPT 


must  obviously  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the 
cause  wlien  once  it  has  been  ascertained.  It  gener- 
ally happens  that  increasing  poverty  is  the  parent 
of  increasing  crime.  No  one  with  the  least  know- 
ledge of  the  country  will  think  that  the  recent  in- 
crease of  crime  in  Egypt  is  due  to  poverty.  There 
must  be  some  other  cause,  and,  in  my  opinion, 
it  is  not  far  to  seek.  It  is,  I  think,  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  the  law  does  not  inspire  sufficient 
terror  to  evildoers.  Only  43*5  per  cent  of  the 
crimes  committed  last  year  (1906)  were  punished. 
In  the  remaining  56*5  per  cent,  it  was  found  im- 
possible to  discover  the  criminals,  or,  if  they  were 
discovered,  to  prove  their  guilt.  I  was  talking  a 
short  time  ago  to  a  distinguished  Frenchman  who 
was  well  acquainted  with  the  affairs  of  Algeria. 
He  explained  to  me  that  certain  districts  lying  in 
the  Algerian  Hinterland,  where  military  law  used 
to  be  applied,  had  recently  been  brought  under  the 
ordinary  criminal  codes.  The  comment  of  one  of 
the  principal  Algerian  Sheikhs  on  this  change  was 
curious.  'Then,'  he  said,  'there  will  be  no  justice. 
Witnesses  will  be  required.'  I  commend  this 
remark  to  those  who  are  in  a  hurry  to  apply 
Western  methods  in  their  entirety  to  a  backward 
Eastern  population.  The  Sheikh  was  not  in  the 
least  struck  with  the  fact  that,  in  the  absence 
of  witnesses,  an  innocent  man  might  possibly  be 
condemned.  AVhat  struck  him  was  that,  as  no 
one  could  be  condemned  without  witnesses,  guilty 
people  would  generally  escape  punishment.  This 
is  precisely  what  is  happening  in  Egypt.  I  have 
said  over  and  over  again,  and  I  now  repeat,  that 
I  strongly  deprecate  any  resort  to  heroic  remedies 
in  dealing  with  this  question.  There  must  be  no 
radical  change  of  system.  But  there  should  be 
no  delusion  as  to  the  time  which  will  be  required, 
or  the  difficulties  wliich  have  still  to  be  encoun- 


CH.  LVUI 


JUSTICE 


523 


tered,  before  a  well-established  reign  of  law  can 
take  the  place  of  the  arbitrary  system  under  which, 
until  recently,  the  Egyptians  were  governed.  In 
the  meanwhile,  let  us  by  all  means  do  everything 
that  is  possible,  not  merely  to  improve  the  Police 
and  the  judicial  systems,  but  also,  by  indirect 
means,  such  as  education  and  the  establishment 
of  adult  reformatories,  to  diminish  crime  and  check 
criminal  tendencies.  But,  simultaneously  with  all 
this,  I  trust  that  criminals  will  receive  adequate 
punishment  when  their  guilt  has  been  brought 
home  to  them.  I  deprecate  the  false  sentiment 
which  expends  all  its  sympathy  on  the  criminal 
and  reserves  none  for  his  victims.  I  at  times 
observe  symptoms  which  lead  me  to  believe  that 
this  sentiment  prevails  to  a  somewhat  excessive 
degree  in  Egypt."  ^ 

»  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  p.  86. 


CHAPTER  LIX 


EDUCATION 

Educational  policy — Obstacles  to  prog^-ess — Want  of  money — ^The 
Pashas — Intellectual  awakening  of  Egypt — The  Mosque  schools — 
Primary  and  Secondary  education — Progress  made  in  forming  the 
characters  of  the  Egyptians — Female  education. 

The  subjects  which  have  so  far  been  treated  fall 
within  the  domain  of  material  or  administrative 
progress.  What,  however,  has  been  done  in  the 
direction  of  moral  and  intellectual  progress  ?  Have 
the  English  made  any  endeavour  to  educate  the 
Egyptians  ?  "  Egypt,"  a  high  authority  on  Eastern 
affairs  has  said,  "  has  always  been  the  servant  of 
nations."^  Have  the  English,  as  some  critics  of 
the  baser  sort  aver,  viewed  this  condition  of  politi- 
cal degradation  with  ill-disguised  favour?^  Have 
they  discouraged  the  acquisition  of  knowledge, 
with  a  view  to  keeping  the  Egyptians  in  a  position 
of  servitude  to  the  British  nation  ?  Or  has  a  more 
noble  policy  been  adopted  ?  Have  the  English,  cast- 
ing aside  all  feelings  based  on  a  mistaken  and  ignoble 
egotism,  endeavoured  to  educate  the  Egyptians 
and  to  lead  them,  so  far  as  was  possible,  along  the 
path  which  may  possibly  end  in  self-government  ? 

'  Muir,  The  Caliphate,  p.  168. 

2  It  was  not  only  with  surprise,  but  also  with  a  feeling  of  keen  dis- 
appointment, that  i  read  in  a  work  written  by  M.  de  Guerville  a  letter 
from  Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdou,  in  which  that  eminent  man  appeared  to 
give  the  weight  of  his  name  to  insinuations  of  this  sort.  He  must  have 
known  perfectly  well  that  they  were  wholly  devoid  of  foundation,  I 
had  hoped  for  better  things  of  him. 

524 


CH.  LIX 


EDUCATION 


525 


In  the  present  chapter  an  attempt  will  be  made 
to  answer  these  questions.  They  are  of  vital  im- 
portance, not  only  to  the  Egyptians  themselves, 
but  also  to  all  Europe,  and  more  especially  to 
England.  The  reason  why  they  are  so  important 
is  that  if  ever  the  Egyptians  learn  to  govern 
themselves  —  if,  in  other  words,  the  full  execu- 
tion of  the  policy  of  "  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians " 
becomes  feasible — the  Egyptian  question  will,  it 
may  be  hoped  and  presumed,  finally  cease  to  be  a 
cause  of  trouble  to  Europe,  and  the  British  nation 
will  be  relieved  of  an  onerous  responsibility. 

Many  years  ago.  Lord  Macaulay  asked  a  perti- 
nent question  in  connection  with  the  system  under 
which  India  should  be  governed.  "Are  we,"  he 
said,  "to  keep  the  people  of  India  ignorant  in  order 
that  we  may  keep  them  submissive  ? "  His  reply 
was  an  indignant  negative.  "  Governments,  like 
men,"  he  said,  "may  buy  existence  too  dear.  Propter 
vitam  Vivendi  perdere  causas  is  a  despicable  policy 
both  in  individuals  and  in  States."^ 

The  English  in  Egypt  have  acted  on  the  prin- 
ciple advocated  by  Macaulay.  They  may  repel, 
with  equal  truth  and  scorn,  the  insinuation  that, 
for  political  reasons,  tliey  have  fostered  Egyptian 
ignorance  and  subserviency.  If  a  race  of  Egyptians 
capable  of  governing  the  country  without  foreign 
aid  has  not  as  yet  been  formed,  the  fault  does  not 
lie  with  the  English.  It  must  be  sought  elsewhere, 
neither  need  any  impartial  person  go  far  afield  to 
find  where  it  lies.  It  lies  mainly  in  the  fact  that 
two  decades  are  but  a  short  time  in  the  life  of  a 
nation.  Material  progress  may,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, be  rapid.  Moral  and  intellectual  progress 
must  of  necessity  always  be  a  plant  of  slow  growth. 
It  takes  more  time  to  form  the  mind  of  a  states- 
man, or  even  to  train  a  competent  administrator, 

^  Speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  July  10,  1833. 


526 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


than  it  does  to  dig  a  canal  or  to  construct  a  rail- 
way. When  the  unpromising  nature  of  the  raw- 
material  on  which  the  English  had  to  work  is  con- 
sidered, when  it  is  remembered  that  for  centuries 
prior  to  the  British  occupation  the  Egyptians 
were  governed  under  a  system  eminently  calcu- 
lated to  paralyse  their  intellectual  and  warp  their 
moral  faculties,  and  when  it  is  further  borne  in 
mind  that  the  circumstances  under  which  reform 
was  undertaken  were  of  an  exceptionally  difficult 
and  complicated  nature,  it  may  well  be  a  matter 
for  surprise,  not  that  so  little,  but  that  so  much 
progress  in  the  direction  of  a  real  Egyptian 
autonomy  has  been  made  in  so  short  a  time. 

Consider  what  is  generally  meant  by  Europeans 
when  they  talk  of  Egyptian  self-government.  If 
they  meant  that  the  Egyptians  should  be  allowed 
to  govern  themselves  according  to  their  own  rude 
lights,  the  task  of  educating  them  in  the  art  of 
self-government  would  not  merely  have  been  easy  ; 
there  would  have  been  no  necessity  that  it  should 
have  been  undertaken.  The  indigenous  art  of  self- 
government  had  already  been  acquired  in  1882, 
and  we  know  with  what  results ;  no  European 
instruction  would  have  been  able  to  improve  on  its 
recognised  canons.  What  Europeans  mean  when 
they  talk  of  Egyptian  self-government  is  that  the 
Egyptians,  far  from  being  allowed  to  follow  the 
bent  of  their  own  unreformed  propensities,  should 
only  be  permitted  to  govern  themselves  after  the 
fashion  in  which  Europeans  think  they  ought  to  be 
governed. 

I  am  not  one  of  those  who  think  that  "any 
State  can  be  saved,  and  any  political  problem 
solved,  by  enlightened  administration."^    At  the 

1  This  was  the  view  held  by  Peregrino  Rossi,  who  was  subsequently 
assassinated,  during  the  early  struggles  for  Italian  unity. — Trevelyau's 
Garibaldi's  Defence  of  the  Roman  Republic,  p.  74. 


CH.  LIX 


EDUCATION 


527 


same  time,  looking  to  the  magnitude  of  all  the 
interests  involved  in  Egypt,  there  is  a  limit  to  the 
decree  of  maladministration  which  can  be  tolerated 
in  order  to  ensure  all  the  advantages  of  self-govern- 
ment. It  cannot  be  doubted  that  that  limit  would 
be  passed,  if  complete  autonomy  were  suddenly 
bestowed  on  the  Egyptians. 

To  suppose  that  the  characters  and  intellects  of 
even  a  small  number  of  Egyptians  can  in  a  few 
years  be  trained  to  such  an  extent  as  to  admit  of 
their  undertaking  the  sole  direction  of  one  of  the 
most  complicated  political  and  administrative 
machines  which  the  world  has  ever  known,  and 
of  guiding  such  a  machine  along  the  path  of  even 
fairly  good  government,  is  a  sheer  absurdity.  I 
must  apologise  to  those  of  my  readers  who  have 
any  real  acquaintance  with  Egyptian  affairs  for 
indulging  in  platitudes  of  this  description.  If  I 
do  so,  it  is  because  it  would  appear  that  the  race 
of  those  who  dream  dreams  of  real  autonomy  in 
the  very  near  future  is  not  yet  extinct. 

The  main  reason  why  it  is  hopeless  to  expect 
that  any  immediate  and  important  political  fruit 
can  be  gathered  from  the  tree  of  educational 
progress  in  Egypt  has  been  already  indicated.  It 
is  now  necessary  to  explain  the  further  obstacles 
which  have  stood  in  the  way  of  rapid  progress  in 
the  work  of  education.    They  were  mainly  twofold. 

The  first  and  principal  obstacle  has  been  want  of 
money.  In  1877  and  1878 — that  is  to  say,  during 
the  worst  periods  of  the  financial  chaos  created  by 
Ismail  Pasha  —  the  Government  expenditure  on 
education  only  amounted  to  the  paltry  sum  of 
£E. 29,000  a  year.  Under  the  Dual  Control,  the 
grant  was  raised  to  about  £E. 70,000  a  year. 
During  the  early  days  of  the  British  occupation, 
that  is  to  say,  whilst  the  issue  of  the  "  Race 
against    Bankruptcy"    was    stUl    doubtful,  the 


528 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


utmost  economy  had  to  be  practised  ;  and  even 
when  the  race  was  won,  it  was  felt  that,  however 
necessary  it  might  be  to  provide  schools  for 
Egyptian  children,  it  was  still  more  necessary 
to  limit  the  excessive  demands  which  the  tax- 
gatherer  had  heretofore  made  on  their  parents. 
Fiscal  relief,  therefore,  took  precedence  of  every- 
thing. It  was  not  until  1890  that  the  Financial 
Department  found  itself  in  a  position  to  increase 
the  sum  of  money  spent  by  the  State  on  education 
to  £E.81,000.  Since  then,  it  has  been  steadily 
increasing  in  amount.^  It  would  long  since  have 
been  largely  increased  had  not  internationalism, 
by  depriving  the  Egyptian  Government  of  the 
free  use  of  their  own  resources,  barred  the  way. 

Want  of  money,  therefore,  was  the  first  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  rapid  progress.  The  idiosyncrasies 
of  Pashadom  constituted  the  second.  It  was  not 
that  the  Pashas  did  not  wish  to  advance  the  cause 
of  education  in  Egypt.  Far  from  it.  Many  of 
them  yearned  —  and  very  naturally  and  rightly 
yearned — for  educational  progress.  They  recog- 
nised that  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  was  the 
sole  instrument  by  the  use  of  which  Egypt  might 
perhaps  eventually  be  freed  from  foreign  control 
But  they  were  themselves  too  ignorant  of  educa- 
tional administration  to  be  able  to  initiate  the  only 
measures  which  would  have  satisfied  their  very 
legitimate  yearnings.  The  execution  of  their  own 
policy  was  perpetually  leading  them  to  conclusions 
which  their  prejudices  forced  them  to  reject.  The 
natural  result  ensued.  The  policy  of  Pashadom 
was  a  mass  of  inconsistencies.     JNIoreover,  the 

'  £E.  305,000  was  expended  on  education  in  1906.  The  provision  made 
in  the  estimates  for  1907  amounted  to  £E.374,000,  and  this  amount  has 
been  increased  to  ££.450,450  in  the  estimates  for  1908.  These  figures 
represent  only  "  ordinary "  expenditure.  They  do  not  include  the 
special  credits  for  the  constructioa  and  maiutenauce  of  school  build- 
ings. 


EDUCATION 


529 


evil  effects  of  those  inconsistencies  were  enhanced 
by  the  fact  that,  at  every  turn  of  the  wheel  of 
nepotism,  some  fresh  individual  was,  during  the 
early  years  of  the  occupation,  appointed  to  direct 
the  affairs  of  the  Department  of  Public  Instruc- 
tion. "  The  frequent  changes  in  educational  policy 
during  past  years,"  I  wrote  in  1892,  "  have  proved 
a  great  obstacle  to  educational  progress  in  Egypt. 
During  the  past  twenty-nine  years,  the  Minister 
(or  Director- General)  of  PubUc  Instruction  has 
been  changed  twenty-nine  times.  At  each  change, 
the  schools  have  for  a  time  been  more  or 
less  completely  upset  and  demoralised,  as  it  has 
been  the  prevailing  tendency  of  the  Minister  to 
reverse  the  administrative  methods  of  his  pre- 
decessor." 

At  one  moment,  recourse  has  been  had  to  the 
usual  remedy  of  the  Egyptian  reformer.  A  ser- 
vile copy  was  made  of  some  foreign  institution. 
"  On  s'etait  contents,"  says  Yacoub  Artin  Pasha, 
who  is  by  far  the  highest  Egyptian  authority  on 
educational  matters  in  Egypt,  "  de  copier  les 
programmes  des  ^coles  de  France,  et  sans  se 
donner  la  peine  de  chercher  a  les  modifier  selon 
les  besoins  du  pays  et  de  notre  culture  future."^ 
At  the  next  moment,  the  undisciplined  mind  of 
the  old-fashioned  Pasha,  with  characteristic  want 
of  moderation,  would  spring  at  a  bound  to  the 
opposite  extreme  of  anti-European  sentiment.  He 
might  own  that  European  knowledge  was  good, 
but  he  refused  to  accept  the  inevitable  conclusion 
that,  at  all  events  until  a  capable  staff  of  Egyptian 
teachers  had  been  trained,  Europeans  alone  could 
impart  it.  Sciences  cannot  be  learnt  save  in  those 
languages  which  possess  a  scientific  literature  and 
vocabulary.  Yet  the  Pasha,  under  the  influence 
of  prejudices  which  his  powers  of  reasoning  were 

1  Considerations  sur  V Instruction  Publique  en  Egypte,  p.  116. 
VOL.  II  2  M 


530  MODERN  EGYPT  ft  vi 

too  feeble  to  stem,  declared  that  a  science  which 
could  not  be  taugb.t  in  Arabic,  should  not  be 
taught  at  all.  There  was  one  thing  which  the 
Pasha  could  do,  and  which,  in  fact,  he  did.  He 
could  multiply  schools  and  scholars  without  any 
regard  to  the  qualifications  of  the  professors,  to 
the  value  of  the  instruction  imparted,  or  to  the 
schoolroom  accommodation  which  was  available. 
He  could  thus  practise  his  favourite  art  of  self- 
deception.  He  could  give  statistical  proof  that  he 
was  moving  rapidly  forward,  whilst  all  the  time 
he  was  in  reality  stationary,  if,  indeed,  his  move- 
ments were  not  retrograde.  On  the  whole,  it  may  be 
said  that  one  of  the  chief  obstacles  to  the  adoption 
of  an  enlightened  educational  policy  in  Egypt  in 
the  early  days  of  the  occupation  was  the  presence 
of  a  few  leading  Pashas  who,  in  theory  at  all 
events,  favoured  educational  progress.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that,  if  the  English  had  from  the  first 
had  a  free  hand  in  this  matter,  greater  progress 
would  have  been  made  than  has  actuallv  been  the 
case. 

From  one  point  of  view,  however,  the  English 
took  in  hand  the  work  of  educating  the  Egyptians  at 
a  propitious  moment.  Almost  simultaneously  with 
the  occurrence  of  the  British  occupation,  the  country 
underwent  an  intellectual  awakening.  The  people 
of  Egypt  had,  in  fact,  slumbered  since  the  days  of 
Mehemet  Ali.  One  of  the  most  singular  traits  in 
that  remarkable  man's  character  was  that,  although 
he  was  himself  uneducated,  although  he  could  never 
write,  and  did  not  learn  to  read  till  he  was  forty- 
seven  years  old,  and  then  imperfectly,  he  placed  a 
high  value  on  European  knowledge.^  He  established 
schools  in  the  towns  and  large  villages.  JSIehemet 
Ali  was,  however,  in  some  respects,  in  advance  of 

'  See  M.  de  Lesseps'  remarks  to  Mr.  Senior,  Converaationt,  etc., 
p.  129. 


CH.  LIX 


EDUCATION 


531 


his  time.  "  Knowledge  was  then  so  unpopular 
that  mothers  blinded  their  children  to  keep  them 
from  school."^  JNIore  than  half  a  century  later, 
the  population  generally  appreciated  the  value  of 
education  almost  as  little  as  they  did  in  the  days 
of  Mehemet  Ali.  Writing  in  1894,  Yacoub  Artin 
Pasha  said  : — 

"  II  n'y  a  pas  une  dizaine  d'ann^es  que  le  public 
en  general,  non  seulement  ne  s'int^ressait  pas  a 
I'instruction  de  ses  enfants,  main  encore  y  ^tait 
oppos4  quoique  dans  une  moindre  mesure  qu'il  y  a 
soixante  ans." 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Egyptians 
were  suddenly  inspired  with  a  thirst  for  know- 
ledge for  its  own  sake,  or  that  they  awoke  to  a 
keen  sense  of  shame  at  their  own  ignorance.  The 
new  spirit  was,  at  all  events  in  the  first  instance, 
rather  to  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that,  in  a  country 
where  a  large  section  of  the  upper  and  middle 
classes  of  society  depends  on  Government  employ- 
ment, parents  suddenly  realised  that,  unless  their 
children  were  sent  to  school,  they  would  probably 
not  be  able  to  gain  their  livelihood.  Contact  with 
the  West,  the  partial  Europeanisation  of  the  ad- 
ministrative services,  and  the  emulation  inspired 
by  the  presence  of  European,  Levantine,  and 
Syrian  competitors,  produced,  therefore,  at  least 
one  beneficial  result. 

But  whatever  be  the  cause,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  of  the  fact.  The  best  test  of  whether  the 
Egyptians  really  desire  to  be  educated  is  to  ascer- 
tain whether  they  are  prepared  to  pay  for  education. 
On  this  point,  the  evidence  is  conclusive.  In  the 
early  days  of  the  British  occupation,  nearly  all 
the  pupils  who  attended  the  Government  schools 
were  taught  gratuitously.    Before  many  years  had 

1  See  M.  de  Lesseps'  remarks  to  Mr.  Senior,  Conversations,  etc., 
p.  130. 


532  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.  vi 

passed,  by  far  the  greater  proportion  paid  for  their 
instruction.^ 

In  1889,  I  visited  many  remote  villages  of 
Upper  Egypt  in  which  the  face  of  a  European 
is  rarely  seen.  No  request  was  more  frequently 
made  to  me  than  that  I  should  urge  the  Govern- 
ment to  establish  a  school  in  the  village.  "De 
difFerents  cotes,  Yacoub  Artin  Pasha  wrote  at 
about  this  period,  "  on  demande  des  ecoles,  et  la  ou 
il  en  existe  deja  on  demande  quelquefois  leur  d^- 
vdloppement,  sans  se  rendre  bien  compte,  il  est 
vrai,  de  ce  que  Ton  demande."  The  Egyptians 
have,  in  fact,  made  one  great  step  forward  in  the 
race  for  a  national  existence.  They  have  learnt 
that  they  are  ignorant.    They  wish  to  be  taught. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  explain  what  measures 
were  adopted  for  teaching  them. 

"The  chief  aim  and  object  of  education  in 
Islam,"  Mr.  Hughes  says,  "  is  to  obtain  a  know- 
ledge of  the  religion  of  JNIohammed,  and  anything 
beyond  this  is  considered  superfluous  and  even 
dangerous."^  Under  tliese  circumstances,  it  was 
clear  to  the  British  reformer  that  the  education 
imparted  at  the  famous  University  of  El-Azhar 
could  not  be  utilised  to  raise  the  general  standard 
of  education  in  Egypt.  He,  therefore,  left  that 
institution  alone. 

The  El-Azhar  University  stands  at  the  summit 

'  The  policy  which  has  of  late  years  been  pursued  in  connection 
with  the  matter  to  which  allusion  is  here  made,  has  been  vigorously 
attacked.  The  grounds  on  which,  as  it  appears  to  me,  it  may  l>e 
successfully  defended  are  stated  at  some  length  in  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906, 
pp.  82-89. 

In  this  work,  I  have  merely  endeavoured  to  give  a  general  sketch 
of  the  progress  which  has  been  made  in  the  various  branches  of  the 
administration.  It  would  lead  me  to  too  great  length  were  I  to 
attempt  to  answer  all  the  criticisms  which  have,  from  time  to  time, 
been  made  ou  the  working  of  the  various  Departments.  This  remark 
applies  with  special  force  to  the  work  of  the  Department  of  Public 
Instruction.  It  has  formed  the  subject  of  a  great  deal  of  very  onjuAt 
animadversion. 

*  Hughes's  Dictionary  of  Islam,  p.  106. 


CH.  LEX 


EDUCATION 


533 


of  the  purely  Moslem  educational  system  of  Egypt. 
The  village  schools  (Kuttabs),  which  are  attached 
to  most  of  the  Mosques  in  the  country,  stand  at 
the  base  of  that  system.  As  regards  the  quality 
of  the  instruction  afforded  in  these  schools,  Mr. 
Hucjhes  makes  the  following  remarks  : — 

"  The  child  who  attends  these  seminaries  is  first 
taught  his  alphabet,  which  he  learns  from  a  small 
board  on  which  the  letters  are  written  by  the 
teacher.  He  then  becomes  acquainted  with  the 
numerical  value  of  each  letter.  After  this,  he 
learns  to  write  down  the  ninety-nine  names  of 
God,  and  other  simple  words  taken  from  the 
Koran.  When  he  has  mastered  the  spelling  of 
words,  he  proceeds  to  learn  the  first  chapter  of 
the  Koran,  then  the  last  chapter,  and  gradually 
reads  through  the  whole  Koran  in  Arabic,  which 
he  usually  does  without  understanding  a  word  of  it. 
Having  finished  the  Koran,  which  is  considered 
an  incumbent  religious  duty,  the  pupil  is  instructed 
in  the  elements  of  grammar,  and  perhaps  a  few 
simple  rules  of  arithmetic.  .  .  .  The  ordinary  school- 
master is  generally  a  man  of  little  learning." 

It  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  these 
Mosque  schools  are  absolutely  useless.  Through 
their  instrumentality,  a  certain  number  of  children 
are  taught  to  read  and  write.  Organised  as  they 
were  at  the  time  the  British  occupation  com- 
menced, they  were,  however,  as  nearly  useless  as 
any  educational  establishments  could  be.  Want 
of  funds  at  first  stood  in  the  way  of  any  attempt 
to  reform  them,  but  about  1897  the  matter  was 
taken  in  hand.  A  reasonable  curriculum,  based 
on  the  teaching  of  the  three  R's,  was  adopted. 
The  teaching  of  any  foreign  language  was 
rigorously  excluded.  Since  1898,  the  number  of 
village  schools  under  Government  supervision  has 
increased  year  by  year. 


534 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


In  1906,  4554  village  schools  were  either  directly 
under  Government  control  or  under  departmental 
inspection  for  grants-in-aid.  They  gave  instruction 
to  165,000  pupils,  of  whom  nearly  13,000  were  girls. 

It  is  on  every  ground  of  the  highest  importance 
that  a  sustained  effort  should  be  made  to  place 
elementary  education  in  Egypt  on  a  sound  footing. 
The  schoolmaster  is  abroad  in  the  land.  We  may 
wish  him  well,  but  no  one  who  is  interested  in  the 
future  of  the  country  should  blind  himself  to  the 
fact  that  his  successful  advance  carries  with  it 
certain  unavoidable  disadvantages.  The  process 
of  manufacturing  demagogues  has,  in  fact,  not 
only  already  begun,  but  may  be  said  to  be  well 
advanced.  The  intellectual  phase  through  which 
India  is  now  passing  stands  before  the  world  as 
a  warning  that  it  is  unwise,  even  if  it  be  not 
dangerous,  to  create  too  wide  a  gap  between  the 
state  of  education  of  the  higher  and  of  the  lower 
classes  in  an  Oriental  country  governed  under 
the  inspiration  of  a  Western  democracy.  High 
education  cannot  and  ought  not  to  be  checked  or 
discouraged.  The  policy  advocated  by  Macaulay 
is  sound.  Moreover,  it  is  the  only  policy  worthy 
of  a  civilised  nation.  But  if  it  is  to  be  carried 
out  without  danger  to  the  State,  the  ignorance 
of  the  masses  should  be  tempered  pari  passu 
with  the  intellectual  advance  of  those  who  are 
destined  to  be  their  leaders.  It  is  neither  wise  nor 
just  that  the  people  should  be  left  intellectually 
defenceless  in  the  presence  of  the  hare-brained  and 
empirical  projects  which  the  political  charlatan, 
himself  but  half-educated,  will  not  fail  to  pour 
into  their  credulous  ears.  In  this  early  part  of 
the  twentieth  century,  there  is  no  possible  general 
remedy  agamst  the  demagogue  except  that  which 
consists  in  educating  those  who  are  his  natural  prey 
to  such  an  extent  that  they  may,  at  all  events. 


CH.  LIX 


EDUCATION 


535 


have  some  chance  of  discerning  the  imposture 
which  but  too  often  lurks  beneath  his  perfervid 
eloquence  and  political  quackery. 

Considerations  of  space  render  it  necessary  that 
I  should  abstain — albeit  somewhat  reluctantly — 
from  giving  a  description  of  the  progress  made 
of  late  years  in  Egypt  in  the  direction  of  Primary 
and  Secondary  education.  For  the  same  reason, 
I  do  not  deal  with  the  very  important  question 
of  Technical  education.^  I  must,  therefore,  confine 
myself  to  stating  the  bald  fact  that,  in  1906,  505 
educational  establishments,  exclusive  of  village 
schools,  existed  in  the  country.  These  gave 
employment  to  4341  teachers,  and  instruction  to 
about  92,000  pupils,  of  whom  about  20,000  were 
girls.  Under  the  enlightened  administration  of 
the  present  Minister,  Saad  Pasha  Zagloul,  and 
of  his  Adviser,  Mr.  Dunlop,  education  of  every 
description  is  making  rapid  strides  in  advance. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  quality  of  the 
instruction  afforded  at  the  Government  schools 
has  of  late  years  been  greatly  improved.  The 
skilful  methods  and  direct  personal  influence  of  the 

1  Very  full  explanations  have  been  given  on  all  these  subjects  in 
my  successive  Annual  Reports. 

The  following  remarks  made  by  Mr.  Lecky  {Democracy  and  Liberty, 
vol.  ii.  p.  6)  apply,  with  great  force,  to  the  Egyptian  educational  system  : 
"The  great  mistake  in  the  education  of  the  poor  has  in  general  been 
that  it  has  been  too  largely  and  too  ambitiously  literary.  Primary 
education  should  .  .  .  teach  the  poor  to  write  well  and  to  count  well ; 
but,  for  the  rest,  it  should  be  much  more  technical  and  industrial  than 
literary,  and  should  be  more  concerned  with  the  observation  of  facts 
than  with  any  form  of  speculative  reasoning  or  opinions.  There  is 
much  evidence  to  support  the  conclusion  that  the  kinds  of  popular 
education  which  have  proved  morally,  as  well  as  intellectually,  the 
most  beneficial  have  been  those  in  which  a  very  moderate  amount  of 
purely  mental  instruction  has  been  combined  with  physical  or  industrial 
training." 

lu  a  very  interesting  article  published  in  the  Edinburgh  Review 
for  October  1907,  and  entitled  "Signs  of  the  Times  in  India,"  the 
disastrous  results  which  have  ensued  from  unduly  encouraging  a  purely 
literary  education  in  that  country  to  the  neglect  of  scientific  and 
technical  training  are  very  clearly  indicated. 


536 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  VI 


new  European  teachers,  who  have  been  introduced 
into  the  Department  of  Education,  have  been 
steadily  raising  the  general  level  of  the  schools, 
in  spite  of  the  numerous  obstacles  encountered. 
Whilst  there  has  been  an  increasingly  strict  super- 
vision of  the  teaching  of  Arabic  and  the  Koran, 
the  study  of  European  languages  has  been  placed 
on  a  new  basis.  Previously,  pupils  were  allowed 
to  waste  their  time  and  addle  their  brains  by 
attempting  the  study  of  an  impossible  number  of 
languages.  It  was  a  great  step  in  advance  when 
the  time-honoured  methods  adopted  in  Egypt  of 
loading  the  memory  without  exercising  the  mind 
were  abandoned.  English  and  French  are  now 
no  longer  merely  treated  as  additional  subjects  of 
linguistic  study.  Either  of  these  languages  is 
used  as  the  medium  of  instruction  in  certain 
subjects,  such  as  history,  science,  etc.  In  course 
of  time,  as  the  number  of  highly  trained  Egyptian 
teachers  increases,  instruction  will,  without  doubt, 
be  given  in  Arabic  to  a  much  greater  extent  than 
heretofore.^ 

From  the  political  point  of  view,  the  most 
important  educational  question  is  this :  Do  the 
educated  Egyptians,  whose  number  is  now  rapidly 
increasing,  possess  the  qualities  and  characteristics 
of  potentially  self-governing  Egyptians  ?  To  put 
the  same  question  in  another  way,  if  we  speak  of 
education  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term — that 
is  to  say,  if  we  include  the  formation,  not  only  of  the 
intellect,  but  also  of  the  character — if,  in  a  word, 

*  That  the  absence  of  an  adequate  staff  of  trained  Egyptian  teachers 
has  greatly  retarded  the  progress  of  education  both  in  Egypt  and  in  the 
Soudan  cannot  be  doubted.  In  my  Annual  Reports,  I  have  frequently 
alluded  to  this  important  subject.  The  cause  has  been  the  same  as 
that  which  has  operated  in  other  Departments  of  the  State,  viz.  want 
of  money.  It  is  only  since  the  Anglo-French  Convention  was  signed 
that  it  has  become  possible  to  take  seriously  in  hand  the  question  of 
rendering  the  profession  of  teaching  attractive  by  increasing  the 
salaries  of  the  teachers. 


CH.  LIX 


EDUCATION 


537 


we  comprise  all  those  manifold  mental  and  moral 
influences  which  tend  towards  preparing  a  boy  or 
girl  for  a  career  of  usefulness  in  after  life,  has  any 
substantial  progress  been  made  ? 

It  is  obviously  impossible  to  give  more  than  a 
conjectural  answer  to  this  question.  Nevertheless, 
although  no  positive  proof  can  be  adduced  that 
such  an  opinion  is  correct,  it  may  be  stated  with  a 
fair  amount  of  confidence  that  something  has  been 
done  towards  forming  and  elevating  the  characters 
of  the  Egyptians.  The  mere  acquisition  of  the 
linguistic  knowledge,  which  has  enabled  a  certain 
number  of  young  Egyptians  to  study  the  literature 
and  sciences  of  Europe,  must  surely  have  tended 
in  some  degree  to  engender  that  accurate  habit  of 
thought  which  is  the  main  characteristic  of  the 
Western  as  opposed  to  the  Eastern  mind  ;  whilst  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  constant  contact  with  a 
number  of  high-minded  Europeans,  the  example 
afforded  by  the  elevated  standard  of  thought  from 
which  all  social  and  administrative  questions  have 
for  some  years  past  been  approached,  the  aboli- 
tion of  barbarous  punishments,  the  suppression  of 
forced  labour  and  of  torture,  the  introduction  of 
the  new  ideas  that  the  rights  of  property  are 
sacred  and  that  all  men  are  equal  in  the  eyes  of  the 
law,  the  practical  abolition  of  slavery,  the  dis- 
couragement of  nepotism,  the  stigma  attached  to 
the  worst  kinds  of  vice,  and,  generally,  the  fact  that 
the  Egyptian  social  and  political  atmosphere  has 
for  some  years  been  heavily  charged  with  ideas 
which  should  act  as  antidotes  against  moral 
degradation — have  not  in  some  degree  contributed 
to  a  partial  assimilation  of  the  best  European  code 
of  morals,  in  spite  of  the  adverse  influence  exercised 
by  the  immoral  or  dishonest  acts  of  individual 
Europeans.  Whilst,  however,  it  may  reasonably 
be  held  that  something  has  been  done  in  the 


538  MODERN  EGYPT 


direction  of  imparting  rectitude,  virility,  and  moral 
equipoise  to  the  Egyptian  character,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  there  is  still  abundant  room  for 
improvement  in  all  these  directions.  If  the  moral 
influences  to  which  the  Egyptians  are  now  exposed 
were  withdrawn,  or  even  weakened,  a  relapse  would 
inevitably  ensue. 

Let  any  one  who  is  inclined  to  take  a  sanguine 
view  of  this  subject  cast,  for  a  moment,  all  details 
aside,  and  consider  the  general  nature  of  the  problem 
which  presents  itself  for  solution.  It  is  nothing 
less  than  this,  that  the  new  generation  of  Egyptians 
has  to  be  persuaded  or  forced  into  imbibing  the 
true  spirit  of  Western  civilisation.  Although 
Europe  was  Christianised  first  and  civilised  after- 
wards, it  may  perhaps  be  argued  with  some  degree 
of  plausibility — more  especially  with  the  example 
of  Japan  before  us — that  the  post  hoc  ergo  propter 
hoc  fallacy  would  be  involved  if  it  were  held  that 
Christianity  is  the  necessary  handmaid  of  European 
civilisation,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  assimilate 
the  true  spirit  of  that  civilisation  without  adopting 
the  Christian  faith.  I  am  insufficiently  acquainted 
with  the  state  of  Japan  to  draw  any  precise 
inferences  from  its  recent  history.  I  confine 
myself,  therefore,  to  arguments  derived  from  facts 
and  subjects  which  have  come  under  my  personal 
observation,  merely  observing  that  both  the  religion 
and  the  social  system  of  Buddhism,  and,  I  believe, 
of  Shintoism,  present  greater  possibilities  for  the 
assimilation  of  exotic  secular  ideas  and  forms  of 
government  than  any  which  can  be  claimed  for 
rigid  Islamism.  Looking  then  solely  to  the 
possibility  of  reforming  those  countries  which  have 
adopted  the  faith  of  Islam,  it  may  be  asked 
whether  any  one  can  conceive  the  existence  of 
true  European  civilisation  on  the  assumption  that 
the  position  which  women  occupy  in  Europe  is 


CH.  LIX 


EDUCATION 


539 


abstracted  from  the  general  plan  ?  As  well  can 
a  man  blind  from  his  birth  be  made  to  conceive 
the  existence  of  colour.  Change  the  position  of 
women,  and  one  of  the  main  pillars,  not  only  of 
European  civilisation,  but  at  all  events  of  the 
moral  code  based  on  the  Christian  religion,  if  not 
of  Christianity  itself,  falls  to  the  ground.  The 
position  of  women  in  Egypt,  and  in  Mohammedan 
countries  generally,  is,  therefore,  a  fatal  obstacle 
to  the  attainment  of  that  elevation  of  thought  and 
character  which  should  accompany  the  introduction 
of  European  civilisation,  if  that  civilisation  is  to 
produce  its  full  measure  of  beneficial  effect. 

The  obvious  remedy  would  appear  to  be  to 
educate  the  women.  The  remarkable  and  con- 
tinuous progress  of  female  education  in  Egypt 
within  the  last  few  years  marks,  in  fact,  very  clearly 
the  changes  of  custom  and  alteration  of  ideas  which 
are  taking  place  in  the  country.  When  the  first 
efforts  to  promote  female  education  were  made, 
they  met  with  little  sympathy  from  the  population 
in  general.  When,  many  years  ago,  this  matter 
was  first  taken  in  hand,  Yacoub  Pasha  Artin  was 
the  only  Egyptian  who  took  the  least  interest  in  it. 
More  than  this,  most  of  the  upper-class  Egyptians 
were  not  merely  indifferent  to  female  education  ; 
they  were  absolutely  opposed  to  it.  They  did  not 
want  the  women  to  be  educated.  Even  when  girls' 
schools  were,  with  much  difficulty,  established, 
parents,  in  the  first  instance,  sent  their  daughters 
to  school  reluctantly,  and  took  them  away  early. 
In  order  to  encourage  the  education  of  girls,  it  was 
necessary  to  admit  a  large  number  of  free  pupils. 
Most  of  these  came  from  the  poorer  classes,  and 
left  early,  either  to  be  married  or  because  it  was 
thought  unbecoming  for  a  girl  to  attend  school 
after  she  had  passed  the  earliest  years  of  childhood. 
All  this  has  now  been  changed.    The  reluctance  of 


540 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


parents  to  send  their  daughters  to  school  lias  been 
largely  overcome.  Free  education  in  the  Govern- 
ment Primary  Schools  has  been  practically 
abolished.  Demands  are  frequently  made  for  the 
establishment  of  other  schools  in  different  parts  of 
the  country.  The  number  of  private  schools  for 
girls  has  also  greatly  increased  of  late  years. 
Further,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  steady  output 
of  boys  from  the  Secondary  Schools  and  Higher 
Colleges  has  indirectly  stimulated  the  movement 
in  favour  of  female  education.  The  younger 
generation  are  beginning  to  demand  that  their 
wives  should  possess  some  qualifications  other  than 
those  which  can  be  secured  in  the  exclusion  of  the 
harem.  The  interaction  of  the  two  branches  of 
education  does  not  stop  here,  for  not  only  has  the 
growth  of  education  among  boys  stimulated  the 
desire  for  instruction  to  girls,  but  it  has  also  tended 
to  improve  the  quality  of  the  education  given 
to  girls  by  prolonging  the  period  of  instruction. 
There  appears  good  reason  for  supposing  that, 
where  education  has  made  progress,  the  age  of 
marriage  has  risen,  and  that,  in  consequence,  the 
girls  are  allowed  to  remain  longer  than  heretofore 
at  school.  The  prospects  of  the  future  are,  there- 
fore, distinctly  bright  in  connection  with  this  all- 
important  question. 

It,  of  course,  remains  an  open  question  whether, 
when  the  Egyptian  women  are  educated,  they  will 
exercise  a  healthy  and  elevating  influence  over  the 
men.  The  few  Moslem  women  in  Egypt  who  have, 
up  to  the  present  time,  received  a  European  educa- 
tion are,  with  some  very  rare  exceptions,  strictly 
secluded.  It  is  difficult,  therefore,  to  form  any 
matured  opinion  as  to  the  results  so  far  obtained. 

In  Christian  Europe,  the  religious  faith  of 
women  is  generally  stronger  than  that  of  men. 
The  woman  feels  and  trusts,  the  man  reasons. 


CH.LIX  EDUCATION 


541 


The  faith  of  Moslem  women,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  probably  rather  less  strong  than  that  of  Moslem 
men.  Neither  need  this  be  any  matter  for 
surprise.  It  is  not  merely  due  to  the  curious 
impulse  which  appears  almost  invariably  to  drive 
the  East  and  the  West  in  opposite  directions. 
It  is  a  consequence  of  the  fundamental  differ- 
ences which  separate  Christianity  from  Islamism. 
Although  it  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  Mohammed's 
general  plan  did  not  involve  a  future  life  for 
women, ^  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  not  only  did 
he,  by  precept  and  example,  relegate  women  to  a 
position  in  this  world  inferior  to  that  of  men,  but 
also  that  the  religion  which  he  founded  is  eminently 
one  conceived  by  the  genius  of  a  man  and  intended 
for  men.  It  is,  therefore,  natural  that  women 
should  generally  be  less  fervent  Moslems  than  men. 

But  the  Moslem  woman  is,  after  all,  a  woman 
first  and  a  Moslem  afterwards.  She  would  belie 
her  sex  if  she  were  not  impulsive  and  inclined,  even 
more  than  the  men,  to  run  to  extremes.  Although, 
therefore,  the  faith  of  the  Moslem  woman  may 
perhaps  be  comparatively  weak,  her  prejudices  in 
respect  to  all  the  customs  and  habits  of  thought 
which  cluster  round  Islamism  are  as  strong  as, 
if  not  stronger  than  those  of  the  men.  A 
Europeanised  Egyptian  man  usually  becomes  an 
Agnostic,  and  often  assimilates  many  of  the  least 
worthy  portions  of  European  civilisation.  Is 
there  any  reason  why  European  education  should 
not  produce  the  same  effect  on  the  Europeanised 
Egyptian  woman  ?  I  know  of  none.  Indeed,  in 
so  far  as  the  Agnosticism  is  concerned,  the  woman, 
on  the  assumption  that  her  faith  is  relatively  luke- 
warm, would  probably  find  less  difficulty  than  the 

*  Surah  III.,  verse  193,  and  Surah  IV.,  verse  123,  of  the  Koran  are 
conclusive  as  to  Mohammed's  teaching  on  this  subject.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  all  devout  Moslems  believe  that  a  future  life  is  reserved 
for  women. 


542 


MODERN  EGVPT 


PT.  VI 


man  in  shaking  herself  free  from  the  ideas  and 
associations  which  have  surrounded  her  from  her 
cradle. 

It  would  obviously  be  neither  safe  nor  just 
to  draw  any  general  conclusion  in  connection 
with  this  subject  from  such  a  limited  number  of 
facts  and  examples  as  can  at  present  be  adduced. 
If  it  be  once  admitted  that  no  good  moral  results 
will  accrue  from  female  education  in  Egypt, 
then,  indeed,  the  reformer  may  well  despair  of 
the  cause  of  Egyptian  education  generally  in  the 
highest  sense  of  the  word.  The  experiment  of 
female  education  should  certainly  be  continued 
with  vigour.  Few  people  now  living  can  hope  to 
see  its  results.  All  that  can  at  present  be  said  is 
that  those  results  must  necessarily  be  uncertain. 
But  whatever  they  may  eventually  be/this  much 
is  well-nigh  certain — that  the  European  reformer 
may  instruct,  he  may  explain,  he  may  argue,  he 
may  devise  the  most  ingenious  methods  for  the 
moral  and  material  development  of  the  people, 
he  may  use  his  best  endeavours  to  "cut  blocks 
with  a  razor"  and  to  graft  true  civilisation  on 
a  society  which  is  but  just  emerging  from 
barbarism,  but  unless  he  proves  himself  able,  not 
only  to  educate,  but  to  elevate  the  Egyptian 
woman,  he  will  never  succeed  in  affording  to  the 
Egyptian  man,  in  any  thorough  degree,  the  only 
European  education  which  is  worthy  of  Europe.  ^ 

What  the  Egyptian  man  most  requires  is  the 
acquisition  of  all  those  qualities  comprised  in  the 
expressive  Greek  term  alSdx;  —  poorly  translated 
by  the  English  word  "self-respect" — and  those 
qualities  he  can  never  fully  acquire  unless,  like  the 
Christian  European,  he  becomes  monogamous,  and 
thus  learns  to  honour  the  one  woman  whom  he  will 
also  have  sworn  to  love  and  to  cherish  until  the 
hand  of  death  parts  him  from  his  life-long  helpmate. 


CHAPTER  LX 


THE  SOUDAN 

Tlie  nature  of  the  Soudan  problem — Extent — Population — Results 
obtained  by  the  Convention  of  1899 — Executive  agency — Finance 
— Railways — Slavery. 

Having  dealt  with  the  affairs  of  Egypt,  I  now 
propose  to  give  a  very  brief  sketch  of  the  progress 
of  administrative  reform  in  the  Soudan.^ 

The  problems  with  which  the  Government  has 
to  deal  in  the  Soudan  are  not  only  very  different, 
but  also,  for  the  time  being,  far  more  simple  than 
those  which  await  solution  in  Egypt.  This  latter 
country  has  advanced  half-way — perhaps  many 
would  think  more  than  half-way — on  the  road 
towards  Western  civilisation.  It  has  certainly 
passed  beyond  the  stage  in  which  the  undivided 
attention  of  the  reformer  may  be  devoted  to 
financial  and  administrative  questions.  It  has 
entered  on  a  phase  where,  unless  I  am  much  mis- 
taken, it  will  year  by  year  become  more  apparent 
to  all  but  very  superficial  observers  that  the  further 
adaptation  and  effective  assimilation  of  Western 
ideas  is  quite  as  much  a  social  as  a  political  or 
administrative  question.  The  really  vital  issues 
which  the  future  has  reserved  for  Egypt  are  not 
how  exotic  political  institutions  can  be  forced  to 
take  root  in  a  soil  which  is  uncongenial  to  their 

'  Most  of  the  remarks  contained  in  this  chapter  have  already 
appeared  in  my  Annual  Reports  from  the  year  1899  onwards. 

543 


544 


MODERN  EGYPT 


FT.  vr 


growth,  but  how  the  relations  of  the  sexes  can  be 
brought  into  conformity  with  modern  ideas,  how 
the  moral  code  on  which  the  laws  of  all  civilised 
countries  are  based  can  be  made  to  penetrate  into 
the  daily  life  and  manners  and  customs  of  the 
people,  and  how,  without  shattering  all  that  is 
worthy  and  noble  in  the  Moslem  religion,  the 
quasi-religious  institutions  of  the  country  can  be 
reformed  to  such  an  extent  as  no  longer  to  con- 
stitute an  insuperable  barrier  to  progress.  The 
Government  have  sometimes  been  accused  of 
moving  too  slowly  in  Egypt.  Does  any  one  who 
has  reflected  on  the  problems  which  I  have  briefly 
indicated  above,  and  who  really  understands  the 
facts  coimected  with  them,  consider  it  possible 
that  they  can  be  solved  with  rapidity  ?  If  so,  he 
must  be  imbued  with  an  optimism  which  I  am 
unable  to  share.  Nevertheless,  until  they  are 
solved,  the  aspirations  of  the  irresponsible  advocate 
of  reforms  must  always  be  tinged  with  a  certain 
degree  of  unreality,  whilst  some  disappointment 
must  inevitably  await  the  well-intentioned  efforts 
of  the  responsible  man  of  action. 

The  case  of  the  Soudan  is,  for  the  present,  wholly 
different.  Even  the  most  advanced  portions  of  that 
country  are  still  in  a  very  backward  condition.  For 
at  least  a  generation  to  come,  no  complex  question 
of  how  Western  methods  may  best  be  adapted  to 
Eastern  minds  will  probably  arise.  Political  issues 
are  few  in  number  and  relatively  simple  in  character. 
The  most  important,  probably,  is  how  slavery  may 
be  completely  abolished  without  causing  serious 
disorder.  The  rise  and  fall  of  some  religious  im- 
postor may  cause  some  temporary  trouble,  but  the 
methods  for  dealing  with  cases  of  this  sort  com- 
mand the  assent  alike  of  Westerns  and  of  educated 
Orientals.  Any  danger  from  religious  fanaticism 
may  be  mitigated,  and  perhaps  altogether  averted. 


CH.LX  THE  SOUDAN 


545 


by  imposing  some  reasonable  and  salutary  checks 
on  the  freedom  of  action  of  missionary  bodies. 
Whatever  may  be  the  case  in  Egypt,  there  can  be 
no  question  that  what  the  Soudanese  now  most  of 
all  require  is,  not  national  government,  but  good 
government.  Hence,  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  and 
his  very  capable  staff  will  be  able  for  the  present 
to  devote  their  entire  attention  to  overcoming  the 
physical  difficulties  with  which  they  have  to  deal, 
and  to  the  introduction  of  administrative,  judicial, 
and  financial  measures  suitable  to  the  requirements 
of  the  primitive  society  whose  interests  are  entrusted 
to  their  care. 

The  Anglo-Egyptian  Soudan  covers  an  area  of 
950,000  square  miles.  By  far  the  greater  portion 
of  this  large  territory  consists  of  what  the  late 
Lord  Salisbury  once  termed  "light  sandy  soil." 
The  area  under  cultivation  has  been  steadily  in- 
creasing of  late  years.  Nevertheless,  at  the  close 
of  1906,  only  about  1576  square  miles  were  culti- 
vated. The  remainder  consisted  of  desert,  swamp, 
and  primsBval  forest. 

The  researches  made  by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate 
into  the  past  and  present  population  of  the  Soudan, 
bring  into  strong  relief  the  terrible  results  which 
ensued  from  Dervish  misrule.  It  is  estimated  that, 
prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  Mahdi's  power, 
the  population  of  the  Soudan  was  about  millions, 
that  of  these  about  3J  millions  were  swept  away 
by  famine  ^  and  by  disease,  notably  by  small-pox,  and 
that  3;^  millions  were  killed  either  in  the  engage- 
ments with  the  British  and  Egyptian  troops,  or  in 
inter-tribal  wars.  The  latter  of  these  two  causes 
accounted  for  by  far  the  greater  portion  ot  the 
terrible  mortality  in  warfare.  Several  tribes 
opposed   to   the  Baggara,  who   constituted  the 

^  The  Dervish  soldiery  used  to  rob  the  inhabitants  of  their  g^aia 
reserves,  with  the  result  that  large  numbers  died  of  starvation. 
VOL.  II  2  N 


546  MODERN  EGYPT 


mainstay  of  the  Dervish  power,  were  well-nigh 
obliterated.  These  figures,  Sir  Reginald  Wiiigate 
remarked,  "seem  almost  incredible."  Nevertheless, 
he  considered  them  substantially  correct.  He 
cited  a  fact,  which  came  under  his  personal 
observation,  in  support  of  their  correctness.  Prior 
to  1882,  the  district  lying  along  the  banks  of  the 
rivers  Rahad  and  Dinder  contained  upwards  of 
800  villages.  When  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  visited 
this  district  in  1902,  "not  a  village  remained."  In 
an  official  report  prepared  on  the  Berber  district 
towards  the  close  of  1903,  it  was  stated  that 
•'villages,  which  used  to  produce  500  fighting  men, 
have  now  only  fifty  to  sixty  adults,  and  in  some 
cases  even  less."  My  personal  experience  is  of 
a  nature  to  confirm  this  testimony.  Shortly  after 
the  battle  of  Omdurman,  I  visited  Metemmeh,  a 
town  formerly  inhabited  by  the  Jaalin,  and  situated 
on  the  Nile  between  Berber  and  Khartoum.  It 
was  clear  from  the  buildings  which  remained  that 
it  had  formerly  contained  a  large  population.  At 
the  time  of  my  visit,  the  inhabitants  numbered 
about  1300,  of  whom  all  but  150  were  women  and 
children.  The  men  had  almost  all  been  killed  by 
the  Dervishes. 

During  the  last  few  years,  the  population  has 
been  increasing,  but  it  is  probable  that  it  does  not 
now  exceed  two  millions. 

The  Convention  between  the  British  and 
Egyptian  Governments,  signed  on  January  19, 
1899,  of  which  a  general  description  has  already 
been  given,^  may  be  termed  the  Constitutional 
Charter  of  the  Soudan.  In  spite  of  many  anomalies, 
which  were  inevitable  under  all  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  it  has  conferred  an  immense  boon, 
both  on  the  people  of  the  Soudan,  and  on  the 
Egyptians,  who,  whatever  some  of  them  may  at 

»  Vide  ante,  Chapter  XXXIIL 


CH.LX  THE  SOUDAN  547 

present  think,  are,  and  must  always  be  deeply 
interested  in  the  development  and  good  govern- 
ment of  that  country.  'J'he  Convention  freed  the 
Soudan  from  the  incubus  of  the  Capitulations,  and  it 
also  obviated  the  very  serious  risks  which  would 
certainly  have  been  incurred  had  the  adoption  of  a 
highly  civilised  system  of  government  been  forced 
prematurely  on  the  country.  I  do  not  suppose 
that  the  most  ardent  advocate,  whether  of  inter- 
nationalism or  of  equality  of  treatment  to  all 
creeds  and  races,  would  seriously  contend  that  it 
would  have  been  possible  in  practice  to  have 
worked  a  system  under  which  Kwat  Wad 
Awaibung,  a  Shillouk  who  murdered  Ajak  Wad 
Deng  because  the  latter  bewitched  his  son,  and 
caused  him  to  be  eaten  by  a  crocodile,^  would  have 
been  tried  by  a  procedure  closely  resembling  that 
followed  at  Paris  or  Berlin,  which  would  have 
necessitated  a  civil  action  brought  by  some  chance 
European,  resident  on  the  upper  waters  of  the 
Blue  Nile,  being  tried  by  a  body  of  Judges  sitting 
at  Cairo  or  Alexandria,  and  which  would  not  have 
allowed  the  executive  Government  to  close  a 
liquor  shop  belonging  to  a  Greek  subject  at  El- 
Obeid  or  Mongalla  without  the  presence  of  a 
Consular  janissary. 

I  need  not  describe  in  detail  the  executive 
agency  through  which  effect  has  been  given  to  the 

1  A  Shillouk  named  Kwat  Wad  Awaibung  was  tried  on  the  charge 
of  murdering  Ajak  Wad  Deng.  He  pleaded  guilty,  and  made  the 
following  statement :  "  The  murdered  Ajak  Wad  Deng  owed  me  a 
sheep,  but  would  not  pay  me.  He  said  he  would  show  me  his  work, 
and  next  day  my  son  was  eaten  by  a  crocodile,  which  was,  of  course, 
the  work  of  Ajak  Wad  Deng,  and  for  that  reason  I  killed  him.  We 
had  had  a  feud  for  years,  as  I  was  a  more  successful  hippopotamus- 
hunter  than  he  was,  and  for  that  reason  he  was  practising  witchery 
over  me  and  my  family."  Mr.  Bonham  Carter,  tne  Legal  Secretary 
of  the  Soudan  Government,  in  reporting  on  this  case,  said  :  "The 
accused's  belief  that  the  crocodile  was  acting  as  agent  of  the  murdered 
man  in  killing  the  accused's  son  was  supported  by  several  other 
witnesses^  and  represents  a  common  local  belief. " 


548  MODERN  EGYPT 


principles  embodied  in  the  Convention  of  1899.  I 
content  myself  with  saying  that  the  country  was, 
in  the  first  instance,  divided  into  districts,  each  of 
which  was  placed  under  the  control  of  a  military 
officer.  It  would,  however,  be  an  entire  mistake 
to  suppose  that  the  country  is  under  a  military 
government  in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of  that 
term.  The  Government,  in  all  its  more  important 
features,  is  essentially  civil,  although  the  Governor- 
General  and  many  of  his  principal  subordinates 
are  military  officers.  I  have  frequently  rendered 
testimony  to  the  very  valuable  services  performed  by 
these  military  officers.  I  need  here  only  add  that  the 
system  of  education  adopted  at  our  Public  Schools 
and  Military  Colleges  is  of  a  nature  to  turn  out  a 
number  of  young  men  who  are  admirable  agents  in 
the  execution  of  an  Imperial  policy.  The  German, 
the  Frenchman,  and  others  may  be,  and  sometimes 
are  better  educated,  but  any  defects  on  the  score 
of  technical  knowledge  are  amply  compensated  by 
the  governing  powers,  the  willingness  to  assume 
responsibility,  and  the  versatility  under  strange 
circumstances  in  which  the  Anglo-Saxon,  trained 
in  the  free  atmosphere  which  develops  individ- 
ualism, excels  beyond  all  other  nations. 

I  know  of  only  one  disadvantage  in  employing 
military  officers,  and  that  is,  tlsat  they  are  liable  to 
be  removed  for  service  elsewhere,  more  especially 
in  times  of  national  emergency.  A  Civil  service  is, 
therefore,  being  formed,  composed  of  young  men 
taken  from  the  British  Universities.  These  will 
gradually  take  the  place  of  the  military  officers 
now  employed. 

I  do  not  propose  to  dwell  on  the  progress 
made  in  education,  the  establishment  of  a  judicial 
system,  the  preservation  of  forests,  and  other 
administrative  matters.  Full  details  on  these 
subjects  will  be  found  in  my  Annual  Reports. 


THE  SOUDAN 


549 


I  confine  my  remarks  to  one  or  two  points  of 
special  importance. 

Finance  is,  of  course,  the  keystone  of  the 
situation.  It  was  felt  from  the  first  that  in  the 
Soudan,  as  in  Egypt,  a  sound  financial  position 
was  the  source  from  which  all  other  reforms  and 
improvements  would  have  to  flow.  In  the  first 
instance,  the  situation  certainly  did  not  look 
promishig.  Those  who  had  had  most  experience 
of  the  country  had  declared  that  the  Soudan  was, 
and  was  likely  always  to  remain,  a  "useless 
possession."  The  ravages  committed  by  the 
Dervishes  deepened  the  sense  of  its  inutility.  The 
population  had,  as  I  have  already  shown,  been 
more  than  decimated.  Flocks  and  herds  had  been 
destroyed.  Date- trees,  which  constitute  one  of 
the  principal  products  of  the  country,  had  been 
hewn  down  in  large  numbers.  Neither  life  nor 
property  had,  for  many  years,  been  secure.  Under 
these  discouraging  auspices,  the  Soudan  revenue 
for  1898  was  estimated  at  the  very  modest  figure 
of  £E.8000.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  revenue  of 
£E. 35,000  was  collected.  The  expenditure  was 
£E.  235,000,  thus  leaving  a  deficit  of  £E.  200,000, 
which  had  to  be  made  good  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury.  Eight  years  later,  in  1906,  the  revenue 
was  £E. 804,000,  and  the  net  charge  on  the  Egyptian 
Treasury,  exclusive  of  interest  on  3|  millions 
advanced  for  capital  expenditure,  amounted  to 
only  about  £E.30,000.  Inclusive  of  interest  at  the 
rate  of  3  per  cent  on  the  capital  advanced,  the 
charge  which  had  to  be  borne  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury,  in  1906,  was  only  £E.130,000.i  rpj^^ 
amount  is  trifling  in  comparison  to  the  unquestion- 
able advantages  derived  by  Egypt  from  the  mainten- 
ance of  a  settled  government  in  the  Soudan,  and 

1  From  January  1,  1908,  the  Soudan  Government  will  commence  to 
pay  interest  on  a  portion  of  the  capital  advanced. 


550  MODERN  EGYPT 


from  the  assured  possession  of  the  Nile  Valley.  I 
should  add  that,  at  the  close  of  the  year  1906,  a 
Reserve  Fund,  amounting  to  over  £E.  31 5,000, 
had  accumulated  in  the  hands  of  the  Soudan 
Government. 

Thus,  a  very  great  and  rapid  improvement  has 
taken  place.  Moreover,  it  has  been  effected  with- 
out increasing  the  burden  of  taxation.  The  fiscal 
legislation  of  the  Soudan  has  been  based  on  the 
unquestionably  sound  principle  that,  in  the  assess- 
ment and  collection  of  the  taxes,  no  innovation, 
based  on  Western  ideas,  should  be  introduced 
unless  its  introduction  is  altogether  unavoidable. 
The  main  fault  of  Oriental  fiscal  administration 
has  generally  been,  not  so  much  that  the  principles 
on  which  the  taxation  is  based  are  unsound,  as 
that  the  method  of  applying  them  has  been  very 
defective.  On  going  through  the  list  of  the  taxes 
which  were  collected  under  the  Khalifa's  rule,  it  was 
found  that,  although  the  manner  in  Avhich  they  had 
been  levied  had  been  cruel  and  extortionate  to  the 
last  degree,  they  were  based  on  principles  which 
are  generally  recognised  in  all  Moslem  countries. 
No  radical  change  of  system  was,  therefore, 
j  necessary.  Broadly  speaking,  all  that  was  required 
was  that  the  rates  of  taxation  should  in  each  case 
be  fixed  by  law  ;  that  the  taxes  should  be  moderate 
in  amount,  and  that  every  care  should  be  taken 
that  no  demands  were  made  on  the  taxpayers  save 
those  which  the  law  allowed. 

With  every  desire,  however,  to  avoid  the 
premature  introduction  of  Western  methods  of 
administration  into  the  Soudan,  it  was  found 
practically  impossible  to  devise  any  proper  system 
for  the  recovery  of  taxes  without  having  recourse 
to  some  of  the  principles  on  which  European 
procedure  in  such  matters  is  based.  The  Dervish 
svstem  consisted  in  practice  in  taking  as  much  as 


THE  SOUDAN 


551 


the  taxpayers  could  pay.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  land  yielded  no  crop,  the  tax  collector  recog- 
nised the  futility  of  making  any  demands  on  the 
cultivator.^  The  experience  of  other  Eastern 
countries  has  shown  that  tlie  elasticity  thus 
obtained  goes  a  long  way  to  mitigate  the  rigour 
even  of  the  worst  fiscal  systems. 

The  European  administrator,  who  has  to  look 
to  financial  equilibrium,  naturally  desires  to  intro- 
duce a  system  which  will  enable  him  to  know, 
with  tolerable  accuracy,  the  amount  of  revenue  on 
which  he  can  count,  not  only  for  a  single  year,  but 
for  a  series  of  years.  It  is  comparatively  easy  for 
him  to  rectify  the  main  defect  of  the  Oriental 
system.  He  can  substitute  a  fixed  and  moderate 
demand  for  one  which  was  capricious  and  generally 
exorbitant.  It  is  far  less  easy  to  obviate  the 
rigidity  which  is,  in  some  degree,  an  almost 
unavoidable  accompaniment  of  the  change  of 
system.  Notably,  it  is  impossible  to  dispense 
altogether  with  the  system  of  legal  expropriation 
in  cases  of  default,  albeit  this  practice  is  wholly 
foreign  to  the  ideas  of  a  backward  Oriental  popula- 
tion. Something,  however,  may  be  done  to  temper 
the  comparative  rigidity  of  European  modes  of 
procedure.  Thus,  in  Egypt,  although  for  many 
years  past  expropriation  has  been  legalised,  the 
best  part  of  the  Oriental  fiscal  system  has  been 
preserved.  It  has  never  been  the  practice,  after 
imposing  a  fixed  rate  on  land,  to  exact  the 
amount  of  the  taxes  in  good  and  bad  years  alike. 
Liberal  concessions  have  been  made  to  the  holders 

1  The  execution  of  a  system  under  which  the  tax  is  made  pro- 
portionate to  the  crop  of  the  year  is,  of  course,  in  some  degree 
facilitated  by  the  practice,  common  in  all  Moslem  countries,  of  taking 
payment  in  kind.  It  has  been  found  necessary  to  continue  this 
practice  in  some  parts  of  the  Soudan.  But  it  is  one  which  leads  to 
numerous  abuses,  and  it  will  be  desirable  to  abolish  it  as  soon  as 
possible.    It  was  abolished  in  Egypt  some  twenty  years  ago. 


552  MODERN  EGYPT 


of  Sharaki,  or  unirrigated  land.  In  the  Soudan, 
an  attempt  has  been  made  to  carry  this  principle 
somewhat  further.  It  has  been  laid  down  that, 
when  a  summons  is  taken  out  against  any  man  for 
non-payment  of  the  land  tax,  the  Magistrate,  "if 
he  is  satisfied  that  the  crop  upon  the  land  has 
failed  through  no  fault  of  the  owner  or  cultivator, 
and  that  the  tax  cannot  be  paid  without  depriving 
the  owner  of  the  means  of  earning  his  living  as 
an  agriculturist,"  may  adjourn  the  summons,  and 
report  the  case  to  the  Governor- General.  The 
latter  can  then,  if  he  thinks  fit,  remit  the  tax. 

The  clothing  of  the  owner  and  that  of  his  wife 
and  children,  the  tools  of  an  artisan  or  the 
implements  of  a  cultivator,  as  well  as  cattle 
ordinarily  employed  in  agriculture,  are  exempted 
from  seizure.  Further,  the  process  for  the  recovery 
of  taxes,  though  it  may  perhaps  be  criticised  on 
the  ground  of  being  somewhat  too  elaborate,  is 
manifestly  devised  with  the  express  object  of 
obviating  a  resort  to  expropriation,  save  in  cases  of 
absolute  necessity. 

I  make  these  remarks  because  the  points  here 
discussed  are,  in  my  opinion,  of  vital  importance 
in  the  administration  of  all  Eastern  countries. 

I  explained  in  a  former  part  of  this  narrative  ^ 
that,  at  a  moment  when  reckless  borrowing  had 
brought  Egypt  to  the  verge  of  ruin,  resort  was 
had  to  what  at  that  time  appeared  the  bold 
expedient  of  contracting  a  fresh  loan.  The  causes 
which  had  led  to  the  creation  of  a  situation  in 
the  Soudan  which,  at  one  time,  seemed  almost 
desperate,  were  different  from  those  which  had 
operated  in  Egypt,  but  the  remedy  adopted  was, 
in  principle,  the  same.  The  country  was  prac- 
tically isolated.  It  was  cut  off  from  the  world  by 
a  waste  of  burning  and  almost  waterless  desert. 

^  Vide  ante,  pp.  462-64. 


THE  SOUDAN 


553 


Manifestly,  the  first  tiling  to  do  was  to  establish 
the  link  through  whose  agency  civilisation  could 
gradually  be  introduced  into  the  country.  Scarcely 
had  the  sound  of  the  guns  of  the  battle  of  Omdurman 
died  away,  when  works  were  commenced  with  a 
view  to  extending  the  Nile  railway,  which  then 
extended  only  to  the  Atbara,  to  Halfaya,  opposite 
Khartoum.  It  was,  however,  obvious  that  some 
port  on  the  Red  Sea  coast  constituted  the  natural 
outlet  for  the  trade  of  the  Soudan.  After  a  full 
examination  of  the  various  alternatives  which  were 
available,  it  was  decided  to  create  such  a  port  at  a 
spot,  now  named  Port  Soudan,  a  short  distance 
north  of  Suakin,  and  to  connect  it  by  railway  with 
the  Nile  Valley.  By  January  1906,  the  railway 
works  were  completed.  The  harbour  works  are 
still  in  course  of  progress.  Thus,  the  connection 
between  the  Soudan  and  the  rest  of  the  world  was 
established. 

There  is  only  one  further  point  of  special 
importance  to  which  I  need  allude  in  connection 
with  the  administration  of  the  Soudan.  What  has 
been  done  to  remove  the  plague-spot  of  slavery  ? 

The  Soudan,  of  course,  no  longer  constitutes  the 
happy  hunting-ground  of  the  Arab  slave-hunter. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  every  effort,  the  Slave 
Trade  has  not,  as  yet,  been  wholly  suppressed. 
Slave  raids  are  still,  at  times,  made,  more  especially 
along  the  Abyssinian  frontier.  A  recent  report 
from  Captain  McMurdo,  the  head  of  the  Depart- 
ment for  the  Suppression  of  Slavery,  contains  the 
following  passage  :  "  Speaking  generally  of  the 
repression  of  slavery  in  the  Soudan,  I  venture  to 
state  that  progress  is  steadily  being  made,  and  that 
slavery  has  turned  the  corner  into  the  high  road  of 
abolition,  but  it  is  a  very  long  road,  and  it  will  take 
years  to  get  to  the  end  of  it.  It  is  not  in  nature 
that  customs  which  have  existed  for  centuries  can 


554  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vt 


be  at  once  put  aside.  It  is  only  by  bringing  to 
bear  a  steady  pressure  on  slave  -  traffickers  that 
abolition  will  be  obtained." 

Domestic  slavery  in  the  Soudan  itself  is 
gradually  dying  a  natural  death.  On  this  subject 
Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote  some  two  years  ago  : 
"  By  carefully  protecting  the  interests  of  those  who 
were  previously  slaves,  and  at  the  same  time 
gradually  employing  them  on  remunerative  work 
in  other  capacities — should  they  be  unwilling  to 
return  to  their  masters  as  ordinary  servants — we 
shall  eventually,  with  the  concurrence  and  assist- 
ance of  the  inhabitants  themselves,  gradually 
transform  the  status  of  slavery,  and  substitute  for 
it  a  system  of  paid  labour,  which  will  probably  be 
acceptable  to  master  and  servant  alike." 

Thus,  the  Soudan  has  been  launched  on  the 
path  which  leads  to  moral  and  material  progress. 
With  reasonable  prudence  in  the  management  of 
its  affairs,  it  should  continue,  year  by  year,  to 
advance  in  prosperity. 


CHAPTER  LXI 


CONCLUSION 

Summary  of  this  work — Changes  since  the  time  of  Ismail — The  British 
reformers — Their  Egyptian  allies — Stability  of  the  reforms 

A  SHORT  account  has  thus  been  given  of  the  reforms 
which,  during  the  last  few  years,  have  been  carried 
out  in  all  the  more  important  branches  of  the 
Egyptian  and  Soudanese  State  administrations. 
The  description  given  of  those  reforms  is,  indeed, 
defective.  Several  important  subjects  have  not 
been  even  mentioned.  No  allusion  has  been  made 
to  the  services  of  many  officials  who  have  done 
excellent  work  in  their  special  spheres  of  action.^ 
All  that  has  been  attempted  is  to  give  a  general 
sketch  of  the  progress  of  Egyptian  reform.  Even 
this  imperfect  sketch  may,  however,  suffice  to 
indicate  the  main  features  of  the  work  which  has 
been  accomplished.  It  has  been  shown  how  the 
extravagance  and  maladministration  of  Ismail 
Pasha  led  to  his  own  downfall,  and  to  the  im- 
position of  a  qualified  European  tutelage  on  the 
Egyptian  Government ;  how,  at  the  moment  when 
that  tutelage  was  beginning  to  produce  some 

^  I  take  this  opportunity  of  testifying  to  the  excellent  services 
rendered  by  the  first  Secretaries  in  the  Diplomatic  Service  who  acted 
for  me  during  my  temporary  absences  from  Egypt.  These  were  Sir 
Gerald  Portal,  whose  premature  death  was  a  great  loss  to  his  country, 
Sir  Arthur  Hardinge,  Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  and  Mr.  Findlay.  I  cannot 
speak  too  highly  of  the  invaluable  assistance  I  received  from  all  of  these 
gentlemen. 

555 


556 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  VI 


beneficial  results,  the  country  was  thrown  back 
into  disorder  by  a  military  mutiny,  the  offspring 
of  Ismail's  reckless  conduct,  and  by  the  growth  of 
national  aspirations  in  a  form  which  rendered  them 
incapable  of  realisation  ;  and  how  England  finally 
intervened  and  bade  disorder  and  administrative 
chaos  cease.  The  readers  of  this  book  have  been 
conducted,  subject  by  subject,  through  the  compli- 
cated mazes  of  the  Egyptian  administrative  system. 
The  degree  of  progress  which  has  been  made  in  the 
direction  of  introducing  Western  civilisation  into 
the  country  has  been  described  in  some  detail. 

No  one  can  fully  realise  the  extent  of  the  change 
which  has  come  over  Egypt  since  the  British 
occupation  took  place  unless  he  is  in  some  degree 
familiar  with  the  system  under  which  the  country 
was  governed  in  the  days  of  Ismail  Pasha.  The 
contrast  between  now  and  then  is,  indeed,  remark- 
able. A  new  spirit  has  been  instilled  into  the 
population  of  Egypt.  Even  the  peasant  has  learnt 
to  scan  his  rights.  Even  the  Pasha  has  learnt 
that  others  besides  himself  have  rights  which  must 
be  respected.  The  courbash  may  hang  on  the 
walls  of  the  Moudirieh,  but  the  Moudir  no  longer 
dares  to  employ  it  on  the  backs  of  the  fellaheen. 
For  all  practical  purposes,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
hateful  corvee  system  has  disappeared.  Slavery 
has  virtually  ceased  to  exist.  The  halcyon  days 
of  the  adventurer  and  the  usurer  are  past.  Fiscal 
burthens  have  been  greatly  relieved.  Everywhere 
law  reigns  supreme.  Justice  is  no  longer  bought 
and  sold.  Nature,  instead  of  being  spurned  and 
neglected,  has  been  wooed  to  bestow  her  gifts  on 
mankind.  She  has  responded  to  the  appeal.  The 
waters  of  the  Nile  are  now  utilised  in  an  intelli- 
gent manner.  JNIeans  of  locomotion  have  been 
improved  and  extended.  The  soldier  has  acquired 
some  pride  in  the  uniform  which  he  wears.  He 


CONCLUSION 


557 


has  fought  as  he  never  fought  before.  The  sick 
man  can  be  nursed  in  a  well-managed  hospital 
The  lunatic  is  no  longer  treated  like  a  wild  beast. 
The  punishment  awarded  to  the  worst  criminal  is 
no  longer  barbarous.  Lastly,  the  schoolmaster  is 
abroad,  with  results  which  are  as  yet  uncertain, 
but  which  cannot  fail  to  be  important. 

All  these  things  have  been  accomplished  by  the 
small  body  of  Englishmen  who,  in  various  capaci- 
ties, and  with  but  little  direct  support  or  assistance 
from  their  Government  or  its  representative,  have 
of  late  years  devoted  their  energies  to  the  work  of 
Egyptian  regeneration.  They  have  had  many 
obstacles  to  encounter.  Internationalism  and 
Pashadom  have  stood  in  the  path  at  every  turn. 
But  these  forces,  though  they  could  retard,  have 
failed  to  arrest  the  progress  of  the  British  reformer. 
The  opposition  which  he  has  had  to  encounter, 
albeit  very  embarrassing,  merely  acted  on  his 
system  as  a  healthy  tonic.  An  eminent  French 
literary  critic^  has  said  that  the  end  of  a  book 
should  recall  its  commencement  to  the  mind  of 
the  reader.  Acting  on  this  principle,  I  may 
remind  those  who  have  perused  these  pages  that  I 
began  this  work  by  stating  that,  although  possibly 
counterparts  to  all  the  abuses  which  existed,  and 
which  to  some  extent  still  exist  in  Egypt,  may  be 
found  in  other  countries,  the  conditions  under 
which  the  work  of  Egyptian  reform  has  been 
undertaken  were  very  peculiar.'^  The  special  diffi- 
culties which  have  resulted  from  those  conditions 
have  but  served  to  bring  out  in  strong  relief  one  of 
the  main  characteristics  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race. 
Other  nations  might  have  equally  well  conceived 
the  reforms  which  were  necessary.  It  required 
the  singular  political  adaptability  of  Englishmen 
to  execute  them.    A  country  and  a  nation  have 

*  Joubert.  ^  Yide  ante,  voL  i.  p.  5. 


558  MODERN  EGYPT 


been  partially  regenerated,  in  spite  of  a  perverse 
system  of  government  which  might  well  have 
seemed  to  render  regeneration  almost  impossible. 

Yet,  when  it  is  said  that  all  these  things  were 
accomplished  by  the  Englishmen  who  have  served 
the  Egyptian  Government,  one  qualifying  remark 
should  in  justice  be  made.  It  should  never  be 
forgotten  that  many  Egyptians  have  themselves 
borne  a  very  honourable  and  useful  part  in  the 
work  of  Egyptian  regeneration. 

Is  the  skilled  labour,  the  energy,  the  persever- 
ance, and  the  patient  toil  of  the  English  reformers 
and  their  Egyptian  allies  to  be  thrown  away  ?  Is 
Egypt  again  to  relapse  into  a  semi  -  barbarous 
condition  ?  Will  posterity  declare  that  this  noble 
effort  to  elevate  a  whole  nation  ended  in  ultimate 
failure  ? 

I  cannot  say  what  will  be  the  future  of  Egypt, 
but  I  hope  and  believe  that  these  questions  may  be 
answered  in  the  negative. 

According  to  the  Eastern  adage,  the  grass  never 
grows  again  where  once  the  hoof  of  the  Sultan's 
horse  has  trod.  In  the  sorely  tried  country  of 
which  this  history  treats,  the  hoof  of  the  Turkish 
horse,  whether  the  rider  were  Sultan  or  Khedive, 
has,  indeed,  left  a  deep  imprint.  Nevertheless,  I 
would  fain  hope  it  is  not  indelible.  We  are  justi- 
fied in  substituting  a  sanguine  in  the  place  of  a 
despondent  metaphor.  Where  once  the  seeds  of 
true  Western  civilisation  have  taken  root  so  deeply 
as  is  now  the  case  in  Egypt,  no  retrograde  forces, 
however  malignant  they  may  be,  will  in  the  end  be 
able  to  check  germination  and  ultimate  growtL 
The  seeds  which  Ismail  Pasha  and  his  predecessors 
planted  produced  little  but  rank  weeds.  The  seeds 
which  have  now  been  planted  are  those  of  true 
civilisation.  They  will  assuredly  bring  forth  fruit 
in  due  season.    Interested  antagonism,  ignorance. 


CH.  Lxi  CONCLUSION 


559 


religious  prejudice,  and  all  the  forces  which  cluster  J 
round  an  archaic  and  corrupt  social  system,  may 
do  their  worst.  They  will  not  succeed.  We  have 
dealt  a  blow  to  the  forces  of  reaction  in  Egypt 
from  which  they  can  never  recover,  and  from 
which,  if  England  does  her  duty  towards  herself, 
towards  the  Egyptian  people,  and  towards  the 
civilised  world,  they  will  never  have  a  chance  of 
recovering. 


PART  VII 


THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT 


Nullum  niimen  abest,  si  sit  prudentm  ;  nos  te, 
Nos  Jacimus,  Fortima,  Deam  coeloque  locnmus. 

Juvenal,  Sat.  x.  365. 


The  essential  qualities  of  national  greatness  are  moral,  not 
material. 

Lecky's  History  of  England,  vol.  i.  p.  490. 


VOL.  II  661  2  O 


CHAPTER  LXII 


THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT 

Quo  Vadis? — The  question  of  the  occupation — Its  duration — Egyptian 
autonomy — The  Capitulations — Desirability  of  training  the  Egyp- 
tians— Importance  of  finance — Display  of  sympathy — Conclusion. 

It  is  probable  that  few  Englishmen  ever  ask  them- 
selves seriously  the  question  of  Quo  Vadis  in  con- 
nection with  either  Indian  or  Egyptian  affairs. 
Even  fewer  are  tempted  to  hazard  any  confident 
answer  to  this  crucial  question. 

The  practical  instincts  of  our  race  lead  us  to 
deal  with  whatever  affairs  we  have  in  hand  for  the 
moment,  and  to  discard  any  attempt  to  peer  too 
curiously  into  the  remote  future.  That  instinct 
seems  to  me  to  be  eminently  wise.  Whether, 
however,  it  be  wise  or  unwise,  it  certainly  exercises 
so  powerful  an  influence  over  my  mind  as  to  pre- 
clude me  from  endeavouring  to  forecast  what  will 
be  the  ultimate  solution  of  the  Egyptian  Question. 
That  solution,  moreover,  depends,  in  no  small 
degree,  on  a  factor  which  is  at  present  both 
unknown  and  uncertain,  viz.,  the  conduct  of  the 
Egyptians  themselves.  We  cannot  as  yet  predict 
with  any  degree  of  assurance  the  moral,  intellectual, 
and  political  results  likely  to  be  obtained  by  the 
transformation  which  is  at  present  taking  place  in 
the  Egyptian  national  character. 

Although,  however,  I  will  not  venture  to  pre- 
dict the  goal  which  will  eventually  be  reached,  I 

563 


564  MODERN  EGYPT 


have  no  hesitation  in  expressing  an  opinion  as  to 
that  which  we  should  seek  to  attain.  So  far  as 
can  at  present  be  judged,  only  two  alternative 
courses  are  possible.  Egypt  must  eventually  either 
become  autonomous,  or  it  must  be  incorporated 
into  the  British  Empire.  Personally,  I  am  de- 
cidedly in  favour  of  moving  in  the  direction  of  the 
former  of  these  alternatives. 

As  a  mere  academic  question,  I  never  have  been, 
neither  am  I  now  in  favour  of  the  British  occupa- 
tion of  Egypt.  Looking  at  the  matter  from  a 
purely  British  point  of  view,  I  believe  that  the 
opinion  enunciated  by  Lord  Palmerston  in  1857^ 
still  holds  good.  More  than  this,  however  much  I 
should  regret  to  see  the  noble  work  of  Egyptian 
reform  checked,  1  am  quite  prepared  to  admit  that, 
if  it  be  in  the  interests  of  England  to  evacuate 
Egypt,  we  need  not  be  deterred  from  doing  so  by 
the  consideration  that  it  is  in  the  moral  and  material 
interests  of  the  Egyptians,  however  little  some  few 
of  them  may  recognise  the  fact,  that  we  should  con- 
tinue our  occupation  of  the  country.  It  does  not 
appear  to  me  that  we  need  stay  in  Egypt  merely  to 
carry  out  certain  administrative  reforms,  however 
desirable  they  may  be,  unless  those  reforms  are  so 
essential  that  their  non-execution  would  contribute 
to  produce  serious  political  or  financial  complica- 
tions after  the  British  garrison  is  withdrawn.  All 
that  we  have  to  do  is  to  leave  behind  us  a  fairly 
good,  strong,  and — above  all  things — stable  Govern- 
ment, which  will  obviate  anarchy  and  bankruptcy, 
and  will  thus  prevent  the  Egyptian  Question  from 
aecain  becomino;  a  serious  cause  of  trouble  to 
Europe.  We  need  not  inquire  too  mmutely  into 
the  acts  of  such  a  Government.  In  order  to  ensure 
its  stability,  it  should  possess  a  certain  liberty  of 
action,  even  although  it  may  use  that  liberty  in  a 

^  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  83. 


CH.  Lxn    THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  565 


manner  which  would  not  always  be  in  accordance 
with  our  views.  But  it  is  essential  that,  subse- 
quent to  the  evacuation,  the  Government  should, 
broadly  speaking,  act  on  principles  which  wUl  be 
in  conformity  with  the  commonplace  requirements 
of  Western  civilisation.  The  idea,  which  at  one 
time  found  favour  with  a  section  of  the  British 
public,  that  Egypt  may  be  left  to  "  stew  in  its  own 
juice,"  and  that,  however  great  may  be  the  con- 
fusion and  internal  disorder  which  is  created,  no 
necessity  for  European  interference  will  arise,  may 
at  once  be  set  aside  as  wholly  impracticable.  It  is 
absurd  to  suppose  that  Europe  will  look  on  as  a 
passive  spectator  whilst  a  retrograde  government, 
based  on  purely  Mohammedan  principles  and  obsolete 
Oriental  ideas,  is  established  in  Egypt.  The  material 
interests  at  stake  are  too  important,  and  the  degree 
of  civilisation  to  which  Egypt  has  attained  is  too 
advanced,  to  admit  of  such  a  line  of  conduct  being 
adopted.  Public  opinion  would  force  the  most 
slug7.;ish  Government  into  action.  If  England  did 
not  interfere,  some  other  Power  would  do  so.  Of 
the  many  delusions  which  at  one  time  existed  about 
Egypt,  the  greatest  of  all  is  the  idea  that  England 
can  shake  herself  free  of  the  Egyptian  Question 
merely  by  withdrawing  the  British  garrison,  and 
then  declaring  to  the  world  that  the  Egyptians 
must  get  on  as  well  as  they  can  by  themselves. 
Lord  Granville  pursued  a  policy  of  this  sort  in 
dealing  with  the  affairs  of  the  Soudan,  and  we 
know  with  what  result. 

It  has  sometimes  been  argued  that,  even  if  mis- 
government  were  again  allowed  to  reign  supreme 
in  Egypt,  British  interests  would  be  sufficiently 
secured  if  all  danger  of  occupation  by  any  other 
foreign  Power  were  averted.  I  have  already^ 
alluded  to  this  aspect  of  the  question,  but  the  point 

1  Vide  ante,  p.  383. 


566  MODERN  EGYPT  Ptvn 


is  one  of  so  much  importance  that  I  need  make  no 
apology  for  reverting  to  it. 

It  cannot  be  too  clearly  understood  that  neutral- 
isation, under  whatsoever  conditions,  wholly  fails  to 
solve  the  Egyptian  Question.  The  solution  of  that 
question  would  be  little,  if  at  all,  advanced  by 
merely  obtaining  guarantees  against  foreign  inter- 
ference in  Egypt.  The  main  difficulty  would 
remain  untouched.  That  difficulty  is  to  decide 
who  is  to  interfere,  on  the  assumption  that  some 
foreign  interference  is  indispensable.  If  it  were 
thought  desirable  to  prevent  competition  and 
rivalry  amongst  the  diffisrent  offices  of  the  Metro- 
politan Fire  Brigade,  the  object  might  readily  be 
obtained  by  forbidding  any  one  of  them  to  aid  in 
extinguishing  a  fire.  The  practical  result  would 
hardly  be  considered  satisfactory.  This,  however, 
is  the  political  system  which  would  be  involved 
in  the  neutralisation  of  Egypt.  Each  member  of 
the  European  Fire  Brigade  would  be  under  an 
obligation  not  to  turn  his  hose  on  to  an  Egyptian 
conflagration,  in  order  to  avoid  wounding  the 
susceptibilities  of  his  neighbours.  In  the  mean- 
while, the  whole  edifice  of  Egyptian  civilisation 
might,  and  probably  would  be  destroyed,  to  the 
infinite  detriment  not  only  of  the  indigenous  in- 
habitants of  Egypt,  but  also  of  the  large  number 
of  Europeans  who  would  be  ruined  if  the  country 
were  allowed  to  relapse  into  anarchy  and  barbarism. 
The  failure  of  international  action  to  deal  effectively 
with  misgovernment  in  other  parts  of  the  Ottoman 
dominions  serves  as  a  warning  in  dealing  with  Egypt. 

Is  it,  however,  possible  to  ensure  the  existence 
of  a  fairly  good  and  stable  government  in  Egypt 
if  the  British  garrison  were  withdrawn  ?  That  is 
the  main  question  which  has  to  be  answered. 

I  make  no  pretension  to  the  gift  of  political 
prophecy.    I  can  only  state  my  deliberate  opmion. 


CH.  Lxn    THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  567 


formed  after  many  years  of  Egyptian  experience 
and  in  the  face  of  a  decided  predisposition  to  favour 
the  policy  of  evacuation,  that  at  present,  and  for  a 
long  time  to  come,  the  results  of  executing  such  a 
policy  would  be  disastrous.  Looking  to  the  special 
intricacies  of  the  Egyptian  system  of  government, 
to  the  licence  of  the  local  press,  to  the  ignorance 
and  credulity  of  the  mass  of  the  Egyptian  popula- 
tion, to  the  absence  of  Egyptian  statesmen  capable 
of  controlling  Egyptian  society  and  of  guiding  the 
very  complicated  machine  of  government,  to  the 
diminution  of  the  influence  exercised  by  the  British 
officials  and  by  the  diplomatic  Kepresentative  of 
England  in  Egypt  which  would  inevitably  result 
from  the  evacuation,  and  to  the  proved  impotence 
of  international  action  in  administrative  matters 
— it  appears  to  me  impossible  to  blind  oneself  to 
the  fact  that,  if  the  British  garrison  were  now 
withdrawn,  a  complete  upset  would  most  probably 
ensue.  It  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Egypt 
of  to-day  is  very  different  from  the  Egypt  of  the 
pre-occupation  days.  A  return  to  personal  rule  of 
the  Oriental  type — and  it  is  in  this  direction  that 
events  would  probably  trend  —  would  create  a 
revolution.  A  transfer  of  power  to  the  present 
race  of  Europeanised  Egyptians  would,  to  say  the 
least,  be  an  extremely  hazardous  experiment,  so 
hazardous,  indeed,  that  I  am  very  decidedly  of 
opinion  that  it  would  be  wholly  unjustifiable  to 
attempt  it. 

It  may  be  that  at  some  future  period  the 
Egyptians  may  be  rendered  capable  of  governing 
themselves  without  the  presence  of  a  foreign  army 
in  their  midst,  and  without  foreign  guidance  hi 
civil  and  military  affairs ;  but  that  period  is  far 
distant.  One  or  more  generations  must,  in  my 
opinion,  pass  away  before  the  question  can  be  even 
usefully  discussed. 


568 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PT.  vn 


The  fact,  however,  that  the  occupation  must 
last  for  a  period  which  cannot  now  be  defined, 
need  not  stand  in  the  way  of  a  gradual  movement 
in  the  direction  of  autonomy  in  the  sense  in  which 
I  understand  that  term  as  applied  to  the  special 
case  of  Egypt.  The  mere  withdrawal  of  the 
British  garrison  would  not  render  E<.'ypt  autono- 
mous ;  on  the  contrary,  it  would  diminish  the 
prospect  of  eventual  autonomy.  It  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms  to  describe  a  country  as  self- 
governing  when 'all  its  most  important  laws  are 
passed,  not  by  any  of  its  inhabitants  or  by  any 
institutions  existing  within  its  own  confines,  but 
by  the  Governments  and  legislative  institutions  of 
sixteen  foreign  Powers.^  Such,  however,  will  be 
the  condition  of  Egypt  until  the  existing  regime 
of  the  Capitulations  is  altered.  There  are,  so 
far  as  I  know,  only  two  methods  for  effecting  a 
radical  alteration  of  that  regime.  One  is  that 
Egypt  should  cease  to  form  part  of  the  Ottoman 
domhiions  and  should  be  annexed  by  some  foreign 
Power — a  solution  which  1  discard.  The  other  is 
that  means  should  be  devised  for  establishing  a 
local  legislature  competent  to  deal  with  all  local 
matters.  The  only  real  Egyptian  autonomy,  there- 
fore, which  I  am  able  to  conceive  as  either  practic- 
able or  capable  of  realisation  without  serious  injury 
to  all  the  various  interests  involved,  is  one  which 
will  enable  all  the  dwellers  in  cosmopolitan  Egypt, 
be  they  Moslem  or  Christian,  European,  Asiatic,  or 
African,  to  be  fused  into  one  self-governing  body. 
That  it  may  take  years — possibly  generations — to 

1  It  has  also  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  onanimity  ainong:st  all  tbe 
foreign  Powers  is  necessary  before  any  law  can  come  into  force.  Prior 
to  1867,  the  German  Zollverein  was  constituted  on  a  somewhat  similar 
basis.  Every  state  of  the  union  had  an  absolute  right  of  veto  on  any 
proposal  submitted  for  its  consideration.  The  system,  Mr.  Percy 
Ashley  says  {Modem  Tariff  History,  p.  49),  caused  "innumerable 
difficulties  and  delays."    It  has,  of  course,  long  since  ceased  to  exist. 


CH.Lxn    THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  569 


achieve  this  object  is  more  than  probable,  but  unless 
it  can  be  achieved,  any  idea  of  autonomy,  in  the  true 
sense  of  the  term,  will,  in  my  opinion,  have  to 
be  abandoned.  I  stated  in  the  last  Report  I  wrote 
from  Egypt  that  it  is  well  for  every  individual  and 
every  nation  to  have  an  ideal.  The  ideal  of  the 
Moslem  patriot  is,  in  my  opinion,  incapable  of 
realisation.  The  ideal  which  I  substitute  in  its 
place  is  extremely  difficult  of  attainment,  but  if 
the  Egyptians  of  the  rising  generation  will  have 
the  wisdom  and  foresight  to  work  cordially  and 
patiently,  in  co-operation  with  European  sympa- 
thisers, to  attain  it,  it  may  possibly  in  time  be 
found  capable  of  realisation. 

In  the  meanwhile,  no  effort  should  be  spared  to 
render  the  native  Egyptians  capable  of  eventually 
taking  their  share  in  the  government  of  a  really 
autonomous  community.  Much  has  already  been 
done  in  this  direction,  and  it  may  be  confidently 
anticipated,  now  that  the  finances  of  the  country  are 
established  on  a  sound  footing  and  the  most  press- 
ing demands  necessary  to  ensure  material  prosperity 
have  been  met,  that  intellectual,  and  perhaps  moral 
progress  will  proceed  more  rapidly  during  the  next 
quarter  of  a  century  than  during  that  which  has 
now  terminated.  Only,  it  should  never  be  forgotten 
that  the  rapidity  of  the  progress  must  be  made 
contingent  on  the  means  available  for  ensuring  it. 
**  Sound  finance,"  as  has  been  most  truly  said,  "  is 
the  foundation  of  the  independence  of  States."^ 
Nothing  can  compensate  the  Egyptians  for  a 
financial  relapse. 

Lastly,  it  should  never  be  forgotten  that,  in 
default  of  community  of  race,  religion,  language, 
and  habits  of  thought,  which  ordinarily  constitute 
the  main  bonds  of  union  between  the  rulers  and 
the  ruled,  we  must  endeavour  to  forge  such  artificial 

*  Oliver's  Alexander  Hamilton,  p.  304. 


570  MODERN  EGYPT 


bonds  between  the  Englishman  and  the  Egyptian 
as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  render  available. 

One  of  the  most  important  of  these  bonds 
must  always  be  the  exhibition  of  reasonable  and 
disciplined  sympathy  for  the  Egyptians,  not  merely 
by  the  British  Government,  but  by  every  individual 
Englishman  engaged  in  the  work  of  Egyptian 
administration.  This  sympathy  is  a  quality,  the 
possession  or  absence  of  which  is  displayed  by 
Englishmen  in  very  various  degrees  when  they  are 
brought  in  contact  with  Asiatic  or  African  races. 
Some  go  to  the  extreme  of  almost  brutal  antipathy, 
whilst  others  display  their  ill-regulated  sympathy  in 
forms  which  are  exaggerated  and  even  mischievous. 
The  Egyptians  rightly  resent  the  conduct  of  the 
one  class,  and  ridicule  that  of  the  other.  A  middle 
course,  based  on  accurate  information  and  on  a 
careful  study  of  Egyptian  facts  and  of  the  Egyptian 
character,  will  be  found  more  productive  of  result 
than  either  extreme. 

Another  bond  may,  to  some  extent,  be  forged 
by  appealing  to  the  person  or  the  pocket.  A 
proper  system  of  justice  and  of  police  can  protect 
the  former.  Material  interests  can  be  served  by 
various  means,  the  most  effective  of  which  is  to 
keep  taxation  low.  Do  not  let  us,  however,  imagine 
that,  under  any  circumstances,  we  can  ever  create 
a  feeling  of  loyalty  in  the  breasts  of  the  Egyptians 
akin  to  that  felt  by  a  self-governing  people  for  in- 
digenous rulers  if,  besides  bemg  indigenous,  they 
are  also  beneficent.  Neither  by  the  display  of 
sympathy,  nor  by  good  government,  can  we  forge 
bonds  which  will  be  other  than  brittle.  Sir  Herbert 
Edwards,  writing  to  Lord  Lawrence  a  few  years 
after  the  annexation  of  the  Punjab,  said  :  "  We 
are  not  liked  anywhere.  .  .  .  The  people  hailed 
us  as  deliverers  from  Sikh  maladministration,  and 
we  were  popular  so  long  as  we  were  plaistering 


CH.  Lxii    THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  571 


wounds.  But  the  patient  is  well  now,  and  he 
finds  the  doctor  a  bore.  There  is  no  getting  over 
the  fact  that  we  are  not  Mahommedans,  that  we 
neither  eat,  drink,  nor  intermarry  with  them."^ 

The  present  situation  in  Egypt  is  very  similar 
to  that  which  existed  in  the  Punjab  when  Sir 
Herbert  Edwards  wrote  these  lines.  The  want 
of  gratitude  displayed  by  a  nation  to  its  alien 
benefactors  is  almost  as  old  as  history  itself.^  In 
whatever  degree  ingratitude  may  exist,  it  would  be 
unjust  to  blame  the  Egyptians  for  following  the 
dictates  of  human  nature.  In  any  case,  whatever 
be  the  moral  harvest  we  may  reap,  we  must 
continue  to  do  our  duty,  and  our  duty  has  been 
indicated  to  us  by  the  Apostle  St.  Paul.  We  must 
not  be  "weary  in  well-doing." 

I  take  leave  of  a  country  with  which  I  have 
been  so  long  associated  with  the  expression  of  an 
earnest  hope  that,  in  the  future,  as  in  the  recent 
past,  Egypt  will  continue  to  be  governed  in  the 
interests  of  the  Egyptians,  and  I  commend  to  my 
own  countrymen  the  advice  which  was  given  to 
Rome  by  one  of  the  later  Latin  poets  :  ^ 

Quod  regnas  minus  est  quam  quod  regnare  mereris. 

*  JJfe  of  Lord  Lawrence,  vol.  ii.  p.  20. 

2  Gregorovius  (Rome  in  the  Middle  Ages,  i.  323)  says,  speaking  of 
the  rule  of  Theodosius  in  Italy  :  "The  unhappy  King  now  learnt  by 
experience  that  not  even  the  wisest  and  most  humane  of  princes,  if  he 
be  an  alien  in  race,  in  customs,  and  religion,  can  ever  win  the  hearts  of 
the  people." 

3  Rutilius. 


APPENDIIX 


KHEDIVES  OF  EGYPT 


Name. 

Born. 

Died. 

Reigned. 

Mehemet  Ali      .  . 

1769 

1849 

1811-1848 

Ibrahim       .        .  . 

1789 

1848 

1848  (June-Nov.) 

Abbas  I.      .       .  . 

1813 

1854 

1848-1854 

Said  .... 

1-822 

1863 

1854-1863 

Ismail .... 

1830 

1895 

186:^-1879 

Tewfik        .  . 

1852 

1892 

1879-1892 

Abbas  11.  . 

1874 

1892- 

BRITISH  SECRETARIES  OF  STATE  FOR 
FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 


Name. 

From. 

To. 

Earl  of  Derby 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 

Earl  Gran\ille 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 

Earl  of  Rosebery  . 

Earl  of  Iddesleigh 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 

Earl  of  Rosebery  . 

Earl  of  Kimberley 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 
1  Marquess  of  Lansdowne 
1  Sir  Edward  Grey  . 

L  . 

February  21,  1874 
April  2,  1878 
April  28,  1880 
June  24,  1885 
February  6,  1886  . 
August  3,  1886  . 
January  14,  1887  . 
August  18,  1892  . 
March  11,  1894  , 
June  29,  1895 
November  12,  1900 
December  11,  1905 

April  2,  1878 
April  28,  1880 
June  24,  1885 
February  6,  1886 
August  3,  1886 
January  14,  1887 
August  18,  1892 
March  11,  1894 
June  29,  1895 
November  12,  1900 
December  11,  1905 

574 


MODERN  EGYPT 


BRITISH  AGENTS  AND  CONSULS-GENERAL 
IN  EGYPT 


N&nie. 

From. 

To. 

Lord  Vivian 
Sir  Frank  Lascelles  . 
Sir  Edward  Malet 
Earl  of  Cromer  . 
Sir  Eldon  Gorst 

May  10,  1876 
March  20,  1879 
October  10,  1879  . 
September  11,  1883 
May  6,  1907  . 

March  20,  1879 
October  10,  1879 
September  11,  1883 
May  6,  1907 

CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


1875 

Adhesion  of  the  British  Government  to  the 
International  Law  Courts  .... 


July  31. 


1876 

Mr.  Cave  reports  on  the  Finances  of  Egypt       .    March  23. 
The  Khedive  suspends  payment  of  his  Treasury 

Bills  April  8. 

Creation  of  the  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt    May  2. 

Issue  of  the  Goschen-Joubert  Decree       .       .    November  18. 

Appointment  of  English  and  French  Controllers 

(Mr.  Romaine  and  Baron  de  Malaret)        .    December  25. 


1877 

An  English  Commissioner  (Sir  Evelyn  Baring) 

appointed  to  the  Commission  of  the  Debt    .    March  2. 

Signature  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Convention  be- 
tween the  British  and  Egyptian  Govern- 
ments      .......    August  4. 


1878 

The  Khedive  consents  to  a  full  inquiry  into  the 

financial  position  of  Egypt        .       .       .    April  4. 

Treaty  of  Berlin       ......    August  3. 

First  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry        .    August  19. 

The  principle  of  Ministerial  responsibility  is  re- 
cognised. Nubar  Pasha  charged  with  the 
formation  of  a  Ministry.  Suspension  of  the 
Dual  Control.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  and  M.  de 
Bhgnieres  appointed  Ministers  of  Finance 
and  Public  Works  respectively  .       .       .    August  28. 

Issue  of  the  Domains  Loan  of  £8,500,000  .       .    October  29 

675 


576  MODERN  EGYPT 


1879 

Nubar  Pasha  and  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  assaulted  by 

a  crowd  of  Egyptian  officers       .        .        .  February  18. 

Resignation  of  Nubar  Pasha      ....  February  19. 

Prince  Tewfik  appointed  Prime  Minister  .        .  March  10. 
Dismissal  of  the  European  Ministers.  Cherif 

Pasha  appointed  Prime  Minister        .       .  April  7. 
Second  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry, 

and  resignation  of  the  Commissioners        .  April  10. 

The  Sultan  deposes  the  Khedive      .       .       .  June  26. 

Ismail  Pasha  leaves  Egypt        ....  June  30. 

Cherif  Pasha  resigns  office        ....  August  18. 
The  Dual  Control  revived.    M.  de  Blignieres 

and  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  appointed  Controllers  September  4. 

Riaz  Pasha  forms  a  Ministry     ....  September  22. 


1880 

Repeal  of  the  Law  of  the  Moukabala       .       .  January  6. 

Appointment  of  a  Commission  of  Liquidation    .  April  2. 
Sir  Auckland  Colvin  appointed  Controller  in 

succession  to  Sir  Evelyn  Baring         .       .  June  23. 

Promulgation  of  the  Law  of  Liquidation   .       .  July  17. 


1881 

Mutiny  of  the  Egyptian  Army.    The  Minister 

of  War  is  dismissed    .....    February  1. 

The  Egyptian  Army  again  mutinies.  Fall  of 
the  Riaz  Ministry.  Cherif  Pasha  becomes 
Prime  Minister  ......    September  9. 

The  Sultan  sends  two  Commissioners  to  Eg^^t     October  6. 

At  the  instance  of  the  French  and  British 
Governments,  the  Turkish  Commissioners 
leave  Egypt  October  19. 

M.  Gambetta  assxmies  office      ....    November  12. 


1882 

The  British  and  French  Governments  address  a 

Joint  Note  to  the  Khedive        .        .        .    January  8. 

M.  Gambetta  resigns  office.    He  is  succeeded 

by  M.  de  Freycinet    .....    January  31. 

Ch6rif  Pasha  is  dismissed  from  office.  Mahmoud 
Pasha  Sami  appointed  Prime  Minister,  with 
Arabi  as  Minister  of  War  ....    February  5. 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


577 


M.  de  Blignieres  resigns  his  appointment  of  Con- 
troller-General ......  March. 

The  Arabist  Ministers  resign^  but  are  reinstated 

in  office     ...  ...    May  23. 

The  British  and  French  Consuls-General  demand 
that  Arabi  should  leave  the  country.  The 
Arabist  Ministry  again  resigns   .        .        .    May  27. 

The  Arabist  Ministry  is  again  reinstated   .       .    May  28. 

The  Sultan  sends  Dervish  Pasha  as  Special  Com- 
missioner to  Egypt    .....    June  4. 

A  serious  riot,  attended  with  loss  of  life,  occurs 

at  Alexandria    ......    June  11. 

Ragheb  Pasha  is  named  Prime  Minister,  with 

Arabi  as  Minister  of  War  ....    Juine  17. 

A  Conference,  in  which  Turkey  refuses  to  take 

part,  meets  at  Constantinople    .       .       .    June  23. 

Bombardment  of  Alexandria.    The  Arabists  set 

fire  to  the  town         .....    July  11. 

On  the  motion  of  M.  Clemenceau,  the  French 
Chamber  passes  a  vote  adverse  to  the 
Ministry.  M.  de  Freycinet  resigns.  M. 
Duclerc  forms  a  Ministry  ....    August  1. 

Battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir      .....    September  13. 

Cairo   occupied   by  British  troops.     Arabi  is 

arrested     .......    September  15. 

The  Egyptian  Army  is  disbanded      .       .       .    September  19. 

Lord  DufFerin  instructed  to  go  to  Egypt  .        .    October  29. 

Arabi  condemned  to  exile        ....    December  3, 

It  is  decided  not  to  re-establish  the  Dual  Control  December. 

Death  of  M.  Gambetta     .....    December  31. 


1883 

Issue  of  a  Circular  prohibiting  the  use  of  the 

courbash   .  January  l6. 

Capitulation  of  El-Obeid  .....    January  19. 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin  appointed  Financial  Adviser    February  4. 

Promulgation  of  the  Organic  Law    .       .       .    May  1. 

General  Hicks's  army  leaves  Duem  .       .       .    September  8. 

Massacre  of  Egyptian  reinforcements  sent  from 

Suakin  to  Sinkat       .....    October  16. 

Sir  EveljTi  Baring  appointed  Agent  and  Consul- 

General  September  11. 

The  British  Government  agree  to  the  reduction 
of  the  garrison  and  the  concentration  of 
British  troops  at  Alexandria       .        .        .    November  1. 

Sir  Edgar  Vincent  appointed  Financial  Adviser     November  4.  •; 
VOL.  II  2  P 


578  MODERN  EGYPT 


Total  defeat  of  the  Eg)'ptian  troops  sent  to 

the  relief  of  Tokar.     Death  of  Captain 

Moncrieff,  R.N.         .  .       .       .    November  4. 

News  of  the  annihilation  of  General  Hicks's 

army  arrives  at  Cairo  ....  November  18. 
Sir  Evelyn  Baring  recommends  the  abandonment 

of  the  Soudan   ......    November  19. 

The  British  Government  agree  to  the  policy  of 

abandoning  the  Soudan  ....  November  20. 
The  reduction  of  the  British  garrison  in  Egypt 

countermanded         .....    November  25. 
Defeat  of  the  Egyptians  at  Tamanieb       .       .    December  2. 
Fall  of  Dara.    Slatin  Bey  is  taken  prisoner. 

The  Province  of  Darfour  falls  into  the  power 

of  the  Mahdi  December  23. 


1884 

Ch^rif  Pasha  resigns  office.    Nubar  Pasha  forms 

a  Ministry        ......    January  8. 

General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  leave  Cairo 

for  Khartoum    ......    January  26. 

Defeat  of  General  Baker's  force  at  El  Teb       .    February  4. 
Annihilation  of  the  Sinkat  garrison  .        .       .    February  8. 
General  Gordon  arrives  at  Berber     .        .        .    February  11. 
General  Gordon  arrives  at  Khartoum        .        .    February  18. 
Sir  Gerald  Graham  defeats  the  Dervishes  at 

El  Teb  February  29- 

The  British  Government  finally  refuse  to  employ 

Zobeir  Pasha  m  the  Soudan       .       .       .    March  5. 
Sir  Gerald  Graham  defeats  the  Dervishes  at 

Tamai       .......    March  13. 

The  British  Government  refuse  to  send  troops 

from  Suakin  to  Berber       ....    March  25. 
Fall  of  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  Province  .       .       .    April  9. 
All  communication  with  Khartoum  is  cut  off     .    April  19- 

Fall  of  Berber  May  19. 

First  Meeting  of  the  London  Conference  on 

Egyptian  Finance      .....    June  28. 
Last  Meeting  of  the  London  Conference  .    August  2. 

The  British  Government  obtain  a  vote  of  credit 

in  the  House  of  Commons  on  account  of  the 

Soudan  Expedition    .....    August  8. 
Zeyla  occupied  by  British  troops       .       .       .    August  24. 
Lord  Wolseley  appointed  to  the  command  of 

the  Soudan  Expedition      ....    August  26. 
Murder  of  Colonel  Stewart  and  Mr.  Power       .    September  H 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


Berbera  occupied  by  British  troops  . 
Lord  Northbrook  reports  on  the  Egyptian  situa- 
tion .....        .       .  . 


579 

September  24<. 
November  20. 


1885 

Battle  of  Abu  Klea  ..... 

Sir  Herbert  Stewart  is  mortally  wounded.  The 
Desert  Column  arrives  at  Gubat 

Sir  Charles  Wilson  leaves  Gubat  for  Khartoum  . 

Fall  of  Khartoum  and  death  of  General  Gordon 

The  Italians  occupy  Massowah  .... 

Action  of  Kirbekan.    Death  of  General  Earle  . 

An  Egyptian  loan  of  £9,000,000  is  guaranteed 
by  the  Powers  ...... 

Action  at  Hashin  (Eastern  Soudan)  . 

Action  of  Tofrik  (Eastern  Soudan)  . 

Sir  Francis  Grenfell  appointed  to  command  the 
Egyptian  Army  ..... 

Evacuation  of  Harrar  ..... 

The  British  troops  retire  from  Dongola     .  . 

Death  of  the  Mahdi  ..... 

Capitulation  of  Sennar  ..... 

Capitulation  of  Kassala  ..... 

Convention  signed  at  Constantinople  under  which 
Sir  Henry  Wolff  and  Moukhtar  Pasha  pro- 
ceed as  Joint-Commissioners  to  Egypt 

Battle  of  Ginniss  ...... 


January  17. 

January  19. 
January  24. 
January  26. 
February  5. 
February  10, 

March  18. 
March  20. 
March  22. 

April  19. 
April  26. 
June  13. 
June  22. 
August  19. 
September  30. 


October  24. 
December  30. 


1886 

The  last  of  the  British  troops  leave  Suakin  .  January  26. 
Europeans  resident  in  Egypt  are  rendered  liable 

to  the  payment  of  the  House  Tax     .       .    April  15. 

1887 

Signature  of  the  Wolff  Convention    .       .       .    May  28. 

The  Sultan  having  refused  to  ratify  the  Wolff 
Convention,  Sir  Henry  Wolff  leaves  Con- 
stantinople       ......    July  15. 

Sir  Gerald  Portal's  mission  to  Abyssinia    .       .    October  12. 

1888 

Issue  of  a  Decree  partially  abolishing  the  corvee    April  2. 
The  Suez  Canal  Convention  is  signed,  but  not 

made  operative  ......    April  29. 


580  MODERN  EGYPT 


Fall  of  Nubar  Pasha.     Riaz   Pasha   forms  a 

Ministry    .......    June  9. 

Decree  issued  constituting  a  Reserve  Fund  of 

£2,000,000   July  12. 

Action  of  Gemaizeh.    The  Dervishes  are  driven 

from  the  neighbourhood  of  Suakin     .       .    December  20. 


1889 

The  power  of  making  by-laws  applicable  to 
Europeans  is  conferred  on  the  Egyptian 
Government      ......    January  31. 

Stanley  and  Emin  Pasha  meet  at  Kavalli  .       .    February  17. 

Sir   Evelyn   Baring  reports  that  the  "  Race 

against  Bankruptcy"  is  practically  won     .    February  18. 

Battle  between  the  Abyssinians  and  the  Der- 
vishes.   Death  of  King  John     .       .       .    March  9- 

Abolition  of  the  Commissions  of  Brigandage     .  July. 

Colonel  Wodehouse  defeats  the  Dervishes  at 

Arguin      .......    July  2. 

Sir  Francis  Grenfell  defeats  the  Dervishes  at 

Toski.    Death  of  Wad-el-Nej  umi      .       .  Augusts. 

Sir  Elwin  Palmer  is  appointed  Financial  Adviser 

in  succession  to  Sir  Edgar  Vincent    .       .    October  2J. 


1890 

The  repairs  to  the  Barrage  are  completed         .  Jane. 
Issue  of  a  Decree  converting  the  Preference 

Stock  June  7. 

Issue  of  a  Decree  converting  the  Daira  Stock  .    July  5. 


1891 

Appointment  of  Sir  John  Scott  to  be  Judicial 

Adviser     .......    February  15. 

The  Dervishes  are  defeated,  and  the  Province  of 

Tokar  is  reoccupied   .....    February  19. 

Fall  of  Riaz  Pasha.     Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi 

forms  a  Ministry       .....    May  14. 


1892 

Death  of  the  Khedive  Tewfik   ....    January  7. 

Total  abolition  of  the  corvee  for  dredging  pur- 
poses. Reduction  of  the  Salt  Tax.  Aboli- 
tion of  the  Professional  Tax       .       .       .    January  28. 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


581 


Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  succeeds   Sir  Francis 

Grenfell  in  command  of  the  Egyptian  Army  April  9« 


1893 

Dismissal  of  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi  .  .  January  15. 
Riaz  Pasha  forms  a  Ministry  ....  January  18. 
The  Dervishes  are  defeated  by  the  Italians  at 

Agordat  December  4. 


1894 

Resignation  of  Riaz  Pasha.    Nubar  Pasha  forms 

a  Ministry         ......    April  14. 

Kassala  captured  by  the  ItaHans       .       •       .    July  17. 

Appointment  of  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  to  be  Adviser 

to  the  Department  of  the  Interior     .       .    November  2. 


1895 

Nubar  Pasha  resigns.    Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi 
is  appointed  Prime  Minister  ... 


November  II. 


1896 

Defeat  of  the  Italian  Army  at  Adua  . 
The  British  Government  decide  to  recapture 


Dongola 


The  Caisse  de  la  Dette  advances  £500,000  to 
the  Egyptian  Government 

Battle  of  Firket  

Dongola  occupied  ...... 

The  Court  of  Appeal  order  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment to  refund  the  money  advanced  by  the 
Caisse  de  la  Dette  ..... 

The  money  is  repaid  ..... 


March  1. 

March  12. 

March  26. 
June  7. 
September  23, 


December  2. 
December  6. 


1897 

Capture  of  Rejaf  by  the  Belgians      .       .       .  February  7. 

British  mission  despatched  to  Abyssinia    .       .  March  10. 

Abu  Haraed  captured       .....  August  7. 

Berber  occupied       ......  August  31. 

Suakin-Berber  road  opened      ....  October  18. 

Railway  from  Wadi  Haifa  to  Abu  Hamed  com- 
pleted      .......  October  3 1 . 

Kassala  reoccupied  by  Egyptian  troops     .       .  December  26. 


582  MODERN  EGYPT 


1898 

National  Bank  created  with  autliority  to  issue 

promissory  notes       .....    June  25. 

Signature  of  the  contract  for  the  construction 

of  the  Nile  Reservoirs       ....    February  20. 

Battle  of  the  Atbara        .....    April  8. 

Signature  of  the  contract  for  selling  the  Daira 

property    .......    June  21. 

The  French  arrive  at  Fashoda  ....    July  10. 

Battle  of  Omdurman        .....    September  2. 

Sir   Malcolm   Mcll  wraith   appointed  Judicial 

Adviser  October  20. 

Sir  Eldon  Gorst  appointed  Financial  Adviser, 
and  Mr.  Machell  appointed  Adviser  to  the 
Interior     .......    October  20. 

The  French  evacuate  Fashoda  ....    December  11. 


1899 

Lord  Cromer's  speech  at  Omdurman         .       .    January  4. 
Death  of  Nubar  Pasha      .....    January  14. 
Signature  of  the  Soudan  Convention         .       .    January  19. 
Destruction  of  the  Khahfa's  army.    Death  of 

the  Khalifa  and  his  leading  Emirs.  The 

Soudan  declared  open  to  trade  .  .  .  November  24. 
Lord  Kitchener  leaves  Egypt.    Sir  Reginald 

Wingate  assumes  command  of  the  Egyptian 

army        .......    December  21. 

Soudan  railway  opened  to  Halfaya    .       .       .    December  30. 


1900 

Post-Office  Savings  Banks  estabhshed 
Navigation  dues  on  the  Nile  abolished 


January  1. 
November  29. 


1902 

Creation  of  an  Agricultural  Bank      .       .  .  June  1. 

Commercial  Convention  signed  with  France  .  November  26. 

Inauguration  of  the  Nile  Reservoirs  .       .  .  December  10. 


1903 

Octroi  duties  abolished  January  1. 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS  583 


1904 

Sir  William  Garstin's  report  on  the  Nile   .       .  March  1 2. 
Signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement       .  April  8. 
Sir  Vincent  Corbett  appointed  Financial  Adviser  April  12. 
Issue  of  a  Decree  giving  effect  to  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement    .....  November  28. 


1905 

Daira  debt  paid  off  October  15. 


1906 

The  Salt  Monopoly  abolished   ....   January  1. 

The  Nile- Red  Sea  Railway  opened  .       .       .    January  27. 

Mr.  Dunlop  named  Adviser  to  the  Department 

of  Public  Instruction         ....    March  24. 

Sir  Nicholas  O'Conor  addresses  a  note  to  the 
Porte  which  terminates  the  "  Sinai  Penin- 
sula" incident    ......    May  15. 

Liquidation  of  the  affairs  of  the  Daira       .       .  October. 

Appointment   of  Saad   Pasha  Zagloul  to  be 

Minister  of  Education        ....    October  29. 


1907 
He  is  succeeded 


Lord  Cromer  leaves  Egypt. 

by  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  . 
Mr.  Harvey  appointed  Financial  Adviser 


May  6. 
October  9. 


INDEX 


Abbas  I.,  career  and  character,  i. 

19-20 

Abdul  Halini,  Prince,  i.  136 
Ahdul-Kader  Pasha,  i.  356-7 
Abdul-Shakour,  Emir,  i.  453 
Abyssinia,  King  of,  treaty  with, 

re  frontier  garrisons,  ii.  48 
Abyssinian  frontier  garrisons,  ii. 

47-9 

Accounts  Department,  Egyptian, 
Sir  Gerald  Fitzgerald  head 
of,  i.  28 
Administration,  the — 
Of  Interior,  ii.  478-513 

diflSculties    of    reform,  ii. 

478-82 
police  reform,  ii.  482-90 
prisons,  ii.  491-4 
slavery,  ii.  495-504 
medical    and    sanitary,  ii. 
504-13 
Of  Justice,  ii.  514-23 

Committee  of  Surveillance,  ii. 
518 

Lord  Cromer's  advice  on  re- 
form of,  ii.  521 
Of  Education,  ii.  524-42 
lack  of  money  for,  ii.  627 
Pashadom  and,  ii.  628-9 
public  desire  for  schools,  ii. 
632 

religious  instruction,  ii.  533 
elementary  education,  ii.  533 
pupils  and  teachers,  ii.  586 
value  of  educating  the  women, 
ii.  539-42 
Of  the  Soudan,  ii.  643-54 
general  system,  ii.  643-8 
finance,  ii.  649 
taxes,  ii.  550-2 
slavery,  ii.  663 


Airolles,  M.  Liron  d'.  Secretary  of 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  i, 
45 

Ala-el-Din  Pasha,  i.  359 

Alcester,  Lord  {also  see  Sir  Beau- 
champ  Seymour),  instruc- 
tions to,  i.  294 

Alexandria  {see  also  Bombardment), 
Arabi's  responsibility  for 
burning,  i.  297 

Anglo-French  Agreement,  1904, 
ii.  888-93 

Annexation,  the  question  of,  L 
93 

Annexation  of  Soudan  by  England, 

its  inadvisability,  ii.  113 
Anti-Slavery    Society    and  the 

Soudan,  i.  403,  517,  ii.  60 
Arabi,  Ahmed,  Pasha — 
mutinies,  i.  176-86 
summons  Notables,  i.  187 
motives  of,  i.  190-3,  208-9 
and  Sultan,  i.  194,  198,  272 
Minister  for  War,  i.  243 
the  Arabi  Ministry,  i.  254-78 
resignation   and  reinstatement 

of,  i.  274-8 
and  slaughter  of  Christians,  L 
288 

dismissal  of,  i.  300 

surrender,  trial,  and  exile,  L 

323,  386 
returns  to  Egypt,  i.  337 
Armenians,  the,  ii.  219 
Army,  British  (in  Egypt) — 
in  1884,  i.  420-1 
Lord  Northbrook  on  withdrawal 

of,  ii.  370 
Wolff  Convention  on  withdrawal 

of,  ii.  376-81 
comment  on  withdrawal  of,  ii.380 


585 


586  MODERN  EGYPT 


Army,  the  Egyptian — 
recruitments  for,  i.  50 
mutiny  of  officers,  1879,  i.  74 
petition  of  Arabi,  i.  176-7 
second  mutiny  of  officers,  i.  179 
mutiny   and    French  Consul- 

General,  i.  180 
third  mutiny,  i.  192,  212 
Military  Budget,  1882,  i.  225 
condition  of,  in  Soudan,  1882, 

i.  353 

defence  of  Egypt  devolves  on, 

ii.  60 

British  Commanders-in-Chief, 
ii.  47'4 

summary  of  facts,  ii.  460-77 
Assize  Courts,  ii.  518 
Assouan  Reservoir,  the,  ii.  82 
Asylums,  ii.  511 
Atbara,  battle  of,  ii.  98-102 
Austria  agrees   to  bombardment 
of  Alexandria,  i.  295 

Bahr-el-Ghazal  under  the  Mahdi, 
ii.  41-3 

Baird,  Sir  Alexander,  L  34,  35 
Baker.  Sir  Samuel — 

on  the  Soudan  in  1870,  i.  349 

on  Gordon,  i.  562 
Baker,  General  Valentine,  i.  362, 
ii.  482 

on  evacuation  of  Soudan,  i. 
376-7 

despatched  to  Suakin,  comment 

on,  i.  400 
instructions  to,  i.  401 
his  defeat,  comment,  i.  404-9 
Bank,  Egyptian  National — 
proposed  creation  of,  i.  12 
created  1898,  ii.  582 
Baravelli,  M.,  appointed  Italian 
Commissioner  of  Debt,  i.  12 
Baring,  Sir  Evelyn.     See  Lord 
Cromer,  a/so  under  British 
Government's  Egyptian 
Policy 
Beaman,  Mr.,  ii.  493 
Bedouins,  the,  ii.  198-9 
Beit-el-mal,  i.  53 

Belgians,  King  of  the,  Gordon 
and  Equatorial  Provinces, 
i.  464-5 

Berber  Expedition,  the  corre- 
spondence re,  i.  637 


Berbera,  condition  of,  IL  49 
taken  by  Great  Britain,  ii.  61 

Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  iL  9 

Billot,  M.,  ii.  .385 

Bismarck,  Prince — 

on  the  claims  of  Egj'pt's  credi- 
tors, i.  33,  132 
epigram,  i.  131 

on  proposed  Conference,  i.  284 
on  Arabi's  power,  i.  293 
on   international   mandate,  L 
303 

his  hostility  to  England,  1883- 
1884,  i.  419 
Black  troops  in  Egyptian  Army, 

ii.  476 
Blignieres,  M.  de — 

French  Commissioner  of  Debt, 
i.  12 

his  character,  i.  40 
succeeded  by  M.  de  Bughas,  L 
103 

Minister  of  Public  Works,  L 

63 

dismissed  by  Ismail,  i.  77 
French  Controller  of  Finance, 

i.  159 
resigns,  i.  257 
Blum  Pasha,  i.  103,  ii.  291 
Blunt,  'Wilfrid,  i.  235 

his  Arabist  sj-mpathies,  i.  255 
employed  as  intermediary,  L 
256 

relations  wath  Mr.  Gladstone, 

i.  279-80 
Secret  History,    I    285,  287, 
297,  325,  335 
Bombardment    of  Alexandria, 
the— 

negotiations  prior  to,  i.  267-76 
British  Fleet  arrives,  i.  277 
batteries  raised  at  Alexandria, 
i.  293 

Lord  Alcester  instructed  to  stop 

work  on  them,  i.  294 
French  opinion  on,  i.  294 
Austrian  opinion  on,  i.  295 
Turkish  opinion  on,  i.  296 
the  bombardment,  i.  296-7 
Bondholders,  the — 

point  of  view  of  the  British,  L 
41 

point  of  view  of  the  French,  L 
42 


INDEX 


587 


Bordeini,  Bey,  ii.  12,  13 
Boutros  Pasha  Ghali,  ii.  211 
Bowring,  Sir  John — 

on  the  Copts,  ii.  205-8-13 
Reports   to  Lord  Palmerston 
on — 

Europeans  in  Egypt,  i.  17 
Osmanlis  in  Egypt,  i.  175 
Brackenbury,  General,  ii.  24,  60 
Bright,  John,  i.  299 
British   Government's  Egyptian 
policy — 
Lord    Beaconsfield's  Govern- 
ment, 1874-1880— 
(Foreign     Secretary,  Lord 
Derby) — 
declines  to  appoint  Debt 

Commissioner,  i.  12 
correspondence  with  Lord 
Vivian  re  Egyptian  Debt 
and  Taxes,  i.  32 
(Foreign     Secretary,  Lord 

Salisbury) — 
(British  Agent  in  Egypt,  Lord 
Vivian) — 
instructs   Lord   Vivian  to 
act  with  French  repre- 
sentative, i.  37 
correspondence  with  Lord 
Vivian  re  Nubar  Minis- 
try, i.  66,  87-8 
(British   Agent,  Sir  Frank 
Lascelles) — 
correspondence    with  Sir 
Frank  Lascelles  re  Prince 
Tewfik's  Ministry,  i.  99 
correspondence  with  Sir  F. 
Lascelles  re  Ismail's  en- 
gagements, i.  132-41 
correspondence    with  Sir 
F.  Lascelles  re  Tewfik 
Pasha's  policy,  i.  152-7 
Mr.   Gladstone  s  Government, 
1880-1885— 
(F  oreign     Secretary,  Lord 

Granville) — 
(British  Agent,  Sir  Edward 
Malet)— 
correspondence  with  Am- 
bassador in  Turkey  dur- 
ing Arabi's  mutiny,  i. 
196-9 

general  policy  of,  i.  200-5 
correspondence    with  M. 


Gambetta  and  Sir  Edward 
Malet  re  Joint  Note,  i. 
214-29 

correspondence  with  M. 
Gambetta  and  Sir  Edward 
Malet  re  effects  of  Joint 
Note,  i.  237-46 

correspondence  with  M. 
Freycinet  and  Sir  E. 
Malet  during  Arabi's 
ministry,  i.  254-77 

correspondence  with  Sir  E. 
Malet  and  Lord  Dufierin 
re  Conference  of  Powers, 
i.  283-96 

correspondence  with  Lord 
Dufferin  re  Turkish 
troops  for  Egypt,  i. 
310-21 

was  a  national  Government 

possible  at  time  of  Arabi's 

rebellion,  i.  323 
correspondence  with  Lord 

Dufferin  re  Arabi's  trial, 

i.  337-45 
correspondence  with  Sir  E. 

Malet  re  the  Soudan,  i. 

364-7 

(British  Agent,  Sir  Evelyn 
Baring  (Lord  Cromer)) — 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  Eng- 
lish troops  for  Soudan, 
i.  372-3,  376-84 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  and  mili- 
tary chiefs  re  campaign 
in  Eastern  Soudan,  i. 
399-416 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  em-' 
ployment  of  General 
Gordon,  i.  423-7 

General  Gordon  appointed 
to  evacuate  Soudan,  i. 
427 

reasons  for  and  against  his 
appointni.-ut,  i.  427-39 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  Gor- 
don's instructions,  i. 
440-52 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  Gor- 


588  MODERN  EGYPT 


don's  slavery  proclama- 
tion, i.  474 
correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  em- 
plovment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha,  i.  482-9,  494- 
629 

reasons  for  and  against 
Zobeir's  appointment,  i. 
629-34 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  Berber 
Expedition,  i.  637  -  9, 
642-5 

reasons  for  and  against 
Expedition,  i.  54fi-8 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  em- 
ployment of  Turkish 
troops  in  Soudan,  i. 
649-52 

Sir  Evelyn  Baring  points 
out  seriousness  of  Gor- 
don's position,  i.  556 

did  Gordon  endeavour  to 
carry  out  Government's 
policy  ?  i.  559-74 
(Mr.    Egerton,  Temporary 
Agent) — 

correspondence  with  Mr. 
Egerton  re  relief  of 
Berber,  i.  574-7 

correspondence  re  relief  of 
Grordon  (Lord  Wolseley 
and  Lord  Hartington),  i. 
679-80 

(British  Agent,  Sir  Evelyn 
Baring  (Lord  Cromer)) — 
comment  on  Government's 

delay,  i.  582-92 
correspondence    with  Sir 
Evelyn   Baring  on  fall 
of  Khartoum,  ii.  19 
correspondence    with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  and  Lord 
^'I'^olseley  re  evacuation 
of  Soudan,  ii.  20-9 
Lord  Salisbury's  Governments, 
1885-1886,  1886-1892— 
(Foreign     Secretary,  Lord 

Salisbury) — 
(British  Agent,  Sir  Evelyn 
Baring  (Lord  Cromer)) — 
Lord  Wolseley  informed  the 


Soudan  to  be  evacuated, 

ii.  29 

comment  on  policy  of 
evacuation,  ii.  29-34,  78 

correspondence    with  Sir 
Evelyn    Baring   re  ad- 
vance on  Tokar,  ii.  75-6 
(British  Agent,  Lord  Cromer )- 

correspondence  with,  re  re- 
conquest  of  Soudan,  ii. 
82 

analysis  of  Government's  policy, 
1882-1883,  iL  349-65 

the  Northbrook  Mission,  iL 
366-71 

the  Wolff  Convention,  ii.  372- 
81 

neutralisation  of  the  Suez  Canal, 

ii.  382-7 
the  Anglo-French  Agreement, 
ii.  388-93 
British  Secretaries  of  State  for 

Foreign  Affairs,  ii.  573 
Broadley,  .Mr.,  i.  297 
Budgets — 

Budget  of  Commissioners,  1879, 
i.  123 

Budget  of  Khedive,  1879,  L  125 
Bughas,  M.  Bellaigues  de — 

Commissioner  of  Debt  in  succes- 
sion to  M.  de  Blignieres, 

i.  103 

Buller,  Sir  Redvers,  ii.  18-19 
Burnaby,  Colonel,  death  of,  iL  7 
Burton,  Sir  Richard — 

advises  occupation  of  Berbers, 

ii.  50 

in  Harrar,  ii.  61 
Butler,  Sir  William,  L  44,  441, 
447 

Cadastral  Survey,  i.  55,  104,  115 
Camel  Corps,  Egyptian,  ii.  60 
Cameron,  Mr.,  on  Mehemet  All's 

policy,  L  16 
Canal,  the  Suez,  measures  for 
protecting,  after  bombard- 
ment of  Alexandria,  i.  303 
Capitulations,  use  of,  L  326,  ii. 
428 

Carter,  Mr.  Howard,  reports  a 
case  of  torture,  i.  50 

Cartwright,  Mr.,  L  289,  292, 
293-4 


INDEX 


589 


Cave,  Mr.  Stephen — 

Financial  Report  of,  1876,  i.  4 
comments   on   Balance  Sheet, 

1864-76,  i.  11 
comments  on  law  of  the  Mouka- 

bala,  i.  30 
comments  ou  Egyptian  officials^ 

i.  30-1 

Cherif    Pasha    (see    alao  under 
Egyptian  Ministries) — 
summoned     before  Commis- 
sioners, i.  47 
his  policy,  i.  153,  197-213 
and  Arabi's  mutiny,  i.  187 
on  Dual  Control,  i.  189 
and  National  party  and  army, 
i.  206 

suggests  Turkish  intervention, 

i.  244 

his  character,  ii.  334 
Chermside,  Sir  Herbert,  i.  537 
Christianity  and  the  Europeanised 

Egyptian,  ii.  230 
Christians,  attacks  on— 
slaughter  of,  i.  287 
flight  of,  i.  289 
Christians,  the  Egyptian,  ii.  201- 
227 

Chronological  Table  of  Events,  ii. 

575-83 

Churchill,  Lord  Randolph,  i.  339 
Civil  Service,  Egyptian,  ii.  298-9 
Clemenceau,  M. ,  on  French  inter- 
ference in  Egypt,  i.  303,  305 
Clot  Bey,  Dr.,  ii.  607 
Coetlogon,  Colonel,  i.  375,  544, 
672 

Coles  Pasha  on  prisons,  ii.  494 
Colleges,  English  military,  value 
of  training  for  official  life, 

ii.  548 

Colville,  Colonel,  on  Nile  Cam- 
paign, ii.  4 
•Colvin,   Sir  Auckland,  head  of 
Cadastral  Survey — 
resigns,  i.  104 

succeeds  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  as 
Debt  Commissioner,  i.  127 

succeeds  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  as 
Controller-General,  i.  173 

his  action  d  uring  Arabi's  mutiny, 
i.  183-6 

on  situation,  September  19, 
1881,  i.  206-7 


his    memorandum,  December 

1881,  i.  222-34 
his  despatch  re  state  of  parties 
in  Egypt  in  December  1881, 
i.  218-22 
on  evacuating  Soudan,  i.  389 
Commission  of  Debt  instituted,  i. 
12,  ii.  306 
objects,  working,  and  altera- 
tions of,  ii.  304-10 
{See  also  Debt) 
Commission  of  Inquiry  into  Egyp- 
tian Finances,  i.  46 
work  of,  i.  47-63 
limitation  of  power  of,  i.  64 
report  of,  i.  124 
resignation  of,  i.  124 
Commission  of  Liquidation,  1880, 

i.  162 

Commission    (luteinational)  to 
assess   claims   re  Alexan- 
drian destruction,  i.  339 
Commissions  of  Brigandage,  ii.  289 
Conference,    International,  pro- 
posed   by    England  and 
France,  i.  283 
meets  at  Constantinople,  i.  291 
Conference  suspended,  i.  312-13 
Consular  Courts,  ii.  319,  514 
Consul  -  General,     the  British, 

duties  of,  ii.  321-7 
Controllers-General  of  Finances, 
1879— 
division  of  work,  i.  161-2 
their  power  disappears,  i.  257 
Cookson,  Sir  Charles,  i.  184,  186, 

257,  281,  287 
Copts,  the,  ii.  201-13 
Corbett,  Sir  Vincent,  ii.  287 
Corruption  in  the  public  services, 

ii.  420-5 

Corve'e,  the,  i.  60,  ii.  405-19 
the  need  for  forced  labour,  ii. 
409 

financial  aspect  of,  ii.  410,  417 
abolition  of,  ii.  419 
Courbash,  the,  ii.  397-405.  See 

also  Corvee 
Cromer,  Lord  (Sir  Evelyn  Bar- 
ing)— 

{See  also  under  British  Govern- 
ment's Policy) 

appointed  British  Commissioner 
of  Debt,  i.  15 


590  MODERN  EGYPT 


inquires  into  outstanding'claims, 

i.  60-4 

on  the  necessary  reforms,  i.  55- 

62 

on  the  Nubar  ministry,  i.  71 

on  differences  between  Lord 
Vivian  and  Sir  Rivers  Wil- 
son, i.  94-5 

on  Report  of  Commission  of 
Inquiry,  i.  122-7 

resigns  Commissionership  of 
Debt,  i.  127 

appointed  English  Controller- 
General,  i.  159 

work  of  Controller-General,  i. 
105-73 

resigns  Controllership,  i.  173 
returns   to   Egypt  as  British 

representative,  i.  345 
his  speech  at  Omdurman,  ii.  115 
letter  from  Sheikh  to  Sheikh 

referring  to  "  Baring  and 

his  English,"  ii.  200 
his  despatch  to  Lord  Granville 

on  withdrawal   of  British 

troops,  ii.  362 
Customs,  control  of,  ii.  292 

Daira  Debt,  i.  13 
Daira  Khassa  loan,  i.  123 
Daira  Sanieh  loan,  i.  123,  ii.  313-14 
Daoud  Pasha,  i.  182 
Darfur  during  the  Mahdi's  re- 
bellion, ii.  36-41 
Debt,  the  Egyptian  Public — 

in  1863  and  1876,  i.  11 

Commission   of   Debt,   i.  12, 

ii.  304-10 

Lord  Goschen  and  M.  Joubert's 

arrangement  of,  i.  13 
Sir  Evelyn   Baring  appointed 
British  Commissioner,  i.  15 
Funded  Debt  in  1877-78,  i.  33-5 
France  and  Great  Britain  act  in 

concert,  i.  37 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  i.  45-63 
addition  to  Funded  Debt,  i.  64 
interest  on  Debt,  i.  65,  98 
Report  of  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, i.  110-27 
resignation  of  Commission  of 

Inquiry,  i.  124 
Commissioners    of    Debt  sue 
Government,  i.  126 


Sir  Evelyn  Baring  resigns,  i.  127 
Sir  Auckland  Colvin  appointed 

Debt  Commissioner,  i.  127 
Commission  of  Liquidation,  i. 

162 

Law  of  Liquidation,  ii.  305 
changes  in  functions  of  Debt 

Commission,  ii.  310 
reduction  of  debt,  ii.  450 
Decrees,  the,  of  1876,  i.  12, 13, 14 
Derby,  Lord,  declines  to  nominate 
Commissioner,  i.  12 
on  General  Baker's  defeat,  i. 
405 

Dervisli  Pasha,  i.  284,  286,  288-89 
Dilke,  Sir  Charles,  i.  235 
Domains,  the,  administration  of, 

i.  63,  ii.  315 
Dongola  Expedition,  ii.  86 
financial  difficulties,  ii.  86,  91 
battle  at  Firket,  ii.  90 
Dongola  taken,  ii.  91 
"  Droits  de  voirie,"  i.  122 
Dual  Control,  the,  L  93, 159, 161, 
164-78 
Cherif  Pasha  on,  i.  189 
abolition  of,  i.  340 
Duclerc,    M.,   succeeds    M.  de 

Freycinet,  i.  306 
Dues  on  stamping  mats  and  on 

sale  of  cattle,  i.  122 
DufFerin,  Lord,  i.  196,  270,  310 
negotiates  military  convention 

with  Turkey,  i.  312-21 
his  mission  to  Egypt,  i.  336 
his  report,  comment  on,  i.  341- 
45 

and  the  Organic  Law,  ii.  271-79 
and  the  courbash,  ii.  399 
on  slavery,  ii.  498 
Dunlop,  M.,  ii.  535 

Earle,   General,   tribute    to,  L 

421,  ii.  18,  24 
Education.    See  Administration 
Education  Department,  Dunlop, 

Mr.,  Adviser  to,  ii.  293 
Egerton,  Sir  Edwin,  i.  432,  558 
"Egypt    for    the  Egyptians," 

fallacies  of  such  a  policy, 

i.  327,  ii.  525-6 
Egypt,  Modern — 

Before  British  Occupation — 
extent  of,  i.  349 


INDEX 


591 


state  of,  1876,  i.  29 
distribution  of  power  in,  i. 
175 

condition   of,  1882,  i.  212, 
323-30 

condition  in  1884,  i.  417-23 
Since  occupation — 
extent  of,  ii.  126 
population,  ii.  129 
races  in,  ii.  127-8 
ruling:  classes,  ii.  131-2 
Islamism,  ii.  132-49 
women,  position  of,  ii.  165 
family  life,  ii.  160 
law,  ii.  162 

Moslems,  the,  ii.  168-99 
village,  the,  in,  ii.  189 
Christians,  the,  ii.  201-27 
Europeanised    Egyptian,  ii. 

228-44 
Europeans  in,  ii.  245-59 
Government,  the,  ii.  260-79 
(See   also    uiuler    Army,  Ad- 
ministration, Ministries, 
British  Government,  Debt, 
Finance,  etc.) 
El  Obeid,  faU  of,  i.  357 
El  Teb,  battle  of,  i.  414 
Emin  Pasha  (Governor  of  Equa- 

toria),  ii.  43-6 
"  Emprunt  Rouznameh,"the,  i.  53 
English,  the  (in  Egypt),  ii.  252-5 
their  friends  and  foes,  ii.  256-9 
Equatoria  under  Emin  Pasha,  ii. 
43-6 

leased  to  Congo  State,  ii.  46 
Essad  EfFendi,  i.  272,  285,  289 
Europeanised     Egyptians,  the, 

anglophobia  of,  ii.  244 
Europeans  in  Egypt — 

summoned  by  Alehemet  Ali,  i. 
16 

summoned  by  Ismail,  i.  23 
bad  name  acquired  by,  i.  23 
character  of  official,  i.  24 
first  European  Ministers,  i.  63 
agitation  against  Ministers,  i.  99 
European  intervention,  i.  323-30 
census  of,  ii.  245 
orientalisation  of,  ii.  247 
and  British  officials,  ii.  255-6 
privileges  of,  ii.  426-42 

Famine  of  1878,  i.  34 


Farrer,  Lord,  Report  on  Railways, 

ii.  311 
Fehmi,  Ali  Bey,  i.  176 
Fellaheen,  the,  ii.  192-8 
Finances  {see  also  under  Public 
Debt)— 
in  1876,  i.  27 

Lord  Vivian's  report  on,  i.  26 
taxes  and  collection  in  1876, 
i.  30-2 

taxes  and  collection  in  1878, 
i.  38 

Commission  of  Inquiry  in 
Finances,  1878,  i.  45 

work  of  Commission  of  Inquiry 
in  Finances,  i.  47-63 

administration  of,  before  1878, 
i.  48 

outstanding  claims  and  deficits, 
1878,  i.  54 

recommendations  of  Commis- 
sion, i.  55 

credit  and  Oriental  view  of,  L 
58 

revenue  returns,  1878,  i.  65 

meetings  between  Sir  Rivera 
Wilson,  M.  de  Bligiiieres, 
and  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  re 
financial  position,  i.  88 

report  of  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, i.  110-27 

condition  of  finances  on  acces- 
sion of  Tewfik  Pasha,  i. 
149 

Khedive's    right    to  contract 

loans  withdrawn,  i.  158 
Controllers-General  appointed, 

i.  159 

Commission  of  Liquidation,  i. 

162,  172-3 
reform  of  taxation,  1880,  i.  168- 

171 

Chamlier  of  Notables  claims  to 
vote  Budget,  i.  242 

financial  position  of  Soudan, 
1882,  i.  354 

conference  on  financial  situa- 
tion, 1884,  i.  558 

Lord   Northbrook's  proposals, 

ii.  370 

summary  of  facts,  ii.  443-55 
Financial  advisers,  ii.  287 
Financial  secretaries,  ii.  291 
Findlay,  Mr.,  ii.  555 


592 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Fitzgerald,  Sir  Gerald — 

head  of  Accounts  Department, 
i.  26 

his  work  and  its  results,  i.  28 
he  resigns,  i.  103 
Flogging.      See    Courbash  and 
Corvee 

Forced  labour.    See  Corvee 
Forster,  Mr.,  on  Soudan  Policy  of 

Government,  i.  410 
Freethinker,  the  Egyptian,  ii.  232 
French  civilisation — 

its  attractiveness  to  Asiatics,  ii. 

236 

contrasted  with  English  civilisa- 
tion, ii.  238,  240 
French  policy  (Egyptian) — 
towards  bondholders,  i.  35-7 
general  policy  in  1879,  i.  91-3, 
130-1 

in  respect  to  Arabi's  mutiny,  i. 

180,  196 
in  respect  to  British  occupation, 

i.  204-5 

proposed  Anglo-French  military 

control,  i.  214 
towards  Turkish  intervention, 

i.  155-6,  269,  275 

,    subsequent  to  bombardment  of 
Alexandria,  i.  802,  305-6 
in  respect  to  >Volff  Convention, 

ii.  372-81 
in  1904,  ii.  388 

Freycinet,  M.  de — 

succeeds  M.  Gambetta,  i.  247 
suggests  deposing  Khedive,  i. 
260 

suggests  sending  squadron,  i. 
266 

suggests  conference  of  Powers, 
i.  283,  291 
Future  of  Egypt,  the,  suggestions 
and  warnings,  ii.  663-71 

Gambetta,  M. — 

urges  united  action  by  England 

and  France,  i.  216,  217 
his  policy,  i.  216 
prepares  Draft  Joint  Note,  i. 
223 

negotiations  with  Lord  Granville, 

i.  237-46 
his  influence  on  the  course  of 

Egyptian  history,  i.  247-53 


on  the  British  occupation,  L 

302 

Garstin,  Sir  William,  ii.  291 
Gatacre,  General,  ii.  101 
Germany's  policy  in   respect  to 
Egypt— 
in  1879,  i.  131,  135 
in  1882,  i.  292 
in  1904,  ii.  391 
Ghazi,  Moukhtar  Pasha,  ii.  374 
Giers,  M.  de — 

protests    against    WolflF  Con- 
vention, ii.  378 
Ginniss,  battle  at,  ii.  30 
Gladstone,  Mr.  (see  also  under 
Britisli  Government) — 
on    responsibility   for  British 

occupation,  i.  160 
denies   existence   of  National 

Party  in  Egypt,  i.  226 
relations    with    Mr.  Wilfrid 

Blunt,  i.  279-80 
his  objection  to  landing  troops 
after     bombardment  of 
Alexandra,  i.  298 
on     military    pacification  of 

Egypt,  i.  301 
on   Baker   Pasha's    defeat,  i. 
405 

on  Gordon's  Soudan  policy,  i. 
478 

in  favour  of  Zobeir's  appoint- 
ment, i.  531 

on  unpopularity  of  Zobeir'a 
appointment,  i.  533 

on  difficulties  of  Egyptian 
affairs,  i.  582 

comment  on  his  responsibility 
for  delay  in  relieving 
Gordon,  i'.  582-92 

responsibility  for  fall  of  Khar- 
toum, ii.  17 

his  phantom  policy,  ii.  368-9 
Godeaux,  M.,  succeeds  Baron  des 
Michels  as  French  Diplo- 
matic Representative,  i.  66 
Gordon,  General  (see  also  under 
British  Government) — 

invited  to  inquire  into  finances, 
i.  44 

on  value  of  Soudan,  i.  390 
his  mission,  i.  417-39 
his  instructions,  i.  390,  443-5 
popularity  of,  i.  427-31 


INDEX 


593 


his  appointment  a  mistake,  i. 

438-9 
in  Cairo,  i.  440 
his  policy,  i.  442 
Governor  of  Soudan,  i.  446, 

450-2 

anil  Zobeir  Pasha,  i.  454-60,  480 
leaves  for  Soudan,  i.  460-2 
further  instructions,  i.  464-5 
his  proclamations,  i.  470 
on  slavery,  i.  471-4 
at  Khartoum,  i.  475 
his  policy,  i.  476-7 
Precis      of  correspondence 
between      him.  Colonel 
Stewart,    Lord  Granville, 
and    Sir  Evelyn  Baring, 
L  480-534 
comment  on  his  policy,  1884,  i. 
560-74 

letters  from,  via  Dongola,  L 
677-8 

relief  expedition,  1.  674-82 

comment  on  delay,  i.  681-2 

Khedive's  telegram  to,  i.  593 

expedition,  ii.  5 

battles  at  Abu  Klea  and 
Metemmeh,  ii.  6-8 

Journal,  and  letters  from,  IL  8 

death  of,  ii.  9-17 
Gorst,  Sir  Eldon,  ii.  287,  292 
Goschen,  Lord — 

his  mission  to  Egypt,  1876,  i. 
13-14 

he  appoints  Sir  Evelyn  Baring 
Commissioner  of  Debt,  i.  15 

Government  of  Egypt,  ii.  260- 
279 

Graham,     Major  -  General  Sir 

Gerald,  i.  410,  537,  538 
Granville,  Lord  (see  also  under 
British  Government) — 
his  lack  of  initiative,  i.  216 
and  Egyptian  Constitutionalism, 
i.  238 

his  policy  previous  to  occupa- 
tion compared  with  Lord 
Salisbury's,  i.  252-3 
personal  notes  on,  i.  392,  420 
his  optimism,  i.  476 
Greeks,  tlie,  ii.  250-1 
Grelle,  M.  Le,  ii.  288-9 
Grenfell,  Sir  Francis — 

Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
VOL.  II 


Egyptian  army,  ii.  63,  64, 
69,  72 
Gre'vy,  M.— 

on  British  military  preparations, 

1882,  i.  305 

Hake,  Mr.  Egmont,  i.  447 

Halim  Pasha,  i.  196 

Harbour  works,  Alexandria,  their 

cost,  i.  51 
Hardinge,  Sir  Arthur,  ii.  .555 
Harrar  annexed  by  Ismail,  ii.  52 

taken  by  King  Menelek,  ii.  63 
Hartington,  Lord,  i.  411,  580-1 ; 

ii.  21,  29 
Harvey,  Mr.,  ii.  287 
Hassan,  Prince,  i.  78 
Herbiu,  M.,  ii.  3 
Hewett,  Admiral,  i.  409 
Hicks,  General — 

appointed    to    Soudan  army, 

1883,  i.  364 

complains  of  his   position,  i. 
361 

appointed  Commander-in-Chief, 

i.  361 
his  optimism,  i.  361-3 
his  army  destroyed,  i.  308 
Colonel  Colville  on  disaster,  1. 

.'?68 

Sir  Reginald  Wingateon  battle- 
field, i.  369 
Hicks-Beach,  Sir  Michael,  ii.  94 
Hoskins,    Admiral,  and  French 
Admiral  at  Port  Said,  L 
303 

Hospitals,  ii.  610-11 
Hunter,  General,  ii.  100-1 
Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa,  i.  467 

Ibrahim,  his  career  and  character, 

i.  18-19 

Indian  troops  for  Suakin,  ii.  88 
Interior,  the,  administration  of. 

See  Administration 
International  administi-ations,  ii. 

304-15 

Internationalism,  in  theory  and 

practice,  ii.  301-15 
Irrigation  (see  also  under  Corvee) — 
under  the  Pharaohs  and  Turks, 

ii.  457 

Lord  Milner  on  improved,  ii. 
458-9 

2  Q 


594  MODERN  EGYPT 


Lord  Cromer's  report  on,  ii. 

463 

Ismail  Pasha — 

and  Public  Debt,  i.  11 
and  European  civilisation,  i.  23 
his  extravagance,  i.  61-2 
his  power,  i.  56-9 
cedes  his  estates,  i.  61 
and  Nubar-Wilson  Ministry,  i. 
66-7 

his  exclusion  from  Council  dis- 
cussed, i.  69-70 
Sir  Evelyn  Baring's  views  on 

exclusion,  i.  71-2 
and  officers'  mutiny,  i.  76-81 
and  constitutionalism,  i.  83 
and  foreign  interference,  i.  83-4 
excluded  from  Council,  i.  89-90 
and  his  Foreign  Ministers,  i. 

99-100 
his  policy,  i.  105-9,  143-6 
advised  to  abdicate,  i.  135-9 
leaves  Egypt,  i.  141-2 
Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub,  on  the  cour- 

bash,  ii.  399 
Ismail   Pasha   Sadik,    his  exac- 
tions, i.  26 
Italy- 
Egyptian  policy  of,  i.  181,  iL 
391 

invited  to  co-operate  with  Eng- 
land, i.  308 
takes  Massowah,  ii.  67 
and  Abyssinia,  ii.  83 

James,  Mr.  F.  L.,  in  Somaliland, 
ii.  49 

Jebel  Kirbekan,  battle  at,  ii.  23 
Joint  Note  of  1882,  i.  214 
its  terms,  i.  223 
local  situation  when  presented, 

i.  224 
presented,  i.  227 
summarj'  of  views  on  the,  i. 

229-35 
eflFects  of,  i.  236-53 
Joubert,  M. ,  associated  with  Lord 

Goscheu,  i.  13 
Judicial  Advisers,  ii.  290 
Judicial  system,  ii.  316-20 
Justice.    Sec  Administration 

Kadi,  the,  legal  functions  of,ii.  320 
courts  of,  ii.  615 


Kalnoky,  Count,  i.  295 
Kassala,  during  Mahdi's  rebellion, 
ii.  47 

Khalifa,     the     (Abdullah  -  el  - 
'Taashi) — 

succeeds  Mahdi,  ii.  30 

battle  at  Ginuiss,  effect  of,  ii.  30 

letter  to  Queen  Victoria,  ii.  62 

battle  of  Toski,  effect  of,  ii.  72 

death  of,  ii.  105 
Kharadji  lands,  i.  114,  121 
Khartoum — 

fall  of,  ii.  9-17 

retaken,  ii.  105 
Khartoum  Campaign,  ii.  79-110 

cost  of,  ii.  105-6 

conduct  of,  ii.  106-9 
Khedives  of  Egypt,  ii.  573 

the  powers  of,  ii.  269-70 

{See  also  under  Mehemet  Ali, 
Ibrahim,  Abbas   I.,  Said, 
Ismail,  Tewfik) 
Kinglake,  i.  130,  323,  331 
Kitchener,  Major,  i.  540,  578 
Kitchener,  Sir  Herbert — 

to  command  Soudan  force,  ii. 
86 

his  qualities  for  command,  ii. 
87-9 

Khartoum  Campaign,  ii.  89-109 
Kremer,  Herr  vou,  Commissioner 
of  Debt,  i.  12 

Land,  tenure  and  taxation — 
held  by  Khedive,  1876,  i.  29 
Law  of  the  Moukabala,  i.  29 
ceded  by  Ismail,  i.  61-3 
Ouchouri  and  Kharadji  lands, 
i.  114-22 

Lands,  cultivable,  ii.  460 

Lascelles,  Sir  Frank — 
British  Representative  in  Egypt, 
i.  96 

reports  agitation,  April  1,  1879, 
against  European  Ministry, 

i.  99 

Lesseps,  M.  Ferdinand  de.  Presi- 
dent of  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, i.  45,  323 
Levantine,  the,  ii.  246-7,  249 
Lighthouses,  control  of,  ii.  292 
Liquidation,  Law  of,  i.  162,  ii.  305 
Lloyd,  Mr.  Clifford,  i.  378,  419, 

ii.  482-8 


INDEX 


595 


Lupton,  Mr.  Frank,  ii.  42 
Lyall,  Sir  Alfred,  i.  552,  ii.  231 
Lyons,  Lord,  i.  199 

MacDonald,  Major,  i.  838 
Mcllwraith,  Sir  Malcolm,  ii.  290, 
518 

McMurdo,  Captain,  ii.  553 
McNeill,  Sir  John,  ii.  25 
Macheli,  Mr.,  ii.  292 
Mahdi,  the — 

of  tradition,  i.  351-2 
Mohammed  Ahmed  proclaims 

himself,  i.  352 
rebellion  of,   comment  on,  L 
356 

Hicks's  army  destroyed  by,  1. 
368 

letter  to  Gordon,  i.  470 

Lord   Wolseley  on  power  of, 

ii.  22 
death  of,  ii.  30 

succeeded    by    Khalifa.  See 
Khalifa 

Mahdiism,  comment  on,  ii.  63-4 
Mahmoud  Pasha  Baroudi,  i.  179 
Mahmoud    Pasha  Sami,  i.  243, 
257 

JVIalaret,  Baron  de,  Controller- 
General  of  Expenditure, 
i.  14 

Malet,  Sir  Edward  (see  aho  under 
British    Government),  i. 
164,  181 
on  mutinous  army,  i.  182 
on  Khedive's  view  of  mutiny,  i. 
205-6 

on  eflFect  of  Joint  Note,  i.  228-9 
protest  to  Lord  Granville,  i. 
269 

on  slaughter  of  Christians,  i. 
288 

his  illness,  i.  289 
on  funds  for  Soudan  army,  i. 
359 

leaves  Egypt,  i.  345 
Mallet,  Sir  Louis,  i.  15 
Mariudin,   Colonel,   Report  on 

Railways,  ii.  311 
Marriott,  General,  President  of 

Railway  Board,  i.  14 
Massowah,  and  Italy,  ii.  55-8 
Maxwell,  Sir  Benson,  ii.  288 
Medical  reform,  ii.  604 


Medicine,  School  of,  ii.  508 
Mehemet  Ali — 

his  career  and  character,  i.  16- 
18 

if  his  general   principles  had 

been  adopted,  i.  22 
and  education,  ii.  530 
Menelek,  King,  ii.  53,  83 
Michels,  Baron  des — 

French    diplomatic  represen- 
tative, i.  37 
succeeded  by  M.  Godeaux,  i. 
66 

Milner,  Lord,  ii.  291-2,  459 
Ministers,    Egyptian,     the,  ii. 
270-1 

Ministries  (Egyptian) — 

Nubar  Pasha's  (Sir  Rivers  Wilson 
and  M.  de  Blignieres, 
members  of),  i.  64-81,  8ii4, 
ii.  58] 

Cherif  Pasha's,  i.  103, 104,  188- 
90,  300 

Riaz  Pasha's,  i.  153-4,  ii.  343,  581 
"  Arabi's,"  i.  254-78 
Mustapha   Pasha   Fehmi's,  ii. 
846,  680,  681 
Mixed  Courts,  i.  33,  419,  ii.  316 
Moberly  Bell,  Mr.,  i.  515 
Mohammed  Ahmed.    See  Mahdi, 
the 

Mohammed  Tahir,  i.  467 
MoncrieflF,  Captain,  i.  898 
Monogamy  and   family  life,  ii. 
167 

Montebello,   Count  de,  protests 
against  WolfiF  Convention, 
ii.  878 
Morley,  Mr.  John — 

on  Joint  Note,  i.  227  ' 
on  M.  Gambetta's  policy,  i, 
260 

on  Zobeir's  appointment,  i. 
681 

Morocco,   Anglo  -  French  agree- 
ment, ii.  391 
Moslem  sects,  the,  ii.  36,  37 
Moslems  in  Egypt,  ii.  168-99 
Moudirs,  the,  i.  48,  258,  ii.  484-5 
Moukabala,  law  of  the,  i.  29,  98, 
99,  115,  117,  118,  121 

Mr.  Stephen  Cave  on,  i.  30 

repeal  of,  i.  168 
Moukhtar  Pasha,  ii.  380 


596  MODERN  EGYPT 


Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi,  i.  265,  ii. 
Musurus  Pasha,  i.  199,  284,  288 

Napoleon   III.  and   partition  of 

North  Africa,  i.  91 
National  Movement,  Sir  Auckland 

Colvin's  Memorandum  on, 

i.  219-21 

National    Party    in    Egypt,  its 

existence,  i.  226 
Native  tribunals,  ii.  287-9 
Nejumi,  Wad-el-,  ii.  64-71 
Nekib-el-Ashraf,  i.  99 
Nelidoff,  M.  de,  protests  against 

Wolff  Convention,  ii.  ;J78 
Neutralisation  of  Egypt,  comment 

on,  ii.  383 
Nile  Campaign,  ii.  4,  6 
Northbrook,  Lord — 

on  General  Gordon,  i.  429,  491-2 
on  Zobeir  P^ha,  i.  .530 
his  mission  to  Egypt,  ii.  366-71 
Northcote,  Sir  Stalfonl  ,  i.  472 
Notables,  Chamber  of,  the,  i.  68, 
254,  266 
convoked  by  Ismail,  i.  68,  73 
protest  of,  i.  101 
summoned  by  Arabi,  187 
at  the  time  of  Joint  Note,  i. 
224 

claim  to  vote  the  Budget,  i.  237, 
242 

Nubar  Pasha — 

his  relations  with  Ibrahim,  L 
19 

on  Said's  policy,  i.  21 
his  Ministry,  1878-1879,  i.  64- 
81 

his  aims  and  character,  i.  70, 

ii.  335-42 

his  unpopularity,  i.  72 
assaulted  by  officers,  i.  74 
he  resigns,  i.  77 
his  Ministry,  1884,  i.  384 

Occupation,  the  British — 

analysis  of  causes  leading  to,  i. 
252-3 

French  opinion,  1882,  i.  305-6 
the  Temps  on,  i.  306 
Italian  opinion,  i.  307-9 
Turkish  opinion,  1.  309 
preferability  of,  i.  328-30 


Octroi  dues,  i.  122 

partly  abolished,  i.  168 
Officials,  British,  ii.  280-300 

qualifications  of  ideal  official,  u. 
281 

their  position,  ii.  282 
the  need  for,  ii.  293-8 
their  numbers,  ii.  298-9 
Omar  Pasha  Lutfi,  i.  105 
Omdehs,  the,  ii.  186 
Omdurman,  battle  of,  ii.  104 
Organic  law,  the,  proposed  re- 
vision, i.  254,  ii.  271-9 
Osman  Digna — 

the  Mahdi's  Emir,  i.  396 
his  campaign  in  Eastern  Soudan, 
i.  396-9 

his  hold  on  Eastern  Soudan,  iL 
63 

Osman  Pasha  Rifki,  i.  176,  262-3 
Ouchouri  land-tax,  the,  i.  68,  99, 
114,  121 
increased,  i.  168 

Paget,  Sir  Augustus,  i.  307 

Pall  Mall  Gazette,  i.  389,  424,  427, 

434,  474,  477,  532 
Palmer,  Sir  Elwin,  ii.  287 
Palmerston,  Lord,  i.  10,  83,  84,  92 
Pauncefote,  Lord,  ii.  384 
Pickthall,  Mr.  (Folk-Lore  of  the 

Holy  Land),  i.  19 
Pinching,  Sir  Horace,  ii.  513 
Plague,  the,  ii.  513 
Police — 

Adviser  to  Minister  of  Interior 

appointed,  ii.  292 
reforms,  ii.  478-82 
Poll-tax,  i.  122 
Polygamy,  effects  of,  ii.  157 
Portal,  Sir  Gerald,  ii.  555 
Post  Office,  control  of,  ii.  292 

statistics  of,  ii.  313 
Power,  Mr.,  i.  358,  ii.  3 
Prisons — 

Sir    Herbert    Chermside  and 
Mr.  Beaman  report  on,  ii. 
492-3 
reform  of,  ii.  494 
Press,  the — 

vernacular  Press  attacks  Euro- 
peans, i.  211 
retorts  of  European  Press,  L 
211 


INDEX 


597 


Prime  Minister,  the  Egyptian,  his 
importance,  ii.  333 

Prime  Ministers  from  1882,  ii. 
334 

Privilege,  European,  ii.  426 
its  interference  with  reform,  ii. 
431 

reforms  of,  ii.  437 
Lord  Cromer's  report  on,  ii. 
437 

Protectorate,  British,  petition  in 

favour  of,  i.  331 
Public  School,  the  English,  value 

of  training  for  official  life, 

ii.  548 

Public  Works  Department,  ii. 
290-1 

Queen  Victoria — 

and  Zobeir's  appointment,  i. 
631 

and  fall  of  Khartoum,  iL  15- 
16 

Ragheb,  Pasha,  i.  293 
Railways,  Egyptian  — 

falsification  of  accounts,  i.  27 
constructed  during  Khartoum 

Campaign,  ii.  90 
administration,  Li.  310-13 
in  Soudan,  ii.  553 
Reinach,  M.  Joseph,  on  M.  Gam- 
betta's  Egyptian  policy,  i. 
247-53 

Riaz,  Pasha  (see  also  under 
Ministries,  Egyptian) — 

Vice  -  President  Commission  of 
Inquiry,  i.  45 

Minister  of  Interior  and  Justice, 
i.  90-1 

denounced  as  friend  of  Chris- 
tians, i.  99 

relations  with  M.  de  Blignieres, 
i.  182 

Minister  of  Interior,  i.  300 
his  aims  and  work,  ii.  342-6 

Ring,  Baron  de,  i.  180,  295 

Rodd,  Sir  Reniiell,  ii.  555 

Rogers,  Sir  John,  ii.  613 

Romaine,  Mr.,  Controller-General 
of  Revenue,  i.  14 

Rosebery,  Lord,  ii.  413 

Rothschild,  Messrs. — 
loan,  1878,  i.  .63,  66 


loan  to  pay  mutinous  officers, 
i.  78 

Rouznameh  loan,  i.  53,  114-16 

Rundle,  Major,  i.  640 

Russia's  policy  in  respect  to  Egypt, 

i.  131 

Saba  Pasha,  ii.  292 
Said  Pasha,  his  career  and  charac- 
ter, i.  20 
St.   Hilaire,  M.  Barthelemy,  i. 
199 

Salisbury,  Lord,  (see  also  under 
British  Government) — 
criticises   Government  action, 

1881,  i.  201 
his  policy  previous  to  occupa- 
tion compared  with  Lord 
Granville's,  i.  252-3 
on  Hicks  expedition,  i.  367 
moves  vote  of  censure,  i.  384 
on  soldier's  advice  on  strategic 

points,  ii.  76 
on  public  indifference,  ii.  77 
Salt  Tax,  i.  169 
Sanitary  Department,  ii.  613 
Sanitary  reform,  ii.  504 
Sartorius,  Colonel  and  Mrs.,  i. 
397 

Schoolmasters,  native  and  foreign, 

ii.  293 
Schools,  village,  ii.  634 
Schweinfurth,  Dr.,  i.  266 
Scott,  Sir  John,  ii.  290,  518 
Scott-Moncrieff,  Sir  Colin,  ii.  290-1 
Scotter,  Sir  Charles,  Report  on 

Railways,  ii.  312 
Senior,   Mr.    {Conversations  and 

Journals  in  Egypt),  i.  21 
Sennar  during  Mahdi's  rebellion, 

ii.  46 

Senonssi  movement,  the,  ii.  39 
Seymour,  Admiral  Sir  Beauchamp, 

arrives  at  Alexandria,  i. 

277 

Shahin  Pasha,  i.  105 
Sheikh-el-Bekri,  i.  99 
Slieikh-el-Obeid,  i.  518 
Sheikh-el-Senoussi,  ii.  37 

his  relations  with  Mahdi,  ii.  38- 
39 

Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdu,  ii.  179 
Sheikh   Mohammed  Beyram,  ii. 
181 


598  MODERN  EGYPT 


Sheikh  Mohammed-el-Saadat,  ii. 
177 

Sheikhs  of  villages,  the,  i.  48,  ii. 
18f5 

their  views  of  the  English,  ii. 
191 

Sienkiewicz,  M.,  i.  197,  198,  224, 
228,  272,  276 

Sirdar,  the,  position  of,  ii.  283 

Slatiu  Bey,  i.  357,  ii.  36 

Slave  Trade,  the,  ii.  74,  495 

Slavery — 

in  Soudan,  i.  350 
General  Gordon  on,  i.  471-2 
position  of  the  slave,  ii.  496-7 
Lord  DufFerin  on,  ii.  498 
disappearing,  ii.  499-504 

Soudan,  the  (see  also  under  British 
Government) — 
extent  of,  January  1883,  i.  349 
Sir  Samuel  Baker  on,  i.  349 
Colonel  Stewart  on,  i.  350-9 
financial  position  of,  1882,  i.  354 
Grant  forarmv,  1883,  i.  355 
the  Mahdi,  i.  356 
Mr.  Power  and  Lord  Dufferin 

on  army,  i.  358 
General  Hicks  in,  i.  360-8 
Osman  Digna,  i.  397-8,  415 
Colonel   IJaker  at  Suakin,  i. 
400-5 

Sir  Gerald  Graham  at  Tokar, 

i.  411-14 

Battle  of  El-Teb,  i.  414 
comment  on  expedition,  i.  414 
the  Berber  Expedition,  i.  536-58 
Battles    at    Abu     Klea  and 

Metemmeh,  ii.  6-8 
fall  of  Khartoum,  ii.  9 
evacuation  of,  ii.  27-29 
fate  of  Provinces  of,  ii.  35-59 
comment    on    evacuation,  ii. 

29-34 

reconquest  of,  ii.  79-110 
Atbara,  ii.  98-102 
Omdurman,  ii.  104 
Khartoum  occupied,  ii.  105 
political  status  of  new  Soudan, 

ii.  115-19 

size  of  new  Soudan,  ii.  545 
administration  of.   See  Adminis- 
tration 

Stephenson,  Sir  Frederick,  i.  376, 
421,  548,  579,  ii.  30 


Stewart,  Sir  Herbert,  iL  5-7 
Stewart,  Colonel — 

on  the  Soudan,  i.  350,  353-4-7- 
8-60 

with  Gordon,  i.  427,  4-33 
contrasted  with  Gordon,  i.  434 
his  reports,  etc.,  on  route  to 

Khartoum,  i.  466-9 
on  Gordon's  policy  in  Soudan,  L 

482-4 

on  value  of  Soudan,  i.  503 

death  of,  ii.  3 
Sturge,  Mr.,  i.  517 
Suakin — 

suggested  Turkish  troops  for, 
i.  381 

Dervish  victories  near,  i.  396-7 
General  Graham  at,  i.  544 
Colonel  Holied  Smith  at,  ii.  76 
Indian  troops  for,  ii.  88 
Succession,  the  Egyptian  Law  of, 

i.  136,  155 
Suez  Canal — 

Credit  Bill,  i.  304 
neutralisation  of.  ii.  382-7 
Commission  to  discuss,  ii.  385 
Convention  put  in  force,  ii.  387 

Suleiman  Pasha,  i.  361 

Sultan  Pasha,  i.  265 

Sultan,    the,    {see    also  under 
Turkey)— 
his  relations  with  the  Khedive, 

ii.  264-9 
Superstitions,  ii.  505-6 
Syrians,  the  (Christian),  ii.  213-19 

Tajourrah   annexed   by  France, 
ii.  54 

Tamai,  battle  at,  i.  415 
Taxes.    See  Finances 
Tel-el-Kebir,  battle  of,  L  323 
Tewfik  Bey,  i.  397 
Tewfik  Pasha — 

President  of  Council,  L  89-90, 
100 

proclaimed  Khedive,  i.  141 
condition  of  Egypt  at  accession, 

i.  149-51 
and  Arabi,  i.  176-93,  254-78, 

335 

Sir  Edward  Malet's  defence  of, 
i.  261 

and  slaughter  or  Christians,  u 
288 


INDEX 


599 


and  Gordon,  i.  441,  693 
his  character,  ii.  327-33 

Tigrane  Pasha,  ii.  221-6 

Times,  The,  i.  516 

Tissot,  M.,  i.  283 

Tokar,  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  advises 
occupation  of,  ii.  74 
Sir  Francis  Grenfell  on,  ii.  76 
Colonel  Holled  Smith  takes, 
ii.  77 

Toski,  battle  of,  ii.  64-9 

Toulba  Pasha,  i.  276 

Trade,  Egyptian,  French  capital 

employed  in,  i.  303 
Trescow,  M.  de,  i.  162 
Tribunals,     InternationaL  See 

Mixed  Courts 
Tribunals,  native,  ii.  319-20 
Tunis,  French  Protectorate  over, 

i.  332 

Turco- Egyptian,  the,  character- 
istics of,  ii.  169-73 
Turkey's  Egyptian  Policy — 

proposal  that  Sir  Evelyn  Baring 
should  be  Minister  of  Fin- 
ance to  Sultan  of,  i.  69 
re  Ismail's  deposition,  i.  129, 
140 

subsequent  to  Ismail's  deposi- 
tion, i.  164-6 
French    and    British  Govern- 
ments,   traditional  policy 
towards,  i.  155-6 
during  Arabi's  mutiny,  i.  194 
France  and  England  and,  i.  196 
Turkish  envoys  in  Cairo,  i.  199 
re  Joint  Note,  i.  258-9 
and  the  Powers,  1882,  i.  282-6 
after  slaughter   of  Christians, 

i.  288 

and  Military  Convention  with 
Great  Britain,  i.  308-21 

relations  between  Khedive  and 
Sultan  of,  ii.  264-9 

and  Wolff  Convention,  ii.  372- 
81 

Turkish  Commissioner  in  Egypt, 

ii.  380 

Ulema,   the,    characteristics  of, 

ii.  173-86 
Ulemas,  i.  99 
Unified  Debt,  i.  13 
University  of  El-Azhar,  ii.  632 


Veterinary  College,  ii.  612 
Vincent,  Sir  Edgar  Vincent,  i. 
422 

value  of  his  work,  ii.  287 
Vivian,    Lord    (see    also  under 
British  Governments) — 
British  Representative  in  Egypt, 
i.  14 

Reports  on  Finances,  1876,  i. 
27,  36 

on  funded  debt,  1877,  i.  33-4 
on  Ismail's  hostility  to  Nubar, 
i.  67-8 

his  disagreement  with  Sir  R. 

Wilson,  i.  95 
succeeded  bv  Sir  F'rauk  Lascelles^ 

i.  96 

Waddington,  M.,  i.  36 
Wakfs,  the,  i.  63,  ii.  409 
Wallace,  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie, 

i.  324 

Walne,  Mr.,  on  Said's  policy,  L 
21 

Weighing  dues,  i.  122 
West,  Sir  Raymond,  ii.  288 
Wilson,  Sir  Charles  W.,  i.  368, 

ii.  8 

Wilson,  Sir  Rivers — 

Vice-President  of  Commission  of 

Inquiry,  i.  46 
appointed  Minister  of  Finance, 

i.  63 

assaulted  by  officers,  i.  74 
on  reinstatement  of  Nubar,  L 
88 

his   disagreement    with  Lord 

Vivian,  i.  95 
President    of   Commission  of 

Liquidation,  i.  162 
references  to,  i.  78-9,  88,  91-6-8, 

100-2-3,  172 
Wingate,  Sir  Reginald — 

on  withdrawn  Soudan  garrisons, 

ii.  31 
Sirdar,  ii.  105 

on  Soudan,  ii.  545-6,  654 
reference  to,  ii.  66-8,  70 
Wodehouse,  Colonel,  ii.  67 
Wolff,  Sir  Henry,  Convention  with 

Turkey,  ii.  372-81 
Wolseley,  Lord,  i.  301,  323,  581 
marches  to  relieve  Gordon,  ii.  6 
correspondence    with  British 


600 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Government  after  fall  of 

Khartoum,  ii.  20-29 
Women,  Egyptian,  importance  of 

educating-,  ii.  539-42 
Wood,    ^ir   Evelyn,  commands 

Egyptian  army,  i.  372,  399 
on   evacuation   of  Soudan^  i. 

376-7 

references  to^  i.  422,  548 
Young  Egypt,  ii.  228-43 


Zeyla— 

farmed  to  Ismail,  iL  63 
taken  by  Great  Britain,  ii.  54 

Zobeir  Pasha — 

proposed  despatch  to  Soudan, 
402 

his   relations  with  Gordon, 

454-00 

on   proposed  appointment 

Soudan,  i.  480-534 
his  return  to  Soudan,  i.  529 


THE  END 


DATE  DUE 

 ■ — J—fJS9^ 

DEMCO  38-297 

